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Executive Summary 
The objective of this doctoral thesis is to identify the determinants of formal parliamentary 
prerogatives in ESM affairs. The asymmetric involvement of NPs in the European Stability 
Mechanism illustrates that parliamentary involvement in EU decision-making is not only 
drifting apart between Eurozone and non-Eurozone Member States, but also within the 
Eurozone itself (see A.1).  
Since the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis in early 2010 the entire governance system of the 
Economic and Monetary Union has been decisively transformed. From all of the instruments 
established to tackle the on-going crisis, the European Stability Mechanism has been most 
intrusive on national parliaments’ political and budgetary prerogatives. Liability sums of the 
ESM can account for more than one third of national annual budgets
1
 (see A.2). The receipt of 
financial assistance is conditional on the ratification of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance (TSCG) which requires the incorporation of statutory or constitutional 
mechanisms in order to limit public borrowing. Financial assistance is granted only in 
exchange for strict conditionality: Furthermore, recipient countries are obliged to sign so-
called Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) which require far-reaching structural reforms in 
nearly all sectors of the economy. The degree of parliamentary involvement in the 
implementation of these programmes, however, seems to vary across recipient countries. 
Against this background this project formulates the following research question: Why have 
some parliaments adopted strong participation rights within the European Stability 
Mechanism while others have not? Specifically, this project seeks to identify the determinants 
accounting for parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs (see A.3).  
This asymmetry challenges accountability relations within the Economic and Monetary 
Union. The parliamentary majorities in a few Member States are able to block decisions on 
the future sovereign aid packages; this distributes the input legitimacy within the Economic 
and Monetary Union unevenly across its Member States. Furthermore, it politicizes decision-
making within an already politically contested governance frame and thus deviates from the 
idea of EMU as a (primarily) rule-based system.  
To operationalize the independent variable, this project inductively gathered information on 
parliamentary prerogatives in ESM affairs. A questionnaire was distributed to parliamentary 
representations in Brussels as well as to parliamentary committees in the 18 Eurozone 
countries under investigation. The investigation was carried out for the time period 2010-2012 
and thus covering the beginning of the Eurozone crisis until the eventual ratification of the 
                                                 
1
 Although liabilities and actual expenditures cannot directly be compared, they indicate the enormous amount of 
money involved in the new rescue mechanism. 
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ESM treaty. The result of this analysis is a typology of parliamentary involvement in ESM 
affairs which is more finely detailed than existing studies (see B.1). 
Theoretically, the project develops a number of independent variables which are all based on 
a rational choice logic. These variables assume that parliamentarians have an interest in 
securing strong parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs in the first place. However, 
parliamentarians act under the constraint of internal and external factors. These factors 
include the macro-economic situation of a country, the presence of strong Eurosceptical 
sentiments, the formal parliamentary prerogatives in EU affairs as well as high political and 
constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty (see B.2).  
Methodologically, the project pursues a mixed-method design (see B.3). It tests the 
explanatory power of the independent variables in a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis 
(fsQCA). The central assumption of QCA is that most social science phenomena can only be 
explained with combinations of conditions and not by single independent variables (C.1). In a 
second step, the project conducts a qualitative case study analysis to take account of country-
specific particularities that have not been addressed comparatively in the QCA. Four countries 
are investigated in detail: Austria and Germany represent donor countries while Ireland and 
Portugal represent recipient countries of financial assistance (see C.2). 29 expert interviews 
with parliamentarians and parliamentary administrators have been conducted between May 
2012 and March 2015 to validate the findings of the QCA. Data for these independent 
variables has been acquired from renowned sources such as Eurostat, official statistics from 
the European Central Bank (ECB), the Eurobarometer or the Chapel Hill Index (2010) (see 
B.4). 
The project comes to the conclusion that countries adopted firm ESM parliamentary 
prerogatives when they were in a favourable macro-economic situation (as of 2012) and 
simultaneously possessed strong formal powers in EU affairs. A strong macro-economic 
situation helps to explain the rational incentives for parliamentarians to opt for strong formal 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs: These countries had (economically) more to lose 
should the granting of financial assistance be unsuccessful. Strong formal prerogatives in EU 
affairs explain if these parliaments were (institutionally) capable of transferring these 
participation rights to the intergovernmental European Stability Mechanism. Only five 
countries possess far-reaching parliamentary prerogatives in ESM affairs (Austria, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany and the Netherlands). Weak parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs 
either results from an unfavourable macro-economic situation, weak formal prerogatives in 
EU affairs or both. Interestingly, Eurosceptical parties do not seem to have an impact on 
parliamentary prerogatives in ESM affairs. Although Eurosceptical parties are more likely to 
demand stronger domestic participation, they have often been in principled opposition to the 
ESM treaty and therefore unwilling to negotiate stronger parliamentary involvement (see 
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especially C.2.2). High political and constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty did 
only exert (an empirically measurable) influence if the governmental majority was depending 
on the votes of other pro-European parties (see C.1). 
The negotiation and implementation of the Memoranda of Understanding was strongly 
dominated by the executives in recipient countries. Portugal and Ireland had large 
parliamentary majorities that helped implementing the far-reaching structural reforms 
demanded in the MoUs. Although Troika representatives regularly visited parliamentary 
chambers of recipient Member States, these meetings did not give parliamentary party groups 
an opportunity to co-decide on the content of the programme. These discussions regularly 
took place between the national governments and Troika representatives. Only the 
Constitutional Court in Portugal occasionally slowed down the implementation of the MoU 
(see C.2). 
The asymmetric dispersion of parliamentary influence has consequences for the future 
management of the crisis. Input legitimacy – in the form of stronger parliamentary 
involvement in ESM affairs – exists in less than a third of EMU Member States. This only 
marginally increases the overall democratic legitimacy of the European Stability Mechanism. 
Output legitimacy – in the sense of a successful management of the crisis – is also unevenly 
distributed and subjected to an on-going political debate. Although sovereign aid packages 
have consistently been approved by those parliaments entitled to vote, parliaments must not 
always act as vicarious agents of their governments. Decisions on redistributive policies will 
necessarily be politicized. Executive representatives must therefore pay attention to the 
political mood within their nationally elected chambers.  
Narrow majorities and a high degree of politicization in the forefront of national elections can 
therefore have a decisive impact on the management of the crisis. The cumbersome 
negotiations leading to the third bailout programme for Greece in August 2015 foreshadow 
these future political conflicts. 
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A. Introduction 
Loss of sovereignty may be an abstract notion, but this week Irish people were 
confronted with what it means in reality. Revelations that draft proposals for the 
Irish December budget had been circulated in a German parliamentary committee 
were met with horror in Ireland (The Guardian Online 2011). 
In November 2010, Ireland was the first country to request financial assistance of a newly 
created rescue mechanism – the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).2 Henceforward, 
the Irish Parliament had to agree to a so-called Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and 
had to regularly present its draft budgets to its international financiers in advance. The 
European Commission, representing Eurozone creditors as part of the so-called ‘Troika’3, was 
legally required to turn over the draft Irish budget to the Eurozone finance ministers for prior 
approval. German guidelines for the participation in the EFSF foresaw that this information 
was handed over to the German budgetary committee. As a consequence, the draft Irish 
budget was submitted to the German Bundestag before it was presented to the members of the 
Irish Oireachtas
4
. The Irish Finance Minister described this incident as “disappointing” while 
the opposition Fianna Fáil labelled it “incredible” (Financial Times 2011).  
The asymmetric involvement of national parliaments (NPs) in the newly created rescue 
mechanisms – especially the strong involvement of some parliamentary chambers – therefore 
creates a double-dilemma: Prior parliamentary approval in some countries potentially slows 
down decision-making procedures. Simultaneously, it undermines democratic prerogatives of 
other elected chambers. 
How is it possible that a national parliament – whose key prerogative is the scrutiny and 
approval of its national budget – is side-lined by other, non-national actors in such a 
significant way? Is that the reality of a programme country, as some Irish commentators had 
submissively stated? Or does this incident exemplify the asymmetric impact of the financial 
and debt crisis on national parliaments, making parliaments from economically strong 
countries stronger, while those from financially stricken Member States are marginalised in 
the course of events?  
                                                 
2
 Financial assistance was provided together with additional funding by the IMF, the EFSM and loans from some 
non-Eurozone countries. 
3
 Upon request of the newly elected Greek government (2015) the Troika is called ‘The institutions’ since 2015. 
4
 Oireachtas is the name of the bicameral Irish parliament, composed of the lower house (Dáil Èireann) and the 
upper house (Seanad Èireann). 
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A.1 State of the Art: National Parliaments in EU Affairs 
The objective of this dissertation is to explain the varying patterns of national parliaments’ 
influence on policy-making in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Specifically, this 
project addresses the puzzle that some parliaments adopted strong participation rights within 
the newly created European Stability Mechanism while others delegated these tasks (nearly) 
exclusively to their governments.
5
 
Variation in parliamentary ESM involvement is, however, not only concerned with the issuing 
of financial assistance. Countries receiving financial support are stepping-out guarantors 
within the ESM and do consequently not possess formal participation rights in granting loans 
or debt guarantees to other countries. They must, however, implement so-called memoranda 
of understanding. The negotiations of the MoUs are dominated by the executives of these 
countries, marginalising the role of national chambers therein. Nonetheless, parliaments of 
recipient countries must implement the conditions of the MoUs. The degree to which these 
conditions are intrusive on parliamentary prerogatives, i.e. how explicitly they demand 
reforms in certain policy fields, seems to vary between programme countries (Ladi 2014: 
195). 
The literature on national parliaments has so far not paid much attention to the varying 
parliamentary influence within the newly created rescue mechanisms. Many commentators 
nonetheless agree that this “crisis [is] not just an economic crisis but a crisis of political 
legitimacy” (Laffan 2014: 271). This makes parliamentary prerogatives within the ESM an 
important object of research. 
The following sub-chapter briefly reviews the literature on the role of national parliaments in 
EU affairs (for a comprehensive overview I recommend Hefftler, Rozenberg 2015, but also 
Goetz, Meyer-Sahling 2008 or Raunio 2009). This debate is not new. The European 
integration process was long characterised by a so-called “permissive consensus” (Lindberg, 
Scheingold 1970: 41) assuming that there was no notable opposition towards the integration 
process as long as implications for the people remained negligible. To some degree, the 
assumption of a permissive consensus devalues the alleged political struggles over European 
integration in the first decades of the integration process. The ‘friendly disinterest’ of 
quiescent national publics is nonetheless an appropriate description of the first decades of 
European integration. It may also explain the subordinate role of national parliaments in this 
period. This pattern has, however, changed and public approval rates for the European Union 
have recently declined (Torreblanca, Leonard 2013). Attitudes towards European integration 
developed from a permissive consensus to a constraining dissensus: “Elites, that is, party 
                                                 
5
 The German Bundestag, for instance, must give its approval to each financial tranche (of already adopted 
sovereign aid packages) within the ESM (§5(2) ESMFinG) while the Slovakian parliament is only informed 
about its activities, but has no further say (for a detailed description see B.1). 
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leaders in positions of authority, must look over their shoulders when negotiating European 
issues” (Hooghe, Marks 2008: 2).6 Despite growing resistances, however, European 
integration has so far proceeded largely unchallenged, especially in the Economic and 
Monetary Union. 
A critical legitimacy discourse started, at the latest, with the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty in the early 1990s (see among others Wimmel 2009: 182). In this debate, the role and 
position of national parliaments in the EU political system occupied a prominent place. The 
failed referenda on the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark as well as its razor-thin approval in 
France signalled that European integration had entered a new phase of political contestation 
which Bellamy and Castiglione labelled the “normative turn” (Bellamy, Castiglione 2003: 8). 
Lowering approval rates for the European integration project as well as the electoral successes 
of Eurosceptical parties indicate a trend that was reinforced with the 2004 EU enlargement, 
the debate on the Constitutional Treaty (2005) and, especially, the outbreak of the Eurozone 
crisis from 2010 onwards. Furthermore, the German as well as the Danish Constitutional 
Court ushered judicial reviews to assess the constitutionality of European treaties. Therewith, 
the conferral of powers to the EU received a strong legal dimension (although the debate on 
the ‘democratic deficit’ goes beyond narrowly defined legal aspects of the integration 
process). Given the democratic deficiencies of the composition of the European Parliament, 
the anomalous distribution of power between European institutions or the insufficient 
democratic legitimacy of the European Commission – any improvement of the EU’s 
democratic constitution must, as it seems, strengthen the supranational dimension of the 
European polity. In the light of increasing public discontent, however, “correcting the 
democratic deficit of the EU becomes a project of squaring the circle” (Tömmel 2012: 287).  
This is one reason why the empowerment of national parliaments appeared as a way out of 
this dilemma. Already the Laeken Declaration from 2001
7
 mentioned the inclusion of national 
parliaments in the EU polity as central priority of future treaty reforms. The Lisbon Treaty 
eventually states in Article 12 TEU that “parliaments contribute to the good functioning of the 
European Union” and then adds a list of what these ‘contributions’ are. Interestingly, the 
article does not state that parliaments should contribute to the good functioning of the Union. 
Deliberately, the wording neither indicates a request or an obligation. The formulation of the 
entire article 12 is therefore slightly misleading since it appears that NPs contribute to the 
good functioning of the Union in any case, and that they only contribute by the means 
expressly listed in the remainder of the article. This article is most often used to highlight the 
                                                 
6
 Some authors link the growing resistances towards the EU to its unfinished political entity (de Wilde, Trenz 
2012, 542). Others emphasize the so-called public communication paradox (Gaber 2009): the more the EU 
becomes the subject of a public debate, the more the EU polity is contested. 
7
 The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty already included protocols mentioning national parliaments and the 
principle of subsidiarity. Since Lisbon, the role of national parliaments is for the first time mentioned in the TEU 
(Art. 10 on the ‘provisions on democratic principles’). 
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upgraded role of national parliaments in EU primary law. For Kiiver, its formulation “has 
been made too hastily and thus a tad sloppily. […] It would therefore be pragmatic to treat 
this first sentence of Article 12 TEU as a declaratory stand-alone provision [...]” (Kiiver 2012: 
6). But if this article is indeed a declaration only, which role should national parliaments 
actually play in the EU political system? 
 
Which role should national parliaments play in the EU political system? 
The normative underpinning of most studies dealing with the role of national parliaments in 
the EU system is that their involvement constitutes ‘something positive’. As the argument 
goes, national parliaments can give additional legitimacy to decisions taken at the European 
level. I distinguish three major types of NPs’ involvement without having the intention to 
provide a full picture, and knowing that more sophisticated concepts of parliamentary 
involvement exist (see for instance Hefftler et al. 2015; Wessels et al. 2013). First, the 
involvement of national parliaments can counterbalance the increasing influence of 
supranational EU institutions. It can thus help to establish a safety belt against a further 
centralisation of EU politics (Cameron 2014). In this conception, a strengthening of NPs aims 
at restricting EU influence on national politics. National parliaments give their explicit 
approval to each conferral of powers to the EU level
8
 and ensure that EU institutions act 
within their limit of competences
9
. Democratic legitimacy is thus primarily based on 
respecting the delineation of these competences, guaranteeing that the Member States remain 
the “Master of the Treaties” (German Constitutional Court 1993). Second, and adding to this 
perspective, national parliaments can also cooperate with the European Parliament (see for 
instance Neunreither 2005) in order to control the Council and the European Council which 
cannot be held accountable individually (Lord 2008). Recent theoretical contributions regard 
this form of cooperation as constitutive for a “multilevel parliamentary field”. Crum and 
Fossum argue that the EU is not a classical, monocentric system of governance: “There is […] 
no single institution, and not even a single level, within the EU that can be seen as the centre 
where sovereignty is embodied” (Crum, Fossum 2009: 256). Within this perspective, the 
                                                 
8
 The concrete parliamentary involvement to modify EU primary law varies over countries. In some political 
systems, such as Ireland, any change of the constitution requires a public referendum. 
9 Gerken and Herzog criticized the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for the systematic 
infringement of its competences – despite a clear demarcation of competences in the EU treaties: “In assigning 
the ECJ with comprehensive rights of decision-making, the assumption was that they could be trusted to take on 
this responsibility in an unbiased way and in compliance with the rules of the judiciary. If the ECJ abuses this 
confidence, it need not be surprised when it breaks down” (see Gerken, Herzog 2008). Other authors equally 
emphasize the exceptionally strong powers of the CJEU compared to other national constitutional court (Scharpf 
2009: 249). Adding to this, the CJEU is often accused of pursuing a neoliberal policy agenda that systematically 
disadvantages organised variants of capitalist systems over liberal models of market economies (see among 
others Höpner, Schäfer 2010; Höpner 2010).  
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cooperation between the EP and national parliaments is thus a logical consequence of the ‘sui 
generis’ character of the EU political system. Or third, the role of national parliaments is 
limited to the control of their own national government activities at the European level (see 
for instance Crespo 2012). This role potentially overlaps with the other two; the emphasis in 
the third model lies, however, on an exclusive national control of EU affairs via the national 
government.  
Auel has spelt out in more detail the normative added value of parliamentary involvement in 
EU scrutiny (Auel 2007; but also Benz 2004). The starting point is a two-folded principal-
agent relation between the voters and the parliament on the one side, and the parliament and 
the national government on the other. In this model, national parliaments constitute the link 
between voters and their governments. They act as the agents towards the electorate, and as 
the principal towards the national government (see also Karlas 2012; Saalfeld 2005; Wimmel 
2009). It is through the national parliaments’ public monitoring and political scrutiny that 
voters can be informed about EU politics. In this conception – and in line with assessments of 
prominent scholars of parliamentarism of the 19
th
 century (see Bagehot 1867) – the role of 
parliaments is not restricted to a policy-making function, but one of their primary tasks is to 
communicate with the citizens (see also Norton 1993).  
 
Many studies so far stated, however, that NPs are neither very active in scrutinising their 
national governments, nor do they possess strong formal participation rights to do so. On 
various occasions, they were described as “institutional Cinderellas” (Dinan 2012: 85), 
“sleeping beauties” (Matarazzo, Leone 2011), “latecomers” or even “losers” of the EU 
integration process (Maurer, Wessels 2001). These assessments have been called into question 
in recent years (Auel, Benz 2005), arguing that national parliaments have – by now – learned 
“to fight back” (Raunio, Hix 2000). At the heart of most comparisons of parliamentary 
influence are the national scrutiny systems of EU affairs (Auel 2007; Bergman 1997; Karlas 
2012; Raunio 2005; Winzen 2012): in how far can parliaments legally bind their ministers in 
Council negotiations? What kind of information rights do they possess? Can they make use of 
scrutiny reserves (see for instance Rasmussen 2012: 104)? Can they use parliamentary 
debates to hold governments publicly accountable? There is considerable variation regarding 
the formal prerogatives of parliaments (Karlas 2012; see especially Raunio 2005) and the 
actual use of these powers (see especially Auel 2007, but also Pollak, Slominski 2003).  
These conventional (national) scrutiny systems of EU affairs can, however, not account for 
the particular challenges that arose with the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis. As will be 
outlined later, the ESM (as well as the EFSF) has been established outside the EU legal 
framework. When handled as foreign policy, national parliaments have on average 
significantly fewer participation rights. Foreign policy was and still is largely the domain of 
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the executive. Laws regulating the relation between the government and the parliament in EU 
affairs do therefore not necessarily apply. This loss of parliamentary autonomy applies 
independently of whether a country is a donor or a programme country within the European 
Stability Mechanism (although there is considerable variation in degree). As Scharpf notes, 
European Council resolutions or ECOFIN agreements increasingly have a take-it-or-leave-it 
character “that no member-state parliament […] [can] afford to reject” (Scharpf 2012: 25). 
Efforts to strengthen the role of national parliaments by the Lisbon Treaty have therefore 
partly been thwarted with the outbreak of the crisis. Empirical evidence indicates that 
parliamentary participation during the management of the crisis was subject to variation (see 
for instance Benz 2013). Some parliaments have been (formally) strengthened while others 
have lost further influence (on the strengthening of the German Bundestag see Höing 2013). 
 
The legal basis of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs 
To understand this development, it is necessary to have a closer look at the legal basis from 
which parliaments derive their say in EU policy-making. I distinguish three types of legal 
bases. The first is uniformly derived from European Treaties, i.e. EU primary law. The second 
type is derived from the domestic provisions to scrutinise EU affairs in parliament. And the 
third type – which this dissertation intends to develop – is concerned with the budgetary 
competences of national parliaments within the European Stability Mechanism. This study is 
consequently restricted to parliaments of the Eurozone. 
In the first category, based on EU primary law, studies looked for ‘the one’ role that 
parliaments can play in the EU political system (see among others: Cooper 2006; Kiiver 2012; 
Raunio 2011). In this perspective, the Lisbon Treaty can be regarded as a milestone for the 
role of parliaments in the European Union since the treaty explicitly intended to upgrade their 
role and to become a “treaty of parliaments” (Lammert 2009). Essentially, any assessment 
derived from EU primary law assumes that all national parliaments are affected to the same 
degree: The inclusion of the subsidiarity principle in the Maastricht Treaty, the protocol on 
the role of national parliaments in the Amsterdam Treaty as well as the newly established so-
called Early Warning System (Lisbon Treaty)
10
 demonstrates the formal strengthening of NPs 
in EU primary law. The extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council, on the 
other side, makes it increasingly difficult for NPs to effectively control their own 
                                                 
10 According to de Wilde, the subsidiarity check should be left to the judiciary and not to national parliaments. 
Essentially, the EWS causes “opportunity costs in terms of time, money and manpower spent by national 
parliaments writing reasoned opinions that could have been spent on communicating with citizens” (Wilde 2012: 
18). De Wilde thus fears that the EWS further narrows down the already marginal role of national parliaments in 
this regard. Activities within the EWS have decreased considerably from 2014 onwards. 
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governments in the EU decision-making processes.
11
 Essentially, however, all national 
parliaments are affected to the same degree. Powers derived from EU primary law reveal 
consequently little about how parliaments exercise influence vis-à-vis their own governments 
and can consequently not explain variation in scrutiny activities. 
Academic contributions have consequently also focused on the internal organisation of 
parliaments and how they influence EU policy-making domestically, i.e. vis-à-vis their 
governments (see for instance Auel et al. 2015; Maurer, Wessels 2001; O’Brennan, Raunio 
2007). These formal participation rights are derived from national regulations (such as 
secondary or statutory law, the constitution or parliamentary rules of procedure). A number of 
studies have been published that do not only look at formal powers, but also on how they are 
exercised in a specific context (Auel 2006; Matarazzo, Leone 2011; Pollak, Slominski 2003). 
One major finding is that parliaments have varying formal powers and are using these formal 
powers to different degrees.
12
 One major explanation for the often observed non-involvement 
of national parliaments is the lack of incentives for MPs to invest their scarce time in the 
scrutiny of EU affairs (Saalfeld 2005). The low salience of EU topics therefore hampers an 
encompassing parliamentary involvement. However, other studies have demonstrated that 
NPs decisively improved their EU scrutiny mechanisms (Raunio, Hix 2000) and that 
especially the establishment of European Affairs Committees has contributed to this 
development (Bergman 1997). 
 
A.2 Relevance: Budgetary Competences as an Own Category of EU 
Influence 
These classifications do still not take the budgetary competences of national parliaments in 
the new rescue mechanisms into account. This, however, has gained political relevance during 
the crisis.  
In October 2011, a European Council summit had to be postponed because the German 
Bundestag did not have sufficient time to deliberate on a reform of the European Financial 
                                                 
11
 This view is contested. O’Brennan and Raunio rightly point out that there has never been a “golden age of 
parliamentarism” before “the EU cast its long shadow over national politics” (O’Brennan, Raunio 2007: 8). In 
fact, compared to developments in domestic politics, there is a remarkable resilience of national parliaments in 
the European context. Power shifts in executive-legislative relations are mainly based on explicit institutional 
decisions (such as successive Treaty amendments) (Auel, Höing 2015). 
12
 This strand of literature increasingly takes the role of national parliamentary administrations into account 
(Christiansen et al. 2013). A number of national parliaments have recently reformed their administrations and 
internal procedures to better scrutinise EU affairs. Also, academic contributions on inter-parliamentary 
cooperation (IPC) have recently enriched this field of research (Crum, Miklin 2011; Hefftler, Gattermann 2015; 
Miklin 2013). Conditions for inter-parliamentary cooperation are specified in EU primary law as well as in 
domestic provisions. However, it is the domestic context in which financial resources for inter-parliamentary 
meetings are provided. 
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Stability Facility (EFSF). As foreseen in the German regulations accompanying the EFSF, the 
Chancellor needed a prior mandate from the Bundestag for agreement. The German EU 
Commissioner Oettinger was enraged by this incident and warned: "If such a difficult 
parliamentary process takes place in the 16 other euro countries, or even in the Triple-A 
(rating) countries, Europe will no longer be sufficiently capable of taking action" (Spiegel 
Online 2011).  
Germany is not the only country with such far-reaching participation rights in the rescue 
mechanisms. Therefore, and in contrast to former studies, this doctoral thesis argues that 
budgetary competences – the key prerogative of national parliaments – must be treated as its 
own category in order to comprehensively assess parliamentary influence in EU, and 
specifically EMU, policy-making. These competences are not merely a sub-category of 
parliamentary influence derived from domestic provisions to scrutinise EU affairs. They 
constitute evidence for parliamentary powers not only drifting apart between Eurozone and 
non-Eurozone countries, but also within the Eurozone itself. Table 1 illustrates this argument.  
Table 1: Various forms of parliamentary influence in EU decision-making 
Powers derived from EU 
primary law 
Powers derived from the 
domestic setting 
Powers related to 
budgetary questions 
(ESM) 
 Ratification of treaty 
changes 
 Early Warning System 
 References in EU 
primary law 
 Implementation of EU 
directives 
  (IPC) 
 The right to give 
(binding) mandates to 
the minster 
 The possibility of 
scrutiny reserves 
 The control of 
European Council 
meetings 
 (IPC) 
 Parliamentary Debates 
 Decision on 
sovereign aid 
packages and 
tranches of financial 
assistance  
 Information rights  
 Delegation of 
competences within 
the parliament  
All parliaments are affected 
to the same degree; 
regulated in primary law. 
Varying degrees of 
influence among the MS; 
regulated in constitutional 
and statutory provisions. 
Varying degree of 
influence among the 18 
Eurozone MS; regulated 
in the accompanying 
provisions of the ESM 
treaty. 
Source 1: (Höing 2013), with some modifications.  
While parliamentary influence within the first category (based on EU law) is equal in all EU 
parliaments, the second column shows the conventional differentiation of parliamentary 
influence in national settings (based on national provisions for domestic participation). The 
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(new) third column looks at participation rights in the newly created rescue mechanisms. 
Powers in this column only apply to the 18 Eurozone parliaments under investigation.
13
  
I understand powers related to budgetary authority as formal prerogatives conferred to 
parliaments within the European Stability Mechanism. Criteria are votes on sovereign aid 
packages (respectively on the release of financial tranches therein), information obligations of 
the government and the potential delegation of decision-making powers to specialised 
committees within the parliament (for a detailed outline of this argument see B.1). The degree 
of national parliaments’ involvement in the ESM affects the speed and arguably the 
effectiveness of the current crisis management. Former Italian prime minister Mario Monti 
proposed that national governments should be more independent from their parliaments in the 
management of the crisis (Spiegel Online 2012b). Due to diverging parliamentary traditions, 
the necessity of parliamentary involvement is often differently assessed in European Member 
States (see Münkler 2012). Effectiveness and democratic legitimacy therefore form a field of 
tension that gained relevance with the outbreak of the current crisis. 
Scientifically, a cross-country comparison of parliamentary involvement across all Eurozone 
parliaments in the newly established rescue mechanisms is still missing. The ruling of the 
German Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Constitutional Court, BVerfG) on the EFSF in 
2011 demonstrates the relevance of parliamentary prerogatives in the newly established 
rescue mechanisms:  
The decision on public revenue and public expenditure is a fundamental part of 
the ability of a constitutional state to democratically shape itself (see German 
Constitutional Court 2011, par. 122).
14
 
According to the German Constitutional Court, a loss of parliamentary control in budgetary 
questions potentially constitutes a breach of democratic principles. The European Treaties do 
not foresee that decisions on revenues and public expenditures are taken at the EU level. The 
German Basic Law stipulates that political will formation takes place through the elections to 
the German Bundestag (Art. 38 German Basic Law, Grundgesetz (GG)). The European 
Parliament – which is not involved in the day-to-day policy-making of the ESM – is only 
regarded as a supplement to the German Bundestag, but does not possess sufficient 
democratic legitimacy to replace it in core policy fields (see for instance Kiiver 2010). The 
same applies to national executives who derive their legitimacy from the chambers that elect 
them. According to the BVerfG, democratic legitimacy is therefore primarily rooted in the 
                                                 
13
 Lithuania adopted the Euro in 2015. It is not part of the analysis. However, Latvia (which joined in 2013) has 
been included. 
14
 These arguments are not restricted to the German discourse. The former president of the EAC in the French 
Assemblée Nationale remarked during the ratification debate: "La convergence budgétaire ne vaudra que si elle 
est expliquée à nos concitoyens et si ces derniers ont le sentiment que leurs représentants élus ont leur mot à dire, 
notamment les parlements nationaux" (Pernin 2012). 
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nation state (Beck 2011: 475). As a consequence, any automatism to grant financial assistance 
– without approval of (nationally) elected chambers – is unconstitutional. 
Only a few studies compile information on basic parliamentary participation rights within the 
new rescue mechanisms. One notable exception is a study from the Deutsche Bank Research 
that collects data on parliamentary participation rights within the EFSF mechanism (see 
Heinen, Theiss 2011). It is, however, not embedded in a scientific context, i.e. the question 
why some parliaments opted for strong participation rights is not addressed. The objective of 
this doctoral thesis is to fill this gap by looking at the determinants that explain parliamentary 
involvement in this new field.  
 
A.3 Research Question 
Given the growing constraints, it is necessary to ask what choices are left within 
the control of domestic government. In other words, what are the emerging 
politics of constrained choice in the euro area? (Laffan 2014: 275). 
As outlined above, this doctoral thesis treats powers related to budgetary competences as its 
own category of parliamentary influence. With such an approach, one descriptive and one 
analytical question arise. The descriptive question asks: how is parliamentary involvement in 
ESM affairs concretely designed? I gather information on parliamentary involvement in 
chapter B.1 and develop a typology of parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. The 
parliamentary prerogatives to control the government representative in the ESM Board of 
Governors are linked to a specific understanding of accountability relations. I will elaborate 
on these in this section (see below). The major analytical research question is: Why have 
some countries adopted strong parliamentary prerogatives in ESM affairs and others not? This 
question goes beyond a mere formal assessment of parliamentary involvement. It asks from 
where democratic legitimacy is derived when decisions with far-reaching budgetary 
consequences are taken. Both questions can only be answered on the basis of a thorough 
understanding of the emerging constraints of interdependent economies of the Eurozone, as 
well as the partly informal character of decision-making procedures throughout the 
management of the crisis. In a first step, I will therefore elaborate on these economic and 
political constraints. 
The starting point is that the diverse rescue mechanisms lack a European source of democratic 
legitimacy. The European Parliament does not possess the financial resources to provide 
financial assistance. Although the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) is an 
additional assistance mechanism established at the European level, the EP is not formally 
involved in the process of issuing financial guarantees therein. In the absence of a genuine 
European source of democratic legitimacy, the involvement of national parliaments seems to 
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be a logical consequence. Some observers have, however, indicated that the common 
monetary union creates structural difficulties for NPs to provide democratic legitimacy, 
namely negative externalities, free-riding or moral hazard (Lord 2012: 7). These problems 
arise in the context of rapidly growing interdependencies of national economies as well as the 
intergovernmental nature of the management of the crisis. These are not genuine problems of 
national parliaments’ involvement. National executives equally face vague accountability 
relations, negative externalities or free-riding, such as changes of governments, the reliance 
on expert assessments (to assess the implementation of the memoranda of understanding) or 
the particular role of the European Central Bank (see A.4.2).  
These factors blur classical accountability relations between democratically elected chambers 
and national or European executives (see especially Wimmel 2009). Fabbrini observes a 
verticalization of decision-making processes within the management of the crisis. German and 
French government representatives regularly meet “before the European Council meetings to 
identify common or shared positions that [are] later imposed in the following formal meeting 
of the heads of state or government” (Fabbrini 2013: 1019). These de jure informal, but de 
facto highly influential political agreements hamper effective parliamentary control: multiple 
executives do not face a unified legislature to which they are accountable. Within the 
European Stability Mechanism, Member States have furthermore lost sovereignty since the 
relation between creditors and debtors necessarily creates mutual dependencies. Even if NPs 
possess strong formal prerogatives to decide on the release of sovereign aid packages, they do 
not have control over their implementation.  
These economic interdependencies exceed the territorially defined sovereignty of Member 
States.
15
 Many Europeans became fully aware of this dependency during the dramatic 
European Council summit in October 2011 (in which a €100bn loan to Athens and a 50% debt 
write-off were agreed upon): the then Greek Prime Minister Papandreou proposed unilaterally 
to call a public referendum on the recently agreed bailout deal. He argued that its ratification 
required a public vote since the national parliament could no longer provide sufficient 
democratic legitimacy for the far-reaching measures of the programme. After some days of 
political manoeuvring, Papandreou eventually decided to call off the plebiscite. He also 
stepped down and paved the way for a unity government in Athens shortly after (see among 
others Vasilopoulou et al. 2014: 390). The New York Times expressed its surprise over these 
dramatic events: “The fate of the European enterprise seemed to hinge on the political 
machinations of one of the union’s smallest members” (Donadio, Kitsantonis 2011). 
However, not only did the call for a public referendum put considerable pressure on Eurozone 
Member States – including national parliamentarians who saw their previously agreed 
                                                 
15
 They “share a common destiny”, as the former President of the ECB emphasized (Trichet 2010). However, 
this statement might euphemize the democratic deficiencies of the current management of the Eurozone crisis. 
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package deal in limbo – it also became evident that Eurozone members lacked legal policy 
tools to coerce a member of the Eurozone to accept the conditions of a bailout programme. 
European leaders were subsequently putting enormous political pressure on the Greek Prime 
Minister to call off the plebiscite. This, in return, strongly impaired on the sovereignty of the 
Greek government: “The Greek premier was savaged by German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
and French President Nicolas Sarkozy at a meeting in Cannes last night. He was threatened 
with enforced bankruptcy unless his country signed up to austerity measures” (Chapman, 
Smith 2011). In the following days, the G20 summit in Cannes had been literally held hostage 
to see whether the Greek parliament would eventually agree to the bailout deal. The bailout 
deal required immense national sacrifices from Greek citizens (see for instance Featherstone 
2011). The Hellenic parliament had to implement measures which were taken in the name of 
Europe, but de-facto decided upon by European and national executives.  
Making national sacrifices and taking political responsibility for European decisions 
exemplifies a dominant pattern of the management of the Eurozone crisis (Puntscher-
Riekmann, Wydra 2013: 566). Although national parliaments only represent a small cog in 
the machinery (and independent of a strong or weak formal involvement within the European 
Stability Mechanism) parliamentarians are most likely to be held accountable for the success 
or failure of the crisis management by their national electorates. This is true for both, 
parliaments issuing financial assistance and those receiving it. One could therefore critically 
ask whether strong parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs has an added value at all. 
Any assessment of the democratic legitimacy of these decisions consequently needs to be 
analysed in the context of economic interdependencies and informal decision-making.
16
 This 
turns conceptualisations of democratic legitimacy into a “labyrinth with no exit” (see for a 
general account of EU democratic legitimacy Wimmel 2009). For Scharpf, democratic 
legitimacy should primarily focus on the justification of governance:  
[Democracy] has a variety of meanings, but when we speak of “democratic legitimacy” we 
refer to arguments that justify the exercise of governing authority, that is, the authority to 
adopt collectively binding decisions and to implement these decisions with resources taken 
                                                 
16
 Alternatively, legitimacy concerns can also be directed to specific EU institutions (Wimmel 2009: 188f). The 
European Commission and the ECB, for instance, have gained considerable influence during the crisis 
management (see for instance Höpner, Rödel 2012). Due to their surveillance function, they influence decisions 
on the release of financial assistance or the provisions of financial liquidity. However, their democratic 
credentials, i.e. the appointment and election of these institutions, have not changed since the outbreak of the 
crisis – despite gaining considerable influence in decision-making procedures.  
Another alternative is to focus on the question of legality, i.e. in how far and to what extent legal regulations 
have been violated during the current crisis management. This legitimacy concern is juristic in nature. An action 
is considered legitimate if a political actor complies with given rules, be they EU treaty or national constitutional 
laws. According to some lawyers, the first bilateral loans to Greece as well as the establishment of the EFSF 
marked a clear legal breach of the EU treaties (see for instance Ryvkin 2012). 
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from the members of the collectivity and by resort to the states monopoly on legitimate 
coercion (Scharpf 2010: 150).
17
 
The fundamental problem with the current construction of the Economic and Monetary Union 
is that no unified authority exists to adopt collectively binding decisions, and that there is 
furthermore no state monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion to enforce decisions. Otero-
Iglesias therefore described the Eurozone as essentially “stateless” (Otero-Iglesias 2015). 
Within the intergovernmental decision-making mode, the implementation of certain policies 
remains an “autonomous voluntary act” (Weiler 2000: 13). This pattern is unlikely to change 
in the foreseeable future. The rapidly growing political and economic interdependencies 
within the Economic and Monetary Union “and the reservations on part of Member States 
against further transfers of ultimate decision-making power to the EU […] can be 
characterized as an integration paradox” (Puetter 2012: 168). One could therefore conclude 
that the current institutional set up of the Economic and Monetary Union does simply not 
comply with the criteria on democratic legitimacy outlined by Scharpf. The EMU is primarily 
designed as a rule-based system and lacks a single authority to adopt collectively binding 
decisions. Furthermore, the EMU governance frame does not possess the legitimate use of 
coercion to implement decisions, but largely relies on intergovernmental decision-making. 
However, the concept of democratic legitimacy also contains elements of democratic 
accountability relations. Questions of accountability concern only a subset of legitimacy 
concerns, and not every accountability concern is a legitimacy concern. Addressing 
accountability concerns can, however, contribute to the overall legitimacy of a political 
system. I therefore propose to focus on the democratic accountability relations within the 
ESM framework to arrive at conclusions about the democratic quality of the EMU governance 
system. 
One major challenge for an effective accountability regime is the multilevel character of 
European governance, in particular the evolving technocratic and intergovernmental arena. 
National governments and parliaments are traditionally in a hierarchical relationship and 
these accountability relations are restricted to the national level only. To elaborate on this 
relation, I use an accountability definition by Bovens who understands accountability 
as a relationship (i) between an actor and a forum, in which (ii) the actor has an 
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, (iii) the forum can pose 
                                                 
17 Justification to set rules and ‘to govern’ strongly depends on the normative foundations of a political system. 
For Eriksen and Fossum, the ‘finalité politique’ is crucial to assess the democratic legitimacy of the EU system. 
They develop three models of what the Union could be, resulting in different strategies to overcome legitimacy 
problems (Eriksen, Fossum 2004). Others emphasize the centrality of the believe in legitimacy. Føllesdal, for 
instance, emphasises that “legitimacy is about whether citizens have trust in the future compliance of other 
citizens and authorities with institutions they believe to be normatively deserving of obedience” (Føllesdal 2006: 
172). 
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questions and pass judgement, and (iv) the actor may face consequences (Bovens 
2007a, 452). 
This definition has the advantage that it is analytically clear and parsimonious with regard to 
the number of criteria it postulates. It allows a classification of the types of actors involved 
who are in a particular mode of interaction (Benz et al. 2007: 455). Applied to the subject of 
this thesis, ‘actors’ should be understood as national governments since they are formally 
taking decisions in the ESM Board of Governors. ‘Forums’, on the other side, should be 
understood as the national parliaments to which governments are accountable. A second layer 
exists which involves quasi-autonomous or independent agencies and actors. The 
accountability relations to these quasi-autonomous actors have become a key characteristic of 
the EU governance system (see Bovens 2007a), and the ESM arguably falls under this 
category. Although the ESM cannot take decisions autonomously, it takes decisions as a 
collective. The concrete administration of sovereign aid programmes is carried out by civil 
servants of the European Stability Mechanism. Even if ministers remain politically 
answerable to their parliaments for actions within the ESM framework, they do not 
necessarily possess control and knowledge of the day-to-day policy-making (on this topic see 
Curtin 2007). Should a minister be structurally uninformed about the daily operations of an 
‘agency’, however, this will also have an impact on the effective scrutiny procedures within 
national parliaments.  
But even if we take these rather new accountability relations between quasi-autonomous 
actors and governments – respectively national parliaments – into account, they do not replace 
the traditional forms of accountability relations, but complement them (Bovens 2007b). 
Effective accountability still requires that democratically elected parliaments vertically hold 
the government representative (who takes ESM-related decisions) accountable. With this 
being said, there are a number of sub-questions that arise, for instance: is account rendered to 
the parliament as a whole, or only to specific parliamentary bodies? Can a government 
representative take decisions without explicit approval of the parliamentary chambers? What 
kind of information and actions must be justified in front of the parliament? Must government 
representatives justify their actions before or after decisions have been taken at the EU level? 
And what kind of consequences do they face
18
 when they deviate from a position a parliament 
has expressed? These questions are not uniformly regulated within all national parliaments. In 
contrast, we observe a huge variation in the concrete design of legal parliamentary 
participation rights. Based on these observations, this thesis develops a classification of 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs in chapter B.1. The generation of comparable 
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 Classical accounts rather speak of the possibility to “impose sanctions” (Grant, Keohane 2005: 29) and not of 
“facing consequences” (on this question see Mulgan 2000; Strøm 2000: 261, quoted in Bovens 2007: 451). The 
advantage of Bovens’ expression is, however, that ‘facing consequences’ is broader and can also include positive 
rewards. Therefore, it is rather the possibility to impose sanctions (respectively face consequences) than its actual 
imposition that constitutes an element of effective accountability. 
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information of parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs is descriptive in nature, but a 
necessary prerequisite to answer the broader, analytical question: Why have some parliaments 
adopted strong participation rights within the ESM and others have not? More concretely, 
which factors account for strong, respectively weak, accountability relations of national 
parliaments and government representatives in ESM affairs? To date, no study analyses the 
determinants of parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs comparatively. 
This thesis thus seeks to address the puzzle of the asymmetrical involvement of national 
parliaments within the European Stability Mechanism. Only by treating budgetary powers as 
its own category, this asymmetric involvement can be understood. 
 
A.4 Why Look at the ESM? A Brief Inventory of the Crisis  
The following section elaborates on the role of national parliaments in selected crisis 
instruments. The objective is to highlight the unique role of the European Stability 
Mechanism and to justify why it has been chosen as an object of investigation. The first part 
briefly explains the political as well as the budgetary constraints of selected crisis instruments 
on national parliaments (A.4.1). The major argument is that the ESM is the most far-reaching 
of all crisis-related instruments in terms of its budgetary implications. The second part 
elaborates on the executive dominance within the crisis management as well as the legal basis 
of selected instruments (A.4.2). I will distinguish three different phases of parliamentary 
involvement, highlighting that the period in which the ESM was ratified partly opened a 
window of opportunity to negotiate stronger parliamentary involvement. The last part (A.4.3) 
gives information on the formal structure of the European Stability Mechanism, highlighting 
the role national parliaments can potentially play therein. 
 
A.4.1 Escalation and Intensification of the Crisis 
Instruments tackling the Eurozone crisis in 2010-2012 constrain to varying degrees the 
political as well as the budgetary leeway of national parliaments. Not all of these instruments 
apply to all Member States. Some have been established outside of the EU legal framework or 
apply to Eurozone Member States only. All instruments were meant to strengthen the ‘E’ 
(economic) in ‘EMU’ affairs, “preferably in the confines of the existing treaty framework, 
supplemented, where necessary or desirable, by intergovernmental agreements” (Barroso 
2011, quoted in Dinan 2012: 85).  
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Efforts to enhance economic coordination impact on the political sovereignty of parliaments 
(for instance under the European Semester or the Euro Plus Pact
19
). European actors (most 
notably the Commission, the European Council and the Council of Ministers) can intervene in 
drafting annual national budgets and therefore exercise oversight functions. Legally speaking, 
no transfer of competences to the European level took place, i.e. EU primary law has not been 
changed. However, national parliaments are foremost politically bound to these newly 
established procedures and must deal with new (European) actors therein. The Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) or the revision of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) are based on a stronger legal basis (Seng, Biesenbender 2012). The TSCG was 
established outside the EU legal framework and not ratified by the Czech Republic and the 
United Kingdom. The revision of the Stability and Growth Pact is based on EU secondary law 
and applies primarily to members of the Eurozone (Buti, Carnot 2012: 906). The degree to 
which the above mentioned instruments are binding for Member States therefore varies, for 
instance between Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries, but also for countries under the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). 
Other instruments impact to varying degrees on the budgetary sovereignty of national 
parliaments. All Eurozone countries ratified the permanent ESM and the temporary EFSF. 
The first bilateral bail-out package to Greece in 2010 was not even ratified by all Eurozone 
Member States since the Slovakian government decided against participation (see 
Featherstone 2011: 205).
20
 On the other side, financial guarantees to Ireland were also 
bilaterally provided by the non-Eurozone Member States Denmark, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. In sum, the introduced instruments are to different degrees binding on a political 
and budgetary dimension (for an historical institutionalist explanation of the EU's crisis 
responses see Verdun 2015). 
The various crisis measures broadly followed two main goals: First, they tried to provide 
immediate financial assistance for countries with solvency problems. Second, they tried to 
foster economic coordination and to address “weak spots in the [economic] surveillance 
framework” (Buti, Carnot 2012: 910). The first bail-out package to Greece (May 2010), the 
temporary EFSF (July 2010) as well as the permanent ESM (operational since October 2012) 
belong to the first category. Crucially, the potential sum of financial guarantees increased with 
each of the new instruments. Also, while the first bailout package to Greece and the EFSF 
were temporarily limited, the ESM was established as a permanent mechanism. The Euro Plus 
Pact was based on voluntary adherence only, while the introduction of the European Semester 
and the strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact (under the so-called Six-Pack 
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 The Euro Plus Pact was ratified by all EU Member States except the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Sweden. 
20
 The former Slovakian government argued that poor countries “shouldn’t pay for the profligacy of richer peers 
(Bloomberg News 2010). 
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legislation) were implemented in secondary law and are therefore legally binding – although 
to varying degrees (depending on the membership in the common currency area, see for 
instance Kunstein, Wessels 2012). The latest instrument fostering economic coordination, the 
TSCG, sets legally binding criteria for the balancing of budgets. It has again a stronger legal 
character than the previous instruments although it was not ratified by all Member States. The 
obligation to transpose the ‘balanced budget rule’ is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. Sanctions can be imposed in case of non-compliance (Art 8(1) 
TSCG).  
In sum, the intensity of the political and budgetary impact of crisis instruments increased 
significantly over the 2010-2012 period: The Euro Plus Pact (2010-11) and the European 
Semester (2011) were two of the first instruments to foster economic coordination. They were 
legally less binding than the revised Stability and Growth Pact (2011) and the TSCG (2012). 
Equally, the first bailout package to Greece (2010, non-recurrent) and the EFSF (2010, 
temporarily limited) were less intrusive on the Member States’ budgetary sovereignty than the 
ESM (2010, permanent mechanism) which can also issue a much higher sum of financial 
guarantees. 
I argue that the European Stability Mechanism is the only instrument subject to a huge 
variation concerning parliamentary participation rights domestically. What makes the ESM 
special is the fact that parliaments are to different degrees involved in the control of the 
finance ministers in the Board of Governors. This ranges from the complete transfer of 
decision-making competences to the national executives up to strong parliamentary 
prerogatives for each sovereign aid package and the release of financial tranches therein. This 
doctoral thesis investigates the role of national parliaments in the ESM because it impairs on 
both, the budgetary and political sovereignty of national parliaments. 
  
A.4.2 Executive Dominance: Three Phases of the Management of the Crisis 
The growing (domestic) asymmetry of parliamentary involvement is also reflected by the 
meetings of the European Council in 2010-2012 and beyond (see Laffan 2014: 276). Since the 
outbreak of the crisis, the Heads of States or Government met several times in the formation 
of the so-called ‘Euro Area’ or ‘Euro Summit’, comprising only the chief executives of those 
Member States which adopted the common currency. A first such meeting took place in 
March 2010.
21
 If counted separately, the European Council met 27 times in different 
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 The meeting was labelled “Meeting of the Heads/State of Government of the Euro Area”. A meeting in 
October 2011 was simply labelled “Euro Summit”, indicating that it took some time to officially label this new 
European Council formation. In 2010-2012, the Euro Area summit passed five ‘statements’ and one 
‘conclusion’. It is not always clear what the semantic difference indicates. Also, the difference between ‘special’ 
and ‘extraordinary’ meetings remains unclear. 
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formations in 2010-2012 (the EU treaties foresee only four regular meetings per year). 
Although this institution has always been far more influential than treaty articles indicated 
(see for instance Wessels 2016), it became the most important decision-making body during 
the crisis. The President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, noted that the crisis 
management “by summit” became the norm (Schulz 2013) rather than the exception. 
The establishment of the Euro Area Summit is by now institutionalised.
22
 Since the Euro Area 
Summit is not an official EU institution, however, parliamentary standing rules did not 
necessarily foresee the obligation to inform parliamentary chambers on the outcomes of their 
negotiations (as it is usually the case, see Wessels, Rozenberg 2013). The German Bundestag 
was one of the first chambers to officially recognise the Euro Area Summit as an EU 
institution. The revised EUZBBG
23
 from 2013 obliges the government to regularly inform the 
parliament about activities of the Euro Area Summit (§4 (2) 1 EUZBBG). The dominance of 
the European Council offers the possibility to trace back the management of the crisis (see for 
instance Rompuy 2014). All important instruments were politically initiated in this institution. 
It is possible to distinguish, roughly, three phases of the management of the crisis in the 
period under investigation. They partly overlap, but differ in degree of national parliamentary 
involvement.  
The first phase lasts from early 2010 to May 2010. The Heads of State or Government 
recognised the worsened financial situation in Greece and started to make public 
commitments from which they (still) hoped they had not to be fulfilled. This phase is 
characterised by the effort to formally respect Union law which prohibits financial assistance 
to EU Member States (Art. 125 TFEU). The involvement of national parliaments during this 
period was marginal since no concrete actions were decided upon. The second phase, from 
May to the end of 2010, was characterized by immediate and hasty reactions to the 
deteriorating financial and economic situation in Greece. Greece’s refinancing problems were 
feared to contagion to other Eurozone Member States (Schimmelfennig 2015b). The first 
bilateral loans to Greece as well as the EFSF heavily impacted on the budgetary competences 
of parliaments in the Euro Area and lead to sharp political quarrels among Member States. 
Many observers stated a clear violation of EU law in establishing these two bailout funds (see 
for instance Ryvkin 2012); furthermore, the management of the crisis did not allow extensive 
deliberations in parliamentary chambers since actions had to be taken under considerable time 
pressure (see among others Saurugger 2014). Since the measures were all limited in time and 
scope, they were often perceived by market participants as “too little, too late” (Gocaj, 
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 Herman van Rompuy was elected its first president in 2011. The question arose whether the President of the 
European Council must always be a member of the Euro Area. The election of Donald Tusk in November 2014 
showed that these concerns were unfounded. 
23
 EUZBBG is the German abbreviation for “Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und 
Deutschem Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union”. 
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Meunier 2013: 243, but also Featherstone 2011: 194). The third phase, beginning at the end of 
2010 until 2012
24
, considered more long-term instruments to stabilize the Eurozone (most 
notably the ESM, the Fiscal Compact and the so-called six- and two-pack legislation). 
Stronger economic surveillance became increasingly the focus of economic governance 
reform which was largely absent in the second phase. The establishment of the permanent 
rescue fund was debated for the first time. In contrast to the EFSF, it was intended to be 
reformed on a more solid legal basis, requiring the amendment of article 136 TFEU. Other 
instruments, such as a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact as well as the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance, were intended to foster economic coordination in the 
EU in the long run, particularly in the Eurozone. Also, the decision to establish a banking 
union was taken in June 2012 (Howarth, Quaglia 2013; De Rynck 2015). 
Figure 1: Three phases of the management of the crisis 
 
Source 2: Own presentation. 
All measures introduced in the third phase were subject to more intensive parliamentary 
deliberations, at least in some Member States. Their impact was, however, also more severe 
than instruments in the first two phases. In several Member States, law files were sued against 
the European Stability Mechanism as well as against the Fiscal Compact; additionally, a 
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 The end of 2012 is the end of the period under investigation of this thesis. 
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public referendum was required to ratify the Fiscal Compact in Ireland which slowed down 
the ratification process for a short while. 
Phase One: Attempts to Calm Down the Markets 
Greece’s deteriorating economic situation has multiple causes, but was accelerated by the 
announcement of the in-coming Greek government in autumn 2009 that the numbers for the 
annual government deficit were far worse than initially reported. While the interest rates on 
Greek government bonds had for more than a decade steadily approximated the European 
average, re-financing costs started to rise sharply in 2009/2010 (see for instance Eichengreen 
2012). Both, the over-and underevaluation of Greek sovereign bonds was not based on 
economic fundamentals, but represented a “mispricing” – and thus false expectations – of 
market participants (see de Grauwe, Ji 2012). In 2009/2010, market participants abruptly lost 
the trust in the Hellenic Republic being able to refinance its public debt (on the relation 
between trust and debt see among others Beckert 2013). At the informal European Council 
summit in February 2010, the Heads of State or Government mentioned Greece’s worsened 
financial situation for the first time in their conclusions and stated: 
Euro area Member States will take determined and coordinated action, if needed, 
to safeguard financial stability in the euro area as a whole. The Greek government 
has not requested any financial support (European Council 2010e). 
This ‘determined action’ was addressed in numerous parliamentary debates in Euro Area 
Member States. However, the formulation was rather imprecise and non-committal; most 
governments did not have to ask for prior parliamentary approval in advance. The sentence 
“The Greek government has not requested any financial support” was important to reach a 
compromise, especially between the Greek Prime Minister and the German Chancellor 
(Rompuy 2014, 14). It officially signified that no immediate action was deemed necessary. 
On 25 March 2010, a European Council – in the formation of the Heads of State or 
Government of the Euro Area – was more concrete and confirmed publicly that Eurozone 
Member States were in principle ready to contribute bilateral loans should the Greek 
government request financial assistance (European Council 2010f). This non-binding 
declaration was still intended to calm down market participants although it became 
increasingly obvious that real actions might soon be required.
25
 Nonetheless, the March 2013 
conclusion already contained clarifications on the potential amount of bilateral loans: 
Eurozone Member States were expected “to participate on the basis of their respective ECB 
capital key” (European Council 2010f). Clarifications on the potential burden-sharing of 
financial assistance were crucial to make the public commitments credible.  
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 The looming elections in North-Westphalia in May 2010 are also often mentioned as a reason for the belayed 
action in spring 2010 (see Crespy, Schmidt 2014: 1089). 
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In March 2010 the Heads of State or Government discussed – for the future – to strengthen 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure of the Stability and Growth Pact as well as first steps of what 
was later coined the ‘European Semester’. The conclusion of the general formation of the 
European Heads of State or Government on 26 March 2010 outlined future lines of conflict: 
The European Council argued for a strengthening of the coordination at the Eurozone level 
and asked the Commission to present proposals that are “offered by Article 136 Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union” (European Council 2010c: 5). Some of the principles of 
future Eurozone reforms were therefore already mentioned in this phase of the management of 
the crisis: the need to provide financial assistance for Member States in dire economic 
situations as well as improved instruments to foster economic convergence.  
The first phase of the crisis management was largely characterized by attempts to formally 
respect Union law; at the same time, public commitments were made from which it was 
hoped that they would not have to be redeemed. In this situation, the lose involvement of 
national parliaments can be justified by a political logic which required immediate (public) 
and rhetorical action, but would avoid any concrete budgetary implications for parliaments or 
a violation of EU primary law. 
Phase Two: Immediate (re)actions and the Violation of EU Law 
However, already in the second quarter of 2010 the financial situation in the Greece 
deteriorated to such an extent that concrete (re)actions was required. In a dramatic meeting in 
May 2010, the finance ministers of the Eurozone decided on bilateral loans for Greece 
amounting to €110 billion (together with the IMF), noting that “Parliamentary approval, 
needed in some Member States prior to the release of the first tranche, is expected to follow 
swiftly” (Eurogroup 2010). At the same time, the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) as well as the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) were launched which 
Member States’ parliaments had to ratify in an ad-hoc manner. The German Bundestag voted 
in favour of the first bailout-out package for Greece on 7 May 2010. The same day, the 
German Bundesrat approved the package which was immediately signed by the Federal 
President. This indicates the enormous time pressure that parliamentarians faced and 
exemplifies the very short amount of time for parliamentary chambers to deliberate on these 
crisis instruments.
26
 The ratification of the EFSF did also not allow much time for public 
deliberations. Quite evidently, the establishment of the EFSF was not in line with EU treaty 
law, but time constraints did not allow for a timely treaty revision procedure. Another 
characteristic of the second phase is that Euro Member States pressed ahead, widening the gap 
between the then 17 and the remaining ten Member States. Some early crisis responses could 
not be integrated into the EU legal framework. This applies for the first bailout package for 
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 The Slovakian parliament refused its consent to the first bailout-package for Greece. 
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Greece, the EFSF and also the Euro Plus Pact
27
 which were initiated in that time period. Since 
some non-Eurozone Member States were willing to join a stronger economic surveillance 
framework, treaties outside the EU legal framework were established. They generally limit 
the influence of national parliaments since national governments treated (or tried to treat) the 
latter as foreign rather than EU affairs. All of the crisis instruments in the second phase were 
decided upon under enormous time pressure. Especially national parliaments of the Eurozone 
ceded a huge amount of political and budgetary sovereignty to the European level. All of 
these measures were temporally limited, partly based on voluntary adherence or not integrated 
into the EU legal framework.  
Phase Three: Bringing Parliaments Back In? Long-term Responses to an Ongoing Crisis 
The third phase is characterized by the attempt to find long-term crisis responses that were – 
although partly outside the EU legal framework – neither based on voluntary adherence nor 
temporally restricted (this phase partly overlaps with the second one). The establishment of 
the ESM required a modification of the EU treaties (Article 136 TFEU) while the ratification 
of the TSCG required a public referendum in Ireland. Instruments within the EU legal 
framework included the so-called six- and two-pack legislation (which itself includes a reform 
of the Stability and Growth Pact as well as the introduction of the European Semester). Also, 
the approval of financial assistance was increasingly linked to stronger economic 
coordination, providing the European Commission a stronger role in the management of the 
crisis. In September 2010, the European Council debated to foster economic surveillance 
further (European Council 2010a: 6). In October 2010, the reform of the Stability and Growth 
Pact was welcomed by the Heads of State or Government (European Council 2010d: 2). 
However, it became increasingly clear that the temporary stability tools had to be replaced by 
permanent crisis instruments, requiring a change of EU treaties. The December 2010 
European Council therefore stated: 
The temporary stability tools put in place earlier this year have proved their 
utility, but the crisis has demonstrated that there can be no complacency. This is 
why we agreed today on the text of a limited amendment to the Treaty on the 
establishment of a future permanent mechanism to safeguard the financial stability 
of the euro area as a whole (European Council 2010b: 2). 
Within the third phase, a change of EU treaty law was envisaged for the first time. Article 125 
TFEU prohibits the Union and the Member States from being “liable for or assum[ing] the 
commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies 
governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to 
mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.” This was commonly 
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 The Euro Plus Pact is an intergovernmental agreement based on voluntary adherence and comprised the then 
17 Eurozone Member States, as well as Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. 
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interpreted as a no bail-out clause. Concerning the EFSF, it was argued that these financial 
commitments were no grants to financially stricken Eurozone states, but repayable loans on 
which interest rates had to be paid. The German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble 
asserted that “[t]he loans are not transfers. And they are not gifts […]. And the conditionality 
is such that the country is compelled to enforce measures that would have been unthinkable 
before the event” (quoted in Ryvkin 2012: 242). 
This argumentation was no longer valid with the establishment of the ESM. The limited treaty 
change necessitated the involvement of all national parliaments, partly with two-third 
majorities in the respective chambers. This opened the opportunity for opposition parties to 
negotiate side payments in exchange for ratifying the ESM. In the Austrian case, for instance, 
the Green Party used the ratification of the Article 136 TFEU amendment to secure more 
extensive parliamentary co-decision rights (see case study on Austria C.2.2). Also the 
ratification of the TSCG partly required broad parliamentary majorities or even a public 
referendum. This allowed more intense deliberations in parliaments and the public. Also, the 
instruments established within the third phase were often subject to legal disputes within the 
Member States, for instance in Germany, Estonia or Ireland (see case study on Ireland C.2.3). 
It is telling that many of the financially stricken Member States, such as Cyprus, Greece, 
Portugal, Slovenia or Spain, were very fast in ratifying the ESM while economically more 
stable countries waited until June/July 2012 to adopt the treaties. 
 
ECB Intervention Calms Down the Markets 
The management of the crisis would be incomplete without an analysis of the unexpected role 
of the European Central Bank therein (see for instance Mourlon-Druol 2014 and Otero-
Iglesias 2015). Before the ESM and the TSCG officially came into force, the European 
Central Bank intervened significantly in the management of the crisis. Some observers 
criticized the ECB for overstepping its mandate while others claimed it was still doing too 
little and that it failed to effectively act as a lender of last resort (see for instance De Grauwe 
2011; Sinn, Wollmershäuser 2011). At an investment conference in London in July 2012, the 
President of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, announced: 
Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. 
And believe me, it will be enough (quoted in Daily Telegraph Online 2012). 
Under the condition that a country accepts a financial adjustment programme under the ESM, 
the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme is designed to buy government bonds 
of financially troubled Eurozone Member States (see The Economist Online 2012). The ECB 
therefore combines an intervention in the market with a political conditionality which is set by 
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the Member States.
28
 The announcement of the ECB marked a turning point in the 
management of the crisis (at least until early 2015): yield spreads for troubled Member States 
decreased significantly. National parliaments could, however, not influence the decisions by 
the European Central Bank although financial risks can occur for their national budgets as 
well. By definition, and according to its statue, the ECB is “independent in the exercise of its 
powers and in the management of its finances” (Art. 282 (3) TFEU).  
Although highly important, the ECB’s role will not be discussed extensively in this 
dissertation. First, the independence of central banks is a generally accepted principle in the 
Economic and Monetary Union, ratified by all Member States with the respective European 
treaties (for an opposing view see Franzese and Hall 2008). Political discussions to limit 
ECB’s independence – as for instance the French government regularly proposes (Crespy, 
Schmidt 2014) – are meant to increase the control and oversight functions of national 
executives and not primarily of parliamentary chambers. Second, legal disputes about 
potential breaches of the ECB mandate are now decided upon at the European and not the 
national level: in a far reaching decision on 7 February 2014, the German Constitutional Court 
referred the decision about the OMT Programme to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union. The European Court of Justice declared the OMT Programme to be in compliance 
with EU law; the German Constitutional Court is expected to pass a final decision on the 
compliance with the German Basic Law in early 2016. 
  
A.4.3 Structure and Functioning of the ESM: What Role for National Parliaments? 
The previous section outlined that the European Stability Mechanism is the most far-reaching 
instrument in terms of impact on the political and budgetary sovereignty of national 
parliaments. The ESM is designed as an intergovernmental organisation under international 
public law. Members are the EU Member States that adopted the common currency (with 
Latvia joining the ESM in March 2014 and Lithuania in early 2015). It is headquartered in 
Luxembourg. In order to establish the ESM, European treaties had to be amended by all 
parliamentary chambers, partly with two-third majorities in bicameral systems. The most 
important decision-making body is the Board of Governors. Each participating country sends 
its Minister of Finance to the Board of Governors who has voting rights therein. The President 
of the European Central Bank as well as the European Commissioner for Economic and 
Monetary Affairs can take part in the meetings of the Board as observers. This exemplifies 
that the ESM – although designed as an international institution – possesses strong links to 
European institutions (see for instance Niemann and Ioannou 2015). The fact that the TFEU 
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 Together with the ESM and the TSCG, the OMT Programme was also challenged at the German 
Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. The Court not only had to decide on the legality of the programme, but also if 
it had jurisdiction over EU institutions in the first place (see for instance The Wall Street Journal Online 2013). 
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had to be amended in order to establish the ESM underlines this fact. In contrast to the TSCG, 
no intention is stated in the ESM treaty that the mechanism will be incorporated into the EU 
treaty framework at a later point in time. However, current reform discussions – such as the 
Five President Report from July 2015 – envisage a greater role for the ESM to directly 
recapitalize banks (see Juncker et al. 2015). 
The ESM is designed as a mechanism to grant financial assistance to Eurozone Member 
States facing liquidity, but not solvency, problems. Article 13 of the ESM stipulates that 
stability support can only be granted when the “financial stability of the euro area as a whole 
or of its Member States” is at stake and when the public debt level of the receiving country is 
sustainable. Such an assessment is carried out by the European Commission, in liaison with 
the European Central Bank. Both of these conditions are open for political interpretation. The 
stability support for Cyprus (2013) and the third sovereign aid package for Greece in August 
2015 have been contested because a number of policy-makers doubted that the two conditions 
were actually fulfilled. Furthermore, the first two sovereign aid packages to Greece have 
changed the debtor structure of the country decisively. While in 2010, more than 90% of 
Greek bonds were held by private investors, the majority of Greek bonds are now held by 
public institutions and governments – and therewith European taxpayers. This has arguably 
reduced the risk of contagion in case of a Greek sovereign default, but is also one reason why 
the ESM is such a highly politicized institution. Despite the seemingly clear formulations in 
the treaty itself decisions on stability support are not solely based on ‘objective’ economic 
criteria, but necessarily contain elements of political assessments. 
These political assessments do also play a role when the European Stability Mechanism is 
located in the current governance frame of the Economic and Monetary Union. In the public 
debate, stability support is often perceived as a kind of ‘transfer’ to financially stricken 
Member States. Although the ESM issues strictly speaking only financial guarantees, the 
likelihood that these loans can be repaid in the long-run seems increasingly uncertain (at least 
regarding the third sovereign aid package for Greece). According to the treaty articles, 
however, ESM financial assistance takes the form of repayable loans; most observers agree 
that a nominal debt relief within the Eurozone is prohibited by the EU treaties. This also 
reveals that the ESM in its current design is not transforming the Eurozone into a kind of 
‘transfer union’ with automatic fiscal transfers to cushion the effects of economic cycles and 
asymmetric economic shocks. The need for automatic fiscal transfers is often highlighted by 
proponents of the ‘Optimal Currency Area’ theory (see for instance Krugman 2012). In the 
absence of fiscal transfers, programme countries can only regain competitiveness through a 
process of an internal devaluation which often includes cutting social benefits or the reduction 
of salaries and pensions. The advisory council of the German Federal Government 
understands the ESM as a mechanism that in essence supports the process of internal 
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devaluations, but allows programme countries to undergo this process in a longer time period 
(see Sachverständigenrat der Deutschen Bundesregierung 2015). Without external financial 
assistance, these adjustment processes would have to take place immediately.    
Except for emergency calls, all “important decisions” require mutual consent, i.e. unanimity 
in the Board of Governors (see article 5 of the ESM treaty). This covers financial assistance to 
ESM members, the definition of conditions for support as well as the choice of instruments. In 
other matters, the ESM treaty foresees the use of qualified majority voting which is defined as 
80% of the votes cast “with voting rights equal to the number of shares allocated to each 
country” (ESM 2014). Countries such as Germany and France – with a capital share of more 
than 20% - have consequently a veto right regarding these questions. The total subscribed 
capital of the ESM is nearly €702 billion; the ESM’s maximum lending capacity is €500 
billion. The shareholder contribution key is based on the ECB contribution key which slightly 
changed with the accession of Latvia and Lithuania to the ESM. Germany (27.07%), France 
(20.33%), Italy (17.86%) and Spain (11.87%) are the largest contributors, while Malta 
(0.07%), Estonia (0.19%) and Cyprus (0.20%) provide the smallest share. The capital 
subscription ranges from €190.02 billion (Germany) to €0.51 billion (Malta). Countries 
receiving financial assistance are stepping-out guarantors. All ESM loans possess seniority 
status (with the exception of IMF loans which have a preferred creditor status). This can only 
be adjusted by a change of the treaty which would again require the approval of national 
parliaments. Additionally, and in contrast to the previous EFSF mechanism, euro area 
Member States provided €80 billion in the form of paid-in capital which is a precondition for 
high credit ratings by several rating agencies (for a detailed description see Gocaj, Meunier 
2013). In order to activate financial assistance, a Member State has to send a formal request to 
the ESM Board of Governors. Financial assistance can only be granted under strict 
conditionality in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This strict 
conditionality is explicitly mentioned in the treaty. The MoU is signed by the European 
Commission which must confirm that the level of public debt is sustainable and that a risk for 
the financial stability of the Eurozone as a whole exists.  
What makes the ESM special is the fact that parliaments are to different degrees involved in 
the control of the finance ministers in the Board of Governors. As outlined above, in some 
parliaments the Minister of Finance must seek the prior approval of the parliamentary plenary 
or a parliamentary body before agreeing to financial guarantees provided by the ESM. In 
specific cases, they even need a mandate before negotiations on stability support can be 
formally opened (see Kreilinger 2015). In other settings, the Finance Minister exclusively 
decides. Given the fact that financial guarantees partly make up a third of national annual 
budgets in some countries, there is a huge variation of parliamentary control regarding ESM 
decision-making. Although parliaments always had varying participation rights in domestic 
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settings (see again Table 1), this asymmetry of parliamentary influence is so far without 
precedent and poses important questions of parliamentary accountability in EMU policy-
making. 
 
A.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis seeks to analyse factors that determine strong, respectively weak, parliamentary 
involvement in ESM affairs. The analysis of this question is split in two broad parts. Chapter 
B will lay out the theoretical and methodological foundations, including the data gathering 
process. Chapter C carries out the empirical analysis while chapter D concludes. 
With regard to the theoretical and methodological foundations of the thesis, I will first gather 
information on the dependent variable, i.e. parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. This is 
conducted via the distribution of a questionnaire to parliamentary representatives in Brussels, 
Budget and Finance Committees as well as individual MPs concerned with the establishment 
of the ESM in the 18 Member States under investigation. This information was cross-checked 
with available information of parliamentary involvement on the websites of the respective 
chambers. The result is a classification of formal parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs 
(see B.1). The next chapter is concerned with theoretical considerations to explain the varying 
degrees of parliamentary influence in this domain (see B.2). It basically follows a rational 
choice approach and regards the macro-economic situation, Eurosceptical attitudes, formal 
prerogatives in EU affairs as well as the political and constitutional requirements to ratify the 
ESM treaty as decisive for parliamentary involvement. Chapter B.3 presents the applied 
methods. This project pursues a mixed-method design. A fuzzy set qualitative comparative 
analysis (fsQCA) analyses determinants of parliamentary involvement. QCA allows for a 
systematic cross-case comparison and is especially suitable for intermediate-N research 
designs. At the same time, sufficient attention can be paid to the within-case complexity of 
comparisons (see Rihoux, Ragin 2009). Another advantage is that it can look at a combination 
of explanatory ‘conditions’ for a certain outcome, rather than explaining a specific 
phenomenon with a single variable. I assume that rather a combination of conditions leads to 
particularly ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs, and not a single 
variable. This analysis is complemented by evidence from 29 expert interviews in four case 
studies (Austria, Germany, Ireland and Portugal). Section B.4.1 and B.4.2 describe the data 
gathering process for the independent variables as well as its calibration (which is required for 
conducting a fsQCA). 
The empirical part first conducts the fsQCA for all 18 Eurozone countries (see C.1). It tests 
combinations of theoretically derived conditions assumed to determine strong or weak 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. It also helps identifying the ‘particular’ cases that 
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merit further analyses. These will be addressed in section C.2. Germany’s and Austria’s 
involvement in ESM affairs is representative for donor countries, while Ireland and Portugal 
represent debtor countries. The parliamentary debates leading to the ratification of the ESM 
treaty, but also the negotiations leading to the so-called Memoranda of Understanding in the 
two debtor countries will be analysed. Section D summarizes the impact of the varying 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs on the accountability regime of the economic and 
monetary union and formulates policy recommendations. 
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B. What to look for: Theoretical and Methodological Approach 
B.1 Dependent Variable: ESM Parliamentary Participation Rights 
To analyse parliamentary involvement within the ESM, this doctoral thesis first gathered 
information on the dependent variable, i.e. the formal participation rights of national 
parliaments in ESM affairs. This was done via the distribution of a questionnaire to 
parliamentary representations in Brussels, to Finance and Budget Committees of Eurozone 
parliaments as well as to individual MPs (more below). The collection and generation of this 
new data source was necessary since no comparable data existed at this time. Furthermore, the 
creation of an own questionnaire allowed the collection of specific aspects of ESM 
involvement which are relevant for the research question and could not be obtained from 
publicly available sources. The information of the questionnaires was cross-checked with 
publicly available sources, such as newspaper reports, national legislation or academic 
publications. Three different legal bases for parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs can 
broadly be distinguished. First, so-called accompanying provisions (or laws, for instance the 
ESMFinG
29
 in Germany) which define specific procedures for parliamentary involvement in 
ESM matters. These accompanying provisions contain detailed regulations about when and in 
how far parliamentary committees or the plenary are involved in decisions related to the ESM. 
Second, involvement in ESM matters can resemble the parliamentary involvement in ordinary 
budgetary affairs (this is, for instance, the case in Italy). Laws regulating the parliamentary 
involvement in budgetary questions equally apply for the involvement in ESM affairs. And 
third, participation rights can be derived from constitutional provisions (for instance Cyprus). 
In these cases, the involvement of parliaments is rather abstract and regulations are not 
specifically designed to deal with matters concerning the ESM. As will be shown later, the 
more a legal construction specifies ESM involvement the stronger is the parliamentary 
participation in this domain. This dissertation aims at finding explanations for the variance of 
these legal constructions.  
In a first step, I analysed existing literature on parliamentary participation rights within the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) (the – broadly speaking – predecessor of the 
ESM). To the best of my knowledge, only one study compares parliamentary participation 
rights in the EFSF from all Eurozone Member States: in 2011, the Deutsche Bank Research 
conducted a study classifying three groups of parliamentary involvement (see Heinen, Theiss 
2011):  
 parliaments that have no participation rights in the day-to-day policy-making of the 
EFSF (Cyprus and Spain) 
                                                 
29
 Gesetz zur finanziellen Beteiligung am Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus, ESM-Finanzierungsgesetz. 
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 parliaments that are only informed about EFSF activities by their governments 
(Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovakia)  
 parliaments that actually vote on a sovereign aid package within the EFSF (Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia (a table can be found in the 
appendix, see Table 38).  
This study gives first insights into the asymmetric accountability provisions of Eurozone 
parliaments within the newly established EFSF. The study has, however, also some 
shortcomings. First, the tripartite classification of the study is imprecise. Although it gives 
valuable information on whether the entire plenary or only standing committees decide on the 
release of sovereign aid packages, it does not differentiate in detail whether the financial 
tranches within a sovereign aid package are additionally subjected to a vote of parliamentary 
bodies. In some cases, the classification of parliaments was furthermore ambiguous: although 
the Maltese parliament should formally decide on sovereign aid packages, it is the Maltese 
Minister of Justice who decides on a case-by-case basis whether parliamentary approval is 
required or not (see Table 38 in the appendix). One should also keep in mind that, as stepping-
out-guarantors, Greece, Ireland and Portugal cannot take a vote on EFSF sovereign packages 
although they have been classified (formally correct) in the third and strongest category of 
parliamentary involvement. Second, the study does provide rich empirical data, but does not 
explain the varying patterns of parliamentary involvement; it is descriptive in nature. And 
third, there is evidence that the EFSF participation rights differ – at least in some 
parliamentary settings – significantly from the accompanying provisions of the European 
Stability Mechanism. Konrath, for instance, has shown how the Austrian parliament 
established firm control over government decisions within the ESM while its role in the 
former EFSF had been rather weak (see Konrath 2012). Also, interview evidence from 
parliamentary representatives of the Dutch second chamber indicates that the parliamentary 
participation rights of the Netherlands are stronger than the Deutsche Bank Research study 
suggested; and in Germany, the Bundestag’s ESM participation rights have been significantly 
strengthened in comparison to former versions of the EFSF accompanying laws (due to 
judgments by the German Constitutional Court, see for instance German Constitutional Court, 
2011, 2012). 
Furthermore, the concrete design of parliamentary participation rights takes different forms. 
In some parliamentary settings ex-ante provisions have been created in which parliamentary 
bodies take a formal vote before the national government formally enters the negotiations on a 
sovereign aid package. In case of the third Greek sovereign aid package in August 2015 the 
parliaments of Austria, Estonia, Finland and Germany have taken such an ex-ante vote (see 
Kreilinger 2015). These are the only parliamentary chambers that could potentially block the 
opening of negotiations leadings to financial assistance. Ex-post provisions, on the other side, 
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can include the formal vote of either a parliamentary committee, the plenary or other 
obligatory consultation procedures (without formal voting) in parliament. In some 
accompanying provisions, this formal participation can furthermore be constrained in 
exceptional circumstances, such as urgency or confidentiality. Only few provisions define 
precisely what these exceptional circumstances are, attributing national executives some 
scope of discretion to decide on parliamentary involvement. In other cases, national 
governments have voluntarily decided to involve parliamentary chambers in the decision-
making process (although this was no legal requirement). In sum, formal parliamentary 
involvement varies significantly: it can be constrained by exceptional circumstances or be 
expanded due to political decisions of national governments. 
Based on these considerations, I developed a questionnaire to assess the formal participation 
rights of national parliaments within the ESM. The questionnaire was sent to the permanent 
representations of national parliaments in Brussels as well as to selected committees within 
the parliament (see below). The starting point is that the specificity with which legal 
constructions outline parliamentary participation differs across the 18 Eurozone parliaments.
30
  
Does your parliament take a vote on each sovereign aid package within the ESM framework? 
Answer Further explications 
Yes  
If yes, which parliamentary body is responsible? The plenary, a 
committee, or a special committee established for that specific purpose? 
No  
 
Does your parliament decide on each financial tranche of sovereign aid packages (or modifications of 
the sovereign aid packages)? 
Answer Further explications 
Yes  
If yes, which parliamentary body is responsible? The plenary, a 
committee, or a special committee established for that specific purpose? 
No  
If the government exclusively decides, is it nonetheless obliged to inform 
specific parliamentary bodies in advance? If yes, which ones? 
 
 
Is the government obliged to report on activities within the ESM framework? 
Answer Further explications 
Yes  
If yes, please specify. Does it provide annual or quarterly reports? Is the 
entire plenary informed or only specific committees? 
No  
                                                 
30
 To give an example: While the German accompanying laws differentiate between purchases at the primary and 
secondary market or describe detailed circumstances under which the government can circumvent full 
parliamentary participation, other parliamentary provisions are less specific and therefore more difficult to 
compare. 
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As a consequence, a detailed qualitative assessment of each of the eighteen settings would 
provide a richer analysis of what national parliaments are formally entitled to do. The 
challenge for the questionnaire was to identify aspects which are comparable across the 18 
cases. I do therefore not claim that the categories chosen assess the full range of parliamentary 
involvement, nor that they cover every potential relevant aspect. However, the questions 
eventually chosen make it possible to compare parliamentary participation across the 18 
countries under investigation on a broader level. It contained the following three questions 
(the full questionnaire – including its appendix – can be found in F.1):  
The first question resembles a question posed in the Deutsche Bank study (“Does your 
parliament take a vote on each sovereign aid package within the ESM mechanism?”). A 
formal vote indicates strong parliamentary participation; the government representative must 
seek prior approval before a decision in the ESM Board of Governors can be taken. This 
allows parliaments to publicly deliberate on the policy proposal in question. Respondents 
were then asked to specify whether the entire plenary takes the decision or whether the 
decision is or can be delegated to parliamentary bodies (such as sectoral committees or even 
specialised committees established for that very purpose).
31
  
The second question asked whether a parliament decides on each financial tranche within 
sovereign aid packages (or modifications thereof). The full sum of a financial assistance 
package is not paid out at once, but distributed over the duration of the programme. A 
sovereign aid package can already set pre-defined amounts of financial tranches.
32
 The 
question is whether parliaments can still decide – or whether they are at least informed – if 
and to what extent conditions have been fulfilled by the recipient state. If that is not the case, 
approving a sovereign aid package equals issuing a counter cheque, defying further 
parliamentary control. Respondents were asked to specify whether the entire plenary or only 
specific parliamentary bodies take this decision. 
The last question addressed specific information obligations of the government towards the 
parliament. Regular information on ESM activities are a pre-condition for effective scrutiny. 
Whether parliaments are only informed upon request or whether they automatically receive 
information before the ESM Board of Governors takes a decision influences their ability for 
effective parliamentary control. Expecting a huge variety of obligations to inform the 
parliament, the question was openly formulated. In all cases, respondents had the possibility 
to include further comments in the questionnaire. 
                                                 
31
 So far, votes on sovereign aid packages have been relatively rare. Besides Greece (which received three 
packages in 2010, 2012, 2015), sovereign aid packages were so far supplied for Ireland, Portugal, the Spanish 
banking sector and Cyprus. 
32
 The disbursement of financial assistance is subjected to strict conditionality which is regularly assessed by 
external evaluators (especially through assessment reports of the (former) Troika, composed of the European 
Commission, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund). 
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A fourth dimension of parliamentary participation was not addressed in the questionnaire, 
namely whether simple or enlarged majorities were requested to ratify the ESM treaty. This 
information will be used for the further analysis (see especially B.4.1.4) but it was publicly 
available (European Commission 2013). The questionnaire therefore focused on information 
that was difficult to retrieve from publicly available sources. The main reason for keeping it 
short was to minimise the efforts to fill it in (and thus increasing the response rate). 
A first round of questionnaires was sent via email to all permanent representations of national 
parliaments of Eurozone Member States in Brussels between January and April 2013. First 
contacts with a number of permanent representations had already been established within the 
OPAL project
33
. Besides English, the questionnaire was translated into French and Spanish.
34
 
It contained the study of the Deutsche Bank Research in the appendix to inform respondents 
about existing participation rights within the EFSF. 13 out of 18 permanent representatives 
responded to the questionnaire by mid-2013 (Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Slovenia). In a second 
step, the questionnaire was sent to deputies of European Affairs and Financial Committees to 
complement previous answers. Where the permanent representatives gave slightly ambiguous 
answers (France and Italy), the questionnaire was again sent to deputies of the respective 
parliamentary committees. The responses have been cross-checked with accessible online 
information. Also, contacts to country experts within the OPAL project allowed cross-
checking the responses to the questionnaires. Quite often, respondents directly referred to 
those legal provisions from which the participation rights in their national settings were 
derived. The questionnaire was also sent to stepping-out guarantors, most notably Cyprus, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. With the exception of Greece, all countries have already 
provided financial assistance to at least one other country. In this respect, the provisions on 
the issuing of financial assistance are also relevant for – at that time – programme countries.  
Table 2 shows the shortened version of the responses from permanent representations and/or 
deputies from the respective committees (the full version can be found in the appendix, see 
Table 39). Partly, information from the accompanying or budgetary laws was added (in 
italics) in case respondents made an explicit reference to it.  
                                                 
33
 OPAL has been a research collaboration of the universities of Cambridge, Cologne, Maastricht and Sciences 
Po (Paris). It was funded, among others, by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), see: http://opal-
europe.org/.  
34
 All permanent representations received the English version of the questionnaire. The French version was 
additionally distributed to the Belgium, French and Romanian permanent representation. The Spanish version 
was additionally sent to the Spanish permanent representation. 
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Table 2: Parliamentary participation within the ESM (short version) 
Country Does your parliament take a vote on each sovereign aid 
packages within the ESM framework? 
2. Does your parliament decide on each 
financial tranche of sovereign aid packages 
(or modifications of the sovereign aid 
packages)? 
3. Is the government obliged to report on 
activities within the ESM framework? 
Austria Yes. The plenary mandates the Austrian representatives in 
the Board of Governors. A competent sub-committee 
mandates the Austrian representative in cases of urgency. 
No. The parliament does not decide on each 
financial tranche of sovereign aid packages. 
Yes. The Minister of Finance provides 
quarterly reports. 
Belgium No. No. No formal obligation. 
Cyprus No. Parliamentary participation rights are derived from the 
constitution. 
No.  No. Only if a parliamentary committee 
explicitly requests this information.  
Estonia Yes. The decision is usually taken by the plenary, but can 
be delegated to the European Affairs Committee. 
Yes. The EAC usually takes the lead. Yes. The government must inform the plenary 
about ESM related activities with annual 
reports; further information upon request. 
Finland. Yes. The Grand Committee takes the decision. Yes. Decision is taken by the Grand 
Committee. 
Yes. The plenary must be regularly informed. 
France No. However, the government must inform the Budget 
Committee in advance.  
No. No decision by the parliament is foreseen. Yes. The government must report on ESM-
related activities three times a year. 
Germany Yes. The plenary usually takes this decision. The Budget 
Committee must be informed. 
Yes. The plenary usually takes this decision. 
Only in cases of urgency and confidentiality, 
it is theoretically possible that a special 
committee (Sondergremium) takes this 
decision on behalf of the plenary. 
Yes. The government is obliged to inform the 
Bundestag comprehensively and at the earliest 
possible time. 
Greece No. As a stepping-guarantor, there is no vote in the 
parliament. 
No. But the Budget Committee is informed 
about changes of its own Memorandum of 
Understanding. 
No obligations to regularly inform the 
parliament. 
Ireland No. No. No. The Minister of Finance is only required 
to report to on the aggregate value of 
contributions made by the State to the 
authorised capital stock of the ESM. 
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Italy Rather no, but the government must inform the Budget 
Committee in advance. 
Rather no, but the government must inform 
the Budget Committee in advance. 
No. 
Latvia There is no legal requirement. No. Yes, the parliament must be informed on 
ESM-related activities. 
Luxembourg No. No. Yes, the parliament must be informed on 
ESM-related activities 
Malta No. No. Optional. The Finance Minister can be 
summoned to report on the activities of the 
ESM before the Public Accounts Committee 
of the national parliament.” 
Netherlands Yes. Every decision must be taken by the plenary, but MPs 
could in principle decide not to take a vote. 
Yes. The decision is taken either by the 
plenary or the Finance Committee. 
Yes. The government is obliged to inform on 
all ESM related decision in public and ex ante. 
Portugal No. No. The government informs the parliament on all 
relevant ESM activities within one month. 
Slovenia No. No. No. 
Slovakia No. No. No. But the Government presents the main 
elements of the financial programme and the 
total amount of the programme to the 
Committee on EU Affairs. 
Spain No. No. No. 
Source 3: Own presentation, based on questionnaires send to parliamentary administrations and deputies of the respective chambers. In italics, treaty provisions mentioned in the 
responses have directly been inserted. The responses can be found in the separate appendix of the thesis (on CD-ROM): For Austria see QESMPR_Austria_2013-01-13; for 
Cyprus see QESMPR_Cyprus_2013-02-18; for Estonia see QESMPR_Estonia_2013-01-31; for Finland see: QESMPR_Finland_2013-01-16; For France see: QESMPR_France I 
2013-01-30, QESMPR_France II 2014-03-06 and QESMPR_France III 2014-04-10; for Germany see: QESMPR_Germany 2013-02-14 and ESMFinG, available from: 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/esmfing/gesamt.pdf (last accessed: 14.03.2014); for Greece see QESMPR_Greece 2014-04-04 and QESMPR_Greece II 2014-04-
10; for Ireland see QESMPR_Ireland 201-03-26, for Italy see: QESMPR_Italy 2013-04-22, for Latvia see: QESMPR_Latvia 2014-09-26, for Luxembourg see: 
QESMPR_Luxembourg 2013-03-31, for Malta see: QESMPR_Malta 2014-02-04, for the Netherlands: see QESMPR_Netherlands 2014-07-22, for Portugal see: 
QESMPR_Portugal 2013-02-12, for Slovakia see: QESMPR_Slovkia I 2014-01-28, QESMPR_Slovakia II 2014-02-03, QESMPR_Slovakia II 2014-02-04; QESMPR_Slovakia 
IV 2014-02-04; for Slovenia see: QESMPR_Slovenia 2013-04-23; for Spain see: QESMPR_Spain 2014-04-04. 
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Vote on Sovereign Aid Packages
35
  
The first column allows an assessment of whether parliaments can vote on sovereign aid 
packages. Only five parliaments foresee a formal vote on sovereign aid packages, namely 
Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands. The Finish case is special since the 
adaption of a sovereign aid package requires the involvement of the Grand Committee, but 
not the plenary. However, the Grand Committee has a dominant position in the parliamentary 
system in Finland. It often acts on behalf of the plenary. The delegation of certain 
competences from the plenary to the Grand Committee is rather a sign of a division of labour 
than a sign of insufficient involvement of the parliamentary plenary.  
In Austria, the Netherlands and Germany the consent of the plenary is required, while the 
Estonian European Affairs Committee may decide – under special circumstances – on behalf 
of the plenary. Strictly speaking, the Dutch MPs can decide themselves whether they want to 
take a vote on a sovereign aid package or not. So far, this has always been the case. I therefore 
classify the Dutch Chamber of Representatives as formally having the right to decide on each 
sovereign aid package.  
These findings are largely in compliance with the Deutsche Bank Research study on 
parliamentary participation within the EFSF: Estonia, Finland and Germany still belong to the 
group of parliaments with the strongest participation rights. Austria, within the EFSF 
mechanism, belonged to the group of parliaments that only possessed information rights (see 
Heinen, Theiss 2011) but no formal say. This assessment is correct for the EFSF, but the 
Austrian parliament has meanwhile strengthened its participation rights significantly within 
the permanent ESM rescue mechanism (see the case study on Austria in C.2.2). Regarding the 
Netherlands, the Dutch permanent representation in Brussels clarified that the classification of 
the Netherlands in the second category by the Deutsche Bank Study was probably incorrect; 
the Dutch parliament already possessed strong formal participation rights within the EFSF 
mechanism (see QESMPR_Netherlands 2013-07-22).  
Italy, France, Latvia and Spain are cases in-between. In all cases, no legal requirements exist 
to involve the parliaments in the decision-making on the sovereign aid packages. However, 
the governments of these countries either recently took the political decision to involve the 
parliaments when granting financial assistance to the Greece (France, Latvia, Spain) or they 
established consultation mechanism that require the government to inform certain 
parliamentary bodies before a decision in the Board of Governors can be taken. In the Latvian 
case, the government has a scope of discretion to decide whether the Saeima should be 
involved in the decision-making or not. Latvia only joined the Euro in 2014 and did therefore 
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 In the following, I will occasionally use the information provided in the questionnaires to describe the different 
forms of parliamentary involvement. Since I guaranteed the respondents anonymity, I will not refer to the 
respondents by name. All information can, however, be found in appendix, see Table 39. 
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not participate in the ESM votes on Cyprus or the Spanish Banking sector. However, the 
Latvian Saeima formally voted on the third bailout package for Greece in August 2015. Since 
this was the first vote of the Latvian Saeima on a sovereign aid package, this might establish a 
political practice from which it is difficult to deviate in the future. The Latvian Saeima is 
therefore classified as a chamber with medium-strong participation rights regarding the 
release of sovereign aid packages. The French and Spanish parliaments also formally voted on 
the third sovereign aid package for Greece in August 2015 (Riedel 2015). These votes were 
not legally binding. In the French case, the parliament did also take decisions on sovereign aid 
packages in the past while the Spanish parliament voted for the first time on a sovereign aid 
package. Due to strong executive dominance (France) or a relatively weak role of the 
parliament in EU affairs (Spain), it seems more unlikely for these two parliaments to 
permanently establish a stronger role beyond the legal provisions. In the Italian case, the 
government must, consult the houses in order to take a decision on a sovereign aid package. 
An explicit vote is not required and the Italian chamber did not take a formal vote on the third 
sovereign aid package for Greece. 
Vote on Release of Financial Tranches 
The second column assesses whether parliaments additionally decide on each financial 
tranche within the sovereign aid package. In the majority of the cases, parliaments do not have 
a specific say. Only in four out of 18 countries parliaments must consent to the release of 
financial tranches within a sovereign aid package. In the Estonian case, the plenary decides on 
the release of tranches. Only in specific, pre-defined circumstances these decisions can also be 
taken by the European Affairs Committee. The EAC can decide on behalf of the plenary when 
tranches have already been pre-defined in the sovereign aid package or do not result in 
changes related to the overall volume (see QESMPR_Estonia_2013-01-31). Estonia is the 
only country in which the European Affairs Committee has such a dominant position. In the 
Dutch case, all decisions regarding the modifications and release of financial tranches are 
taken by the Financial Affairs Committee or the plenary. The Government must assure that 
there is a (simple) majority in the Dutch House of Representatives. The second chamber is not 
involved. Similar to the decision on the release of sovereign aid packages, Dutch MPs could 
in principle decide not to take a decision. 
The German accompanying provisions stipulate in detail under which conditions the 
parliament must be involved. Regarding the release of tranches (§5(3) ESMFinG) the 
parliament must be informed comprehensively and in time in order to issue a position that the 
government must take into account. Only under strictly defined circumstances – which have 
been specified in a judgement by the German Constitutional Court in February 2012 – a 
special sub-committee may take decisions on behalf of the plenary. These exceptional cases 
are negligible since “the German Bundestag complies its function as a body of representation 
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in its entirety and through the participation of all its Members” (German Constitutional Court 
2012: par. 102).
36
 Also, this so-called ‘Sondergremium’ (special committee) has not convened 
a single session until today (see also the BVerfG judgments in the case study on Germany in 
C.2.1.2.3). In sum, Estonia, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands decide (or can decide) on 
the release of tranches within a sovereign aid package and therefore form a group of 
parliaments with quasi-veto powers throughout the duration of the programme. In Austria, a 
competent Standing Sub-Committee must mandate the Austrian representatives in the ESM 
Board of Governors to consent or abstain from a vote changing instruments without amending 
the amount of a given financial stability facility (§ 32h (1) no. 5 Geschäftsordnungsgesetz). A 
plenary debate follows this vote, but has only an informative character. However, there is no 
explicit vote on the release of tranches since provisions for the release can and should also be 
voted upon within the initial decision on a sovereign aid package. In contrast to the other four 
parliaments, the Austrian Nationalrat does not take an explicit vote on the release of financial 
tranches, but must give its consent to all other modifications or changes of instruments within 
a sovereign aid package. It therefore possesses strong formal participation rights, but is no 
quasi-veto players as the other four parliaments.
37
 The remaining parliaments do not have an 
explicit say on the release of financial tranches within an aid package. 
Information Rights 
The obligation of the government to inform the parliament on ESM activities is subject to 
huge variation. In some parliaments, the government is not obliged to inform parliament at all. 
This is, for instance, the case in Slovakia, Spain or Cyprus. In these countries, information is 
only delivered upon request.
38
 The President of the European Affairs Committee in the 
Slovakian Parliament (who responded to the Slovakian questionnaire in person) explained that 
there was a discussion in the European Affairs Committee on how strongly the parliament 
should be involved in ESM affairs. The parliamentarians eventually decided for more 
flexibility for the government. First, they feared that stronger parliamentary powers could be 
misused by populist parties in the parliament. Secondly, strong formal participation was 
regarded as unnecessary since informal channels between the President of the EAC and 
representatives of the Ministry of Finance exist (see appendix, QESMPR_Slovakia I 2014-
01-28). They reduce the need to formally involve the parliament. In Luxembourg, the 
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 Emphasis added by the author.  
37
 In the Portuguese case the government exclusively decides on the release of financial tranches. However, the 
government “shall” inform the parliament within one month to justify the terms and conditions of each operation 
within the aid packages. That makes the Portuguese case slightly different from the remaining 12 cases in which 
the parliaments are all not involved in the release of financial tranches. However, the Assembleia is not taking a 
vote and can therefore not be classified in one of the first two categories. Here, the assessment of the formal 
strength of the Portuguese parliament differs from the assessment of the Deutsche Bank study. 
38
 In line with previous research, Spain and Cyprus were classified as the countries with the weakest participation 
rights in EFSF affairs in the Deutsche Bank study. The Slovakian parliament was, in contrast, classified as a 
parliament with medium strong participation rights. 
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parliament adopted a motion asking the government to systematically inform the Finance and 
Budget Committee prior to meetings of the Council of Governors of the ESM in order “to set 
forth and discuss” the position of the Luxembourg Governor. The Committee is also informed 
on the outcome and the financial implications of the meetings of the Council of Governors 
(see QESMPR_Luxembourg 2013-03-31). Also, rather loose information rights exist for 
Malta and Ireland. The Maltese Finance Minister stated in the response to the questionnaire 
that he “can39 be summoned to report on the activities of the ESM before the Public Accounts 
Committee of the national parliament” (QESMPR_Malta 2014-02-04). This can-provision 
does not guarantee that the parliament is regularly informed, but provides information upon 
request. In Ireland, the Finance Minister has to report about the aggregate value of 
contributions made by the state to the authorised capital stock of the ESM. However, there are 
no provisions that would guarantee regular information on the day-to-day activities of the 
ESM. In other parliamentary settings, information obligations are more strictly defined. In the 
French case, for instance, both houses have to be informed each trimester on ESM activities. 
Additionally, the parliament is informed when ESM governors take decisions, although it is 
not specified whether the parliament is informed ex ante or ex post. In the Austrian case, the 
government has to provide quarterly reports to the standing-subcommittee. Furthermore, there 
are specific reporting requirements defined in the Austrian Parliament’s 
Geschäftsordnungsgesetz. 
Generally, those parliaments that have strong participation rights with regard to the vote on 
sovereign aid packages and the release of tranches therein also have the strongest information 
rights. In the Estonian case, the government must provide annual reports, but the minister 
must additionally inform the parliament immediately – in writing – about a) the application of 
stability support and b) decisions taken to terminate the emergency reserve found. Also the 
German provisions are quite extensive. The government is obliged to inform the Bundestag 
about all ESM-related activities comprehensively and at the earliest possible time in order to 
allow the Bundestag to issue a statement that the representative of the government must take 
into consideration. Seven days after a country has sent a request for financial assistance, the 
government must provide the parliament with a first assessment. In the Netherlands, the 
government is obliged to inform the plenary of the House of Representatives on all decisions 
of the ESM in order to be discussed ex ante in a public debate. The Dutch provisions allow 
public deliberations on ESM activities, although most of the time the discussion of ESM 
activities is done in anticipation of regular debates, for instance in the run-up to Euro Group 
or ECOFIN Council meetings. In the Finish case, the government must additionally provide 
information before and after each meeting of the Board of Governors. 
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 Emphasis added by the author. 
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Five Types of Parliamentary ESM Participation 
Based on this information, different types of parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs can be 
formed inductively. These types possess characteristics that partly overlap: some parliaments 
(can) take a formal vote on each sovereign aid package and the release of financial tranches 
therein (type 1). Other parliamentary settings only foresee the vote on a sovereign aid 
package, but do not require further parliamentary involvement throughout the duration of the 
programme (type 2). In other settings, specific parliamentary bodies must be informed about 
ESM-related decisions before the government may take a decision in the ESM Board of 
Governors, or these parliaments have recently been involved in the decision-making process 
although this was not a legal requirement (type 3). In a fourth type, the government must 
regularly inform parliamentary bodies on ESM related activities (type 4). In order to be 
classified in type 4, formal provisions on the obligation of the government to inform the 
parliament must exist. Type 5 therefore includes those parliaments that do not possess formal 
information rights. This is not to say parliamentary opposition to a sovereign aid would not 
impact on the decision-making processes; nor does it say that individual MPs or political 
party groups cannot request information on ESM activities. However, constitutive for 
parliaments in type 5 is the fact that these information rights are not formalised. 
The major difference is between those parliaments that are institutionally involved in the 
release of sovereign aid packages (type 1 and 2) and those that are not (type 3,4 and 5): this 
(non-) involvement constitutes a major qualitative difference while the classification of the 
other types shows differences in the degree of involvement. Klaus Regling, the managing 
director of the European Stability Mechanism, explained in a hearing of the Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Committee in the European Parliament in January 2014: “In about a third40 
of the euro area countries the finance minister could agree to the programme only once his or 
her national parliament had given authority to do so“ (Regling 2014). Regling is referring to 
the parliaments of type 1 and 2, namely Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany and the 
Netherlands. In this argumentation, the strong parliamentary participation rights are 
considered a proof of strong democratic legitimacy of the current rescue policy.
41
 This aspect 
will again be addressed in the four case studies (see C.2). The five parliaments with the 
strongest participation rights vote on each sovereign aid package, but only four of them 
approve additional tranches as a general rule: the Estonian, the Finish, the German and the 
Dutch parliament. I label these four parliaments quasi-veto players (see Figure 2). Although 
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 At this time, the Eurozone was composed of 17 countries only. 
41
 In other settings, the involvement of national parliaments was not necessarily regarded as an added value in 
democratic terms. During the ratification debate in the French Senate, the former Minister for European Affairs 
declared that the European Stability Mechanism “est contrôlé par les ministres des finances des États membres 
de la zone euro, qui ont la légitimité démocratique pour prendre des décisions" (Pernin 2012). From the 
perspective of the former French government, it seems that the involvement of national government 
representatives was regarded as sufficient to ensure democratic legitimacy.  
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only the Bundestag has a ‘real’ blocking power (because it represents more than 20 per cent 
of the subscribed capital), decisions within the ESM framework have so far always been taken 
by consensus. This gives the other three parliaments likewise quasi-veto powers. In principle, 
a parliamentary majority in these four countries could deny the release of a financial tranche 
within a sovereign aid package as well as a sovereign package. That puts them into a powerful 
position and allows exercising significant influence over the management of the crisis. 
However, variation between these four countries exists. The decision on financial tranches 
can – under specific circumstances – be delegated to committees (such as the Grand 
Committee in Finland or the European Affairs Committee in Estonia). Also the German 
regulations allow for exceptions from the rule that the plenary must take decisions on 
financial tranches (see §5(2) ESMFinG). However, these differences are mainly related to 
procedural questions. They weigh less since all these parliaments can potentially block 
decisions on the release of financial tranches within the ESM framework. Therefore, the four 
parliaments are all classified in the group of parliaments with quasi-veto powers. It must be 
noted, however, that none of 18 Eurozone countries does possess maximum veto rights in the 
sense that the release of each financial tranche depends on a public vote in the plenary – 
without exceptions. 
The Austrian parliament also belongs to the group of strong parliaments since it takes a vote 
on sovereign aid packages. Taking unanimity as the (political) rule in the ESM Board of 
Governors, the Austrian Nationalrat could in principle block the decision on a sovereign aid 
package as well. The only difference to the four other parliaments is that the Austrian 
Nationalrat does not necessarily decide on the release of each financial tranche. It has a veto 
with regard to sovereign aid packages, but not with regard to the release of financial tranches. 
If we the formerly weak participation rights of the Austrian Nationalrat within the EFSF are 
taken into account, it is fair to classify the Austrian parliament in a second group which I label 
partial veto player. Although the Austrian parliament has fewer formal powers than the other 
four parliaments, all five can – at least theoretically – block or slow down decisions taken 
within the ESM framework. 
Italy, France, Latvia and Spain form a third group of parliaments which possess a consultative 
or political role only. In Italy, the government must inform the respective parliamentary 
chamber(s), but it is not obliged to do so in advance. In France, Latvia and Spain, the 
parliaments have taken formal decisions on sovereign aid packages (at least for the third 
sovereign aid package to Greece in August 2015) although this was no legal requirement. 
These parliaments are thus special cases in which formal regulations and political practice 
deviate. Especially due to the size of France, Italy and Spain, these parliamentary chambers 
are in a more powerful position than the remaining parliaments. 
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Figure 2: Types of parliamentary ESM participation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These cases are slightly different from those of Luxembourg, Portugal, Malta
42
, Ireland and 
Slovenia where parliaments are not formally involved in decision-making on sovereign aid 
packages. They are, however, regularly informed on ESM activities, ranging from annual to 
tri-semester reports that must be provided by the government. These parliaments possess 
legally defined information rights. These rights must not necessarily be sufficient to 
effectively control the government at the European level. However, these parliaments can 
refer to some statutory provisions that guarantee a minimum level of information. This is 
different from the remaining seven countries: In Slovakia, Greece, Cyprus and Belgium 
parliamentarians are, if at all, only informed about ESM activities upon request. They form a 
type of parliaments with no formal participation rights. Consequently, they have no formal 
tools to control European or national actors in ESM decision-making. 
Succinctly, this classification distinguishes two qualitatively different types of parliaments: 
those that take a vote on sovereign aid packages (type 1 and 2) and those that do not (type 3 to 
5). It also makes clear that no parliament possesses the strongest possible form of 
parliamentary participation, i.e. a public vote by the plenary for the release of each single 
                                                 
42
 Also Malta is classified in between type four and type five, since obligations to inform the parliament have 
been formulated with a ‘can-provision’. However, since this already exceeds the formal information rights of 
Cyprus or Belgium, Malta was classified in the fourth category. 
Quasi-Veto powers 
Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Netherlands 
Partial veto powers: 
Austria 
 Consultative/political role:  
France, Italy, Latvia, Spain 
 
Information rights:  
(Malta), Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Slovenia 
 No formal participation rights:  
Slovakia, Greece,  
Cyprus, Belgium 
 
Source 4: Own presentation. 
59 
 
tranche within a sovereign aid package. Beyond that, the participation rights of parliaments 
range from non-involvement to quasi-veto players within the ESM framework. 
This classification represents a snapshot of parliamentary ESM involvement. Accompanying 
provisions can be modified; parliamentary party groups might request stronger involvement or 
governments might decide to voluntarily involve parliamentary chambers due to the political 
significance of the decisions being taken. This is a likely scenario since the ESM was so far 
only rarely activated. A ‘learning process’ might therefore take place among the different 
parliamentary chambers which might lead to a stronger involvement in the long term. 
As a general rule, if special accompanying laws regulate the parliamentary influence in ESM 
decision-making, the formal participation rights of parliaments are stronger. If participation 
rights are only derived from rather vague constitutional provisions, formal participation is 
rather weak or even non-existent. The classification not only reveals an asymmetry of 
parliamentary powers between Eurozone and non-Eurozone parliaments, but also between 
parliaments within the Eurozone.  
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B.2 Theoretical Considerations 
The following chapter seeks to identify (theoretical) explanations that account for variation in 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. King et al. define a theory as “a causal argument 
of universal, transhistorical validity and nomothetic quality, which can be tested through the 
falsification of a series of hypotheses” (quoted in: Wiener, Diez 2009: 3). I will first start with 
a rather broad theoretical interpretation of the management of the crisis before I turn to the 
question of parliamentary involvement. 
Responses to the Crisis from the Perspective of EU Integration Theories 
The responses to the current crisis have been addressed in a number of theoretical 
contributions focussing on classical theories of European integration (see for instance 
Niemann and Ioannou 2015; Schimmelfennig 2015b; Verdun 2015). Especially neo-
functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and approaches of path dependency provide 
useful tools to understand the management of the crisis from a macro-perspective. They can 
help explaining why sovereignty was transferred from the national to the European level (for 
instance federalist or neo-functionalist approaches), but also how this process was carried out 
(such as historical institutionalism) and in how far power relations influenced the concrete 
design of the crisis responses (such as liberal intergovernmentalism or – to a lesser extent – 
neo-realist approaches). None of these approaches can solely explain the management of the 
crisis or the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism, but are offering useful tools 
for a comprehensive understanding (more below).  
What complicates the application of classical theories of European integration is the fact that 
the Eurozone crisis is in many respects without precedent. These theories conventionally aim 
at explaining the deepening and widening of the EU political system. At first glance, 
deepening and widening have taken place throughout the crisis. The Eurozone was enlarged 
by Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014) and Lithuania (2015) and the EMU governance frame was 
deepened by numerous reforms (see again A.4.1). However, there had been warnings that the 
EMU was unlikely to survive in its initial form (see for instance Feldstein 1997). The 
outbreak of the crisis came as a surprise for most decision-makers. The very definition of a 
‘crisis’ implies that policy-makers were confronted with a situation for which there was no 
rule book or pre-defined routines and practices on how to deal with it. Furthermore, a 
systemic crisis also implies that the stability and the survival of the entire system are (or are at 
least perceived to be) at risk. Although economic crises (and even banking crises and the 
default of sovereign countries) regularly occurred in recent decades, the specific design of the 
Economic and Monetary Union posed challenges to adequately respond to the financial and 
economic turmoil starting in 2007/2010. In the EMU, a single monetary policy is pursued by 
the European Central Bank (Art. 119 and 127 TFEU) while fiscal and economic policies rely 
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on a mixture of hard and soft coordination mechanisms which ultimately leaves responsibility 
with the Member States. This structure has often been described as deficient. German policy-
makers initially rejected the idea that a common currency union could be created without a 
political union (Kohl 1991). The current EU treaties stipulate that the economic policies of the 
Member States shall be considered a “matter of common concern” (Art. 212 TFEU). The 
1997 Stability and Growth Pact tried to foster responsible fiscal policies of the Member 
States, and the entrance into the common currency union was conditioned by the fulfilment of 
so-called convergence criteria.  
These instruments had proven to be ineffective in the time before the outbreak of the crisis 
(see for instance Eichengreen 2012). Neither were the convergence criteria to enter the 
Eurozone fully respected in the late 1990s (Hix, Høyland 2011: 245ff) nor did the Stability 
and Growth Pact rigorously sanction countries violating the self-imposed rules (Seng, 
Biesenbender 2012). With the benefit of hindsight, the Eurozone was not equipped with 
policy tools to tackle diverging economic cycles or asymmetric economic shocks (see 
Krugman 2012); it also possessed no answer to the question of what to do with Member 
States that were not willing or not able to comply with the self-imposed rules of economic 
harmonization. The current EU treaties exclude the possibility to bail-out a country or the exit 
from the Eurozone. They do also not define mechanisms to handle a sovereign default of a 
Eurozone Member State. The result is an impossibility-trinity of “no exit, no bail-out, and no 
default” with which European policy-makers were confronted at the onset of the crisis. 
Neo-functionalist Explanations 
The mismatch between a centralised monetary policy on the one hand and a decentralised 
economic and fiscal policy on the other is the starting point of many neo-functionalist and 
historical institutionalist accounts explaining the management of the crisis. In such a 
conception, the creation of Economic and Monetary Union in the 1990s is the ultimate 
‘critical juncture’ which structures many of the policy responses since the outbreak of the 
crisis (Verdun 2015: 224). Functional spill-overs thus resulted from the endogenous 
interdependence of Euro area Member States as well as from converging preferences to 
preserve the Eurozone (Schimmelfennig 2015: 179). From a neo-functionalist perspective, the 
ultimate objective of the management of the crisis was the preservation of the Single Market. 
For this to be achieved, adjustments to the current design of the EMU had to be made. The 
status quo of the EMU design had turned out to be unsustainable.  
The status quo was unsustainable for all Eurozone Member States, but two groups can be 
distinguished to highlight the divergent preferences during the crisis negotiations: Those 
countries which were heavily indebted on one side and economically strong Member States 
which were in the position to provide financial assistance. The unsustainability of the status 
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quo, however, did not mean that both groups of countries had common interests about future 
reform steps. Neo-functionalist accounts can thus offer valuable explanations as to why 
functional needs occurred to change and reform the Eurozone, and to ultimately deepen 
economic and fiscal cooperation. The establishment of financial assistance tools 
(EFSF/EFSM/ESM), the strengthening of mechanisms to foster economic coordination (the 
TSCG, Euro-Plus Pact and the revised StGP) as well as the common supervision of 
(numerous) European banks (Banking Union) can both be interpreted as spill-over effects, 
resulting from a deficient design of the EMU (as created at the beginning of the 1990s). 
However, these accounts do not necessarily explain the direction of the management of the 
crisis. 
Political Economy and Optimal Currency Areas  
To understand the diverging preferences of Eurozone Member States, it is helpful to draw on 
theories from the field of the political economy. Mundell (1961) and Kenen (1969) have 
developed a theory of optimal currency areas (OCA) in which they identify different 
mechanisms to tackle economic cycles and asymmetric economic shocks within a currency 
union. The starting point is that every currency area faces economic cycles. Some parts of a 
currency union inevitably perform better than others. This pattern changes over time. 
Consequently, the common exchange rate as well as the common interest rate will always be 
too high for some areas of the currency union and too low for others. It can never be optimal. 
Ideally, members of a currency union should have similar economic cycles to reduce the 
negative impact of divergent economic cycles and asymmetric shocks. The Maastricht criteria 
were initially designed to guarantee that only homogenous economies could enter the 
Eurozone. Bayoumi and Eichengreen, in 1993, modelled the impact of asymmetric economic 
shocks in Europe (to which they counted Germany, France, Denmark and the Benelux 
countries). The impact of asymmetric shocks was relatively modest. If Southern European 
countries were included into the model, however, the impact of economic shocks was much 
more severe and asymmetric (Bayoumi, Eichengreen 1993). As outlined above, the 
convergence criteria were not fully respected in late 1990. Only three out of eleven countries 
fully complied with all self-imposed criteria in the late 1990s. As a consequence, the members 
of the Eurozone were much more heterogeneous than initially intended by the architects of the 
Maastricht Treaty.  
The more heterogonous a currency union is, the more difficult it becomes to address 
economic cycles and asymmetric shocks. A classical approach to address an economic 
downturn is to increase public spending. A significant increase of public spending is, 
however, hampered by the strict rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (as well as lately by 
the Fiscal Compact). Additionally, heavily indebted countries were essentially cut off from 
money supply by financial markets as a result of their worsening economic situation. Labour 
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mobility – another key mechanism in the conception of OCA – is equally deficient in the 
Eurozone due to linguistic and cultural barriers (see among others Jauer et al. 2014). As a 
consequence, Eurozone Member States had basically two options to address economic 
imbalances: either debtor countries would regain competitiveness by a process of ‘internal 
devaluation’, e.g. the reduction of salaries, pensions and social benefits combined with 
structural reforms in the economy, or through automatic large-scale fiscal compensations 
(which some would describe as a ‘transfer union’). 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Crisis 
From the perspective of liberal intergovernmentalism, the mismatch between a centralized 
monetary policy and decentralized economic and fiscal policies is only the starting point to 
explain why reform pressure arose in the first place. In line with Moravscik’s seminal work of 
intergovernmental negotiations (Moravscik 1998), tough bargaining between debtor and 
donor countries determined the concrete design of the crisis response. Although the status quo 
was unsustainable for all Eurozone Member States, the question was whether economic 
adjustment should be primarily addressed through a process of internal devaluation or bail-out 
policies. Schimmelfennig describes the negotiations on the different bailout packages as a 
‘chicken game’. Both parties would lose most in case of non-agreement. Beside the political 
damage of a euro dissolution, debtor counties risked sovereign default and abandoning the 
euro. For donor countries, on the other side, a breakdown of the euro would have resulted in a 
steep appreciation of their own currencies and a concurrent slump in exports (Schimmelfennig 
2015: 181). However, both parties would also gain most if the other party gave in completely. 
The fact that no previously defined procedures existed to deal with the crisis put national 
executives in a pivotal position. Fabbrini has convincingly outlined the limits of this 
intergovernmentalist approach (see Fabbrini 2013). First, the Heads of State or Governments 
had to overcome a veto-dilemma which necessarily occurs in intergovernmental bargaining. 
Legally, no Member States can be forced to give up sovereignty, to enhance economic 
coordination at the European level or to contribute to any kind of financial assistance. In order 
to overcome this veto dilemma, treaties were established outside of the EU legal framework. 
The EFSF/ESM, but also the TSCG and the Euro Plus Pact were ratified as intergovernmental 
treaties. In case of the TSCG, the Member States even agreed that the treaty could come into 
force if only 12 Eurozone Members (with a pre-defined capital share and economic weight) 
would ratify the treaty. The unanimity requirement was therefore de facto suspended, 
allowing for further differentiated integration between Eurozone and non-Eurozone member 
states. The British opposition to the TSCG, in particular, could be overcome with this 
approach. Second, the Heads of State and Government faced an enforcement dilemma. How 
could it be guaranteed that decision were applied which were ultimately taken on a voluntary 
basis? The ‘creative’ solution was to link some of treaties outside the EU legal framework 
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with each other. Any form of financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism 
requires the ratification and implementation of the TSCG. This explains why Eurozone 
Member States, especially debtor countries, were willing to accept stricter economic 
coordination via the TSCG (which goes beyond rules set by the Stability and Growth Pact). 
For the donor countries it was obvious that they could only convincingly demand economic 
reforms in programme countries if they committed themselves to stricter economic 
surveillance as well. Overcoming the enforcement dilemma thus resulted in a legal 
construction that appears to some extent orderless. If the provisions of the TSCG and the 
StGP are in conflict with each other (for instance regarding the newly introduced reversed 
qualified majority threshold) the question arises: which of the two treaties has legal 
superiority? The treaty embedded in the EU legal framework or the intergovernmental treaty? 
And third, the intergovernmentalist approach also faced a compliance dilemma: how could it 
be guaranteed in the long-run that rules were respected which no longer fitted the interests of 
one or more voluntarily contracting parties? Fabbrini outlines how the Heads of State or 
Government addressed this dilemma by giving European institutions an important role in 
those treaties outside the EU legal framework. The European Commission, for instance, is 
part of the so-called former Troika to monitor the implementation of the Memoranda of 
Understanding in programme countries. The Court of Justice of the European Union can 
sanction the non-implementation of the debt-brake rule in national constitutional or statutory 
provisions; furthermore, the Stability and Growth Pact has been extended and reinforced in a 
way that it is now in many respects in line with the provisions of the TSCG. From a liberal 
intergovernmentalist perspective, the involvement of European institutions in treaties outside 
of the EU legal framework can be interpreted as a kind of ‘credible commitment’ (see 
Moravscik 1998). Neo-functionalists would interpret this involvement as a kind of ‘cultivated 
spillover’ in which European institutions actively tried not to be side-lined and to increase 
their say in the management of the crisis. 
Classical theories of European integration therefore provide useful explanations for the 
reforms of the Eurozone since the beginning of 2010 (Schimmelfennig 2015a). Ultimately, 
new Member States joined the Economic and Monetary Union in this time period (widening) 
and the governance frame was significantly extended (deepening). These theories thus 
provide convincing explanations for the initial pressure to ‘complete’ the EMU governance 
framework based on critical junctures and spill-over pressures. But they also explain the 
asymmetrical negotiation position of different groups of Member States, accounting for the 
specific design of the rescue mechanisms. 
Parliamentary Involvement within the ESM 
These theories do not, however, directly explain parliamentary involvement within the rescue 
mechanisms and especially within the European Stability Mechanism. In the following, I will 
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collect theoretical assumptions to explain why some parliaments have adopted strong 
participation rights in the ESM while others have not. These theoretical assumptions structure 
the data collection process for the independent variables (see B.4). I do not intend to test 
competing hypotheses with the objective of demonstrating the greater explanatory power of 
one theory over another. In line with arguments on configurational reasoning (see for instance 
Ragin 2006 and Rihoux, Ragin 2009) I assume that these different hypotheses can unfold their 
full explanatory potential in combination with others. The method I employ is ‘qualitative 
comparative analysis’ (QCA) and will be explained in chapter B.3.1. QCA is therefore not 
simply a research technique, but already contains a theoretical argumentation (see below). 
Sixteen combinations of the four guiding assumptions are theoretically possible
43
 (see chapter 
B.3.1). Not all of these combinations possess the same explanatory power. However, there are 
two combinations of guiding assumptions that I will elaborate upon in more detail at the end 
of this sub-chapter (see B.2.5). I assume that the combination of a strong macro-economic 
situation with either strong formal EU prerogatives or strong Eurosceptical parties accounts 
for strong parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. The four guiding assumptions are 
primarily derived from the literature on parliamentary behaviour in EU affairs; they are all 
based on a rational choice logic. As for any theoretical design, the aim is to provide a lean 
explanation for a given outcome (see Sieberer 2007). Lean explanations do not necessarily 
account for all possible instances of an outcome, but aim at providing generalizable causal 
patterns. The following chapter first introduces the basic assumptions of rational choice 
approaches. In a second step, four guiding assumptions are derived from a thick description of 
empirical and theoretical evidence from parliamentary behaviour. 
Rational Choice 
Rational Choice is considered a ‘second-order’ or meta-theory. Its fundamental logic is that 
individuals or collective actors take decisions to maximize their own benefit. These 
approaches have been fruitfully applied in EU studies, and especially in legislative politics at 
the European level (see Pollack 2006: 37) (on the role of NPs in the general context of 
European integration see among others Benz 2004; Dimitrakopoulos 2001; Dinan 2012; 
Neunreither 2005).
44
 Individuals or collective actors with pre-defined interests and 
preferences are assumed to be the decisive protagonists in EU decision-making processes. 
Variation regarding an observed phenomenon thus results from the different interests and 
preferences of these very actors.  
                                                 
43
 According to the QCA logic, the guiding assumptions (conditions) can either be present or absent. The 
dichotomous classification of the conditions leads to sixteen possible combination of conditions (2
4
). This 
reasoning will be explained in detail in chapter B.3.1. 
44
 The emergence of the EP as a decisive actor in the legislative procedure as well as the extension of QVM has 
been explained, alongside other approaches, with rational choice approaches. 
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National parliamentary party groups were the ultimate decision-makers in the ESM 
ratification process (although national governments and civil servants negotiated the ESM 
treaty as well as accompanying provisions). These actors could – at least theoretically – 
upload their preferences and interests to the European level and instruct their governments 
during the negotiations in a principal-agent relationship (for a general account an principal-
agent relations in EU affairs see Kassim, Menon 2003).  
This fundamental presumption informs the development of the guiding assumptions. I 
consequently assume that differences in ESM involvement can be explained with different 
preferences and interests of utility-maximizing actors within parliaments. These actors 
maximize their expected utility and thus follow the ‘logic of consequentialism’45. Applied to 
national parliaments, parliamentary behaviour is determined by rational incentives and 
preferences, most notably re-election, policy impact or career ambitions. These incentives are 
expected to be fixed and exogenously given (although there is a controversy in the literature 
on the question whether preference formation is rather exogenously (rational institutionalism) 
or rather endogenously derived (historical institutionalism) (see Steinmo et al. 1992: 9, more 
below))
 46
. 
Due to their role as parliamentarians, parliamentarians across Europe have a similar set of 
preferences, respectively similar interests in maximizing their expected utility. They defend, 
for instance, national interests and try to control their governments in EU affairs. If that was 
correct, however, there should be similar policy outcomes, i.e. similar parliamentary 
participation rights in ESM affairs in all 18 participating countries. This is not the case (see 
again B.1). Rational choice approaches therefore resort to additional tools explaining why 
actors sometimes pursue different actions despite a similar set of preferences in the first place: 
they are expected to take decisions under constraints. Neo-institutionalist accounts (for an 
overview see Hall, Taylor 1996; Kato 1996; Pierson 1996) assume that the preferences of 
actors are to different degrees shaped by institutional rules. Institutions – defined as “formal 
or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational 
structure of the policy or political economy” (Hall, Taylor 1996: 938) – are regarded as a form 
of constraint. They shape political behaviour (see for instance Immergut 1997: 333) and thus 
help explaining, for example, variation in ESM parliamentary participation. They can 
furthermore either hinder actors to take specific actions close to their preferences and 
                                                 
45
 In contrast to the ‘logic of arguing’, see for the term Risse 2000. 
46
 The assumption of exogenously given and fixed preferences of actors is a valid criticism that applies to all 
first-order theories derived from rational choice approaches (see among others Snidal 2002). This research 
project does, however, not intend to explain altered preferences of parliamentary actors over time. It tries to 
theorize their preferences at a fixed point. Applying the idea of exogenously derived preferences for this very 
empirical case seems thus tenable.  
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interests, or they can even alter these preferences in the first place. In both cases, the results 
are different policy outcomes, although based on initially similar preferences. 
Applied to the ESM treaty, parliamentarians may have an interest in securing strong 
participation rights in order to increase their influence. These preferences are shaped, 
however, by different institutional environments: Parliaments issuing financial assistance are 
presumably interested in strong parliamentary involvement in order to guarantee the 
surveillance of financial assistance. Parliaments receiving financial assistance, on the other 
side, are hypothesized to have an interest in fast decision-making procedures which are not 
slowed down by extensive parliamentary deliberations. It is consequently rational for them 
not to insist on strong parliamentary involvement in order to reduce the number of possible 
veto players in this process. In this sense, acting rational can mean different things under 
different (institutional) constraints. 
Four Guiding Assumptions Explaining Parliamentary Involvement in ESM Affairs 
Assuming rationalist behaviour of collective actors as the starting point, I derive four guiding 
assumptions to explain the degree of parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. First, the 
macro-economic situation of a country (see B.2.1) is hypothesized to influence the likelihood 
of strong or weak parliamentary involvement. Economic strength is an important element of 
power and can be perceived as an institutional constraint which structures behaviour and 
alters preferences. It might therefore constitute an incentive to establish ‘safety belts’ in the 
sense of stronger parliamentary involvement within the ESM. In line with this reasoning, it 
would be rational to establish stronger parliamentary involvement if there is potentially more 
to lose (economically), or, put differently: economic prosperity might allow for the ‘luxury’ of 
enhanced democratic control. Economically weak countries, on the other side, are assumed to 
have an incentive in establishing fast decision-making procedures that are not slowed down 
by extensive parliamentary deliberations. Similar arguments can be found in power-based 
approaches of international relations in which the economic situation of a country serves as an 
explanatory variable (see among others Grieco 1995; Mearsheimer 1995). Second, the 
presence of Eurosceptical sentiments (see B.2.2) might impact on parliamentary involvement. 
Eurosceptical parties are hypothesized to have a political interest in holding governments 
publicly accountable for the management of the crisis in order to strengthen their own 
profiles. The presence of strong Eurosceptical sentiments would consequently make stronger 
parliamentary involvement in the crisis management more likely. Third, following the logic of 
path dependency (Pierson 1996), it is assumed that parliaments which already possessed 
strong scrutiny powers in the handling of EU affairs (at the domestic level) are able to transfer 
these powers to the intergovernmental ESM (see B.2.3). These parliaments have fought for a 
stronger say in EU affairs in a long and arduous process. They are following a path of 
established practices when maintaining this stronger influence in the European Stability 
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Mechanism. On the other side, it is rather unlikely that parliaments with weak formal 
participation rights in EU affairs acquire a strong say in the intergovernmental setting of the 
ESM (since intergovernmental settings are traditionally a domain of the executive). Lastly, 
the number and the role of political actors required to ratify the ESM treaty is assumed to 
influence parliamentary participation (see B.2.4). If special majorities were required in 
parliament to ratify the treaty – partly even in both chambers – opposition parties could more 
easily influence the government’s policy by negotiating side payments. One of these side 
payments are stronger parliamentary participation rights in ESM affairs in order to secure 
influence in the event of a change in government. These four guiding assumptions structure 
the process of the data collection for the independent variables (see B.4).  
The theoretical logic of each of the four assumptions will be spelt out in more detail in the 
following sub-chapters. As outlined above, this thesis does not assume that any one of these 
four guiding assumptions can – on its own – explain parliamentary involvement sufficiently 
across all cases. It is rather a combination of guiding assumptions that unfold the strongest 
explanatory power. I will elaborate upon these combinations in chapter B.2.5. 
 
B.2.1 Macro-Economic Situation 
In this sub-section I argue that the macro-economic situation of a country influences the 
parliament’s position within the management of the crisis. The costs and benefits of EU 
integration are often assessed from an economic perspective. They serve as utilitarian 
explanations for EU support. If a country is economically better off, support for a political 
system is likely to be higher.  
There is an intensive discussion within the literature whether specific types of capitalist 
systems are systematically advantaged or disadvantaged within the process of European 
integration (see especially Höpner, Schäfer 2010 and Scharpf 1999). These contributions do 
not primarily deal with the role of parliaments within a political system. However, they 
demonstrate that different economic set-ups have consequences for democratically elected 
decision-makers to defend a specific type of capitalist system. The distinction between liberal 
(such as the United Kingdom or Ireland) and co-ordinated market economies (such as Austria 
or Germany) (for a good overview see Albert 1992; but also Hall, Soskice 2001) is most 
prominent among these concepts. Crum (2013) lists more fine-grained distinctions that also 
identify the ‘Scandinavian model’ (as developed by Esping-Andersen 1990), the ‘Latin 
capitalism’ model for the countries in the Mediterranean (Rhodes, Van Apeldoorn 1997) and 
the ‘dependent market economies’ in East central Europe (Nölke, Vliegenthart 2009) (for an 
overview see Crum 2013). These different economic set-ups can be found in the current 
European Union, indicating the immense heterogeneity of capitalist systems. Assuming a 
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‘neo-liberal’ or ‘market-facilitating’ approach of supranational institutions as a starting point 
(for instance by the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union or the 
ECB), this literature demonstrates how different ‘varieties of capitalism’ came under pressure 
during the intensification of economic integration. This development enlarged, as the 
argument goes, democratic deficiencies in the current institutional set-up of the European 
Union (see for instance Scharpf 1999). 
Succinctly, approaches explaining policy outcomes with macro-economic variables have a 
long and well-established tradition in political science and are, at least indirectly, linked to the 
question of democratic governance and European integration. The institutional set-up of 
market economies, however, is less decisive than the macro-economic performance of 
Eurozone Member States to account for differences in parliamentary involvement in ESM 
affairs. Scharpf, in a quite pessimistic outlook, elaborates how democratically elected 
institutions have been side-lined by the executive-dominated management of the crisis as well 
as the worsened financial situation of most Member States. He observes a loss of 
parliamentary autonomy which gave summit resolutions or ECOFIN agreements a take-it-or-
leave-it character “that no member-state parliament[…] [could] afford to reject” (Scharpf 
2012: 25). Although Scharpf argues that all national parliaments are affected by this 
development, he nonetheless emphasises that especially debtor countries were exposed to 
pressure from non-national actors (Scharpf 2012: 27, but also Scharpf 2014). The dividing 
line is therefore not a specific ‘variant of a capitalist system’, but the economic strength of a 
country and the question whether these countries provide or receive financial assistance.  
Maatsch (2013) tries to explain the policy positioning of political parties towards the crisis 
management by differentiating between debtor and donor countries. She finds that political 
parties in debtor countries are more likely to advocate for Keynesian anti-crisis measures – 
independent of their ideological party positioning. Parties in donor countries, on the other 
side, are more likely to advocate neo-liberal anti-crisis measures (Maatsch 2013). This leads 
to the question of whether Member States’ parliaments are differently affected by the crisis, 
depending on their macro-economic situation. Benz also observes an asymmetry of 
parliamentary influence during the crisis. He sees the dividing line between parliaments from 
economically strong and economically weak Member States (see Benz 2013), most notably 
between debtor and donor countries. However, Benz also admitted that this distinction might 
be too simplistic. Parliaments in France or Italy – both officially belonging to the group of 
donor countries – are not strengthened by the crisis to the same extent (if at all) as, for 
instance, the German Bundestag. These countries are effectively in the firm grip of austerity 
programmes mandated by European institutions, although they did not request financial 
assistance (for the Italian case see Hopkin 2012). In 2011, a total of 24 out of 27 countries had 
been under the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) monitored by the European Commission. 
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Therefore, it seems necessary to have a more fine-grained distinction between economically 
strong and economically weak countries that goes beyond the rather simplistic distinction of 
debtor and donor countries. 
The starting point for such a distinction is the macro-economic situation of Eurozone Member 
States. When the ESM treaty was ratified in the first half of 2012, macro-economic 
parameters differed significantly within the Eurozone (see among other Buti, Carnot 2012; De 
Grauwe, Ji 2012). The economies of Germany, Luxembourg or Estonia had relatively soon 
recovered from the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Greece, Ireland or Portugal had to 
request financial assistance from the EFSF in 2010-2012 (see for instance Gorjao 2012) with 
Spain (late 2012) and Cyprus following in early 2013 (these loans were granted under the 
ESM in liaison with the IMF). The spreads on government bonds for Eurozone countries had 
widened significantly: Austria, Germany or the Netherlands could easily refinance their 
government expenditures at record low prices while countries such as Slovenia or Italy had to 
pay significantly higher interest rates on their government bonds (see for instance Drudi et al. 
2012: 888). As of 2014, eleven countries were still under the excessive deficit procedure since 
their annual budget deficits exceeded the 3% GDP limit (European Commission 2014a) – 
most of them coming from Southern and Eastern European countries. This reflects the 
heterogeneity of the macro-economic situation in the Eurozone. Many observers therefore 
diagnosed an increasing North-South divide that was beginning to pose a serious obstacle for 
the further economic integration of the Eurozone (for a slighlty different argument on the 
preferences over international redistribution see Bechtel et al. 2014). This gap was largely 
unobserved and neglected in the first decade of the monetary union: “There is now a 
widespread consensus that financial markets in the Eurozone were systematically wrong when 
during 2001–08 they were charging the same risk premium on Greek and German government 
bonds despite huge differences in debt-to-GDP ratios of these countries” (De Grauwe, Ji 
2012: 878). However, these economic differences influenced the discussion on the concrete 
arrangements of national accompanying provisions to the ESM treaty significantly. While 
Northern countries demanded strict conditionality in exchange for financial assistance (see for 
instance Katsikas 2012: 53), government leaders of Southern European countries advocated 
fast and efficient decision-making procedures to overcome the crisis. This debate was 
surrounded by discussions of a ‘stability’ or ‘transfer union’. 
Why was the granting of financial guarantees accompanied with great scepticism in 
(especially) ‘Northern’ European countries? First, because it became increasingly difficult to 
predict whether programme countries would be able to repay the credits they had received. 
And second, because politicians were increasingly concerned to give away decision-making 
powers that concerned their own public revenues and expenditures (on the German 
Bundestag’s reticence to approve bailout packages see among others Powell, Steinberg 2012: 
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59). The assessment whether programme countries would be able to repay their credits or not 
became as controversial as the question of who should take the respective decisions and be 
accountable for them. As Hopkin puts it: “countries such as Germany, [the] Netherlands and 
Finland fear[ed] that a bailout would create a lasting relationship of dependency of the debtor 
nations on their more creditworthy neighbours” (Hopkin 2012: 36). Parliamentarians in all 
countries were faced with a situation of incomplete information as well as decision-making 
under high uncertainty. Finland, for instance, demanded exceptional guarantees in exchange 
for the agreement to a Greek bailout package (FAZ Online 2015). In Germany, numerous law 
suits were filed against the ESM, arguing that the German Bundestag lacked sufficient means 
to control the issuing of financial guarantees. In Austria, the opposition Green Party 
demanded stronger parliamentary participation in the ESM in exchange for support of the 
modification of article 136 TFEU (see case study on Austria in C.2.2). 
Southern European countries, on the other side, did not necessarily share the concern of 
insufficient parliamentary involvement. Italy’s former Prime Minister, Mario Monti, declared 
in an interview in 2012: “If governments allow themselves to be entirely bound to the 
decisions of their parliament, without protecting their own freedom to act, a break-up of 
Europe would be a more probable outcome than deeper integration” (Spiegel Online 2012). 
Although Monti’s comment enraged numerous German politicians, the statement passed 
almost unnoticed in Italy. Monti – somehow ‘unbound’ to the parliament as a precondition for 
accepting to govern – feared that parliamentary involvement would hamper efficient decision-
making. For the German Constitutional Court, on the other side, strong parliamentary 
involvement not only serves to defend economic interests, but also to safeguard national 
sovereignty and accountability. These different approaches of Northern and Southern 
countries towards the role of national parliaments might also reflect different political cultures 
and traditions of parliamentary involvement. Nonetheless, there is reason to assume that the 
macro-economic situation of a country influenced the decision whether strong parliamentary 
involvement was incorporated or not. Therefore, I formulate the first guiding assumption: 
Guiding Assumption 1: Countries in a favourable economic situation adopt stronger 
parliamentary participation rights within the ESM than economically weaker countries. 
Succinctly, countries in an economically favourable condition regard stronger parliamentary 
involvement as an appropriate tool to safeguard economic and political interests. Countries in 
economically weaker conditions have either already requested financial assistance from the 
ESM, or had to anticipate such a step in the foreseeable future. They thus had an interest in 
decision-making procedures that are not slowed down by extensive parliamentary 
involvement. It is therefore rational to opt for stronger respectively weaker parliamentary 
involvement depending on the macro-economic situation. In this sense, the macro-conditions 
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constitute institutional constraints that alter the preferences of utility-maximizing political 
actors. 
 
B.2.2 Political Contestation 
Evidence from the literature also suggests that the degree of contestation over the European 
Integration process impacts on formal parliamentary involvement (Abbarno, Zapryanova 
2013). Raunio has shown that the actual involvement of parliaments in EU affairs depends on 
the formal prerogatives of NPs, but also on the presence of Eurosceptical parties in parliament 
(Raunio 2005). Gattermann and Hefftler equally tested whether political contestation 
increases the odds to issue reasoned opinions under the so-called Early Warning System 
(EWS) and find a positive correlation (Gattermann, Hefftler 2015). This empirical evidence 
suggests that the degree of contestation impacts on both, formal parliamentary participation 
rights as well as on actual parliamentary activities. Since the ratification of the ESM treaty is 
about redistributive policies, it can be assumed that the topic is even more controversial than 
classical EU affairs (on a similar argument see Moravcsik 2006). 
Euroscepticism as such is still a relatively new concept. For a long time, it appeared as a 
distinct English phenomenon; only the 1990s saw it emerging as a new line of conflict in 
continental Europe. Euroscepticism is not adequately reflected in the classical left-right 
positioning of political parties (see among others Hooghe, Marks 2008). Opposition to the 
integration process can be found on both sides of the party spectrum. Currently, Eurosceptical 
parties are often framed as being part of the so-called ‘new politics’ (Hooghe et al. 2002), or 
they are simply a sub-category of so-called ‘populist parties’. This development was preceded 
by changes in political preferences in Western Europe. David Easton (1979) defined the 
responsiveness of political systems as 
 […]first, that the authorities are willing to take information into account and give 
it consideration in their outputs and second, that they do so positively in the sense 
that they seek to use it to help avert discontent or to satisfy grievances over initial 
outputs or some unfulfilled demands. Responsiveness of authorities will vary 
from extreme sensitivity to stony impermeability to the wants and demands of the 
politically relevant members of the system (Easton 1979: 434). 
Eurosceptical sentiments have without doubt affected political actors in all EU Member States 
since the 1990s (McLaren 2006) and especially since the decisive no-votes on the 
Constitutional Treaty in the Netherlands and France. Also the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis 
has triggered a rise of Eurosceptical sentiments, at times particularly directed to the common 
currency (see among others Hobolt, Wratil 2015 and Kuhn, Stoeckel 2014). With the latest 
election to the European Parliament in 2014, nearly one third of the seats are now occupied by 
more or less Eurosceptical parties. They partly oppose further integration or want to withdraw 
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from the European Union entirely (Höing, Müller Gómez 2014). The rise of these parties has 
numerous causes: the elite-driven approach of EU integration (Chandler 2010: 154) provoked 
increased demands for a democratization of decision-making procedures at the EU level; 
demands to regain sovereignty, fear of uncontrolled immigration or excessive 
bureaucratization of, especially, the European Commission became influential factors 
explaining the rise of Eurosceptical sentiments since the 1990s (for an overview on the 
different strands of Euroscepticism see Sørensen 2007). Also the Eurozone crisis itself 
triggered Eurosceptical sentiments and arguably made parties at the extremist fringes of party 
spectrums more socially acceptable. A case in point is Greece, where the traditional party 
system collapsed after two early elections in 2012 (Katsikas 2012: 51) and was transformed to 
an even greater extent after the ballots in January and September 2015. It is less obvious in 
Spain or Portugal where the fury and annoyance with European rescue packages provoked the 
establishment of new political movements opposing austerity policies, but not necessarily EU 
integration as such. Nonetheless, Eurosceptical demands played an important role 
domestically in nearly all EU Member States and forced political parties to react. Crucially, 
growing public dissatisfaction with European integration and the management of the Euro 
crisis provide electoral incentives.  
From a rational choice perspective, electoral incentives are a crucial driving force to explain 
(parliamentary) behaviour. Political parties are expected to react to growing Eurosceptical 
sentiments (Abbarno, Zapryanova 2013: 594) either by adapting Eurosceptical strategies or by 
avoiding to publicly discuss EU issues (Auel elaborates on why the classical opposition-
government dualism does not work with EU affairs, see Auel 2007). Additionally, the 
ratification of the ESM treaty was accompanied by huge media attention in most Member 
States. Eurosceptical parliamentarians had the opportunity to present themselves as defenders 
of national sovereignty, and the national budget in particular (see case study on Austria, 
C.2.2). The ratification of the ESM was preceded by a longer period of public deliberations 
(while the ratification of the EFSF and its accompanying laws was carried out under immense 
time pressure in May 2010, see again A.4.2). Eurosceptical parties had therefore chances to 
pick up the issue and to publicly hold the government accountable. Some MPs and political 
parties have even taken legal actions against the ESM before their constitutional courts (also 
on the grounds that democratic principles were violated by the new mechanism, see case 
studies on Germany and Ireland, C.2.1 and C.2.3).  
Since the ESM is designed as a permanent rescue mechanism, provisions regulating 
parliamentary involvement are unlikely to be changed in the near future. The ratification of 
the ESM treaty was therefore accompanied by two culminating trends that make an impact of 
Eurosceptical sentiments on parliamentary prerogatives more likely: First, financial 
guarantees cover a sensitive part of parliamentary sovereignty. And second, although the rise 
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of Eurosceptical parties is a rather long-term trend, the high media attention during the 
ratification process offered an ideal window of opportunity for Eurosceptical parties to 
publicly criticise the government. I therefore formulate the second guiding assumption as 
follows: 
Guiding Assumption 2: The stronger Eurosceptical sentiments are – in public opinion polls 
or through the presence of Eurosceptical parties in parliament – the stronger parliamentary 
participation rights within the ESM. 
This guiding assumption does not assume that more Europhile parliaments automatically 
renounce stronger parliamentary prerogatives. However, public Eurosceptical sentiments offer 
electoral incentives to publicly demand stronger parliamentary participation in the ESM. The 
guiding assumption is thus directed to political systems in which Eurosceptical sentiments are 
strong without making predictions on political settings in which they are absent. 
 
B.2.3 Institutional Capacities 
In order to fully understand ESM parliamentary involvement, it is necessary to recall that the 
European Stability Mechanism is intergovernmental in nature. Any parliamentary 
involvement in intergovernmental settings is rather the exception than the norm since 
intergovernmental domains are conventionally dominated by executive actors. In the 
literature, strong or weak parliamentary involvement in EU affairs always focusses on the 
scrutiny abilities of parliaments in supranational EU settings (see for instance Bergman 1997; 
Karlas 2012; Maurer, Wessels 2001)
47
, i.e. in how far are NPs informed about legislative 
proposals by the European Commission, in how far can they influence the government 
representative in the Council of Ministers or what kind of administrative resources do they 
possess to scrutinise EU politics? Parliaments differ significantly in these regards (see for 
instance Goetz, Meyer-Sahling 2008; Holzhacker 2007). Differences between NPs become 
even more striking when involvement in supranational and intergovernmental settings is 
distinguished. The challenge of the European Stability Mechanism is that NPs must transfer 
the competences they acquired in supranational policy-making to the intergovernmental 
level.
48
  
Starting from a historical institutionalist perspective, the central question is “how institutions 
emerge from and are embedded in concrete temporal processes” (Thelen 1999: 371). I assume 
                                                 
47
 Supranational settings cover those areas where national parliaments legally conferred decision-making 
competences to the European level. The Member States’ governments still exercise influence in the Council, and 
political party groups can try to influence their counterparts in the European Parliament. 
48
 The question whether the management of the crisis should be treated as EU affairs – in the sense of the 
German Basic law (art. 23 GG) – or as a kind of foreign policy has dominated the debate on the parliamentary 
involvement of the German Bundestag throughout the crisis management (see Höing 2013). 
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that strong parliamentary prerogatives in (supranational) EU affairs make the transfer of these 
competences to the ESM more likely.
49
 Stronger parliamentary involvement can be 
interpreted as a legacy of former historical processes, namely the parliamentary participation 
rights in EU affairs. In the words of Cathleen Thelen: 
Crucial founding moments of institutional formation […] send countries along 
broadly different developmental paths; […] institutions continue to evolve in 
response to changing environmental conditions and ongoing political 
manoeuvring but in ways that are constrained by past trajectories (Thelen 1999: 
387). 
The established institutional formation of strong participation rights in EU affairs is thus 
expected to affect parliamentary behaviour when provisions on the ESM accompanying 
provisions were drafted. The extent of parliamentary involvement is expected to be 
constrained by past trajectories. Parliamentarians had long fought for a stronger say in EU 
affairs. They were not willing to relinquish this say with the establishment of the European 
Stability Mechanism. In order to understand the process of gradually emerging scrutiny 
powers, their evolutionary development must briefly be recalled: European affairs were long 
treated as foreign policy with a dominant position of the executive. Only during the 1980s, 
parliaments started to establish procedures to better control and scrutinise EU affairs. This 
gradual process is still on-going. Notably, nearly all NPs established European Affairs 
Committees during the 1980s to acquire expertise, enabling them to better control government 
action at the EU level. Especially the Danish European Affairs Committee (in line with its 
Scandinavian counterparts) was often regarded as one of the strongest parliamentary bodies in 
EU affairs – although this assessment has recently been called into question (see for instance 
Sousa 2008). The scrutiny of European Affairs remained under-developed in other political 
settings, especially where the executive still holds a dominant position. As a result, we find a 
wide range of parliamentary (formal) powers in handling EU affairs at the domestic level. 
Most scholars caution that the formal prerogatives of parliaments do not necessarily equate 
parliamentary activity (see for instance Auel 2007; Pollak, Slominski 2003) nor can they 
consistently predict parliament’s actual influence. However, recent studies have shown that 
formal participation rights positively correlate with actual activities in EU affairs (see for 
instance Auel, Höing 2015; Auel et al. 2015). They can often be interpreted as a precondition 
for parliamentary involvement. 
Essentially, the prerogatives to influence EU affairs at the domestic level cover policy areas 
that have been transferred to the European level. Due to the increased application of qualified 
majority voting, it became gradually more difficult to effectively control government action in 
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 Zysman differentiates between rational choice and historical institutionalism by accentuating that the former 
starts with individuals and asks where institutions came from, while the latter starts with institutions and asks 
how they affects individual behaviours (Zysman 1994, quoted in Thelen 1999). 
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the Council: a minister can in principle be outvoted. This makes it a risky strategy to restrict 
the political room for manoeuvre of ministers too much by legally binding mandates. The 
ESM, on the other side, is an intergovernmental organisation in which the participating 
members have, by definition, a stronger say. Majority requirements and the political 
sensitivity of the issues are high. This makes majoritarian voting unlikely. Legally binding 
mandates within the ESM are therefore a more effective tool to control policy-making at the 
European level. For parliaments with strong parliamentary prerogatives in EU affairs, the 
non-transfer of these strong powers to the ESM setting constitutes a deviation from previously 
established practices. For parliaments with weak prerogatives in EU affairs, on the other side, 
the non-transfer constitutes a continuation. Strong parliamentary involvement in EU affairs 
can therefore be conceptualised as “sets of regularized practices with rule-like quality in the 
sense that the actors expect the practices to be observed” (Hall, Thelen 2009: 9). A path-
dependent logic consequently explains why strong prerogatives in EU affairs are more likely 
to be transferred to the ESM – even under new circumstances. I therefore formulate the third 
guiding assumption as follows: 
Guiding assumption 3: The stronger the formal powers a parliament possesses in handling 
EU affairs, the stronger the parliamentary participation rights within the ESM. 
Parliamentary involvement in EU affairs constitutes a trajectory that parliamentarians are 
unlikely to deviate from: Parliamentarians have an interest in keeping those formal 
prerogatives they have already acquired in supranational settings. Formally weak parliaments 
do not deviate from previous trajectories if they implement weak parliamentary participation 
rights in ESM affairs. 
 
B.2.4 Political and Constitutional Requirements 
Parliamentary involvement within the ESM is also likely to depend on the political and 
constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty, i.e. the number of policy-makers and 
veto-players involved in decision-making procedures. 
Lijphart (1999) distinguishes two ideal types of democracy. The majoritarian model of 
democracy assumes a “government by the majority of the people” (Lijphart 1999: 31). It 
largely excludes the opposition from decision-making but is based on the assumption that 
majorities and minorities alternate in government. It is often characterised by a strong 
executive and by relatively few veto players that influence government policy. In contrast, the 
consensus model of democracy tries “to share, disperse, and restrain power in a variety of 
ways” (Lijphart 1999: 34). Coalition governments are the norm, and most of these political 
systems are based on federal principles. Although the empirical evidence for Lijphart’s model 
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might need to be updated, his typology contains an important element: political systems differ 
in the degree to which the executive must consider majorities in parliament or the influence of 
other political or constitutional (potential) veto players. The more a system leans to the ideal 
of a consensus democracy, the more players are involved in the decision-making process. This 
has implications for negotiations at the EU level. Putnam (1988) describes that all Heads of 
State or Government operate in a double hatted world: “they govern domestically as heads of 
their cabinets, and usually their political parties, and collectively as members of the European 
Council.” They consequently have two principals: the national citizenry and the European 
collective (Laffan 2014: 275–6). Government leaders can make strategic use of this two level 
game. They can demand concessions in package deals if they convincingly argue that they are 
constrained by domestic actors (such as majorities in parliaments or decisions by powerful 
constitutional courts). This does not facilitate compromise at the European level. As Putnam 
notes himself: “the political complexities for the players in this two-level game are 
staggering” (Putnam 1988: 434). 
If the number of veto players exceeds a certain threshold, compromises at the lowest common 
denominator (or no compromise at all) become the norm. One crucial question is whether 
these domestic constraints are used strategically and whether a potential ‘no’ poses a credible 
threat for the other European players. The total absence of any domestic constraint does not 
necessarily pay out in strategic negotiations at the EU level, as Rozenberg notes. He 
exemplifies the paradox that a huge political leeway in EU negotiations can have negative 
consequences for defending national interests by using the example of the French President: 
In comparison with the British Prime Minister, who needs to secure a majority in 
the Commons, or to the German Chancellor, who needs the support both from 
within her coalition and from the Länder, the French President is often free from 
domestic veto players. Paradoxically, such strength may occasionally weaken 
France’s negotiation position […]. [I]n the current period, the European policy 
does not seem to be such a useful mechanism for the President to solve domestic 
issues. As a result, French Presidents are more inclined to compromise in Brussels 
and more concerned with short-term success in the French press. The domestic 
strength of the President makes him weak in Brussels” (Rozenberg 2013: 71). 
This example illustrates that domestic constraints can strengthen the negotiation position of 
the executive at the EU level. Although the absence of domestic red lines can facilitate 
compromises, this must not necessarily be in the national interest of a Member State. With 
regard to the ESM treaty, domestic veto players are understood as enlarged majority 
requirements in parliamentary chambers to ratify the treaty or the credible threat that 
agreements can be nullified by national constitutional courts. Crucially, the two-level game 
for government leaders opens a window of opportunity for opposition parties to negotiate side 
payments, especially since the ESM treaty concerns the budgetary competences of 
parliaments – commonly regarded as their “crown jewels”. Parliaments are especially 
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“anxious to keep control of decisions taken at the European level and have to be satisfied 
through side-payments or constitutional concessions strengthening their control function” 
(Puntscher-Riekmann, Wydra 2013: 565). Although a high consensus on European issues still 
characterizes most party systems in the EU, the sensitivity of the issue makes opposition to 
the ratification of the ESM treaty more likely. Puntscher-Riekmann and Wydra emphasize 
that “decisions during the crisis management are taken in the name of Europe, but require 
national sacrifices” (Puntscher-Riekmann, Wydra 2013: 566). These national sacrifices come 
at a price if opposition parties are able to occupy potential veto positions. I therefore develop 
the following guiding assumption: 
Guiding assumption 4: The higher the constitutional and political obstacles to ratify the ESM 
treaty, the stronger the parliamentary participation rights within the ESM. 
If the political system allows other domestic veto players to draw red lines, it is likely that 
they will make use of it and negotiate side-payments in the form of stronger parliamentary 
participation rights in the ESM. The absence of red lines makes it unlikely that demands for 
stronger parliamentary involvement are taken into consideration. 
 
B.2.5 Summary Theoretical Considerations 
These guiding assumptions predict varying degrees of parliamentary involvement within the 
ESM. Even if actors behave rationally, they are all exposed to (institutional) constraints which 
potentially alter their preferences, or the circumstances under which they take decisions.  
None of the guiding assumptions presented above is assumed to explain the full range of 
parliamentary ESM involvement. By contrast, the supposition is that specific combinations of 
these guiding assumptions carry greater explanatory power than others. The strongest 
parliamentary participation rights can be expected if all four guiding assumptions are fulfilled 
simultaneously: a favourable macro-economic situation, strong Eurosceptical sentiments, 
strong formal prerogatives in EU affairs and the dependence on opposition support for the 
ratification of the ESM treaty. Firm parliamentary participation rights in the ESM are likely to 
occur in such a setting. By contrast, if all of these conditions are absent, strong parliamentary 
involvement is hardly plausible. 
But not only the simultaneous presence or absence of all four conditions unfolds explanatory 
power: I also hypothesize that certain conditions gain further explanatory power when they 
are combined with others. Eurosceptical sentiments, for instance, are more likely to have 
explanatory power when they are present in countries within a favourable macro-economic 
situation. Especially in richer EU Member States, these parties have gained electoral 
relevance by arguing that their country’s EU membership is too costly (see among others 
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Sørensen 2007, but also Hobolt, Wratil 2015: 240ff). This line of argumentation can regularly 
be observed by parties of net-contributors states to the EU annual budgets (such as UKIP, the 
FPÖ or the Front National). Financial assistance to financially troubled Member States is 
highly unpopular among the electorate of these parties. Eurosceptical parties can therefore 
more easily hold the national government accountable on question of financial guarantees. 
Policy-makers in these countries are expected to react to these public demands. Strengthening 
the parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs is therefore one plausible way to demonstrate 
that a country remains formally in control of decisions taken within the European Stability 
Mechanism. On the other side, Eurosceptical parties are rather unlikely to demand stronger 
parliamentary participation rights when they belong to a country which has already requested 
financial assistance, or must anticipate doing so. These parties might oppose the 
memorandum of understanding. They might also complain about insufficient involvement in 
the negotiations leading to the memorandum of understanding, or criticize the economic and 
financial measures proposed by European actors. However, they will probably not demand 
stronger parliamentary prerogatives to issue financial assistance since this topic is not relevant 
enough in debtor states. 
A similar logic is expected concerning strong formal prerogatives in EU affairs. These powers 
are probably only transferred to the domain of the (intergovernmental) ESM if the country is 
in a favourable macro-economic situation. The reasoning behind this argument is that the 
macro-economic situation of a country decisively influences the political priorities at the time 
of the ESM ratification. Parliamentary powers in EU affairs, on the other side, shed light on a 
parliaments’ institutional capacity to transfer these powers to the ESM. Strong parliamentary 
prerogatives in ESM affairs might be regarded as a luxury problem which is irrelevant when 
policy-makers must deal with an economic downturn or financial predicament. If the macro-
economic situation is troubled, stronger parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs might 
primarily appear to hamper efficient decision-making – with potentially negative 
consequences should this country ever request financial assistance. Conversely, a favourable 
macro-economic situation on its own might not be sufficient to account for stronger ESM 
involvement. If parliaments are traditionally weak in EU affairs vis-à-vis their governments, 
they might simply lack the institutional capacities to incorporate a stronger say in the 
intergovernmental ESM – even if these Member States are in a propitious macro-economic 
situation. 
In order to test this configurational logic, this doctoral thesis pursues a qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA). The analysis tests all of the four conditions on its own as well as 
their combined effects. QCA will be applied to explain strong and weak ESM parliamentary 
involvement separately (see C.1). Its methodology will be explained in the next chapter (see 
B.3). 
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B.3 Mixed-Method Design 
This research project pursues a mixed-method design by combining set-theoretic methods 
with in-depth qualitative case studies. The units of analysis in the first major part (C.1) are the 
18 parliaments of the Eurozone; this analysis will be conducted with fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA; 
see B.3.1.1). In the second major part (see C.2), four case studies will be conducted in a 
qualitative research frame. This allows meeting the advantages of both case-oriented and 
variable-oriented research techniques. 
The following sub-chapters introduce the applied methods. First, the main variants of QCA 
techniques are presented and the choice for fsQCA will be justified (B.3.1). Additionally, the 
critiques of QCA approaches are addressed (B.3.1.2) and the concrete application of fsQCA 
to the topic of this thesis will be elaborated upon (B.3.1.3). Next, the qualitative research 
techniques employed to conduct the four case studies are presented, focusing especially on 
expert interviews and a qualitative content analysis (B.3.2). 
 
B.3.1 Set-theoretic Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
The term QCA is nowadays used to describe a number of different research techniques that 
operate with set-theoretic methods. Set-theoretic methods have different labels. Ragin and 
Rihoux in 2009 coined them “Configurational Comparative Methods” (CCM) (Rihoux and 
Ragin 2009) while Caramani called them “Boolean methods” (Caramani 2009). These 
approaches are very close to John Stuart Mill’s ‘logical methods’ (Mill 1843). QCA is the 
most often used research technique of these set-theoretic labels. At the core of these 
approaches lies the assumption that social science deals with arguments about set relations. 
Set relations are pervasive in social sciences, although this is not always made explicit 
(Schneider, Wagemann 2013: 1).
50
  
For Ragin, “set relations are the building blocks of verbal statements; they are […] the 
building blocks of most social science theories” (Ragin 2006: 291). The analysis is 
nonetheless still in its infancy (Ragin 2006: 310). To give a hypothetical example: a statement 
such as ‘citizens of small, rural towns in the USA vote for the Republican party’ can be 
translated into set-theoretic language:
51
 There is a set of ‘small-town rural voters’ (X) which 
is a subset of all ‘Republican voters’ (Y). In this example, all cases that possess the 
characteristic X also possess the characteristic Y. Being an inhabitant of a small, rural town is 
a sufficient condition to explain voting for the Republican Party.  
 
                                                 
50
 Mahoney notes that especially many comparative case study analyses apply set-theoretic reasoning without 
making it explicit (Mahoney 2007: 135). 
51
 The example is taken from (Schneider, Wagemann 2013: 4). 
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Figure 3: Necessity and sufficiency: A hypothetical example  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The notion of necessity and sufficiency in these subset relations triggers a number of 
analytical consequences (emphasis in bold letters by the author). 
[…] saying that there is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition generally 
requires the existence of other sufficient conditions for the same outcome. This, in 
turn, means that by embracing a set-theoretic perspective on social science 
phenomena one unavoidably recognizes the existence of equifinality, i.e., a 
scenario in which alternative factors can produce the same outcome (Schneider, 
Wagemann 2013: 5). 
The above mentioned example does not include information on voters who do not live in 
small rural towns in the United States. Therefore, the outcome ‘voting for the Republican 
party’ can also be present if other (combinations of) conditions are present. This is called 
equifinality (in contrast to unifinality). It gives set-theoretic methods a special characteristic: 
Set-theoretic methods do not assume that a single variable determines a specific outcome, but 
suppose that different (combinations of) conditions can lead to the same outcome. 
Furthermore, the presence of a certain condition does not necessarily lead to the outcome in 
all circumstances, but only if it is combined with other (configurations of) conditions. 
Logically, ‘being a small town rural voter’ only leads to the outcome ‘voting for the 
Republican party’ if the inhabitant is ‘living in the United States’. The set of ‘small town rural 
voters in the USA’ is therefore a subset of all ‘small town rural voters’. Only in the 
intersecting set of ‘small town rural voter’ and ‘citizen of the United States’ – if both 
conditions are present – the outcome ‘voting for the Republican party’ can be present. QCA 
techniques are increasingly used in social sciences and also applied to the study of 
parliamentary behaviour: Raunio, in 2005, applied a fsQCA to analyse the parliamentary 
control over governments. He identifies the combination of a more Eurosceptical public 
opinion and a powerful legislature to be sufficient in bringing about higher levels of control 
over the government – but not each condition on its own (Raunio 2005: 319). Maatsch 
analyses why political parties opted for Keynesian or neo-liberal anti-crisis measures during 
the Eurozone crisis with a csQCA. She concludes that parties from bailout countries opted for 
X 
Y 
Source 5: Own presentation. 
82 
 
Keynesian measures despite having a more right-wing economic orientation (Maatsch 2013: 
112). Having a ‘right-wing economic orientation’ can thus explain the favouring of ‘neo-
liberal anti-crisis measures’, but not in combination with the condition ‘being a bailout state’. 
In these cases, parties with ‘right-wing economic orientations’ have also opted for ‘Keynesian 
anti-crisis measures’. This fundamental logic is described by Schneider and Wagemann as 
follows: 
Set-theoretic methods are approaches to analyse social reality in which (a) the 
data consists of set membership scores; (b) relations between social phenomena 
are modelled in terms of set relations; and (c) the results point to sufficient and 
necessary conditions and emphasize causal complexity […] (Schneider, 
Wagemann 2013: 6) 
For the purpose of this thesis, a set-theoretic reasoning is assumed to be helpful in explaining 
the varying patterns of parliamentary involvement within the European Stability Mechanism. 
For instance, the presence of Eurosceptical parties in parliament might not suffice to explain 
strong parliamentary participation rights; however, the ‘presence of Eurosceptical parties’ can 
have a stronger explanatory power in combination with the ‘being in a good macro-economic 
condition’ (see again B.2.5). The theoretical reasoning is that donor countries have arguably 
more to lose and must justify the release of financial guarantees vis-à-vis their national 
electorates. It is easier for Eurosceptical parties to create public attention in such an 
environment. Their presence might therefore have a stronger impact on parliamentary 
participation rights in donor than in debtor countries. Similarly, the traditional strength of 
parliaments vis-à-vis their governments might account for parliamentary participation rights 
in the ESM. However, this criterion might lose explanatory power if parliaments belong to the 
group of countries in a poor macro-economic situation. Here, the variable ‘traditionally strong 
participation rights in EU affairs’ is combined with ‘being in a poor macro-economic 
condition’. While the traditional strength of a parliament in EU affairs might theoretically 
account for strong ESM participation, the intersection with another condition might soften the 
explanatory power of this theoretical assumption. 
 
B.3.1.1 Variants of Set-theoretic Methods 
Not only different set-theoretic methods exist, but also a number of different variants of 
qualitative comparative analyses. The two main variants are crisp-set QCA (csQCA) and 
fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), whereas the development of fsQCA is often interpreted as a reaction 
to the critiques of csQCA (for a slightly different argument see Schneider, Wagemann 2013: 
15). The former was introduced by Charles Ragin (Ragin 1987) who made this approach 
prominent in the social sciences; fuzzy set logics had already been prominent in mathematics, 
philosophy or computer sciences (see for instance Kosko 1993; Seising 2007; Zadeh 1965, 
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1968). Both variants operate with set membership scores, but differ in how the conditions are 
operationalized. A third variant is multi-value QCA (mvQCA) which was developed by 
Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser (Cronqvist, Berg-Schlosser 2008). It allows for the use of 
multinominal data.
 52
 This makes the approach less straightforward with regard to its set-
theoretic groundings. As a consequence, it is not as often applied in practice as the other two 
approaches and will not be explained in more detail. The following two sub-sections present 
the main variants of csQCA and fsQCA, and justify the choice for fsQCA. 
B.3.1.1.1 Crisp-set QCA  
Each variant of QCA attempts to explain a certain outcome (Y) by the use of a number of pre-
defined conditions (C). The outcome is similar to what is called the ‘dependent variable’ in 
conventional research designs; the conditions are close to the concept of ‘independent 
variables’. In crisp-set QCA, the conditions and the outcome are dichotomized, i.e. the 
researcher asks whether a condition or outcome is present or not. The presence of conditions 
is symbolized in capitals (C), its absence in small letters (c).  
Rihoux and De Meure, for instance, analyse the survival of democracies (SURVIVAL) in the 
interwar period (Rihoux, De Meur 2009) based on Lipset’s theory ‘Political Man’ (Lipset 
1960). What explains the survival (SURVIVAL) or the breakdown (survival) of European 
democracies between 1918 and 1939? Explanatory factors in Lipset’s theory are economic 
prosperity (GNPCAP), the degree of urbanization (URBANIZATION), the degree of literacy 
(LITERACY) and the strength of the industrial labour force (LABOUR). One challenge for 
csQCA is the dichotomization of these conditions that must be derived from empirical 
evidence and be based on substantive theoretical grounds.
53
 A csQCA with, for instance, five 
pre-defined conditions explaining a certain outcome has 2
5
=32 logical combinations of 
conditions. There is often only limited empirical evidence for each of the (theoretical) 
possible combinations. In the example by Rihoux and De Meure, they operate with empirical 
evidence for nine out of 32 (theoretical) cases. With Boolean algebra, the QCA researcher 
                                                 
52
 MvQCA is an advancement of csQCA which allows the use of multi-nominal data, e.g. the processing of 
multi-value conditions (in contrast to binary coding). It therefore shows some similarities with fsQCA, except for 
the fact that the number of values in mvQCA is often reduced to a maximum of three or four different values that 
can be assigned (Cronqvist, Berg-Schlosser 2008: 84). Apart from that, mvQCA contains the basic 
characteristics of csQCA. Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser equally conduct a mvQCA based on the data of Lipset’s 
theory. Due to a more precise calibration of the GNP per person, the sufficient conditions for the survival and 
breakdown of democracies slightly differ from the results in a csQCA.  
53 Often, this approach is criticized for being arbitrary with regard to the settings of thresholds. Schneider and 
Wagemann, however, argue that claims about the manipulability of set-theoretic results are often largely 
exaggerated. Most of the time there is only a small range where a threshold can plausibly be put; furthermore, no 
huge differences in the results occur due to minor adjustments of these threshold (Schneider, Wagemann 2013: 
26). Nonetheless, it often depends on the data at hand whether the application of a crisp-set QCA is appropriate, 
or whether the researcher gains more insights by applying a more fine-grained fuzzy-set analysis (see below). 
The presence or absence of bicameral systems can be more easily translated into a crisp-set reasoning than the 
question whether Eurosceptical parties are in parliament or not (since this is often a question of degree). 
84 
 
tries to arrive at a parsimonious explanation for a given outcome. The major aim of a 
qualitative comparative analysis is thus to reduce the empirical complexity for a given 
outcome. If there is empirical evidence for the survival of a democracy (SURVIVAL) 
resulting from the combination of the presence of a high GDP per capita (GNPCAP), a high 
degree of literacy (LITERACY) and a high degree of urbanization (URBANIZATION) 
GNPCAP * LITERACY * URBANIZATION → SURVIVAL, 
but also by the presence of a high GDP per capita (GNPCAP), a high degree of literacy 
(LITERACY) and the absence of a high degree of urbanization (urbanization) 
GNPCAP * LITERACY * urbanization → SURVIVAL, 
then a QCA researcher draws the conclusion that the degree of urbanization has no impact on 
the outcome (Y). The condition is interpreted as redundant. Whether a high degree of 
urbanization is present or absent does not affect the survival of the democracy with the data at 
hand. In this hypothetical example, a csQCA would reveal that it is sufficient for the survival 
of a democracy in the interwar period if a high degree of GDP per capita is present in 
combination with a high degree of literacy. This key procedure of csQCA to reduce 
complexity is called ‘Boolean minimization’. It allows minimizing the number of possible 
combinations of conditions leading to a certain outcome. The so-called Quine-McCluskey 
algorithm is used for this logically minimization process (the analysis is only used for the 
analysis of sufficiency, but not for necessity, see especially Schneider, Wagemann 2013: 
104).
54
 Lipset’s theory can therefore be broken down to a number of key conditions 
determining the survival of democracies. The previous term would be simplified in 
GNPCAP * LITERACY → SURVIVAL. 
As with all QCA techniques, the choice of the conditions is of central importance. It would 
thus be inadequate to describe QCA as a simple social science method or technique. By 
choosing the conditions, the researcher is already making theoretical arguments (see B.3.1.2). 
This can be problematic since it makes the approach largely deterministic and becomes 
obvious when the same combination(s) of conditions lead to different empirical outcomes. 
These so-called ‘contradictory cases’ must be treated carefully since they can indicate that 
relevant (theoretical) conditions have been omitted (more on that see Rihoux and Ragin 
2009). One way to address these problems is to add new conditions to the research design in 
order to allow for further distinctions, or to re-specify the measurement of conditions and the 
outcome (for the handling of contradictory truth table rows see especially Schneider, 
Wagemann 2013: 120ff). These re-formulations and re-specifications belong to the standards 
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 Further minimization can be achieved by identifying so-called prime implicants (see for instance Schneider, 
Wagemann 2013: 108ff). 
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of good QCA research techniques and describe what Ragin called “going back and forth 
between ideas and evidence” (Ragin 2000)55. 
 
B.3.1.1.2 Fuzzy-set Analysis 
Another limitation of csQCA is the fact that conditions and the outcome can only be present 
or absent (Ragin 2009: 87). As elaborated above, it depends on the data at hand whether a 
dichotomization of the conditions and the outcome is appropriate. As a reaction to these 
limitations, QCA researchers have tried to develop tools that allow for partial membership 
“without abandoning core set theoretic principles” (Ragin 2009: 90). In fsQCA, different 
threshold can be set, for instance four-value, six-value or even continuous fuzzy set scales. To 
give an example: India might be considered a democratic country, but would be less qualified 
as a democracy than, for instance, Norway. Both are in the set of democratic countries; with 
csQCA, no further distinction would be possible. FsQCA allows for a more fine grained 
tuning, attributing Norway, for instance, the score 1 (full membership) and India the score 0.7 
(still more in than out of the set of democratic countries).
56
 CsQCA and fsQCA have in 
common that they define scores for full membership [1], non-membership [0] and a cross-
over point [0.5] to decide whether a country is more in or out of a given set. They differ in the 
degree to which a country can be a member of a given set. In contrast to ordinal scaling, it is 
not necessary that the intervals in a fsQCA are equal. They must be based on substantive 
theoretical knowledge (Ragin 2009: 91). If the researcher is interested in unambiguously rich 
countries, it is irrelevant that Norway and Sweden have a slightly different GDP per capita; 
they can be attributed the same fsQCA-value if this can be justified on substantive grounds. In 
a way, this logic is closer to the day-to-day use of these terms. Often, we are interested in the 
effects of ‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’ income, and not in detailed differences within these 
groups. Applied to this thesis, partial membership in sets can be used to assess ‘Eurosceptical 
parties’ or a ‘Eurosceptical public’ (B.2.2), but also for parliamentary strength in EU affairs 
(B.2.3). A csQCA would risk being imprecise and omitting important differences between the 
cases.  
However, the partial membership in sets has consequences for the further proceeding of the 
analysis. The results are “more empirically circumscribed than the results of a crisp-set or a 
multi-value analysis”, as Ragin notes (Ragin 2009: 119). Nonetheless, there are hardly any 
combinations of conditions that are unambiguously in or out a specific set [1 or 0]. This 
makes them less well suited for a conventional truth table analysis (as carried out in csQCA). 
Theoretically, fuzzy sets can have spatial membership in all logically possible combinations 
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 Quoted in (Schneider, Wagemann 2013: 121). 
56
 This is a hypothetical example. 
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of causal conditions. Therefore, sufficiency and necessity in fsQCA must be calculated 
differently. In a basic crisp-set logic, a condition is considered sufficient if the outcome is 
always present whenever the condition is present across the cases.
57
 Such a test can be 
conducted with a simple two-by-two table. Due to partial membership in cases, a fuzzy set 
sufficiency test can be visualized in so-called XY plots. A subset relation is indicated when 
membership scores in one set (i.e. a condition or combination of conditions) are consistently 
less than or equal to membership scores in another set (i.e. the outcome). The XY plot 
visualizes these patterns by a diagonal axis which divides the area into two regions (see 
Figure 4). X is smaller than Y in all cases above the main diagonal. It follows that X is a 
subset of Y and can be interpreted as a sufficient condition (for necessity tests see Wagemann, 
Schneider 2012: 67-76). This logic does not only apply to single conditions, but X can of 
course also display a combination of conditions.  
Figure 4: XY plot – distribution of cases for sufficient condition X 
 
 
Source 6: Wagemann, Schneider 2012: 67. 
Combinations of conditions are slightly differently calculated in fsQCA than in csQCA. An 
example from Ragin illustrates this point:
58
 countries were attributed partial membership 
regarding the conditions ‘developed’, ‘urban’ and ‘literate’ (this example refers again to 
Lipset’s theory). Contrary to csQCA, fsQCA operates with ‘fuzzy algebra’ (and equally with 
the logical AND and OR). In the intersection of the above mentioned conditions – if we are 
interested countries that are developed, urbanized and literate (see Table 3) – a fsQCA only 
looks at the weakest link between these conditions. Estonia, for instance, has a high degree of 
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 Empirical evidence alone is of course not enough to make a statement about sufficiency. Such a statement 
must always be substantiated by convincing theoretical arguments. 
58
 I will present only four countries from Ragin’s example to illustrate the major reasoning behind this operation. 
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Cases X ≤ Y 
No Cases X > Y 
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literacy (0.96), but has low values in the sets of developed (0.16) and urbanized (0.07) 
countries. The theoretical reasoning is that we are only interested in countries that 
simultaneously fulfil all three conditions. The combination of these causal conditions (D* U* 
L) attributes Estonia a 0.07 score. In this example, Estonia has an outcome value of 0.12 
(survival of democracy). A fsQCA concludes that there exists a relation between the 
combination of D*U*L and the breakdown of democracy in the Estonian case. The 
combination of D*U*L is a subset of the outcome (since the X value is smaller than the Y 
value). This is also true for Belgium and Czechoslovakia, but not for Austria. In the Austrian 
case, the combination D*U*L is not a subset of the outcome. The value for X is higher than 
the value for Y and can therefore not be interpreted as a sufficient condition. 
Table 3: Fuzzy-set membership of cases in causal combinations 
 
Membership in causal 
conditions 
Combination of 
causal conditions (X)  
DEVELO
PED (D) 
URBAN 
(U) 
LITER
ATE 
(L) 
D * U * L 
Outcome 
(Y) 
Austria 0.81 0.12 0.99 0.12 0.05 
Belgium 0.99 0.89 0.98 0.89 0.95 
Czechoslovakia 0.58 0.98 0.98 0.58 0.89 
Estonia 0.16 0.07 0.98 0.07 0.12 
Source 7: Snapshot from Ragin’s presentation in (Ragin 2009: 101). 
Still, two major questions remain to fruitfully evaluate the fuzzy-set membership in cases. 
First, to which degree are cases (sharing the same combination of conditions) also displaying 
the outcome in question? This is called set-theoretic consistency.
59
 Second, to which degree 
does such a causal combination account for instances of the outcome? This is called set-
theoretic coverage. It is in principle possible that cases are a 100% consistent with the 
outcome, but the outcome is still happenstance (see Dion 1998). Therefore, Ragin talks about 
a trade-off between coverage and consistency (Ragin 2006: 299) and gives the following 
definitions for both measurements: 
In the plot of membership in the outcome (Y) against membership in a causal 
condition or combination of causal conditions (X), consistency is defined as the 
proportion of cases on or above the main diagonal of the plot. If membership X is 
consistently less than or equal to membership in Y, then all the cases will fall on 
or above the main diagonal of the plot, yielding a consistency score of 1,0 (or 
100% consistent) (Ragin 2006: 294–5).  
                                                 
59
 Belgium and Czechoslovakia show relatively high scores in the causal combination and in the outcome, while 
Austria and Belgium show low scores in the combination and the outcome. 
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It is possible to formalize the calculation of fuzzy set-theoretic consistency as follows:  
 Consistency (Xi ≤ Yi) = ∑(min(XiYi))/ ∑(xi); 
whereas ‘min’ indicates the selection of the lower of the two values. “When the Xi values are 
all less than or equal to their corresponding Yi values, the consistency score is 1.00; when 
there are only a few near misses, the score is slightly less than 1.00; and when there are many 
inconsistent scores, with some Xi values greatly exceeding their corresponding Yi values, 
consistency drops below the 0.5” (Ragin 2006: 297). However, consistency says only little 
about the number of cases that are covered by a specific path. As elaborated above, QCA is 
based on the assumption that not only a single condition explains a certain outcome, but that 
there are numerous ways to arrive at the same outcome. The coverage – the question of how 
much of the outcome is covered by a condition in question (Ragin 2006: 300) – must 
consequently be measured after the establishment of the consistency of a certain path. The 
degree of coverage can formally be expressed as follows: 
 Coverage (Yi ≤ Xi) = ∑(min(XiYi))/ ∑(xi) (Ragin 2006: 301). 
The QCA researcher must nonetheless base his findings on theoretical evidence. Low 
coverage can still contain very substantial information about empirical cases. To take this into 
account, different types of coverage can be calculated: raw coverage, unique coverage and 
solution coverage (for more on that see Schneider, Wagemann 2013: 129–139). In sum, 
fsQCA as a technique is more sophisticated than csQCA. Similar to mvQCA, it allows for a 
more precise operationalization of the data which is at the same time harder to apply and to 
interpret. Yet, it is still grounded in the basic set-theoretic reasoning. 
 
B.3.1.2 Addressing the critiques of QCA 
As every statistical method, the application of QCA techniques has some pitfalls. Many 
problems derive from the fact that the QCA is not simply a research technique, but also 
incorporates a theoretical argumentation. Conditions – or independent variables – are not 
simply tested, but derived from substantial theoretical knowledge: only if all theoretically 
relevant conditions have been correctly identified and operationalized, a QCA can be 
successfully pursued (which makes the approach more deterministic than conventional 
statistical methods). If relevant theoretical conditions are omitted, the results of a QCA are 
blurred. However, the omission of relevant explanatory variables poses a problem for every 
statistical technique. It is admittedly more severe in set-theoretic approaches, but not 
fundamentally different from other statistical methods. The correct identification often 
requires in-depth knowledge about the cases at hand. This is one reason why QCA is better 
suited for medium N research design. The same is true for the selection of empirical cases. 
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They must be selected in a way that diversity on factors of interest is maximized, and 
variation in contextual conditions minimized (Yamasaki, Rihoux 2009: 125). The choice of 
conditions and cases thus requires careful consideration. A substantive, theoretically derived 
selection of cases can help to overcome these shortcomings. Also, QCA techniques are 
sometimes criticized for the (arbitrary) setting of thresholds (especially in csQCA). Generally, 
thresholds can either be set mechanically (for instance by the statistical mean) or theoretically. 
While the former does not necessarily pay attention to the empirical evidence of cases
60
, the 
latter has the disadvantage that the replicability of the research is more difficult to conduct 
(Yamasaki, Rihoux 2009: 130–132). However, theoretical threshold setting has an anchor in 
case knowledge, and might therefore be better justified empirically. Also, it is a fundamental 
problem in all social sciences that the verbal categories we form do not have an objective 
expression in empirical reality. There can be a variety of different objective criteria for ‘rich’ 
or ‘democratic’ countries. Nonetheless, these categories exist and form our thinking. The set-
theoretic logic has the advantage that it can be designed in a way that is close to our everyday 
use of these terms (as elaborated above). While the QCA researcher must pay attention to the 
meaningful setting of thresholds, detailed differences within a given set can more easily be 
neglected. Another problem in the application of QCA is the occurrence of contradictory 
configurations, i.e. different empirical outcomes occur for the same combination of 
conditions. These contradictory cases often indicate that the theoretical frame needs to be 
revised. Various strategies (see above) are available to overcome this problem. The most 
prominent one is to re-evaluate specific cases and search for additional conditions that have 
been omitted (for other strategies see Yamasaki, Rihoux 2009: 133ff). This problem is 
particularly relevant in csQCA. Since this project pursues a fsQCA, these pitfalls can more 
easily be circumvented. Another shortcoming is the occurrence of logical remainders. This 
phenomenon is called ‘limited diversity’. Limited diversity means that there is no empirical 
evidence for a number of logical possible combinations of conditions (the number of possible 
combinations increases exponentially with the number of conditions). Logical remainders 
need not be considered problematic per se, but their analysis is crucial in set-theoretic 
approaches. Different strategies have been developed to handle logical remainders (see 
Schneider, Wagemann 2013: 160–165). Crucially, this problem can occur in other techniques 
as well and QCA possesses by now a broad range of techniques to deal with this issue. 
 
B.3.1.3 Why Fs-QCA? 
A couple of reasons support the application of a fsQCA for this particular research design. 
First, the supposed causal structure leading to strong parliamentary participation rights within 
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 Software, such as TOSMANA, can help in identifying meaningful thresholds. 
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the ESM is expected to be complex. As elaborated above (see B.2.5), it is rather unlikely that 
a single condition or combination thereof explains the expected outcome on its own. 
Equifinality (see B.3.1.1.2) is a fundamental pillar of every configurational research method, 
and a fsQCA allows analysing these conjunctural causal structures. In section C, the 
explanatory power of all single conditions (see C.1.1.1 and C.1.2.1) as well as combinations 
thereof (C.1.1.2 and C.1.2.2) will be tested separately. Second, the number of cases under 
investigation (18) is too low as to apply frequentist research techniques. Although QCA can 
be applied for large N studies as well, it has special advantages in medium N research 
designs. The software offers various ways of dealing with logical remainders (as elaborated in 
the previous section); it also allows measuring coverage and consistency degrees which are 
constitutive for interpreting results in a research design with a relatively low number of cases. 
Third, the researcher must develop a good understanding and knowledge of the individual 
cases which help interpreting the research results. The questionnaires distributed to assess 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs (see B.1) as well as the comprehensive collection 
of data for the independent variables (see B.4) allow for in-depth insights into the variables. A 
medium-N research design is suitable for such an approach. Last but not least, fsQCA will be 
used as a case selection mechanism. It allows for the identifiction of special cases that should 
be analysed separately in a qualitative research frame. The second part of the empirical 
analysis (see C.2) thus concludes with four case studies on parliaments with particularly 
strong and weak participation rights within the ESM. 
 
B.3.2 Case Study Analysis 
These four case studies will be informed by two main sources. First, by documents 
concerning the ratification of the ESM treaty (such as ratification debates in the plenary, 
information on committee meetings, votes on the respective treaties, etc.) via a qualitative 
content analysis. And second, by expert interviews with parliamentarians and administrators 
from the four parliaments under investigation. This information will be added by publicly 
available sources on the ratification debate, such as secondary literature or newspaper articles. 
Documents surrounding the ratification of the ESM treaty have been searched online and 
include the plenary protocols of the ratification debates, information on committee meetings 
and the votes on the respective treaty as well as the accompanying laws. Most information 
was accessible from the parliamentary websites. Occasionally, former interview partners 
provided additional information on the ratification process, such as position papers of 
parliamentary party groups. This information was complemented with academic sources on 
the role of the respective parliaments in EU affairs. For the case studies on Portugal and 
Ireland, a comprehensive European Commission report (European Commission 2014b) on the 
work of the former Troika was consulted to put the economic situation of these two countries 
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into perspective. The evaluation contains specific information on the Memoranda of 
Understanding that these two countries had to ratify. Additionally, the quarterly progress 
reports on the implementation of the MoUs have been consulted. 29 expert interviews have 
been conducted between May 2012 and March 2015 in Berlin (May 2012), Lisbon (June 
2013), Dublin (October 2013) and Vienna (March 2015). A complete overview can be found 
in Table 4. The interviewees included ten government representatives, nine opposition 
representatives and ten administrators. In each parliament, the number of government and 
opposition representatives was equally distributed. All interviewees received interview guides 
in advance, outlining the topic of the discussion and presenting concrete questions on the 
European Stability Mechanism and other instruments to tackle the financial and debt crisis. 
Preferred interview partners were MPs sitting in the finance or budget as well as the European 
Affairs committees. All interviews lasted between 25 and 80 minutes. Some of them were 
audio recorded (in case we received the explicit permission); in other cases transcripts of the 
interviews were produced shortly after the meetings by memory. We assured the interviewees 
anonymity to increase the likelihood that they would reveal more confidential information of 
the subject. In three out of four interview trips, two interviewers were present, allowing one 
researcher to lead the conversation while the other took notes. 
The first round of interviews took place within the OPAL
61
 project in Berlin (together with 
Katjana Gattermann) and was explorative in nature. The OPAL project had a general focus on 
the role of national parliaments within the European Union, i.e. the role of the plenary and 
sectoral committees in EU affairs, inter-parliamentary cooperation and the new powers 
granted to national parliaments by the Lisbon Treaty. It also focused on the Eurozone crisis as 
one particular case study for which my colleague Katrin Auel (IHS) and I were in charge. A 
detailed interview guide for questions concerning the financial and debt crisis had been 
developed and was distributed to the interviewees in advance (see Table 40 in the appendix).  
We interviewed three government representatives, five opposition representatives and three 
administrators dealing with EU affairs in the German Bundestag. The interviews took place a 
couple of weeks before the ESM treaty was eventually ratified in the Bundestag (29 June 
2012). The salience of the topic was therefore quite high.  
                                                 
61
 Observatory of Parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty. The three-year project was funded by the DFG. ANR, 
NOW and ESCR and was a collaboration of the universities of Cambridge, Cologne, Maastricht and Sciences Po 
(Paris). 
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Table 4: Interview partners in the four countries under investigation 
 Position (MP/ 
administrative staff 
Country Chamber Government/Opposition Committee Affiliation 
Voice 
Recording 
Time of the 
interview 
Aa Secretariat EAC Germany Bundestag Neutral EAC No May 2012 
Ab Assistant MP Germany Bundestag The Left (Opp.) EAC Yes May 2012 
Ac Assistant MP Germany Bundestag FDP (Gov.) EAC Yes May 2012 
A1 MP Germany Bundestag CDU (Gov.) EAC, Committee of Defence No May 2012 
A2 MP Germany Bundestag SPD (Opp.) Subcommittee of the budget committee for EU Affairs No May 2012 
A3 MP Germany Bundestag SPD (Opp.) EAC No May 2012 
Ad Administrator Germany Bundestag Neutral Scientific Service Bundestag Yes May 2012 
Ae Assistant MP Germany Bundestag The Left (Opp.) Committee of the Interior Yes May 2012 
A4 MP Germany Bundestag FDP (Gov.) EAC Yes May 2012 
Af Assistant MP Germany Bundestag The Greens (Opp.) EAC/ Finance Committee Yes May 2012 
Ag Administrators Germany Bundestag Neutral Europe Division of the German Bundestag Yes May 2012 
B1 MP Ireland  Seanad  Fine Gael (Gov.) Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform Yes October 2013 
Ba Administrator Ireland Dáil Èireann Neutral EU Policy Advisor Yes October 2013 
B2 MP Ireland Dáil Èireann Fianna Fail (Opp.) Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform Yes October 2013 
B3 MP Ireland Seanad  Fine Gael (Gov.) EAC Yes October 2013 
B4 MP Ireland Dáil Èireann Independent EAC Yes October 2013 
B5 MP Ireland Dáil Èireann Fine Gael (Gov.) EAC Yes October 2013 
B6 MP Ireland Dáil Èireann Independent Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform Yes October 2013 
Bb Administrator Ireland Dáil Èireann Neutral Convention on the Constitution Secretariat Yes October 2013 
C1 MP Portugal Assembleia  Socialist (Opp.) EAC Yes June 2013 
Ca Administrator Portugal Assembleia  Neutral EAC Yes June 2013 
Cb Administrator Portugal Assembleia  Neutral International Relations and Protocol Yes June 2013 
C2 MP Portugal Assembleia  Neutral EAC Yes June 2013 
C3 MP Portugal Assembleia   PSD (Gov.) EAC Yes June 2013 
C4 MP Portugal Assembleia  PCP (Gov.) EAC No June 2013 
Da Administrator Austria Nationalrat Greens (Opp.) ESM Committee Yes March 2015 
D1 MP Austria Nationalrat ÖVP (Gov.) ESM Committee No March 2015 
D2 MP Austria Nationalrat FPÖ (Opp.) ESM Committee No March 2015 
Db Administrator Austria Nationalrat SPÖ (Gov.) ESM Committee Yes March 2015 
Source 8: Own presentation.
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The interview trip to Lisbon in June 2013 was organised within the OPAL project as well, but 
additionally funded by a programme of the University of Cologne (Nachwuchs-
Professorinnen Programm). The interviews were conducted with my colleague Claudia 
Hefftler. They focussed on the role of the parliament within the European Stability 
Mechanism as well as on inter-parliamentary cooperation. Six interviews have been 
conducted with two government representatives, one opposition representative and three 
administrators dealing with EU affairs. A detailed interview guide had been distributed in 
advance (see Table 41 in the appendix). Five interviews were conducted in English and one 
interview in Portuguese.  
The interview trip to Dublin in October 2013 was equally funded by the above mentioned 
programme of the University of Cologne and conducted with my colleague Claudia Hefftler. 
They covered the same topics as for the Portuguese case. We conducted interviews in both 
houses of the parliament (six in the lower chamber (Dáil Èireann) and two in the upper 
chamber (Seanad Éireann)). Three government and three opposition representatives have been 
interviewed as well as two administrators. Two of the opposition representatives had no party 
affiliation (independents) but considered themselves as opposition representatives. The 
interview guide for the Lisbon and Dublin interviews had been identical.  
The interview trip to Vienna took place in March 2015, without assistance from colleagues. 
Two government and two opposition representatives were interviewed. Two of them were 
members of the parliament (ÖVP and FPÖ), while the others worked as administrators for 
political parties (SPÖ and Greens). An interview guide had been distributed in advance (see 
Table 42). All interviews have been conducted in German and were later translated into 
English.  
The selection of the cases results from the fsQCA conducted in C.1. All information serves 
primarily as background information. Only rarely, interviewees are directly quoted (for small 
exceptions see C.2.3 and C.2.4). To guarantee anonymity, the individual interviews have been 
numbered (A = Germany, B = Ireland, C = Portugal and D = Austria). Interviews with 
parliamentarians have been additionally numbered 1,2,3 etc. and interviews with 
administrators with a,b,c, etc. (see again Table 4). All interview transcripts have been stored 
on a CD-ROM attached to this dissertation. 
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B.4 Independent Variables: Data Collection and Calibration 
The purpose of the section is twofold. First, it collects data on the independent variables based 
on the four guiding assumptions developed in chapter B.2. All data relates to the year 2012 in 
which the ESM treaty has been ratified.
62
 Second, it will calibrate the data in order to make 
use of it for the fsQCA.  
 
B.4.1 Data Collection Independent Variables 
Different variables are collected to assess the macro-economic situation of Eurozone countries 
in 2012 (see B.4.1.1). In the absence of a single measurement for economic performance, 
eight of the most often used economic indicators are chosen from renowned sources (such as 
Eurostat or the ECB, see below). The assessment of Euroscepticism (see B.4.1.2) is twofold: 
data from the Eurobarometer measures public Euroscepticism, while the latest 2010 Chapel 
Hill index assesses the positioning of political parties concerning European integration. Two 
recent rankings from high-quality journals are consulted in order to assess the institutional 
capacities of NPs in handling EU affairs (see B.4.1.3). Constitutional and political 
requirements to ratify the ESM treaty (see B.4.1.4) are measured by calculating the majority 
of the governing parties in parliament as well as on the basis of a European Commission 
report which outlines if (and by which majorities) parliamentary chambers were involved in 
the ratification of the ESM treaty. 
 
B.4.1.1 Macroeconomic Situation 
The economic situation of Eurozone countries differed significantly when the ESM treaty was 
ratified in 2012 (see for instance Buti et al. 2012; De Grauwe et al. 2012). In order to arrive at 
a robust measurement, I combine some of the most often used economic indicators measuring 
the performance of Eurozone countries in 2012. Some of the indicators measure rather long-
term economic performances of a country and remain comparatively stable over time (such as 
the GDP per capita or the government debt ratio)
63
 others can be subject to rapid changes 
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 To enhance comparability, the data for Latvia was also taken for the year 2012, although it joined the euro in 
2014. However, the acceptance of ESM conditions took place well ahead of 2014. Parliamentary deliberations 
on the ESM treaty are likely to have taken place in the 2012 period, such as for all the other Eurozone countries. 
63
 Notable exceptions are the so-called programme countries which experienced a sharp increase of their public 
debt levels in 2010-2012. The public debt of most industrialised countries substantially increased although there 
are countries that traditionally had higher public debt levels (e.g. Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Greece) than others. 
And also the GDP per capita – despite its increase in all countries in the last decades – remains relatively stable 
vis-à-vis other countries over time. 
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(such as interest rates on government bonds or the credit rating of a country)
64
. If the analysis 
was limited to a single of those economic indicators, the assessment of economic performance 
would necessarily be biased.
65
 I therefore opt for a mixture of long-, medium- und short-term 
indicators: GDP per capita, government debt ratio (long-term), GDP growth, unemployment 
rate, the competitiveness of the economy (medium-term), the annual government deficit ratio, 
the credit rating (which can in principle be both, medium or short term) and interest rates on 
ten-year government bonds (short-term) (see Table 47). The following paragraphs present the 
data and their sources and provide explanations as to why the respective indicators have been 
chosen. I will start with government debt and the annual governmental deficit ratio 
(commonly known as the ‘Maastricht criteria’); this is followed by GDP per capita and the 
economy’s competitiveness, the unemployment rate and GDP growth, interest rates on ten-
year government bonds as well as credit ratings. 
 
The Maastricht Criteria: Government Debt Ratio and Annual Government Deficit Ratio 
The two most prominent economic indicators to assess the economic performance of EU 
Member States are the public government debt and the annual government deficit ratio. They 
are the reference values for the so-called excessive deficit procedure which is laid down in 
protocol 12 of the Lisbon Treaties: “3 % for the ratio of the planned or actual government 
deficit to gross domestic product at market prices and 60 % for the ratio of government debt 
to gross domestic product at market prices”. The data for these two indicators is taken from 
the Eurostat homepage (Euro Area Statistics 2015). Only six countries complied with the 3% 
government deficit criteria in 2012, namely Germany (+0.1%), Luxembourg (+0.1%), Estonia 
(-0.3%), Latvia (-0.8%), Finland (-2.1%) and Austria (-2.3%). Countries not complying with 
these criteria can face sanctions initiated by the European Commission and must explain how 
they are going to respect the outlined criteria in the medium-term.  
Regarding the second Maastricht criteria, only six countries had a ratio of government debt to 
gross domestic product lower than 60% in 2012: Estonia (9.7%), Luxembourg (21.9%), 
Latvia (40.9%), Slovakia (52.1%), Finland (52.9%) and Slovenia (53.7%). Other 
economically strong countries such as Germany, Austria or the Netherlands failed to comply 
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 Credit ratings are assumed to measure the overall economic performance of a country. They take various 
economic indicators into account. However, they also measure and influence the perception of market 
participants. Credit ratings have thus a political component. Furthermore, the mispricing of credit ratings after 
the introduction of the common currency has called the reliability of these measurements into question. 
65 
Germany, for instance, had a quite high level of public government debt in 2012 (long-term), although the 
interest rates on ten-year government bonds (short-term) remained at record low values. Other countries 
experienced a sharp increase of their annual government deficits (medium-term) in 2010-2012 although the 
credit rating or the unemployment rate remained relatively stable (the Netherlands are a case in point). 
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with this criterion. Estonia, Luxembourg, Latvia and Finland were thus the only four countries 
in compliance with both Maastricht criteria in 2012. There is a relatively strong correlation 
between a high government debt and a high government deficit ratio. One exception in 2012 
is Spain: traditionally, Spain’s government debt ratio had been lower than the European 
average (similar to Ireland), but the annual government deficit surged considerably 
throughout the crisis (as did the overall level of public debt). Italy, on the other side, managed 
to keep its government deficit ratio on a relatively modest level though its public debt has 
always been one of the highest in Europe. The economic situation in Cyprus just started to 
deteriorate in summer 2012 (and Cyprus experienced a sharp increase in its public debt level 
as well as a major soar of its unemployment figures since early 2013). All Eurozone countries 
which already requested financial assistance (as of mid-2012) can be found in the first half of 
Figure 5. The figure thus already indicates current and former debtor countries.  
Figure 5: Government Debt and Government Deficit Ratio. Eurozone 2012 
 
Source 9: Own compilation, sources are indicated in the following paragraphs. The black line indicates 
the threshold to comply with both Maastricht criteria. 
However, as argued above, looking at these two indicators is potentially biased. The position 
of smaller countries (such as the Baltic States or Luxembourg) must be put into a broader 
context. With regard to the Maastricht criteria these countries perform well; however, they are 
economically not the most important players in the Eurozone. 
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GDP per Capita and competitiveness 
In order to account for the overall prosperity of a country, the GDP per capita is considered. 
GDP per capita is a commonly used indicator assessing the aggregate welfare of a country. It 
adds up the value of all final goods and services that have been produced in one year (on a 
yearly basis) and divides this value by the number of people living in a country. The indicator 
does consequently not allow making any statements on the distribution of economic wealth 
within a country. The data for this indicator was retrieved from the homepage of the World 
Bank (World Bank 2015) and is presented in US dollars. The indicator is thus helpful to put 
the economic performance of Eurozone Member States into perspective. They differ 
significantly from the values of the above mentioned Maastricht criteria. Latvia (14.000$) and 
Luxembourg (106.000$), for instance, both met the Maastricht criteria, but Latvia’s GDP per 
capita is only around 13% that of Luxembourg (it equals around 64% of the European 
average). From those countries that eventually received a bailout, only Ireland (and to a lesser 
extent Spain) have an above average GDP per capita. 
Figure 6: Competitiveness Index and GDP per capita in $ 
 
Source 10: Own compilation, sources are indicated in the text. 
GDP per capita is often presented alongside information on the general competitiveness of an 
economy. A high competitiveness of a market economy is considered crucial to maintain 
economic welfare. In order to acquire larger amounts of economic prosperity, countries must 
have gained high levels of competitiveness to be successful in international markets. The 
World Economic Forum regularly publishes insight reports measuring the competitiveness of 
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European economies. The indicator includes, among other things, the spending of a country 
on research and development (R&D), resource efficiency, the development of the digital 
market or the number of patents in a country (for a detailed description see World Economic 
Forum 2012). As can be seen in Figure 6, there is a high correlation between competitiveness 
and GDP per capita. Luxembourg is in a way an outlier because it has an exceptionally high 
GDP per capita (mainly due to its large banking industry). The most competitive economies in 
2012 were in Finland, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany and Luxembourg. On the other side 
of that scale are Greece, Slovakia, Italy, Latvia and Malta. Adding these two indicators to the 
picture, a comparatively strong North-South divide emerges. 
 
Unemployment Rate and GDP Growth 
The unemployment rate and the annual GDP growth provide better information on the 
medium-term situation of a country. Both indicators can be subjected to fluctuations, but they 
also follow longer-term patterns.  
Figure 7: Unemployment Rate and GDP Growth in 2012 
 
Source 11: Own compilation. Sources are indicated in the text. To increase comparability of the two 
indicators, the GDP growth rate is presented on a reversed scale. 
The GDP growth allows measuring the economic development over time and, more 
importantly, of economies of different sizes. It compares the value of all produced goods and 
services, reduced by the costs of their production. The unemployment rate is equally 
comparable over countries and measures the percentage of the economically active part of the 
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population which is currently jobless. Data for both indicators were again retrieved from 
Eurostat (Eurostat 2013a, 2013b). 
The economic performance of Eurozone countries differs significantly with regard to these 
two indicators. Spain and Greece suffered from record high unemployment rates (24.8% and 
24.5%) while Austria experienced nearly full employment (4.9%). The average 
unemployment rate in the Eurozone in 2012 was between 10.7% (January) and 11.7% 
(December) with a tendency on the rise (Eurostat 2013b). The variation is also striking 
regarding GDP growth. While Latvia experienced a GDP growth of 4.8%, Greece’s economy 
shrunk by around 7%. On average, the growth domestic product shrank by 0.8% in the 
Eurozone in 2012 (Eurostat 2013a). The Eurozone had therefore been in a recession in 2012. 
Again, a North-South divide can be observed with these numbers. All countries that received 
financial assistance can unsurprisingly be found in the first half of Figure 7. This picture 
intensifies when short-term indicators to measure the macro-economic performance of a 
country are included.  
 
Interest Rates and Credit Ratings 
The interest-rates on ten year bonds as well as the credit ratings are, in a way, assessments of 
the future economic development of a country. Ideally, they contain information from the 
economic indicators presented above, but can also be complemented by political 
considerations. Interest rates on government bonds can be described as a kind of ‘monetary 
thermometer’ (see for the term, among others, Bjorksten, Syrjänen 1999) for the economic 
situation of a country. Countries regularly issue government bonds to re-finance their 
expenditures. The interest rates on governments bonds reflect the expectation of market 
participants on the probability that a debtor can repay his obligations.
66
 When Greece or 
Portugal faced extraordinarily high interest rates on their government bonds (up to 25% for 
Greece in 2010) their governments eventually decided to request financial assistance from the 
EFSF/EFSM/IMF. Different kinds of government bonds exist, from which the ten-year 
government bonds are most indicative to assess the ability of a country to re-finance its debt.
67
 
Borrowing money for a ten year period requires a solid knowledge of the economic situation 
of a country. A six-month loan, on the other side, is less risky for the debt holder since the 
creditworthiness can be more easily predicted. Numbers were again retrieved from Eurostat 
(Eurostat 2014) which publishes data on a monthly basis. The monthly data for 2012 was 
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 They are nonetheless used in academic studies: in order to assess the impact of European Council decisions on 
the ‘financial markets’, for instance, changes in the return on sovereign debt served as an important indicator in a 
study by Smeets and Zimmermann (see for instance Smeets, Zimmermann 2013). 
67
 Market participants normally pay lower interest rates for short-term government bonds since they can better 
assess whether a country can pay back its loan in a shorter time period. Investments in ten year governments 
bonds, on the other side, require a careful assessment on the creditworthiness of a market participant. 
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summoned and divided by twelve to form the monthly average interest rate for the year 2012. 
In the period under investigation, Germany (1.63%), Luxembourg (2.05%) or Finland 
(2.11%) could re-finance themselves at record low prices while interest rates for programme 
countries went through the roof (Greece with 25.7%, for instance). But also Italy (5.75%) or 
Cyprus (7%) faced a sharp increase of their costs to re-finance their debt. Since the beginning 
of the common currency, the spread between the interest rates of the Eurozone countries has 
never been as wide as of 2012.  
Credit ratings are another economic assessment of the creditworthiness of a country. They 
significantly influence the decision to buy government bonds and also contain a strong 
political component. Besides data on economic fundamentals, credit rating agencies try to 
assess how likely it is that a certain government policy is successful. They can upgrade their 
ratings if a government announces policy measures from which the agency believes that they 
can be successful. Likewise, they can downgrade their rating if the political outlook for a 
country seems uncertain (for instance, if an election did not result in stable majorities for a 
governing coalition). The role of credit rating agencies has become highly contested 
throughout the course of the crisis (see among others Darbellay 2013). The three most 
influential agencies are Standard& Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch, all U.S. based companies. 
They publish updated assessments on the creditworthiness of states in irregular intervals. 
Their rankings partly differ in their assessments, but also in their scaling (see full table can be 
found in the appendix, see Table 43). The 16 highest ratings in all three agencies range from 
‘Triple A’ to ‘Highly Speculative’. Below this threshold, government bonds count as 
‘substantial risks’ or even default.  
The highest 16 classifications of all three agencies are measured within the same intervals; 
only their names differ. To operationalise and summarize these numbers, the highest ‘tripe A’ 
rating received the value 16, the second highest rating (Aa1: Moody’s, AA+: S&P, AA+: 
Fitch) the value 15, etc. All ratings below the value of ‘highly speculative’ (below ‘B2’ for 
Moody’s, ‘B’ for S&P, ‘B’ for Fitch) received the value 0. A distinction between different 
kinds of bonds below the threshold was unnecessary since the empirical evidence for these 
cases is limited (this only applies to Greece). 
Instead of relying on data from a single point in time, I took data from five different points in 
time between April 2010 and October 2012 (due to data availability). The assessments neither 
differ significantly over time nor between the three agencies. Four countries regularly 
received the highest rating from all three rating agencies: Finland, Germany, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands (the complete comparable data can be found in the appendix, see Table 44, 
Table 45 and Table 46). Investments in governments bonds from these four countries were not 
expected to pose a risk to bondholders. Also Austria and France receive high ratings (15.8) 
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although Stand& Poor’s had downgraded both countries in 2012 (both countries were still 
able to re-finance themselves at record low prices). 
Figure 8: Credit Ratings and interest rates on 10-year government bonds 
 
Source 12: Own compilation. Sources are indicated in the text. 
The lowest ratings as well as the highest interest rate on ten-year bonds can be found for 
Greece: its governments bonds are assumed to pose a substantial risk of default (average 
value of 1) and thus reflect the exceptional macroeconomic situation of the Hellenic Republic 
in 2012. However, also countries such as Latvia, Ireland, Portugal or Cyprus receive low 
credit ratings (values range between 6.07 and 8.2) and thus have to pay high interest rates on 
government bonds. Again, the economic North-South divide is strongly visible in these 
numbers.  
All the eight indicators represent a wide range of economic assessments. In most cases, the 
values of the different indicators are interrelated. The combination of these eight indicators 
(conducted in B.4.2.2.1) allows arriving at a single, robust measurement to assess the overall 
macro-economic situation of a country. The full list of these macro-economic variables can be 
found in the appendix (see Table 47). 
 
B.4.1.2 Euroscepticism 
Besides macro-economic factors, Eurosceptical attitudes are expected to impact on 
parliamentary prerogatives in ESM affairs (Raunio 2005). Since the issuing of financial 
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assistance is a particularly sensitive policy field, I assume that these attitudes were taken into 
account when parliaments drafted the accompanying regulations of the ESM treaty. The 
assessment of Eurosceptical sentiments, however, is equally challenging. A broad distinction 
can be made between public and party Euroscepticism. Both are interrelated: strong public 
Eurosceptical sentiments are likely to result in a stronger share of Eurosceptical parties in 
parliament. Differentiating between the two is nonetheless helpful since a shift in public 
Eurosceptical sentiments does not immediately result in an altered composition of the 
parliament. Furthermore, Eurosceptical parties in parliament have more direct means at their 
disposal to influence policy-making and can therefore more strongly account for 
Eurosceptical sentiments in a country. The following two sub-sections present data on public 
and party based Euroscepticism separately. 
B.4.1.2.1 Public Euroscepticism 
The measurement of public Euroscepticism is provided by data from the Eurobarometer. The 
Eurobarometer is conducted twice a year in all EU Member States as well as in some 
accession countries. It asks a wide range of questions. Some occur regularly which makes 
long-term comparisons possible.  
The Eurobarometer has been criticised on several grounds: First, the European Commission, 
as the purchaser of the survey, is not well suited to assess preferences of integration since it 
has an inherent interest in positive results of the poll. Second, as Höpner and Jurczyk argue, 
the surveys did not always respect the most common standard rules of opinion polls (see 
Höpner, Jurczyk 2012). According to these authors, the Eurobarometer is partly at the 
borderline of being interest-driven propaganda and not objective preference testing (ibidem). 
This criticism might be slightly too harsh although the numbers of the Eurobarometer must be 
interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, in the absence of other comparable data sources to 
measure public opinion towards the European Union, data of the Eurobarometer will be used 
to measure public Euroscepticism. In the forefront of the ratification of the ESM treaty (in 
2011 and 2012), the European Commission published a Eurobarometer asking, among other 
things, the following question: “In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, 
fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?”. The question allows 
measuring the general satisfaction with EU politics. I took those answers into account where 
respondents answered they had a “fairly negative” or “very negative image” of the EU68. To 
ensure greater validity, I took the responses from the November 2011 and June 2012 
Eurobarometer (see European Commission 2012: 13). The same Eurobarometer also asked 
whether respondents regard “the membership of their country as a ‘good’, ‘neither good nor 
bad’ or a ‘bad thing’”. Although both questions are fairly similar, they provide information on 
                                                 
68
 The data does not allow distinguishing between these two answers.  
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the general attitude towards EU integration. I took those answers into account where 
respondents regarded EU membership as a bad thing. The answers are taken from the May 
2011 and June 2012 Eurobarometer; the time horizon thus differs slightly (European 
Commission 2012: 16). 
Table 5: Public Euroscepticism in 18 Eurozone parliaments 
In general, does the EU conjure up for you a 
fairly negative/ very negative image (in %)? 
Generally speaking, do you think that 
(your country)’s EU membership EU is a 
bad thing (in %)? 
 EB 76.3 
Nov 2011 
EB 77.4 
June 2012 
EB 75.3  
May 11 
EB 77.4 
June 12 
ø 
Portugal 35 34 26 31 31.5 
Austria 42 29 25 29 31.25 
Greece 37 31 33 19 30 
Cyprus 21 35 25 27 27 
Finland 31 31 19 17 24.5 
Spain 22 28 17 18 21.25 
France 26 25 19 12 20.5 
Slovenia 20 25 21 16 20.5 
Italy 21 20 17 20 19.5 
Latvia 18 21 21 14 18.5 
Ireland 26 22 12 13 18.25 
Netherlands 29 22 12 9 18 
Slovakia 26 21 10 11 17 
Germany 25 18 16 8 16.75 
Malta 19 18 18 12 16.75 
Luxembourg 20 20 13 8 15.25 
Belgium 23 18 11 9 15.25 
Estonia 15 15 9 9 12 
Source 13: Own compilation, based on (European Commission 2012). 
The last column of the table (see Table 5) shows the average percentage of all combined 
answers, divided by four. According to this survey data, the highest public Euroscepticism 
can be found in Portugal, Austria, Greece and Cyprus. With the exception of Austria, these 
three countries were hit hard by the crisis and had to demand financial assistance from the 
EFSF/ESM/IMF. Ireland is an exception, were public Euroscepticism is surprisingly low. 
Also Finland and Spain show high levels of public Euroscepticism. 
There are notable differences between the answers to the two questions. Dutch people, for 
instance, have a fairly negative image of the EU, but do not regard EU membership as a bad 
thing per se (25.5% and 10.5% on average respectively). The lowest level of public 
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Euroscepticism can be found in Estonia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta and Germany. The 
first four countries usually rank high with regard to a positive image of the EU. In Germany – 
similar to the Netherlands – the image of the EU is rather negative; however, only few people 
regard EU membership as a bad thing. Of course, the numbers must be carefully interpreted. 
They give a general idea about the degree of Eurosceptical attitudes of the general public 
which is expected to indirectly impact on political decision-making. These findings must be 
completed with information on party Euroscepticism. Political parties in parliament can exert 
greater parliamentary influence, for instance by politicizing European affairs. 
B.4.1.2.2 Party Euroscepticism 
Party Euroscepticism is often measured with the Chapel Hill Index which has been updated 
since its first publication in 2006 (see Bakker et al. 2012). The Chapel Hill Index is a survey 
directed at deputies of national parliaments in the European Union. It assesses, among other 
things, which course the party leadership took over European integration on a 1-7 scale. One 
specific question in the 2010 Chapel Hill Index was: “How would you describe the general 
position on European integration that the party leadership took over the course of 2010? 
[Strongly Opposed/ Opposed/ Somewhat Opposed/ Neutral/ Somewhat in favour/ In favour/ 
Strongly in Favour/ Don’t know].” This question has several advantages. First, the survey is 
an expert survey. Respondents can be expected to be well-informed about the given subject. 
Second, it is an indirect question towards the stance of the party leadership. The wording of 
the question rules out ambiguity (on this point see Proksch, Lo 2012). Answers are expected 
to be more objective since personal attitudes of the respondents are not asked for. Third, the 
survey question does not only capture Eurosceptical positions, but also positions in favour of 
European integration. Hence, a party does not have to be coded as either Eurosceptic or not-
Eurosceptic. The Chapel Hill index allows measuring a degree of attitudes towards European 
integration. And lastly, the response rate to the surveys is unusually high; partly up to ten 
deputies per party responded on average to the questionnaire, allowing calculating a robust 
average score on the party’s attitude towards European integration. There are, however, also 
two shortcomings. First, the data set is from 2010 and thus two years before the ratification of 
the ESM treaty. No updated data on party positioning for the year 2012 exists. However, since 
party positioning towards European integration represents a more general attitude, it is 
unlikely that this attitude has changed significantly over two years. The potential inaccuracy 
of the data is thus not expected to influence the results of the analysis significantly. And 
second, data for Luxembourg and Malta was not available. In the course of another article, my 
colleague Katrin Auel and I therefore requested information from the deputies in these two 
countries to complement the Chapel Hill data set (Auel, Höing 2015). In other (rare) cases 
where individual data for a single political party was missing, we contacted country experts 
within the OPAL project to provide us with estimated numbers. The complete data can be 
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found in the appendix (see F.3.2). In a first step, the average score on the general positioning 
of the party leadership on European integration has been calculated for each party, ranging 
from ‘strongly opposed’ (1) to ‘strongly in favour’ (7).69 In a second step, this average score 
was weighted according to the number of seats in parliaments. This is necessary to take the 
relative strength of a party (the share of seats in parliament) into account. Eurosceptical 
parties are often found on the fringes of the party spectrum, while pro-European parties tend 
to be mainstream parties. They traditionally occupy a larger number of seats in parliament. 
This is reflected with the adjusted indicator. In order to retrieve information on the seat share, 
all parliamentary elections results from 2010 were accessed from the parliamentary websites. 
The average score for each party has then been multiplied with the number of its seats in 
parliament. 
These scores were then divided by the absolute number of seats to calculate the overall 
positioning of the entire parliament. The score calculated for each parliament thus ranges 
from 1 = strongly opposed to European integration to 7 = strongly in favour of European 
integration. This calculation can be found in model 1 of Table 6.However, the composition of 
some parliaments changed in the 2010-2012 period. I therefore conducted an alternative 
measurement by including the results of the more recent parliamentary elections – if 
necessary (see model 2).
70
 The second model therefore takes into account the potentially 
altered compositions of parliaments in the period under investigation. There is, however, a 
trade-off between the two models: the data on party positioning for 2010 (model 1) is more 
accurate since the Chapel Hill questionnaire was sent exactly to those deputies sitting in 
parliament in the year 2010. The second models transfers these responses to the newly elected 
deputies
71
 although their positioning could – at least theoretically – have changed. The second 
model is thus more up-to-date with regard to the seat share, but slightly more prone to error 
due to potentially imprecise data. As Table 6 shows, however, the two indices do not differ 
significantly. The most Eurosceptical parliaments can be found in Greece (3.89 after the 2012 
election), the Netherlands (2010: 4.14 and 2012: 4.23), but also Austria (4.74) and Finland 
(2010: 5.59 and 2011: 4.93). These countries are known for having strong Eurosceptical 
parties in parliament that partly gained additional seats in the post-2010 period. Most notable 
is the success of left and right extremist parties in Greece in 2012 (and also in 2015) and in 
Finland. Especially the Finish 2011 elections were dominated by the question of a rescue 
package for Portugal under the EFSF (see among others Laffan 2014: 272). Parliaments with 
                                                 
69
 If ten deputies of a party responded to the respective questions, the average score of these responses has been 
summoned and been divided by ten. 
70
 In a number of countries no parliamentary elections were held in the 2010-2012. This applies to Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia. An alternative measurement of party positioning 
was therefore unnecessary. 
71
 When new political parties entered the parliament, the Chapel Hill data was of course not available. It had thus 
to be omitted for further calculations. 
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rather Europhile political parties can be found in Luxembourg, Malta, but also in Ireland, 
Spain or Estonia. The two models presented above do not differ significantly, with the 
possible exception of Finland (where Eurosceptical parties gained seats in the 2011 election) 
and Latvia (that elected much a more pro-European parliament in 2011).  
Table 6: Party Euroscepticism in 18 Eurozone countries, based on Chapel Hill data 
Country Model 1 Model 2 
Austria 4.74 4.74 
Belgium 5.91 5.91 
Cyprus * 5.36 5.33 
Estonia * 6.09 6.29 
Finland * 5.59 4.93 
France * 5.81 5.84 
Germany 5.57 5.57 
Greece * 3.89 3.89 
Ireland * 6.21 5.96 
Italy 5.23 5.23 
Latvia * 4.59 5.96 
Luxembourg 6.57 6.57 
Malta 6.74 6.74 
Netherlands * 4.14 4.23 
Portugal * 6.25 6.29 
Slovakia * 5.25 5.54 
Slovenia 5.86 5.86 
Spain * 6.32 6.15 
Source 14: Own presentation. The complete data can be found in the appendix F.3.2. 
 ‘*’ indicates that parliamentary elections have taken place between 2010 and 2012. Model 1 presents 
data based on the composition of national parliament in 2010. Model 2 presents the data based on the seat 
share of political parties after elections in 2011 or 2012 – before the ratification of the ESM treaty.  
For the calibration of the data (see Table 16), I eventually used the second model. First, both 
models do not differ significantly in the first place. And second, although there is a trade-off 
between accuracy of the given responses and the accuracy of the seat share in parliament, 
there is no evidence that the general positioning of political parties towards European 
integration has changed significantly between 2010 and 2012. I thus take the altered 
composition of parliaments into account when calculating party based Euroscepticism. It was 
in this composition that the respective parliaments decided on the ratification of the ESM 
treaty in 2012. 
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B.4.1.3 Parliamentary Prerogatives in EU Affairs 
National parliaments also differ with regard to their parliamentary prerogatives in EU affairs. 
At the beginning of the integration process, European politics were mostly treated as foreign 
politics and thus dominated by the executive. This changed with the beginning of the 1990s. 
In many parliamentary settings, specific laws or provisions now regulate the cooperation 
between the government and the parliament in EU affairs. European Affairs Committees were 
set up and parliamentary administrations were upgraded to better cope with the increasing 
amount of EU documents forwarded to parliamentary assemblies. Although this is a general 
trend, huge differences between Member States exist. The Danish Folketing, for instance, 
emerged as a chambers with a particularly strong influence on EU politics (see for instance 
Sousa 2008) while the involvement of the Belgium parliaments remained limited (Bosch 
2014). Comparisons of parliamentary strengths in EU affairs remain nonetheless challenging 
in methodological terms. Are governments more accountable to their parliaments if NPs 
exercise an effective ex ante control (better access to information, the right to issue binding 
mandates, etc.)? Or are NPs more effective if they exercise strong ex post control, for instance 
threatening not to ratify or implement decisions taken at the European level? How can 
informal influence be accounted for if single MPs negotiate policy proposals with 
representatives of the executive?  
The tasks of NPs in EU affairs are numerous: parliaments are expected to monitor and 
scrutinise legislative processes at the European level and to exercise influence vis-à-vis the 
European Council (Wessels and Rozenberg 2013) or their government representative in the 
Council of Ministers. Additionally, they are responsible for the ratification of treaty changes, 
the transposition of EU legislation
72
 (see for instance Karlas 2012: 1095) and should publicly 
deliberate on EU issues, hence informing the public about EU affairs.  
I do not intend to provide an answer to the question of how to measure parliamentary strength 
in EU affairs, nor do I develop an own classification. Instead, I will refer to existing rankings 
in the literature and base classifications on formal parliamentary strength on existing 
knowledge. These rankings include all of the 18 Eurozone parliaments. To guarantee the 
quality of these rankings, I will only refer to rankings that have been published in high-quality 
journals. In order not to rely on the groundwork of a single author, I present two of the most 
recent rankings of parliamentary strengths: Karlas’ index on parliamentary control in EU 
affairs (2012) and the OPAL index on parliamentary strength (Auel et al. 2015), both 
published in West European Politics. They cover a wide range of those indicators mentioned 
above and are thus representative for a larger number of classifications. The scores of the two 
rankings will be summoned to an overall indicator at the end of this section (see B.4.1.3.3). 
                                                 
72
 Parliaments are to different degrees involved in the transposition of EU laws. In some settings, this can be 
regulated by government decree. 
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B.4.1.3.1 Karlas Index on Parliamentary Control in EU Affairs 
Karlas (2012) measures parliamentary control on five dimensions: scope, decentralisation, 
influence mechanism, binding character and upper chambers (for a short description of the 
measurement see footnote)
73
. Except for the last one, these dimensions represent the most 
often used criteria to assess parliamentary strength and are therefore representative for a 
number of other studies. The index has the advantage that it includes the 18 Member States 
under investigation. For the measurement, Karlas consults available national legal documents, 
basic information about parliamentary control (accessible from parliamentary websites) as 
well as three biannual COSAC reports from 2005, 2007 and 2010 (Karlas 2012: p.1101). As 
can be seen in Table 7, differences between the 18 parliaments are striking. The strongest 
parliaments in terms of (formal) parliamentary prerogatives can be found in Estonia and 
Finland, but also Slovenia, Germany or Austria score quite high. Quite often, strong 
parliamentary prerogatives in EU affairs positively correlate with parliaments’ actual 
involvement (Auel and Höing 2014). The German Bundestag is an interesting case in this 
regard. Although it was for a long time perceived as a laggard in EU affairs (Auel 2006), it 
has recently acquired a stronger role in EU affairs (see for instance Calliess, Beichelt 2013), 
especially as a result of judgments of the German Constitutional Court. 
Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain possess only weak formal 
parliamentary prerogatives in EU affairs. In Belgium, the weak parliamentary involvement is 
often attributed to the fragmented parliamentary landscape which complicates the 
coordination of the different legislative chambers (Bosch 2014). In Cyprus or Ireland, the 
executive is traditionally dominant. Overall, parliaments in Southern Europe seem to exercise 
less influence on their government representatives in EU affairs than other parliaments. 
                                                 
73 Karlas develops an index with a maximum of twelve points to assess parliamentary strength in EU affairs. To 
assess the scope of the scrutiny process, the index measures whether EU legislative proposals and the 
government’s negotiating positions are systematically analyzed (2 points), only one of them (1 point) or none (0 
points). The second dimension assesses the degree of decentralisation, in particular whether standing committees 
are regularly (2 points), occasionally (1 point) or not (0 points) involved in EU scrutiny procedures. Standing 
Committees possess more technical expertise to deal with certain policy proposals. Their regular involvement 
thus makes scrutiny procedures more effective. To assess parliamentary influence, Karlas measures whether 
mandates are regularly (3 points), not regularly (1.5 point) or not at all adopted (0 points). Furthermore, Karlas 
attributes 1.5 points to those parliaments that make use of the so-called scrutiny reserve (1.5 point), e.g. where a 
minister must abstain from voting at the European level if the parliament claims that it did not have sufficient 
time to scrutinize a proposal. Parliaments that can give binding mandates to their ministers are attributed 3 
points. When the government must justify its position in case of deviations from the position of the parliament, 
he attributes 1.5 points. Since mandating is the strongest policy-influencing mean of a parliament, this indicator 
receives higher weight. Lastly, Karlas measure the influence of second chambers on the third and fourth 
indicator (2 respectively 1 point). Although second chambers (with the exception of Italy and, to some extent, 
Germany) are not involved in the day-to-day handling of the ESM, they did play an important role in the 
ratification process. It thus makes sense to include this indicator into the index. 
109 
 
Table 7: Karlas’ index on parliamentary control for 18 Eurozone countries 
Country 
Score 
Parl. 
Control 
Score Parl. 
Control in % 
Country 
Score 
Parl. 
Control 
Score Parl. 
Control in % 
Estonia 8.5 70.83 Italy 5.5 45.83 
Finland 8.5 70.83 Luxembourg 3 23 
Slovenia 7.5 62.50 Malta 2.5 20.83 
Germany 7 58.33 Belgium 2 16.67 
Austria 6.5 54.17 Cyprus 2 16.67 
Netherlands 6.5 54.17 Greece 2 16.67 
Slovakia 6.5 54.17 Portugal 2 16.67 
Latvia 6.5 54.17 Ireland 2 16.67 
France 5.5 45.83 Spain 2 16.67 
Source 15: Karlas 2012: 1102, with minor modifications. The table only shows the 18 Eurozone 
countries that are analysed in this thesis. Furthermore, the column on percentage points has been added. It 
is based on the highest possible amount of points (12) of all five dimensions. 
 
B.4.1.3.2 OPAL Score on Parliamentary Strength 
The second classification, developed by Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea (Auel et al. 2015) within 
the OPAL project, has the advantage that it puts more emphasis on the access to information. 
Generally, the authors assume that governments act as the agents of their parliaments when 
EU affairs are delegated to them. In order to avoid agency losses parliaments need access to 
information. They must be able to process this information and must possess formal tools in 
order to exercise influence. The score for institutional strength is therefore based on three 
different sets of indicators: the ‘access to information’74, the ‘scrutiny infrastructure’75 and 
what the authors label “oversight”76. In total, eleven indicators measure the institutional 
                                                 
74
 The access to the different types of documents (e.g. restricted, confidential, secret/ top secret etc.) is measured 
on a scale from 1 to 6. Whether the government provides explanatory memoranda on EU proposals is measured 
from 0 to 1. Whether governments provide ex ante reports on both, European Council summits and Council 
meetings, on one or neither of them is measured with 0, 0.5 or 1.  
75
 If more than one sub-committee deals with EU affairs, the authors attribute 2 points. EACs established as full 
standing committees receive 1 point, and those that are established as joint committees with other chambers are 
attributed 0.5 points. Since EACs (at least as sub-committees) exist in every national parliament, the minimum 
value for this indicator is 0.5 and not 0. Secondly, Auel et al. assess whether standing committees are fully 
responsible (1 point) for EU affairs, whether they have only advisory responsibilities (0.5 point) and whether or 
not they are systematically involved in the scrutiny process (0 points). This indicator is similar to Karlas’ index. 
Furthermore, they assess whether information is filtered (from a scale from 0 to 1) before they are submitted to 
the committees and the percentage of MPs involved in scrutiny (which is weighted with a Standing Committee 
multiplier, see appendix of their paper). The involvement of other standing committees in the scrutiny of EU 
affairs increases the number of MPs dealing with EU affairs. This is expected to have an impact on the general 
scrutiny activity. 
76
 On the third dimension, the index measures four indicators. The binding character of mandates (on a scale 
from 0 to 1), the possibility of scrutiny reserves (ranging from 0 to 1), the scope of the scrutiny (whether EU 
documents and government positions are scrutinized (1 point), only one of them (0.5 points) or none of them (0 
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parliamentary strength in EU affairs. The fact that many indicators of this index overlap with 
those of Karlas is not a disadvantage but points to the validity of the indicators chosen. One 
difference is that the OPAL score does not pay specific attention to the role of second 
chambers. At the same time, the sources to measure the different indicators go beyond the 
often cited COSAC reports and also include 28 country reports by parliamentary experts 
developed within the OPAL project. The ranking of the parliaments is largely in line with 
Karlas’ index (see Table 8). Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Estonia still belong to the 
groups of parliaments with the strongest participation rights, although Austria is now ranked 
slightly lower. Portugal, Malta, Spain and Ireland have higher scores in this index, although 
starting from an arguably low level. They still belong to the weaker parliaments when it 
comes to formal institutional strength. Belgium and Greece are still placed at the bottom half 
of the index. 
Table 8: Institutional strength in EU affairs for 18 Eurozone countries 
Country Score Parl. Control Country Score Parl. Control 
Finland 0.84 Italy 0.46 
Germany 0.78 Malta 0.46 
Estonia 0.67 Portugal 0.43 
Netherlands 0.66 Luxembourg 0.40 
Slovenia 0.60 Spain 0.40 
France 0.55 Ireland 0.39 
Latvia 0.53 Cyprus 0.27 
Austria 0.51 Greece 0.26 
Slovakia 0.49 Belgium 0.24 
Source 16: Auel et al. 2015, only 18 Eurozone countries. 
Both indices exemplify that the measurement of parliamentary strength is a challenging 
undertaking and depends on the authors’ choices of indicators and data sources. There exists 
no objective assessment to measure the institutional strength of a parliament. However, since 
both articles are very recent and have been published in high-quality journals, they can be 
used for the empirical analysis of this thesis. In order to account for the strengths and 
weaknesses of both approaches, the two indicators will be combined in order to increase the 
validity of the measurement in the next step. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
points)). Lastly, they also assess whether governments provide ex post reports on European Council summits and 
meetings of the Council of Ministers (ranging from 0 to 1). 
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B.4.1.3.3 Combined Index of Institutional Strength in EU Affairs 
The combined index (see Table 9) makes Finland the by far strongest parliament in terms of 
formal participation rights (77.42%), followed by Estonia (68.92%) and Germany (68.17%).  
Table 9: Combined index of parliamentary (institutional) strength in EU affairs 
Country Karlas (in %) Auel et al. (in %) 
Combined Index (in 
%) 
Finland 70.83 84.00 77.42 
Estonia 70.83 67.00 68.92 
Germany 58.33 78.00 68.17 
Slovenia 62.50 60.00 61.25 
Netherlands 54.17 66.00 60.09 
Latvia 54.17 53.00 53.58 
Austria 54.17 51.00 52.59 
Slovakia 54.17 49.00 51.59 
France 45.83 55.00 50.42 
Italy 45.83 46.00 45.92 
Malta 20.83 46.00 33.42 
Luxembourg 23.00 40.00 31.50 
Portugal 16.67 43.00 29.84 
Spain 16.67 40.00 28.34 
Ireland 16.67 39.00 27.84 
Cyprus 20.83 27.00 23.92 
Greece 16.67 26.00 21.34 
Belgium 16.67 24.00 20.34 
Source 17: Based on Karlas 2012 and Auel et al. 2015. 
Finland traditionally possesses one of the strongest parliaments in EU affairs. The literature 
on parliaments often points to the fact that EU newcomers adopted stronger scrutiny systems 
than older EU Member States (see for instance O’Brennan and Raunio 2007). The scores for 
Latvia, Slovenia or Slovakia confirm this finding.  
Overall, the combined index is in line with previous assessments on parliamentary strength in 
EU affairs. The group of formally weak parliaments contains Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Cyprus, 
Greece and Belgium (all less than 30 per cent) while also Malta and Luxembourg must be 
classified as rather weak parliaments in EU affairs. 
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B.4.1.4 Political and Constitutional Requirements to Ratify the ESM Treaty 
Further factors potentially influencing the parliamentary participation rights in ESM affairs 
are the political and constitutional requirements to ratify international treaties. Governments 
must organize majorities in their parliaments in order to pass legislation. Depending on the 
political system, majorities in two parliamentary chambers or even public referenda are 
required to adopt international treaties; some constitutional courts can also review the 
constitutionality of adopted treaties. The following data concentrates on the size of the 
political majorities in parliament and constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty 
(including the involvement of second chambers). The reason for this limitation is that no 
public referendum was required to adopt the ESM treaty in any of the 18 Eurozone countries. 
And second, comparable data for the role of constitutional courts is, although important, 
unfortunately not available. The specific role of some constitutional courts will nonetheless be 
addressed in the case studies in the second part of the empirical analysis (see C.2). 
B.4.1.4.1 Parliamentary Majorities to Ratify the ESM Treaty 
Governments rely on parliamentary majorities to pass legislation. Minority governments, but 
also small majorities combined with dissidents in the own ranks make the government 
dependent on opposition votes. The size of the parliamentary majority of the governing 
parties in lower chambers is thus an indicator to assess the political hurdles to ratify the ESM 
treaty. The greater the parliamentary majority is, the lower the need to compromise with 
opposition parties who – especially when they are Eurosceptic – are expected to demand 
stronger parliamentary participation rights in ESM affairs. In 2012, the majorities in 
parliaments for governing parties were unevenly distributed. On average, governing parties 
held a comfortable majority of more than 57% of seats in parliament.  
However, the measurement of parliamentary majorities by the number of seats has some 
pitfalls. In the Cypriot Parliament, for instance, the governing AKEL party occupied only 19 
out of 56 seats after the coalition partner (DIKO) had left the government over questions of 
the Cypriot conflict. Losing the (formal) parliamentary majority (in a transitional period) did 
not lead the entire Cypriot political system into a stalemate. The Cyprus political system is 
largely dominated by the executive and the directly elected president. Additionally, the ESM 
treaty was still adopted by all parties in parliament, even if not all deputies voted in its favour. 
The low number of parliamentary seats for the governing party is thus not well suited as a 
measurement for the political requirements to ratify the ESM treaty. The data for Cyprus will 
consequently not be used for the further analysis. The same applies to Italy, although for 
opposite reasons: in 2012, former Prime Minister Mario Monti led a coalition that – at least on 
paper – occupied nearly 88% of all seats in the lower chamber. The technocratic government 
was nonetheless contested during its term in office since a growing number of dissidents 
113 
 
withdrew its support. They eventually left the all-party coalition in 2013 resulting in new 
general elections. 
Table 10: Seat share in Eurozone parliaments in 2012 
Country 
Number of seats 
in parliament 
Number of seats 
governing parties 
Percentage 
share 
Austria 183 108 59.02% 
Belgium 150 96 64.00% 
Cyprus 56 19 33.92% 
Estonia  101 52 51.49% 
Finland 200 125 62.50% 
France 577 320 55.46% 
Germany 622 332 53.38% 
Greece 300 160 53.33% 
Ireland 168 113 67.26% 
Italy 617 547 87.97% 
Latvia 100 56 56.00% 
Luxembourg 60 39 65.00% 
Malta 69 35 50.72% 
Netherlands 150 76 50.66% 
Portugal 230 130 56.52% 
Slovakia 150 83 55.33% 
Slovenia 90 55 55.55% 
Spain 350 186 53.14% 
Source 18: Own presentation. Information on the seat share was retrieved from parliamentary 
websites. 
Other outliers, although for different reasons, are Ireland and Finland. Ireland held 
parliamentary elections in early 2011 after the country requested financial assistance from the 
EFSF and the International Monetary Fund (see case study on Ireland in C.2.3). The election 
resulted in a landslide victory of Fine Gael and the Labour party, resulting in a seat share of 
more 67%. Parliamentary elections in Finland in 2011 were dominated by discussions about 
the financial bailout package for Portugal. During this debate, the True Finns Party could 
multiply their seat share in parliament by six, occupying 39 seats in an assembly with 200 
deputies. As a result, a large coalition government composed of six parties was formed which 
occupied an unusually high share of parliamentary seats (62%). The data on the political 
parliamentary majorities must therefore be interpreted with caution. Even if governments 
possessed a formally large majority in parliament, this does not necessarily mean that the 
ESM vote was uncontested. And even if governments possessed only small majorities, the 
major opposition parties sometimes supported the ESM ratification without much political 
114 
 
debate. The data – with the exception of Cyprus and Italy – is thus primarily interpreted as a 
proxy to assess the likelihood that the government had to make concessions to the 
parliamentary opposition. The larger the seat share, the lower the political obstacles to ratify 
the ESM treaty.  
In 2012, the smallest majorities in lower chambers were in Malta, the Netherlands and 
Estonia. In Malta, only two parties entered the parliament from which both are quite 
Europhile. In the Netherlands, on the other side, the minority government in power was 
supported by the VVD of Geert Wilders and possessed a majority of only one seat. The party 
is sceptical of further European integration. Hence, the small majorities in the Dutch case are 
more likely to have influenced parliamentary participation rights within the ESM than in 
Malta. Also in Germany, Greece or Spain governments could only rely on relatively narrow 
support in parliament. In Luxembourg, Belgium or Austria, by contrast, majorities were 
traditionally larger.  
B.4.1.4.2 Constitutional Requirements to Ratify the ESM Treaty 
The adoption of international treaties often requires extended majorities in parliament as well 
as the approval of upper chambers (in some bicameral systems). The ratification of the ESM 
treaty was simultaneously ratified with the modification of article 136 TFEU. 
Constitutionally, this change of EU primary law resulted in the need for enlarged majorities in 
parliament as well as the involvement of second chambers. In the following, I will assess the 
constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty and article 136 TFEU separately, since 
they partly differ. It is interesting to recall that all EU parliaments had to ratify the 
modification of article 136 TFEU and not only Eurozone countries. Information is retrieved 
from a report by the European Commission (European Commission 2013) which also 
provides information on the ratification of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance (TSCG). Table 11 (see below) lists the constitutional requirements for the ESM 
treaty and article 136 TFEU separately.  
In some Member States, the ESM was treated as a treaty under international law and passed 
with simple majorities in parliament (Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Malta, Portugal and 
Slovenia). In these unicameral settings, it was relatively easy for the government to secure a 
parliamentary majority for both measures. In some unicameral settings, an absolute (Estonia, 
Slovakia) or even a qualified majority (Luxembourg) was necessary, increasing the 
constitutional requirements slightly. 
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Table 11: Constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty 
Country Parl. Ratification Art. 136 TFEU Parl. Ratification ESM 
Austria 2/3-majority in both chambers. International Treaty. Simple majority in 
both chambers. 
Belgium Simple majority in all chambers (at 
federal, regional and community 
level). “Mixed competence” 
(Ratification by all parliaments of 
Belgium necessary). 
International Treaty (federal 
competence). Simple majority in both 
chambers. 
Cyprus Simple majority International Treaty. Simple majority 
Estonia Simple majority. International Treaty. Absolute majority. 
Finland Simple majority. International Treaty. Simple majority. 
France Simple majority in both chambers. International treaty. Simple majority in 
both chambers. 
Germany 2/3 majority in both chambers. International treaty. 2/3 majority in both 
chambers. 
Greece Simple majority. International Treaty. Simple majority. 
Ireland Simple majority in both chambers. International Treaty. Simple majority in 
both chambers. 
Italy Simple majority in both chambers. International Treaty. Simple majority in 
both chambers. 
Latvia Simple majority. International Treaty. Simple majority. 
Luxembourg Qualified majority. International Treaty. Qualified majority. 
Malta Simple majority. International Treaty. Simple majority. 
Netherlands Simple majority in both houses. International Treaty. Simple majority in 
both chambers. 
Portugal Simple majority. International Treaty. Simple majority. 
Slovakia Absolute majority. Absolute majority. 
Slovenia Simple majority. International Treaty. Simple majority. 
Spain Absolute majority in both 
chambers. 
Absolute majority in both chambers. 
Source 19: European Commission (2013). 
In the remaining settings, simple, absolute or even two-third majorities were required in both 
chambers. These different requirements must be interpreted and categorized in order to assess 
which countries faced the highest constitutional requirements to adopt the ESM treaty. One 
major distinction is the number of chambers involved in the ratification process. A second 
distinction is concerned with the kind of majority required to ratify the treaty. This helps 
assessing the constitutional opportunities for opposition parties to influence ESM legislation, 
and especially the accompanying provisions regulating parliamentary influence therein. It is 
used and interpreted as a proxy for the likelihood that opposition parties were able to 
negotiate side payments from the government. Unicameral settings in which the ESM treaty 
and article 136 TFEU were ratified with simple majorities were attributed zero points, thus 
indicating the weakest constitutional requirements (such as Cyprus, Portugal or Malta). 
Unicameral settings in which absolute majorities were required were attributed one point 
(among others Luxembourg or Estonia). Constitutional requirements were rather moderate in 
these settings. Two points were attributed to bicameral settings where the treaties were 
ratified with simple majorities each (as it was the case in Belgium, France or Italy). Three 
points were attributed to the special case in Austria, in which a simple majority for the 
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ratification of the ESM treaty was required in the lower house, but a 2/3 majority in the other 
chambers to adopt the modification of article 136 TFEU. Four points were finally attributed to 
those bicameral settings in which extended majorities were required in both chambers and for 
both treaties (Germany and Spain). The score for constitutional requirements thus ranges from 
0 to 4.  
The role of second chambers cannot be analysed in more detail here. In some parliamentary 
settings second chambers only possess delaying powers (for instance in Ireland or France), 
while they can also be crucial veto players in others (such as in Germany). This shortcoming 
will be addressed by first, interpreting the data from this section with caution and second, by 
addressing the special role of (some) second chambers in the case studies in more detail (see 
C.2). Table 12 lists the constitutional requirement to ratify the ESM treaty.  
Table 12: Constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty and article 136 TFEU 
Points Requirements County 
4  Very strong  Germany, Spain 
3  Strong  Austria 
2  Medium  Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands 
1  Moderate  Luxembourg
77
, Estonia, Slovakia
78
 
0  Weak  
Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Malta, Portugal, 
Slovenia 
Source 20: Own presentation. 
Overall, bicameral systems score automatically higher than unicameral ones since both 
parliamentary chambers ratified both proposals. However, this is fair categorization since the 
number of parliamentary players potentially blocking or slowing down the decision-making 
processes is higher than in bicameral settings. In five settings (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy 
and the Netherlands), medium high constitutional requirements existed to pass the treaties. In 
seven countries, only simple majorities in one chamber were required, making it difficult for 
opposition parties to influence the ratification process. In Estonia, Luxembourg and Slovakia 
absolute majorities were required, making it slightly more difficult to obtain majorities. 
                                                 
77
 In the Luxembourg political system, a qualified majority is required in order to pass the ESM treaty and the 
ratification of article 136 TFEU. The stakes are slightly higher than a simple majority vote. Therefore, 
Luxembourg is attributed 1 point since parliamentary actors have more opportunities to slow down the 
ratification process. 
78
 The ratification process in Estonia and Slovakia requires absolute majorities. Therefore, Slovakia is attributed 
one point to account for the slightly higher opportunities of parliamentary actors to slow down the ratification 
process. 
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B.4.1.5 Preliminary results 
All the data presented in this section presents indicators to measure the four variables outlined 
in section B.2. The data for these independent variables serve as proxies. The majority of the 
indicators is quantitatively assessed; other indicators have additionally been informed by 
qualitative assessments. The next sub-chapter will calibrate the data in order to make use of it 
for the fsQCA.  
 
B.4.2 Calibration of Data 
The calibration of the data is a necessary precondition to apply fsQCA (see chapter B.3.1 for a 
detailed explanation). The idea behind the calibration process is to attribute cases a 
membership score in a given set. In a conventional statistical analysis, a researcher is likely to 
measure, for instance, the GDP per capita on a metric scale. In QCA, GDP per capita is 
measured as a proxy for a given set, for instance to assess the set of ‘rich countries’. The 
‘richness of a country’ is a verbal expression of the idea ‘rich country’. A QCA researcher 
asks in how far a country is ‘fully in’, ‘mostly in’, ‘more out than in’, etc. in a given set.  
Table 13: Example for a verbal description of fuzzy-set membership scores 
Fuzzy value The element is… 
1 Fully in 
0.9 Almost fully in 
0.8 Mostly in 
0.6 More in than out 
0.5 Crossover: neither in nor out 
0.4 More out than in 
0.2 Mostly out 
0.1 Almost fully out 
0 Fully out 
Source 21: Adapted from Ragin 2000:156, quoted in (Schneider, Wagemann 2013: 29). 
Table 13 introduces the general logic of this calibration process. Fuzzy values are used as 
“linguistic qualifiers”, helping to connect quantitative assessments with natural language 
(Schneider, Wagemann 2013: 31). Every fuzzy value therefore relates to a certain qualitative 
idea. The researcher has a specific concept for countries that are ‘fully in’ or ‘almost fully in’ 
the set of rich countries. Thresholds assessing the degree of membership can vary, as the table 
demonstrates. No fixed default exists of how many thresholds are appropriate; based on the 
empirical evidence at hand, it is up to the researcher to set meaningful thresholds. Linguistic 
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qualifiers thus combine empirical data and substantial, theoretical ideas. If appropriate, this 
allows neglecting quantitative differences within groups. 
79
 
 
B.4.2.1 Dependent Variable: Parliamentary ESM Participation Rights 
In B.1, I inductively derived five categories for parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. A 
group of parliaments had quasi-veto powers (Estonia, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands), 
one parliament had partial veto-powers (Austria), four parliaments had a consultative or 
political role (France, Italy, Latvia and Spain) and a fourth group had some information rights 
that were written down (Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia). The remaining 
parliaments were not formally involved in the ESM decision-making procedures (Belgium, 
Cyprus, Greece and Slovakia). To account for these differences, the set of parliaments 
participating in ESM affairs needs to have five thresholds. I will not assign any parliament the 
fuzzy value 1, i.e. being ‘fully in’ the set of parliaments participating in ESM affairs. As 
argued in section B.1, every accompanying regulation defines (minor) exceptions from the 
rule of full parliamentary involvement. In case of urgency, it is theoretically possible to 
circumvent parliamentary involvement – even if this is not likely in practice. Also, the 
accompanying provisions define circumstances under which a parliamentary committee can 
take decisions on behalf of the plenary. Full parliamentary involvement would require that the 
plenary is involved in all decision related to the ESM. In the absence of empirical evidence 
for that case, no parliament will receive the value 1, e.g. being ‘fully in’ the set of parliaments 
participating in ESM affairs. I assign the ‘quasi-veto powers’ the fuzzy value 0.9. Apart from 
the exceptions mentioned above, these parliaments decide not only on every sovereign aid 
package, but can also decide on the release of financial tranches therein. Although there are 
some differences in between the cases (for instance with regard to which parliamentary body 
takes the decision), these four parliaments linguistically count as ‘quasi-veto powers’ which 
formally influence all major decisions within the ESM framework. They are ‘almost fully in’ 
the set of parliaments participating in ESM affairs. I assign the fuzzy-value 0.8 – ‘mostly in’ – 
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 To give an example: the GDP per capita in 2013 for Qatar ($ 93.352) and Norway ($100.819) can both receive 
the fuzzy value 1 and be classified as being fully in the set of rich countries, despite their quantitative differences 
(see World Bank 2014). Such a distinction makes sense if the researcher compares them to countries with a 
much lower GDP per capita, for instance with Croatia ($13.530) or the Czech Republic ($18.861). If the 
researcher wants to test whether rich countries have higher expenditures for development aid, the quantitative 
differences between Norway and Qatar can indeed be irrelevant for the theoretical argument. If the analysis, 
however, focuses on rich countries only – such as Switzerland ($80,528) and Luxembourg ($111.162) – it might 
be necessary to account for the quantitative differences between Norway and Qatar. A different empirical basis 
can thus alter the theoretical classification. In that case, Norway and Qatar might be classified as being ‘almost 
fully in’ the set of rich countries, while Luxembourg is now the only case that is ‘fully in’ the set of rich 
countries. The classification varies, depending on the research interest and the empirical data at hand. If 
substantially justified, such a calibration process is closer to the use of concepts in our every-day language. 
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to the parliaments with partial veto powers. The Austrian Nationalrat is the empirical 
evidence at hand which takes a vote on sovereign aid packages, but not necessarily on the 
release of tranches therein. The fuzzy-value is close to the one of ‘quasi veto-powers’. It 
indicates that it has decisive decision-making powers although slightly lower than the groups 
of parliaments mentioned above.  
Table 14: Fuzzy set calibration independent variable 
Fs-Value Linguistic Qualifier Countries 
1 Fully in None 
0.9 Almost fully in; quasi-veto power 
Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Netherlands 
0.8 Mostly in; partial veto power Austria 
0.4 
Still more in than out, consultative 
role 
France, Italy, Latvia, Spain 
0.1 
Almost fully out; minimal 
information rights 
Ireland, Luxembourg, (Malta), 
Portugal, Slovenia 
0 Fully out; no formal role 
Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, 
Slovakia 
Source 22: Own presentation. 
I assign the fuzzy-value 0.4 – which is more out than in of the set of participating parliaments 
in ESM affairs – to those parliaments which have a consultative or political role in the 
decision-making process. I purposefully chose a huge gap in the fuzzy value between 
parliaments with ‘partial veto powers’ and those with a ‘consultative role’ since there is a 
huge qualitative difference between these two cases. FsQCA allows reflecting these 
qualitative differences by defining the respective thresholds accordingly. The parliaments are 
not legally empowered to take a formal vote on sovereign aid packages, nor could they legally 
prevent their government representative from taking a decision. In these settings, ESM 
decision-making is legally dominated by the executives. Despite their political involvement, 
these chambers play (legally) a rather marginal role. This huge qualitative difference between 
the first two groups and the remaining three has been outlined in detail in section B.1 and is 
captured in the calibration process. I assign the fuzzy value 0.1 to those parliaments which 
possess minimal information rights regarding ESM decision-making (which are formally 
written down). There are differences between the countries, i.e. whether a government 
informs the parliament with bi-annual or trimestral reports, or whether a government 
generally informs the parliament in the forefront of meetings of the ESM Board of Governors. 
What these parliaments have in common, however, is that they do not take a vote on 
sovereign aid packages, the release of tranches therein and are not formally consulted as a 
precondition for the government representatives to take a decision. Nonetheless, statutory 
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provisions attribute them minimal information rights. These parliaments are ‘almost fully out’ 
of the set of parliaments participating in ESM affairs. Lastly, I assign the value zero to those 
parliaments that are not at all involved in the daily ESM decision-making procedures. As 
argued in section B.1, parliamentarians or political party groups can of course request 
information from their government. In almost every political setting MPs or political party 
groups can ask questions to the government to which these must respond. Also, the 
classification does not make any statement about possible informal channels with which these 
parliaments might influence the government representative in the ESM Board of Governors. 
However, these channels of influence are not formalized. The parliaments with no formal role 
in ESM decision-making are thus classified as being ‘fully out’ of the set of parliaments 
participating in ESM affairs. The calibration of the dependent variable allows classifying 
groups of parliaments in qualitatively similar groups although minor quantitative differences 
in-between each group exist.  
This process goes along with a loss of information; however, it also reduces the complexity of 
the empirical phenomenon. The thresholds indicate the qualitative differences between the 
five groups. These numbers do of course not exist ‘objectively’ in reality. They are 
constructed, based on empirical and theoretical justifications. The advantage of this process is 
that the qualitatively different groups of parliaments can quantitatively relate to each other. 
The calibrated data is the basis for the empirical analysis in chapter C. 
 
B.4.2.2 Independent Variables 
The following sub-section calibrates the four independent variables: the macro-economic 
situation of a country, Euroscepticism, formal prerogatives in EU affairs and political and 
constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty. As shown above (see B.4.1), these 
variables are partly composed of different indicators and must therefore be summoned up 
before calibration. 
B.4.2.2.1 Calibration: Macro-economic Situation 
As outlined above, the macro-economic data consist of eight different indicators (see B.4.1.1) 
representing numerous long-, medium and short-term assessments of the macro-economic 
situation of a country. Only the combination of these indicators allows arriving at a robust 
measurement of the overall macro-economic situation of a country. All indicators contribute 
equally to this robust measurement. However, numbers for the eight indicators cannot simply 
be added up since they are measuring different data on different scales.  
In a first step, eight rankings were conducted assessing the performance of Eurozone Member 
States for each category. The rankings range from 1 to 18, with the exception of the interest 
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rates for ten-year government bonds (since no data was available for Estonia which did not 
issue ten-year government bonds in this time period). In a second step, the average rank for all 
eight indicators has been calculated. This information can be found in the tenth column of 
Table 15. The table already orders the countries. Luxembourg, for instance, comes first or 
second in six out of the eight rankings while it has an average ranking regarding the GDP 
growth or the competitiveness index. Greece comes last or second last in seven out of eight 
indicators, scoring above average only regarding the GDP per capita. 
Table 15: Calibration macro-economic variables 
Country 
Gov./ 
Debt 
Ratio  
Gov./ 
Deficit 
Ratio  
Credit 
Rat-
ing 
Interest 
Rates 
GDP 
per 
capita  
Unem
ploym
ent  
GDP 
Growth  
Competi
tiveness 
Index Total 
Fuzzy 
Set 
Luxembourg 2 1 1 2 1 2 10 5 3,00 0.9 
Germany 9 1 1 1 7 3 6 4 4,00 0.9 
Finland 5 5 1 3 5 7 12 1 4,88 0.9 
Austria 11 6 5 5 4 1 5 3 5,00 0.9 
Netherlands 7 10 1 4 2 4 11 2 5,13 0.9 
Estonia 1 3 9 n/a 17 10 2 8 7,14 0.7 
Belgium 14 11 7 7 6 6 8 6 8,13 0.7 
France 13 13 5 6 8 9 7 7 8,50 0.7 
Malta 8 8 13 8 14 5 3 14 9,13 0.7 
Slovenia 6 9 8 11 13 8 15 11 10,13 0.4 
Latvia 3 4 16 10 18 15 1 15 10,25 0.4 
Slovakia 4 12 10 9 16 13 4 17 10,63 0.4 
Ireland 15 16 15 15 3 14 9 9 12,00 0.2 
Italy 16 7 12 13 9 11 16 16 12,50 0.2 
Cyprus 10 15 14 14 11 12 14 13 12,88 0.2 
Spain 12 18 11 12 10 18 13 12 13,25 0.2 
Portugal 17 14 17 16 15 16 17 10 15,25 0 
Greece 18 17 18 17 12 17 18 18 16,88 0 
Source 23: Own compilation. The numbers indicate the ranking for each of the eight indicators to assess 
the macro-economic performance of Eurozone countries. The data and sources are indicated in the text, 
see chapter B.4.1.1. 
Such a ranking does necessarily neglect qualitative differences in between certain groups. 
This is, of course, a shortcoming and must be acknowledged when the data is interpreted. 
However, the calibration into fuzzy sets values does not aim for an absolute precise 
description of the economic performance of a country. As outlined above, there is not one 
single indicator that could precisely describe the economic situation of a country. Each 
individual measurement has strengths and weaknesses. The idea of the fuzzy set calibration is 
to develop qualitative groups of countries which allow an assessment about the degree to 
122 
 
which a country is in the group of ‘economically strong’ countries. The ranking in Table 15 
must therefore be understood as a proxy for the macro-economic situation of a country.  
In order to increase the robustness of the ranking, individual variables were either left out or 
given double weight (such as the two Maastricht criteria or the credit ratings). These changes 
did not significantly affect the ranking developed above.
80
  
The first five countries (Luxembourg, Germany, Finland, Austria and the Netherlands) were 
attributed the fuzzy set value 0.9, meaning that they are almost completely in the set of 
economically strong countries. Each of these countries performs best in at least one of the 
eight indicators presented above and there is at most one indicator in which these countries 
have a below average performance. 
I attribute Estonia, Belgium, France and Malta the value 0.7 meaning that they are more in 
than out of the set of economically strong countries. In most cases, these countries perform 
better than the European average. Their aggregated ranking ranges between 7.14 and 9.13 and 
forms a distinguishable group from the remaining countries. 
Slovenia, Latvia and Slovakia receive the value 0.4 meaning that they are slightly more out 
than in the group of economically strong Eurozone countries. Although Latvia performs well 
regarding the two Maastricht criteria and the annual GDP growth, it scores low regarding 
other indicators. The three countries have an aggregated ranking between 10.13 and 10.63 and 
do equally form a distinguishable group from the other countries. 
Ireland, Italy, Cyprus and Spain have aggregated rankings between 12 and 13.25. They 
receive the fuzzy set value 0.2 meaning that they are more out than in the group of countries 
that are economically strong. All these countries suffer from a high unemployment rate and a 
low credit rating. Only Ireland performs above average regarding the GDP per capita. 
Greece and Portugal do both not have a single indicator in which they perform better than the 
European average. They are attributed the fuzzy value 0 meaning that they are completely out 
of the set of economically strong Member States. 
The classification is inductively derived and based on the empirical evidence at hand. The 
fuzzy values are an enormous simplification of the economic reality of these countries. 
Nonetheless, they adequately reflect the macro-economic situation of Eurozone countries in 
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 Also, I alternatively calculated the range of each indicator in percentages: the best performing number in a 
given indicator (for instance Estonia’s low public government debt ratio of 9.7%) was calculated as 100% and 
the worst performing number (in this case Greece’s public debt level) was calculated as 0%. The numbers of all 
other Eurozone countries were ranked accordingly within this range. Such a measurement allows taking into 
account qualitative differences regarding each single indicator. However, even if the overall indicator was 
calculated based on percentages, this did not significantly alter the ranking eventually derived. I therefore opted 
for the ranking outlined in Table 15 which approximates the macro-economic performance of Eurozone Member 
States sufficiently and is based on rather lean calculations. This ranking is thus used to develop the respective 
fuzzy set values. 
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2012: all countries receiving financial assistance from any European bailout mechanism are 
attributed the fs-values 0 or 0.2. The only non-bailout country in this group is Italy, reflecting 
that it was also at the brink of default in the 2010-2012 period.  
 
B.4.2.2.1 Calibration: Eurosceptical attitudes 
The variable measuring Euroscepticism is derived from two different indicators: public 
Euroscepticism (measured with data from the Eurobarometer) and party Euroscepticism, 
measured with the Chapel Hill index (see B.4.1.2). I will give the party Euroscepticism 
double weight. Eurosceptical parties have more efficient means at their disposal to influence 
ESM policy-making. They can – as argued above – hold governments publicly accountable on 
ESM matters. And they pose a threat to mainstream parties should they increase attention for 
the ratification of the ESM treaty. In order to combine both indicators, the country with the 
highest value receives 100%, the country with the lowest value 0% in the respective category. 
The other countries range in between these two points. The values for party and public 
Euroscepticism are then added up and divided by two. The fuzzy set values thus reflect the 
range of Eurosceptical sentiments in Eurozone countries. 
With the exception of Ireland, public Euroscepticism is pronounced in those countries that 
requested financial assistance. However, also some of the ‘Northern’ donor countries, 
especially Austria, Finland and the Netherlands, show high levels of Eurosceptical attitudes, 
both on a public and party based level. The strongest level of Euroscepticism can be found in 
Greece with 97.44%. It will receive the value 1 and is fully in the set of Eurosceptical 
countries. Austria (79.69%) receives the value 0.9, while the Netherlands and Finland 
(between 63 and 68%) receive the value 0.8. Both countries score quite high (especially 
regarding party Euroscepticism). Cyprus (58.62%) receives the value 0.6. Its level of public 
Euroscepticism is high while party Euroscepticism is less distinct. Only these five countries 
have values above the cross-over point of 0.5. The fuzzy values reflect that Euroscepticism is 
only expected to impact on parliamentary prerogatives in ESM affairs if it is distinctively 
expressed. Portugal and Italy (43.86% and 48.14%) receives the value 0.4. They are more out 
than in the set of Eurosceptical countries. Especially in Portugal, a huge gap between party 
and public Euroscepticism can be observed. Four countries receive the value 0.3: France 
(35.58%), Germany (35.49%), Slovakia (36.62%) and Slovenia (35.11%). Another group of 
four countries receives the value 0.2, namely Belgium (24.97%), Ireland (28.93%), Latvia 
(29.36%) and Spain (29.61%). The last group of countries contains Malta (8.12%), 
Luxembourg (9.53%) and Estonia (10.53%). According to the data at hand, Euroscepticism in 
these countries hardly exists. They receive the value 0.1.  
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Table 16: Fuzzy set values based on Eurosceptical attitudes 
 Range Chapel 
Hill Index 
Range Public 
Euroscepticism 
Total 
Fuzzy 
Value 
Greece 100% 92.31% 97.44% 1.0 
Austria 70.18% 98.72% 79.69% 0.9 
Netherlands 88.07% 30.77% 68.97% 0.8 
Finland 63.51% 64.10% 63.71% 0.8 
Cyprus 49.47% 76.92% 58.62% 0.6 
Italy 52.98% 38.46% 48.14% 0.4 
Portugal 15.79% 100% 43.86% 0.4 
Slovakia 42.11% 25.64% 36.62% 0.3 
France 31.58% 43.59% 35.58% 0.3 
Germany 41.05% 24.36% 35.49% 0.3 
Slovenia 30.88% 43.59% 35.11% 0.3 
Spain 20.70% 47.44% 29.61% 0.2 
Latvia 27.37% 33.33% 29.36% 0.2 
Ireland 27.37% 32.05% 28.93% 0.2 
Belgium 29.12% 16.67% 24.97% 0.2 
Estonia 15.79% 0.00% 10.53% 0.1 
Luxembourg 5.96% 16.67% 9.53% 0.1 
Malta 0.00% 24.36% 8.12% 0.1 
Source 24: Own compilation. Sources are indicated in the text. 
As mentioned above, the fuzzy set calibration allows giving Eurosceptical attitudes above the 
cross-over point of 0.5 a higher fuzzy-set value than a metric scaling would suggest. This 
accounts for the theoretical consideration that Euroscepticism is only expected to have an 
impact if it is distinctively pronounced (see again B.2.2). 
 
B.4.2.2.2 Calibration: Formal Prerogatives 
Formal prerogatives in EU affairs are measured by two indicators: one ranking was developed 
within the OPAL framework, the other was one was developed by Karlas. Both have already 
been transformed into a ranking ranging from 0 to 100% (see again B.4.1.3). The two 
indicators can thus be summoned up in order to calculate their average. Finland has the 
highest combined value (77.42%) while Belgium receives the lowest value with 20.34%. The 
calibration process will also be informed by the knowledge I acquired throughout the data 
gathering process.  
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Table 17: Fuzzy set values for formal prerogatives in EU affairs 
 OPAL Index Karlas Index Combined Index Fs-Value 
Finland 84.00% 70.83% 77.42% 0.8 
Estonia 67.00% 70.83% 68.92% 0.8 
Germany 78.00% 58.33% 68.17% 0.8 
Slovenia 60.00% 62.50% 61.25% 0.7 
Netherlands 66.00% 54.17% 60.09% 0.7 
Latvia 53.00% 54.16% 53.58% 0.6 
Austria 51.00% 54.17% 52.59% 0.6 
Slovakia 49.00% 54.17% 51.59% 0.6 
France 55.00% 45.83% 50.42% 0.4 
Italy 46.00% 45.83% 45.92% 0.4 
Malta 46.00% 20.83% 33.42% 0.1 
Luxembourg 40.00% 23.00% 31.50% 0.1 
Portugal 43.00% 16.67% 29.84% 0.1 
Spain 40.00% 16.67% 28.34% 0.1 
Ireland 39.00% 16.67% 27.84% 0.1 
Cyprus 27.00% 20.83% 23.92% 0 
Greece 26.00% 16.67% 21.34% 0 
Belgium 24.00% 16.67% 20.34% 0 
Source 25: Own presentation, see chapter B.4.1.3. 
This is the reason why no parliament receives the value 1, being fully in the set of parliaments 
with strong prerogatives in EU affairs. Although many national parliaments upgraded their 
parliamentary administrations, established special committees dealing with EU affairs and 
became partly more attentive of EU affairs, most of them are still latecomers in this process. I 
assign Estonia (68.92%), Finland (77.42%) and Germany (68.17%) the value 0.8. These 
parliaments score quite high regarding both indicators. Estonia and Finland have a tradition of 
rather strong parliaments in EU affairs, while the German parliament was especially 
strengthened by decisions of the German Constitutional Court in recent years.  
I attribute Slovenia (61.25%) and the Netherlands (60.09%) the value 0.7 while Austria 
(52.59%), Latvia (53.58%) and Slovakia (51.59%) receive the value 0.6. Especially the latter 
three are borderline cases since they are only slightly above the cross-over point of 0.5. 
Evidence from the literature suggest that Austria is formally quite strong in EU affairs, but is 
not making extensive use of its formal prerogatives (Pollak, Slominski 2003). And although 
Latvia already established a European Affairs Committee in 1995 and thus long before its 
accession to the European Union, the Committee is regarded as rather low profile within 
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parliament. These eight countries have nonetheless a fuzzy value above the cross-over point 
of 0.5 and are expected to be capable of exercising some influence in EU affairs. Some of the 
newcomer countries have incorporated stronger formal prerogatives in EU affairs by adapting 
existing systems from founding Member States. Discussions on EU formal prerogatives have 
also been influenced by the decisions of the German Constitutional Court. This justifies 
putting these parliaments above the cross-over point although the values will be interpreted 
with care. France (50.42%) and Italy (45.92%) both receives the value 0.4. Although France’s 
score is relatively close to that of Slovakia and slightly above the cross-over point, the 
traditional executive dominance in the French political system as well as interview evidence 
with the OPAL network makes it more reasonable to attribute France a value below the 0.5 
threshold. Ireland (27.84%), Luxembourg (31.50%), Malta (33.42%), Portugal (29.84%) and 
Spain (28.34%) receive the value 0.2. They neither possess strong information rights nor can 
they give binding mandates to their minister in EU negotiations. Finally, Belgium (20.34%), 
Cyprus (23.92%) and Greece (21.34%) receive the value 0.1 since they possess hardly any 
formal prerogatives to influence EU affairs. 
 
B.4.2.2.3 Calibration: Political and Constitutional Requirements 
As outlined above, the political and constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty are 
based on two different indicators: the parliamentary majorities in first chambers as well as 
constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty. The data for Cyprus and Italy concerning 
the political requirements will not be used for the calibration process (see arguments in 
section B.4.1.4). At the time of the ESM ratification, these countries had either unity 
governments or a strong presidential system which did not require large parliamentary support 
for the ratification of the treaty. For these two countries, only information on the 
constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty is used. Without the data for Cyprus and 
Italy, the maximum range of the seat share in the parliaments under investigation had been 
between the Netherlands (50.66%) and Ireland (68.07%).
81
 The data on constitutional 
requirements to ratify the ESM treaty has already been measured in five categories (see again 
Table 12). The values have been summoned up and divided by two. Both indicators were thus 
assigned an equal value. 
                                                 
81
 This maximum range (17.41%) was divided into five equally large groups (3.48 percentage points each). The 
countries in which the government had the closest majority in the first chamber were Estonia (51.49%), 
Germany (53.38%), Greece (53.33%), Malta (50.72%), the Netherlands (50.66%) and Spain (53.14%). They 
were attributed the value 4, indicating that it was politically difficult to secure own governmental majorities to 
ratify the ESM treaty. The largest majorities have been in Ireland (68.07%) and Luxembourg (65%). They were 
attributed the value 0 indicating that it was rather easy to secure own parliamentary majorities. The values for the 
remaining countries have been assigned accordingly. 
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Table 18: Fuzzy values for const. and pol. requirements to ratify the ESM Treaty 
 
Constitutional 
Requirements 
Political 
Requirements 
Combined 
Measurement 
Fuzzy 
Value 
Germany 4 4 4 1 
Spain 4 4 4 1 
Netherlands 2 4 3 0.8 
Austria 3 2 2.5 0.6 
Belgium 2 1 2.5 0.6 
France 2 3 2.5 0.6 
Estonia 0 4 2 0.4 
Greece 0 4 2 0.4 
Malta 0 4 2 0.4 
Italy 2 n/a 2 0.4 
Slovakia 1 3 2 0.4 
Portugal 0 3 1.5 0.3 
Slovenia 0 3 1.5 0.3 
Latvia 0 3 1.5 0.3 
Ireland 2 0 1 0.2 
Finland 0 1 0.5 0.1 
Luxembourg 1 0 0.5 0.1 
Cyprus 0 n/a 0 0 
Source 26: Own presentation, see chapter B.4.1.4. 
The combined measurement of the two indicators is interpreted as a proxy to assess the 
political and constitutional requirements necessary to ratify the ESM treaty. Germany and 
Spain have the combined value of 4 which is translated into a fuzzy set value of 1. Germany 
and Spain have been fully in the set of countries with high political and constitutional 
requirements to ratify the ESM treaty. There is no country with a value of 3.5, but the 
Netherlands have a value of 3 which is translated into a fuzzy value of 0.8. A fuzzy value of 
0.6 is attributed to countries with a combined value of 2.5 (Austria, Belgium and France). The 
only bicameral systems with a fuzzy value lower than the 0.5 threshold are Ireland (with a 
rather weak Senate and a very strong governmental majority in the first chamber), Italy (for 
which the huge majority in both chambers at the time of ratification was not considered) and 
Slovenia. With these deviations in mind, it is logical that bicameral systems have higher 
constitutional requirements to adopt international treaties than unicameral ones; this is 
reflected in the respective fuzzy values.  
A fuzzy value of 0.4 was attributed to those countries with a combined value of two (Estonia, 
Greece, Italy, Malta, Slovakia); 0.3 for countries with a combined value of 1.5 (Latvia, 
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Portugal and Slovenia); 0.2 for countries with a combined value of 1 (Ireland); 0.1 for those 
with a combined value of 0.5 (Finland and Luxembourg) and finally a fuzzy set value of 0 for 
countries with a combined value of 0 (Cyprus).  
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C. Empirics: Parliamentary Involvement in ESM Affairs 
The empirical part of this thesis is divided into two main sections. First, a fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative analysis is conducted (see C.1). It serves to identify sufficient and necessary 
conditions explaining strong and weak parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. A second 
objective is to identify potential outliers, i.e. cases that cannot be sufficiently explained with 
the theoretical arguments (see B.2) or the empirical data at hand (see B.4). Second, these 
outliers will be further analysed in qualitative case studies (see C.2). These case studies are 
informed by interview evidence, an extensive review of secondary literature on the respective 
parliamentary settings as well as documented information on the parliamentary ratification 
process of the ESM treaty. The guiding question for both parts is: why have some parliaments 
adopted strong ESM participation rights and others have not? 
Chapter C.1 conducts the fsQCA and is divided in two broad sections. The first part analyses 
strong parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs (C.1.1) while the second one analyses weak 
parliamentary involvement (C.1.2). The occurrence and non-occurrence of the outcome 
requires two separate empirical analyses (more on this below). Both of these sections consist 
of three parts. First, the four independent variables (derived in chapter B.2) are tested 
separately. To what extent does their presence or absence account for strong, respectively 
weak, parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs? Second, the fsQCA is applied to formally 
analyse the truth tables. The guiding question is: which combination(s) of condition(s) is 
sufficient to explain strong or weak parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs? Third, the 
process of the so-called logical minimization is conducted to manually to address some of the 
shortcomings of the algorithm application and to identify necessary conditions of the 
outcome. The guiding question is: which particularities arise in specific cases that must be 
interpreted differently?  
The insights of the fsQCA inform the selection of case studies that will be conducted in 
chapter C.2. To conduct the fsQCA, all data is first summarized in a table (see Table 19). It 
contains all gathered data from the chapter B.4.2.  
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Table 19: Calibrated dependent and independent variables 
 
Y y A a B b C c D d 
Austria 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 
Belgium 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.6 0.4 
Cyprus 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.9 0.0 1.0 
Estonia 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.6 
Finland 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.9 
France 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 
Germany 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.2 1.0 0.0 
Greece 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.4 0.6 
Ireland 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 
Italy 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 
Latvia 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.7 
Luxembourg 0.1 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.9 
Malta 0.1 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.6 
Netherlands 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.2 
Portugal 0.1 0.9 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.7 
Slovakia 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.6 
Slovenia 0.1 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.7 
Spain 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 1.0 0.0 
Source 27: Own presentation, based on information from chapter B.4.2. 
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C.1 Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
To facilitate reading, I rename the different conditions and the outcome: ‘A’ stands for the 
macro-economic situation, ‘B’ for Euroscepticism, ‘C’ for parliamentary prerogatives in EU 
affairs and ‘D’ for constitutional and political requirements to ratify the ESM treaty. ‘Y’ 
stands for the outcome, e.g. for parliamentary participation rights in ESM affairs. Capitals 
indicate the presence of a condition, while small letters indicate its absence. 
Table 20: Renaming of conditions and the outcome 
Conditions (Independent Variables) PRESENCE / absence 
Macro-economic situation A / a 
Euroscepticism B / b 
Formal EU prerogatives C / c 
Pol. and const. requirements to ratify the ESM treaty D / d 
Outcome (Dependent Variable)  
Parliamentary Participation ESM affairs Y / y 
Source 28: Own presentation. 
These values are necessarily complementary. If Germany receives the value ‘A = 0.9’ – which 
indicates strong membership in the group economically strong countries – it receives the 
inverse value ‘a = 0.1’, indicating weak membership in the group of economically weak 
countries (see again Table 19). To apply a fsQCA, a truth table is conducted in a first step (see 
Table 21). A truth table is the indispensable device for any QCA, whether crisp or fuzzy set. 
Each truth table row represents one of the theoretically possible combinations of conditions. 
Its number is determined by the formula 2
k
, while ‘k’ is the number of conditions. Sixteen 
possible configurations result from the four conditions introduced above (2
4
). They are 
represented in the sixteen columns in Table 21 (see below). Each combination of conditions 
represents an ‘ideal type’. The truth table allows assessing in which combination of conditions 
a case (in the example of the thesis the 18 Eurozone Member States) possesses the highest 
membership score. 
A * B * C * D, for instance, is the ideal type for cases in which all four conditions are present 
simultaneously. Every case possesses at least partial membership in each combination of 
conditions.
82
 This pattern deviates from the logic of crisp-QCA (see B.3.1.1.1). In crisp-QCA, 
                                                 
82
 The example of Estonia can illustrate the partial membership scores: in order to test the degree to which 
Estonia is a member of the set of countries with a strong macro-economic situation (A = 0.7), strong 
Euroscepticism (B = 0.1), strong formal prerogatives in EU affairs (C = 0.8) and high political and constitutional 
requirements to ratify the ESM treaty (D = 0.4), Estonia is attributed a value of 0.1 in the combination 
A*B*C*D. In Boolean algebra, the logical AND operator always measures the “weakest link in the chain” 
(Schneider, Wagemann 2013: 44ff). The logical AND is only interested in the subset where all conditions are 
present. Estonia is nearly fully out of the set of countries in which all four conditions are present simultaneously. 
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the binary coding of conditions results in one ideal type only. FsQCA, by contrast, allows 
calculating the degree to which a country is a member of a specific ‘ideal type’. There is, 
however, only one combination in which a country has a higher membership score than 0.5. 
This value is indicated in bold letters in the table. In the following, this value will be 
interpreted as ‘the’ ideal type for a specific case. 
Table 21 presents all possible combinations of conditions for the 18 Eurozone countries. Two 
conclusions can already be drawn. First, most countries possess partial membership scores in 
all configurations of conditions. The identification of an ideal type is therefore not always 
straightforward. This is striking for Italy with a 0.2 or 0.4 membership score in fifteen out of 
sixteen different combinations, and only one membership score with 0.6 (in the combination 
a*b*c*d). Based on the empirical evidence at hand, Italy is thus a rather ambiguous case. This 
is different from, for instance, Finland or Luxembourg. Finland has a membership score of 0.8 
in the combination of A*B*C*d; in all other combinations it receives a value of 0.2 or 0.1 
respectively. The ideal case for Finland is thus clearly identifiable. Also Luxembourg 
evidently belongs to one ideal type only (A*b*c*d with a membership score of 0.8); it has a 
membership score between 0.2 or 0.1 in all other combinations.  
As will be shown later, the degree to which a country belongs to a certain ideal type is an 
indispensable information to fruitfully interpret the results of the fsQCA. Ambiguous 
membership scores – which are to some extent inevitable – make the interpretation of the 
results more challenging and will be treated with special care.  
  
                                                                                                                                                        
If we assess, however, the degree to which Estonia is a member of the set of countries within a strong macro-
economic situation (A = 0.7), weak Euroscepticism (b = 0.9), strong formal prerogatives in EU affairs (C = 0.8) 
and weak requirements to adopt the ESM treaty (d = 0.6), it receives a membership score of 0.6. Estonia’s ideal 
membership score is thus greatest in the combination A*b*C*d (see Table 21). This membership score is 
interpreted as the ideal case for Estonia and used for the further analysis. 
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Table 21: Fuzzy set truth table 
Countries 
Y y 
Combination of conditions 
 
ABCD ABCd ABcD Abcd AbCD AbCd ABcd AbcD aBCD aBCd aBcD aBcd abCD abCd abcD abcd 
Austria 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Belgium 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 
Cyprus 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 
Estonia 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Finland 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
France 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Germany 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Greece 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ireland 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.8 
Italy 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 
Latvia 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.4 
Luxembourg 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Malta 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 
Netherlands 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Portugal 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 
Slovakia 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 
Slovenia 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.3 
Spain 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.0 
Source 29: Own presentation, bold letters indicate the respective ideal types. The outcome column refers to the parliamentary participation rights within the ESM.
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Second, the table above already gives some indications on necessary (and sufficient) 
conditions to explain the outcome. Parliaments with strong participation rights in ESM affairs 
(Y) can all be found on the left sight of the table in which countries in a favourable macro-
economic situation (A) are situated. The other parliaments (y) are distributed unevenly across 
the table – although many of them belong to the group of countries which have been in an 
economically difficult situation (a). This indicates that a strong macro-economic situation of a 
country can be interpreted as necessary for strong ESM participation rights, even if it is not 
sufficient to explain the outcome (Y). No such statement can be made for the outcome (y) 
since the occurrence and non-occurrence of conditions is distributed unevenly across the 
table. To interpret these patterns, a fsQCA will be carried out. Charles Ragin developed a 
software for the application of fs QCA.
83
 This program is the most often used software to 
conduct fuzzy set analyses (see among others Kent 2008; Rihoux, Ragin 2009; Schneider, 
Wagemann 2007) although other statistical programmes (such as STATA, R or Tosmana) 
equally provide tools for configurational analyses. The software applies the Quine McCluskey 
algorithm to identify sufficient conditions for an outcome. These sufficient conditions are 
logically minimized to reduce the complexity of a solution term. In order to interpret the truth 
table, consistency and coverage thresholds are calculated. Furthermore, the software employs 
tools to deal with the so-called logical remainders (see especially Kent 2008). Logical 
remainders are configurations of conditions for which no empirical observation exists (see 
again B.3.1.1.2). In QCA language, this phenomenon is called limited diversity (see 
Schneider, Wagemann 2013: 119ff). Including logical remainders in the interpretation of the 
results can reveal additional insights, although the interpretation must be carefully conducted 
(a good example of the paradoxes of logical remainders is given by Cooper, Glaesser 2011). 
The following chapter first tests and visualises the explanatory power of each condition (see 
again B.2) on its own, before it is applied to different combinations of conditions. It starts by 
interpreting the results for those countries which have rather strong ESM participation rights 
(see C.1.1) and then analyses the remaining countries (see C.1.2). 
  
                                                 
83
 See: http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml, last access: 30
th
 January 2015. 
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C.1.1 Strong Parliamentary ESM Participation Rights 
Countries with strong ESM parliamentary participation rights (Y) were those classified as 
partial or quasi veto powers in chapter B.1. Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany and the 
Netherlands belong to this group of countries. 
C.1.1.1 Testing Conditions Separately 
Macro-economic Situation 
The first hypothesis predicted that a good macro-economic situation of a country increases the 
odds for strong parliamentary ESM participation rights (see B.2.1). Countries in a good 
macro-economic situation have potentially more to lose should financial guarantees ever 
become due. Parliamentary involvement is thus regarded as a safety belt to avoid the frivolous 
issuing of financial aid. 
Figure 9: ESM Participation Rights and Macro-Economic Situation 
 
Source 30: Own presentation. The triangles indicate the countries under investigation, i.e. those 
parliaments with strong ESM participation rights. 
As can be seen in Figure 9, the quasi and partial veto powers can all be found in the upper 
right corner in the XY plot, indicating a correlation between a good macro-economic situation 
and strong ESM participation rights. On the reverse, many countries within an unfavourable 
macro-economic situation can be found in the left bottom corner of the XY plot (indicating 
the simultaneous presence of a weak macro-economic situation and weak ESM participation 
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rights). In set theoretic language: countries that belong to the group of Member States with 
strong ESM participation rights (Y) also belong to the group of countries within a good 
macro-economic situation (A). However, as the bottom right corner of the XY plot shows, 
there are a number of countries within a good macro-economic situation which do not belong 
to the group of parliaments with strong ESM participation rights (Belgium, France, Malta and 
Luxembourg). The solution term (A → Y) has a consistency level of only 62.4% (for the 
calculation of set-theoretic consistency see again chapter B.3.1.1.2). The consistency value 
resembles the notion of significance in conventional statistical models. In the words of 
Wagemann and Schneider: “Consistency provides a numerical expression for the degree to 
which the empirical information deviates from a perfect subset relation” (Schneider, 
Wagemann 2013: 129). Conventionally, a consistency level lower than 0.75 indicates that a 
condition (or combination therefore) is not a strong predictor for an outcome. In many 
analyses, the threshold must even be above 0.85 to be interpreted as sufficient for an outcome 
(see for instance Freitag, Schlicht 2009). However, the consistency level does not allow 
interpreting the degree to which a certain condition (or combination thereof) accounts for the 
instances of an outcome. In fsQCA, this degree is called ‘set-theoretic coverage’ and 
resembles the notion of R². It measures how well the data fits the statistical model, i.e. how 
much of the outcome is explained by a certain variable. The coverage value of (A) is quite 
high (89.2%). Countries with strong parliamentary participation rights within the ESM 
frequently belong to the group of countries within a good macro-economic situation. This 
indicates that (A) can be interpreted as a necessary, but not sufficient condition for strong 
parliamentary involvement. It is not sufficient because there are countries within a good 
macro-economic situation (A) which do not belong to the group of countries with strong ESM 
participation rights (Y) (most notably Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Malta). A 
preliminary conclusion thus is that a strong macro-economic situation must be combined with 
other conditions in order to account for strong ESM participation rights. 
Eurosceptical Sentiments 
Strong Eurosceptical sentiments alone cannot be interpreted as necessary or sufficient for firm 
ESM participation rights (see Figure 10). The five quasi and partial veto powers are 
distributed unevenly across the XY plot, with Austria showing strong levels of 
Euroscepticism (0.9) and Estonia only modest Eurosceptical sentiments (0.1). The consistency 
value for this condition is at a relatively low level (61.1%). Although many countries with 
rather modest Eurosceptical sentiments also have weak parliamentary participation rights in 
ESM affairs (as the left bottom corner of the XY plot indicates), the effect of Eurosceptical 
sentiments on the outcome Y is not generalizable. Eurosceptical sentiments are an even 
weaker predictor of ESM participation rights than the macro-economic situation of a country.  
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Figure 10: ESM participation rights and Eurosceptical sentiments 
 
Source 31: Own Presentation. The triangles indicate the countries under investigation, i.e. those 
parliaments with strong ESM participation rights. 
The coverage (67.7%) is significantly lower than for the previous indicator, although the 
absence of Eurosceptical sentiments seems to facilitate weak parliamentary involvement (this 
is, however, not the case for Greece in the right bottom corner of the XY plot). Germany and 
Estonia as well as Greece and Cyprus are the strongest outliers. Germany and Estonia only 
have modest levels of Eurosceptical sentiments (b), but strong parliamentary participation 
rights within ESM affairs (Y). Greece and Cyprus show high levels of Eurosceptical 
sentiments (B), but possess hardly any participation rights in the rescue mechanism (y). The 
fact that Greece (since 2010) and Cyprus (since 2013) are both programme countries might 
have impacted on their role in the European Stability Mechanism. It can be hypothesised that 
parliamentarians in these countries were aware of the fact that they would rather receive than 
grant financial assistance from the new rescue mechanism. Cyprus had already requested 
financial assistance from the ESM in June 2012, i.e. before the ratification of the mechanism 
(see also C.2). However, this still leaves the attitudes of Estonia and Germany unexplained. 
Why did they opt for strong parliamentary involvement although Eurosceptical sentiments 
had not been very much pronounced? Or, in QCA language: which other combination of 
condition(s) has been present to explain their strong parliamentary involvement? The 
assumption that Eurosceptical sentiments increase the odds for strong parliamentary 
involvement in ESM affairs must therefore be tested in combination with other conditions. It 
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cannot be interpreted as a necessary condition accounting for strong ESM parliamentary 
involvement. 
Formal EU Prerogatives 
Strong formal EU prerogatives are expected to positively correlate with strong ESM 
participation rights (see B.2.3). Once stronger formal prerogatives in EU affairs are 
established, the logic of path-dependency makes it more likely that these prerogatives are 
transferred to the intergovernmental ESM setting. 
Figure 11: ESM participation rights and formal EU prerogatives 
 
Source 32: Own presentation. The triangles indicate the countries under investigation, i.e. those 
parliaments with strong ESM participation rights. 
And indeed, countries with strong formal prerogatives have on average higher ESM 
participation rights than countries with weak ones (see Figure 11). The consistency value for 
this solution term alone is at 72.7%. This is still not a very high value, but nonetheless 
predicts more strongly the outcome Y than the other two conditions. Strong outliers are 
Slovenia and Slovakia. Slovakia has quite strong formal prerogatives in EU affairs (0.7) but 
belongs to the group of countries with only minimal information rights within the ESM (0.1) 
(see again chapter B.1). The Slovenian parliament is also quite influential in EU affairs (0.6), 
but does not have significant participation rights in the rescue mechanism. Strong formal 
prerogatives in EU affair can nonetheless be interpreted as a necessary condition since all 
countries with high values in (Y) also have strong values in (C). The fact that some countries 
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with high values in (C) also belong to the group of parliaments with weak ESM participation 
rights indicates that strong formal prerogatives – on their own – are not sufficient to explain 
strong parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. To reveal the full explanatory power of this 
condition, strong formal prerogatives need to be tested in combination with other conditions. 
The question thus is: what distinguishes the Latvian, Slovenian and the Slovakian case from 
the other five parliaments with strong ESM participation rights? Or, in QCA language: in 
combination with which (other) condition(s) do strong formal prerogatives in EU affairs 
impact on ESM participation rights? The coverage for this condition is quite high (with 
86.2%). On their own, formal EU prerogatives are so far the strongest predictor of strong 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. 
 
Political and Constitutional Requirements to Ratify the ESM Treaty 
High political and constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty are expected to 
increase the odds for strong parliamentary ESM involvement. The dependence on opposition 
votes makes it more likely that these parties demand stronger participation rights in exchange 
for supporting the entire mechanism. As can be seen in Figure 12, however, this condition is 
only a weak predictor of strong parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. Although we find 
a larger number of countries with a low value for (D) in the bottom left corner of the XY plot 
(parliaments with weak ESM participation rights), this indicator cannot explain strong ESM 
involvement since the quasi and partial veto powers are distributed unevenly across the table. 
Especially Germany (1.0) and Finland (0.1) differ significantly with regard to the political and 
constitutional hurdles to ratify the ESM treaty. However, they have similar values for the 
outcome Y. We find empirical cases in every corner of the XY plot which indicates an only 
weak correlation between the outcome (Y) and the condition (D).  
We furthermore find extreme cases: Finland and Luxembourg (0.1) faced similarly low 
requirements to ratify the ESM treaty, but are very differently involved in ESM affairs. The 
argument can be made that this hypothesis was formulated in a way that only high political 
and constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty affect parliamentary involvement, 
while making no statements concerning low obstacles to pass it (see again B.2.4). Spain and 
Germany (1.0) had both the highest obstacles to ratify the ESM treaty (see again B.4.1.4), but 
have different levels of parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. The consistency of the 
condition on its own is therefore only at 60.8%, the lowest of all four conditions. Also, the 
coverage is quite low, with only 73.8%. 
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Figure 12: ESM participation and constitutional and political requirements  
 
Source 33: Own Presentation. The triangles indicate the countries under investigation, i.e. those 
parliaments with strong ESM participation rights. 
This does not rule out that this condition has explanatory power in combination with other 
conditions, but it is nonetheless the weakest predictor of parliamentary involvement in ESM 
affairs. It can thus not be interpreted as a necessary condition accounting for strong ESM 
involvement. 
 
C.1.1.2 FsQCA Analysis: Combination of Conditions 
In order to conduct the combinatorial analysis of the conditions under investigation, a new 
truth table is compiled with the software in a first step (see Table 22)
84
. The data of the 
independent and dependent variables is identical with that of Table 19, although the new truth 
table contains more information and thus looks slightly different:  
                                                 
84
 Information on the dependent and independent variables was saved in an excel file and uploaded to the 
software program. 
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Table 22: Completed truth table for Y 
A B C D Number Outcome 
Raw 
Consistency 
1 1 1 1 2 1 0.8157 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0.7692 
1 1 1 0 1 1 0.7647 
1 0 1 0 1 1 0.6756 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0.5813 
1 0 0 1 2 0 0.5609 
0 0 1 0 3 0 0.5500 
1 0 0 0 2 0 0.4565 
0 1 0 0 2 0 0.4390 
0 0 0 0 3 0 0.4200 
Source 34: Information for the truth table is based on Table 19. 
The first four columns (A to D) display the four different conditions to be tested. The value 1 
indicates that the fuzzy set membership score is above the 0.5 threshold while a 0 indicates 
that it is below. Although this looks like a binary coding, the program calculates coverage and 
consistency values with the more fine-grained fuzzy set scores. Column five shows the 
number of cases that can be explained with a certain combination of conditions. Two cases 
are, for instance, covered by the solution term A*B*C*D and one case is covered by the 
solution term (A*B*C*d) etc. (see Table 23). Up to two cases are covered by each solution 
term.  
Table 23: Four most complex solution terms for the outcome Y 
Solution term Countries 
A*B*C*D Austria, Netherlands 
A*B*C*d Finland 
A*b*C*D Germany 
A*b*C*d Estonia 
Source 35: Own presentation. 
Column six indicates whether the outcome is present or not. This column is added manually 
to the truth table to allow the researcher setting the consistency threshold based on theoretical 
and empirical considerations. For the first four columns, the outcome has been classified as 
present. Ideally, the raw consistency scores (column 7) should be higher than 0.75 to make 
stronger statements about the explanatory power of each combination of conditions. The fact 
that the threshold is slightly lower in one case necessitates a careful interpretation of the 
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results. I follow Wagemann and Schneider who emphasize that the choice of a specific 
consistency threshold should be open to research-specific features (Schneider, Wagemann 
2013: 127 ff), taking conventional practices into account without overemphasizing them. The 
low number of cases (five) makes any generalization challenging, but the detailed case studies 
in C.2 allow overcoming some of these shortcomings. Empirical evidence exists for ten out of 
sixteen theoretically possible combinations of conditions; there is thus no empirical evidence 
for six combinations. This is far from unusual: instances of limited diversity increase with the 
number of conditions. The combinations of conditions without empirical evidence have been 
manually deleted from the truth table (see Kent 2008: 6).  
As can be seen in Table 22 (and also Table 23), four different combinations of conditions lead 
to the outcome (Y). These four solution terms are called the ‘most complex solution terms’; 
they are interpreted as being sufficient for the outcome. As such, they are simple descriptions 
of the empirical reality. The aim of the minimization procedure is to reduce the complexity of 
these solution terms without violating theoretical or empirical evidence. By applying the 
Quine McCluskey algorithm, an ‘intermediate solution term’ is derived, which essentially 
contains the same empirical information as the most complex solution term, but is less 
complex at the same time. In this procedure, the logical remainders are first excluded from the 
analysis (see among others Elliott, 2013, p. 7). As a result, the analysis reduces the four most 
complex solution terms to only one (A * C → Y).  
Table 24: Truth table for the intermediate solution term for Y 
 
Raw 
Coverage 
Unique 
Coverage 
Consistency 
A * C    
Finland (0.8,0.9)
85
, 
Germany (0.8,0.9), Estonia 
(0.7,0.9), Netherlands 
(0.7,0.9), Austria (0.6,0.8) 
0.80000 0.80000 0.81250 
Solution coverage:  
Solution consistency:  
0.80000 
0.81250 
  
Source 36: Own presentation.  
This solution term is logically equivalent to the four most complex solution terms on which 
the truth table is based. The four most complex solution terms are still a subset of this 
intermediate solution term; the terms only differ in the degree of their complexity. The 
                                                 
85
 The value (0.8, 0.9) for Finland indicates the following: The first of these two values (0.8) describes the 
weakest link between a combination of conditions A*C. Finland’s score in (A) is 0.9 and its score in formal 
prerogatives in EU affairs (C) is 0.8. The second value (0.9) indicates Belgium’s membership in the outcome 
(Y). 
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intermediate solution term indicates that the simultaneous presence of a strong macro-
economic situation and strong formal prerogatives in EU affairs are consistent with the 
presence of strong parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. The consistency value of the 
intermediate solution term is around 81.25%
86
. The overall consistency score is higher than 
for each of the two conditions separately (as shown in Figure 9 and Figure 11). Recalling the 
outliers in Figure 9, i.e. those countries within a good macro-economic situation but with 
weak ESM participation rights (Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Malta), the intermediate 
solution term (A * C → Y) helps demonstrating that the macro-economic situation alone does 
not sufficiently account for the outcome (A → Y). 
The same is true for the outliers in Figure 11 (C → Y), i.e. countries with strong formal 
prerogatives in EU affairs, but with weak parliamentary participation rights in ESM affairs 
(Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia). Although the consistency value is still relatively low, the 
analysis gives evidence that only a configurational logic of conditions leads to the outcome 
under investigation. The coverage for the solution term is at around 80.00% and thus 
relatively high. 
With only one combination of conditions leading to the outcome (Y), the intermediate 
solution term is already parsimonious. This becomes evident when analysing the most 
parsimonious solution term (which includes logical remainders in the analysis). In this 
procedure, the Quine McCluskey algorithm uses any or all logical remainders
87
 to simplify 
the solution term. The algorithm hypothesizes an outcome for a combination of conditions for 
which there is no empirical evidence if this helps simplifying the solution term. 
Table 25: Truth table parsimonious for the solution term for Y 
 Raw Coverage Unique Coverage Consistency 
A * C 0.80000 0.80000 0.81250 
Solution coverage:  
Solution consistency:  
0.80000 
0.81250 
  
Source 37: Own Presentation. 
This procedure is disputed because it is not based on empirical evidence. It is a rather 
“mechanical, atheoretical procedure” (see especially Cooper, Glaesser 2011); the most 
parsimonious solution term can therefore only be used if the researcher carefully checks 
whether the inclusion of the hypothetical outcome values does not contradict any empirical or 
theoretical evidence (Elliott 2013: 8). In this case, the intermediate (see Table 24) and the 
parsimonious solution terms are identical, i.e. the solution term (A * C → Y) cannot be 
simplified any further. The deficiencies of this procedure do thus not have to be addressed.  
                                                 
86
 Since there is only one solution term, it is identical with the score of the overall solution consistency. 
87
 These truth table rows have not been shown in the presentation Table 22. 
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Figure 13 graphically shows the solution term (A * C → Y). The five countries under 
investigation can all be found above the diagonal while the majority of other countries are 
below or on the diagonal. There are only minor exceptions: Portugal has slightly higher 
parliamentary participation rights than the combination of the conditions A * C → Y would 
predict since the Assembleia possesses formalised information rights in the ESM mechanism. 
The Spanish parliament was involved in the issuing of financial assistance in the third 
sovereign aid package for Greece although this was no legal requirement (August 2015). And 
the Italian accompanying ESM provisions foresee that parliamentary bodies must be 
consulted before the government representative can take a vote in the ESM Board of 
Governors. 
Figure 13: ESM participation and combination of A* C 
 
Source 38: Own Presentation. The triangles indicate the countries under investigation, i.e. those 
parliaments with strong ESM participation rights. 
In conclusion, the solution term that explains best high parliamentary participation rights in 
ESM affairs is the combination of a good macro-economic situation (A) and strong formal 
prerogatives in EU affairs (C). To discuss and illustrate the logic of this Boolean minimization 
procedure, the analysis will be conducted manually in the next paragraph. As advocated by 
Cooper and Glaesser, such a section serves to make the minimisation procedure more 
transparent (see Cooper, Glaesser 2011: 1). 
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C.1.1.3 Manual Interpretation of the Fuzzy Set Truth Table 
Four combinations of conditions lead to the outcome ‘strong parliamentary ESM 
involvement’. These solutions terms are interpreted as sufficient conditions. As stated above, 
they simply describe the observed empirical reality and do not have a strong added value in 
terms of generalizations. This is why they are called most complex solution terms.  
The four solution terms are all characterised by a strong macro-economic situation (A). This 
is why (A) can be interpreted as a necessary condition for the outcome (Y): whenever the 
outcome (Y) is present, the condition (A) is present as well. However, also Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg and Malta have been in a comparatively good macro-economic situation in 
2012, but belong to the countries with weak parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. A 
good macro-economic condition is thus not sufficient to explain the outcome. In order to 
reduce the complexity of the solution terms, Boolean algebra is applied. The first two solution 
terms (Austria, the Netherlands and Finland) have in common that the conditions A, B and C 
are present. They are both linked to the outcome (Y), but the condition (D) is present in one 
solution term and absent in the other. Can the same logical truth (A*B*C*D → Y and 
A*B*C*d → Y) be reformulated in a less complex manner? With logical minimization, the 
condition (D) is considered logically redundant, i.e. it is interpreted as irrelevant for producing 
the outcome. The following minimization results: 
1. A*B*C*D    + A*B*C*d → Y  
(Austria, Netherlands)     (Finland) 
 
 
2. A*B*C     → Y 
(Austria, Finland, Netherlands) 
The omission of a logically redundant condition allows merging two solution terms into a 
simpler sufficient conjunction of conditions. With the empirical evidence at hand, high or 
weak political and constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty do not seem to account 
for differences in parliamentary ESM involvement.
88
 According to the new simplified 
solution term, strong parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs in Austria, Finland and the 
Netherlands requires a strong macro-economic situation in combination with strong 
Eurosceptical sentiments and strong formal EU prerogatives.
89
  
                                                 
88
 As indicated in chapter B.4.2.2.2, however, the fs-values for Austria’s formal prerogatives in EU affairs (C) 
should be interpreted with caution since Austria was only slightly above the 0.5 threshold. 
89
 Due to the lack of empirical evidence, it is not possible to assess whether a strong macro-economic condition 
in combination with only strong Eurosceptical sentiments or only strong prerogatives in EU affairs would have 
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The two remaining solution terms describe the combination of conditions leading to strong 
ESM involvement in Germany and Estonia. Germany (A*b*C*D) and Estonia (A*b*C*d) 
have similar values for their macro-economic situation (A), their degree of Eurosceptical 
sentiments (b) and formal prerogatives in EU affairs (C). They differ, however, with regard to 
the political and constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty. These two solution 
terms can be equally simplified by using Boolean algebra. 
 
3. A*b*C*D  +  A*b*C*d  → Y 
(Germany)  (Estonia) 
 
 
4. A*b*C     → Y 
(Estonia, Germany) 
Again, the presence or absence of strong political and constitutional requirements to ratify the 
ESM treaty is interpreted as logically redundant. There are two possible explanations for this. 
First, the variable only measures the formal political and constitutional requirements to ratify 
the treaty. It was impossible to receive comparable quantitative data on the degree of political 
contestation within the different parliaments to ratify the treaties (although qualitative 
information for some countries has been collected and will be used in the case studies, see 
chapter C.2). The second explanation is that the fourth guiding assumption (see B.2.4) is 
simply falsified. Other conditions determine parliamentary involvement more strongly than 
political and constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty. And the consistency and 
coverage values for D on their own were indeed the lowest of all conditions tested in C.1.1.1. 
The two new simplified solutions terms (2 and 4) can again be minimized. So far, strong 
parliamentary ESM involvement in Austria, Finland and the Netherlands was interpreted with 
the formula (A*B*C* → Y), while it was interpreted with the formula (A*b*C → Y) for 
Estonia and Germany. In both cases – and given the empirical evidence at hand – the absence 
or presence of Eurosceptical sentiments does not seem to affect the outcome ‘strong 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs’. It is equally interpreted as logically redundant. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
been sufficient to explain strong involvement in ESM affairs. Theoretically, there is reason to assume that the 
presence of Eurosceptical parties in a macro-economically strong country could also impact on parliamentary 
participation rights in ESM affairs, even if formal prerogatives in EU affairs had been rather weak. This will be 
analysed in more detail in the case study on Austria (see C.2.2). 
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5 .A *B*C   +  A*b*C   → Y  
 (Austria, Finland, Netherlands)  (Estonia, Germany) 
 
6. A*C        → Y 
 (Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Netherlands) 
The final solution term for all countries with strong parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs 
(Y) is now interpreted as follows: the partial and quasi veto powers have in common that they 
were in a rather good macro-economic situation and had strong formal prerogatives in EU 
affairs simultaneously. With the empirical evidence at hand, the combination of these two 
conditions was sufficient to account for the outcome. The four most complex solution terms 
(see Table 23) are logically equivalent to this newly derived solution term. The new solution 
term (A*C → Y) thus reduces the complexity of the data presented above, but maintains the 
core theoretical and empirical assumptions.  
It has, however, some shortcomings. As mentioned in B.4.2.2.2, Austria’s membership score 
in C is only slightly above the 0.5 threshold. Its membership in the combination A*B*C*D 
(0.6) is only marginally above its membership score in the combination A*B*c*D (0.4). If the 
Austrian Nationalrat had been classified as rather weak in EU affairs, the solution term would 
have to be re-interpreted. In that case, strong parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs would 
be a result of strong macro-economic situation combined with either strong Eurosceptical 
sentiments or strong powers in EU affairs (or both), thus: A* (B + C) → Y. Chapter C.2.2 
will shed some more light on this problem in the case study on Austria. Chapter C.1.3 will 
discuss some general limitations of the application of fsQCA. 
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C.1.2 Weak Parliamentary ESM Participation Rights 
Analysing the absence of the outcome (y) is not simply the reverse analysis of identifying 
combinations of conditions for (Y). First, different consistency and coverage values emerge 
for each (combination of) condition(s). The presence of a certain condition might increase the 
odds for the presence of the outcome (Y); however, the absence of a condition might even be 
a stronger predictor for its absence (y). A good macro-economic situation to explain strong 
ESM parliamentary involvement can illustrate this point. When analysing the presence of the 
outcome (Y), (A) had been interpreted as a necessary condition (see C.1.1.3), but it was not 
sufficient to explain (Y). It needed to be combined with other conditions to exert explanatory 
power. The absence of a strong macro-economic situation (a), however, makes the occurrence 
of weak ESM participation rights (y) even more likely (see C.1.2.1). Despite the fact that the 
presence of a strong macro-economic situation (A) is not a sufficient predictor of (Y), its 
absence (a) predicts the absence of (Y) more fruitfully. The explanatory power of each 
condition thus changes depending on whether the absence or the presence of the outcome is 
analysed. Similar to the previous procedure, the explanatory power for each condition will be 
tested separately in a first step. This time, however, the negated values of the conditions are 
tested, i.e. the absence of the four conditions. 
 
C.1.2.1 Testing Conditions Separately 
Weak Macro-economic Situation 
Weak parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs (y) is measured on a 0 to 1 scale, with 1 
indicating full membership in the group of countries with weak parliamentary involvement. 
Similarly, a weak macro-economic situation (a) is indicated by the value 1, while 0 indicates 
weak membership in the condition ‘weak macro-economic situation’, i.e. a strong macro-
economic situation. The hypothesis assumed that the stronger the economic situation of a 
country, the higher the odds that a country possesses strong ESM participation rights (see 
B.2.1). The reverse logic is that an unfavourable macro-economic situation decreases the odds 
for strong ESM participation rights. There are nine countries within a weak macro-economic 
situation in the upper right corner of the XY plot (see Figure 14); they all possess only weak 
ESM participation rights. The consistency value for the assumption is at 92.0%, indicating a 
strong correlation between a weak macro-economic situation and weak parliamentary 
involvement.  
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Figure 14: Weak ESM participation and weak macro-economic situation 
 
Source 39: Own Presentation. The triangles indicate the countries under investigation, i.e. those 
parliaments with strong ESM participation rights. 
Five of these countries (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) have received financial 
assistance from one of the rescue mechanisms in the period under investigation, with Slovenia 
being at the brink of requesting assistance in 2012-2013. For these countries it can be 
hypothesized that decision-makers expected strong parliamentary involvement to slow down 
decision-making processes (which would eventually hamper an efficient management of the 
crisis). The reverse logic is confirmed for the quasi and partial veto powers in the bottom left 
corner of the XY plot (see again C.1.1.2). Countries within a good macro-economic situation 
established strong parliamentary participation rights since they had potentially more to lose. 
The Italian parliament, which at least secured some consultative rights within the mechanism 
(see again B.1), is also fully in line with this expectation. Nonetheless, the coverage value for 
this condition is only at 69.6%, with Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Malta slightly 
deviating from this logic (left upper corner of the XY plot). They have been in a rather good 
macro-economic situation, but nonetheless adapted weaker ESM participation rights. The 
absence of A can therefore not be interpreted as a necessary condition for their weak ESM 
parliamentary involvement. Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Malta are thus outliers; their 
involvement in the ESM must be tested in combination with other conditions. In QCA 
language the question is: in combination with which other conditions did the condition (a) 
exert influence on the condition (y)? 
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Weak Levels of Euroscepticism 
Strong levels of Euroscepticism are expected to increase the odds of strong parliamentary 
involvement in ESM affairs (see again B.2.2) while the absence of strong Eurosceptical 
sentiments is expected to facilitate weaker parliamentary involvement. The data for a number 
of countries is in line with this assumption. 
Figure 15: Weak ESM participation and weak Euroscepticism 
 
Source 40: Own Presentation. The triangles indicate the countries under investigation, i.e. those 
parliaments with strong ESM participation rights. 
In Malta, Luxembourg, Ireland, Spain and Belgium, weak levels of Euroscepticism 
simultaneously occur with weak ESM participation rights (see Figure 15). The Austrian, 
Finish and Dutch parliaments – with above average levels of Euroscepticism – secured strong 
involvement within the European Stability Mechanism. There are other countries, such as 
Portugal, Slovenia or Slovakia in which at least the level of party Euroscepticism has been 
relatively low. These countries did also not adopt strong ESM participation rights. The 
consistency value for this condition is at 80.6% and thus relatively high. However, there are 
also some very strong outliers. Greece, and also Cyprus, have been hit hard by the crisis and 
show higher levels of party Euroscepticism, but also high popular discontent with the EU in 
general. These two countries still belong to the group of parliaments with weak participation 
rights. On the contrary, Germany and Estonia still have only modest levels of Eurosceptical 
sentiments (as of 2012), but strong ESM participation rights. The coverage value for the 
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condition (b) is at 75.7%. Neither weak nor strong Euroscepticism on its own is thus sufficient 
to explain strong or weak parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs, nor can its absence be 
interpreted as a necessary condition for weak parliamentary involvement. Cyprus and Greece 
both received financial assistance from the ESM; demanding a stronger parliamentary role 
within the ESM mechanism should rather be concerned with parliamentary involvement in the 
negotiations leading to a memorandum of understanding, and not in issuing financial 
assistance. Despite the fact that the ESM is a long-term mechanism and countries can 
theoretically switch sides in the long-run, political decision-makers in both countries might 
not have been very much concerned with a stronger parliamentary role for guaranteeing 
financial assistance. That leaves, however, the attitudes of Germany and Estonia unexplained; 
the level of Euroscepticism must thus be tested in combination with other conditions. 
Weak Formal Prerogatives in EU Affairs 
The third hypothesis assumes that stronger formal prerogatives in EU affairs lead to stronger 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs (see again B.2.3), and reverse. Strong institutional 
capacities of parliaments in EU affairs are expected to be transferred to the ESM while 
already weak formal prerogatives are unlikely to be extended and incorporated into the design 
of the intergovernmental European Stability Mechanism. When analysing strong 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs, this condition on its own had been the strongest 
predictor of strong ESM participation rights (see again C.1.1.2). Regarding weak 
parliamentary involvement, the consistency level is equally high (91.3% see Figure 16). 
Parliaments that only possessed weak parliamentary prerogatives in EU affairs were not able 
to extend and transfer these powers to the ESM. There is not a single case in which a 
parliament had weak formal prerogatives in EU affairs, but strong parliamentary participation 
rights in the ESM. Nonetheless, the condition (c) cannot be interpreted as a necessary 
condition for (y) since weak parliamentary ESM involvement also occurs in parliaments with 
strong formal EU prerogatives (most notably Slovenia and Slovakia, but to a lesser extent also 
Latvia). The coverage of this condition on its own has a value of only 81.7%. Latvia, Slovakia 
and Slovenia can be interpreted as outliers. They are comparatively strong in EU affairs, but 
simultaneously share the outcome (y).  
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Figure 16: Weak ESM participation and weak formal EU prerogatives 
 
Source 41: Own Presentation. The triangles indicate the countries under investigation, i.e. those 
parliaments with weak ESM participation rights. 
All other countries with strong formal EU prerogatives (C) belong to the group of countries 
with strong ESM parliamentary participation rights (Y). Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia were 
thus not able to transfer their comparatively strong EU prerogatives to the European Stability 
Mechanism. One likely explanation for this pattern is that other conditions have not been 
present: strong EU prerogatives only make a difference in combination with other conditions. 
The question therefore is: in which combination(s) with other condition(s) do weak formal EU 
prerogatives lead to weak parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs? 
Weak Constitutional and Political Requirements to Ratify the ESM Treaty 
The presence of strong political and constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty is 
expected to increase the odds for strong parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs (see again 
B.2.4). Opposition parties can demand stronger parliamentary involvement as a side payment 
for supporting the ratification of the ESM treaty. Parliaments with a large governing majority, 
on the other side, are expected to neglect stronger parliamentary involvement since the 
government could rely on its own majority. The consistency threshold for this condition on its 
own is at 83.2% and thus quite strong. In many parliamentary settings in which the 
government possessed a sufficient majority to pass the treaty (partly in both chambers), only 
weak parliamentary participation rights were established. Exceptions are Spain, but also 
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Belgium and France. Although the government was more likely to rely on opposition support 
to pass the treaties, stronger parliamentary involvement has not been established. 
Figure 17: Weak ESM participation and constitutional and political requirements 
 
Source 42: Own Presentation. The triangles indicate the countries under investigation, i.e. those 
parliaments with strong ESM participation rights. 
On the other side, in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, the government relied on 
opposition support to pass the treaty and stronger parliamentary participation rights have been 
established. Outliers are Estonia and Finland which incorporated stronger parliamentary ESM 
involvement despite having a sufficient governmental majority. 
In the Finish case, the debate on the ratification of the ESM treaty was highly politicized, with 
the True Fins gaining support in the polls for opposing the ESM treaty. This kind of public 
resistance is not included in the variable (see again B.4.1.4) since no comparable data for all 
countries exist. The coverage value for this condition is at 73.0% only. Again, the full 
explanatory power of this condition can only be revealed in combination with other others. 
 
C.1.2.2 FsQCA Analysis: Combinations of Conditions 
The following analysis proceeds similar to the one conducted in C.1.1.2. A new truth table is 
compiled with the fsQCA software (see Table 26).  
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Table 26: Completed truth table for y 
a b c d Number Outcome Raw Consistency 
0 1 0 0 2 1 1.0000 
0 0 0 0 3 1 0.9800 
0 0 1 0 3 1 0.9500 
1 0 0 0 2 1 0.9348 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0.9302 
1 0 0 1 2 1 0.9268 
1 0 1 0 1 0 0.8108 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0.7436 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0.7059 
1 1 1 1 2 0 0.6842 
Source 43: Information for the truth table is based on Table 19. The data in the seventh column is 
rounded to the fourth decimal place. The solution terms have been ordered according to their raw 
consistency values; logical remainders are omitted. 
Although the data of the independent and dependent variables is displayed in a binary coding, 
it is identical with that of Table 19. The outcome is now defined as the absence of strong 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs (y). In line with the previous proceeding, this 
column is added manually to the completed truth table. As indicated by the raw consistency of 
the solution terms, the gap between the two groups of parliaments regarding the outcome is 
clearly visible (92.68% to 81.08%). More often than in the previous analysis, the same 
combination of conditions leads to the same outcome. The second (a * b * c * d) and the 
fourth (a * b* C* d) solution terms already cover six cases, i.e. nearly half of the cases under 
investigation.  
Six solution terms describe the outcome (y) and form the most complex solution terms. All of 
them can be interpreted as sufficient conditions for the outcome. They describe, however, 
simply the observed empirical reality without generalizations (see Table 27).  
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Table 27: Most complex solutions terms for weak involvement in ESM affairs 
Solution term Countries 
A*b*c*d Luxembourg, Malta 
A*b*c*D Belgium, France 
a*b*c*D Spain 
a*b*c*d Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
a*B*c*d Greece, Cyprus 
a*b*C*d Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia 
Source 44: Own presentation. 
Boolean algebra is applied to minimise the complexity of these solution terms with the 
respective software without violating theoretical or empirical evidence.  
Table 28: Truth table for most complex solution term for y 
Intermediate Solution Term(s) 
Raw 
Coverage 
Unique 
Coverage 
Consistency 
b * c    
Belgium (0.8,1)
90
, Ireland (0.8,0.9), 
Luxembourg (0.8,0.9), Malta (0.8,0.9), 
Spain (0.8,0.6), France (0.6,0.6), Italy 
(0.6,0.6), Portugal (0.6,0.9)  
0.660870 0.234783 0.926829 
a * c * d    
Cyprus (0.8,1), Ireland (0.8,0.9), 
Portugal (0.7,0.9), Greece (0.6,1), 
Italy (0.6,0.6) 
0.521739 0.095652 0.983607 
a * b * d    
Ireland (0.8,0.9), Italy (0.6,0.6), 
Latvia (0.6,0.6), Portugal (0.6,0.9), 
Slovakia (0.6,1), Slovenia (0.6,0.9) 
0.486956 0.060870 0.965517 
Solution coverage:  
Solution consistency:  
0.817391 
0.930693 
  
Source 45: Own presentation. 
As can be seen in Table 28, the Quine McCluskey algorithm reduces the six most complex 
solution terms from six to three. The first solution term reads that the absence of 
Eurosceptical sentiments (b) in combination with the absence of strong EU formal 
prerogatives (c) is sufficient to explain weak parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs in 
eight cases. This gives evidence that hypotheses two and three are partly confirmed (see B.2.2 
                                                 
90
 The value (0.8, 1) for Belgium indicates the following: The first of these two values (0.8) describes the 
weakest link between a combination of conditions, in this case b*c. Belgium’s score for Eurosceptical sentiments 
was measured with B = 0.2 and its formal prerogatives in EU affairs with C = 0.1. The negated values for these 
two variables are thus b = 0.8 and c = 0.9, with the weakest link b * c = 0.8. The second value (1) indicates 
Belgium’s membership in the outcome y, i.e. no ESM parliamentary participation rights. Since Belgium does not 
possess any formalised role in the ESM mechanism (Y = 0), it is fully a member of those parliaments with no 
participation rights in ESM affairs e.g. y = 1.  
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and B.2.3), but they only exert explanatory power in combination with each other. The fact 
that the sole absence of Eurosceptical sentiments is not sufficient to explain weak 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs is comprehensible. Eurosceptical parties might be 
more likely to defend (national) parliamentary participation rights, but formal EU 
prerogatives must exist as a precondition in order to be defended in the first place. If there are 
neither strong formal prerogatives in EU affairs (c) nor strong Eurosceptical sentiments (b), it 
is not surprising that no strong ESM parliamentary prerogatives result from this combination. 
The solution term (b * c → y) applies to Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Spain, 
France, Italy and Portugal. The raw coverage is at 66.09%. It covers the outliers from Figure 
14, the countries within a rather favourable macro-economic situation, but with weak ESM 
participation rights (Belgium, France Malta and Luxembourg). Interestingly, the presence of a 
strong macro-economic situation in these four countries is not part of the solution term. 
Although the consistency level for the solution term (b * c → y) is quite high (92.7%), it is 
unsatisfactory that the presence of A is not part of the solution term.  
The lower unique coverage (23.5%) indicates, however, that many cases can also be 
explained with other combinations of conditions (see for instance Ireland, Italy and Portugal). 
This phenomenon is commonly referred to as equifinality (see again B.3.1.1.2) and underlines 
that there are multiple paths to arrive at the same outcome. The combination of weak 
Eurosceptical sentiments and weak formal EU prerogatives might thus not have the same 
explanatory power for those countries for which other solution terms equally apply. The 
omission of a strong macro-economic situation will be critically examined in C.1.2.3.  
The second solution term (a * c * d → y) assumes that the simultaneous absence of a strong 
macro-economic situation (a), weak formal EU prerogatives (c) and low political and 
constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty (d) is sufficient to explain the outcome 
(y). This solution term applies to five countries (Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Italy) 
and is very consistent with the assumption of weak ESM parliamentary participation rights 
(98.3%). However, while ESM participation for Ireland, Portugal and Italy can also be 
explained with other combination of conditions, the solution term is unique for Cyprus and 
Greece only (the unique coverage is at around 9%). These two countries have been hit hard by 
the crisis; interestingly the absence of the conditions A, C and D outweighs the higher levels 
of Eurosceptical sentiments that these two countries possess. The question to be asked is: do 
we need an own solution term for Greece and Cyprus? Are these two cases so particular that 
they cannot be explained with any other combination of conditions? And what exactly is the 
causal mechanism behind the solution term (a * c * d → y)?  
The third solution term (a * b * d → y) combines the absence of A, B and D to be sufficient 
for explaining the outcome y. It applies to Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. The consistency level is higher than for the first solution term (96.6%) although the 
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coverage is significantly lower (48.7%). This solution term is unique for Latvia, Slovakia and 
Slovenia only. These countries were the outliers in Figure 16. They possessed relatively 
strong formal EU prerogatives, but were not able to transfer them to the intergovernmental 
ESM. The presence of (C) is, however, not included in the solution term any more. The 
minimization of this condition is in line with the logic of Boolean Algebra, but also distorts 
the explanatory power of the solution term to some extent. I will address this and other 
shortcomings in the manual analysis (C.1.2.3). 
How can these three solution term be interpreted? It is still difficult to draw any general 
conclusions from this analytical evidence. Every single condition (in combination with at least 
one other) is included in one of the three solution terms, but none of them is present in all. In 
principle, the empirical reality can be so complex that no further clarity can be achieved. The 
software offers, however, an additional tool to reduce the complexity further. By including 
logical remainders, the Quine McCluskey algorithm assumes the outcome for combinations of 
conditions for which no empirical evidence exists – given that this further reduces the 
complexity of the solution terms. I will include logical remainders in the next step to arrive at 
the most parsimonious solution term.  
As can be seen in Table 29, the most parsimonious solution term interprets the absence of two 
conditions as sufficient for the outcome (y). Either countries did not possess strong formal 
prerogatives in EU affairs (which applies to ten countries, consistent at 93.2%), or they have 
been in a weak macro-economic situation (which applies for nine countries, consistent at 
96.5%). In six of these countries, both of the conditions have been fulfilled simultaneously 
(Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, Ireland, Spain and Italy). It is thus difficult to hypothesize if one of 
the two conditions weighs more than the other to explain the outcome. The joint consistency 
for both conditions is at around 92%, with a coverage value of around 86%. 
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Table 29: Truth table parsimonious solution term for the outcome y 
 Raw Coverage Unique 
Coverage 
Consistency 
c    
Belgium (0.9,1), Cyprus (0.9,1), 
Greece (0.9,1), Ireland (0.8,0.9), 
Luxembourg (0.8,0.9), Malta 
(0.8,0.9), Portugal (0.8,0.9), 
Spain (0.8,0.6), France (0.6,0.6), 
Italy (0.6,0.6)  
 
0.817391 0.20000 0.912621 
a     
Greece (1,1), Portugal (1,0.9), 
Cyprus (0.8,1), Ireland (0.8,0.9), 
Spain (0.8,0.6), Italy (0.6,0.6), 
Latvia (0.6,0.6), Slovakia (0.6,1), 
Slovenia (0.6,0.9) 
 
0.695652 0.078261 0.919540 
Solution coverage:  
Solution consistency:  
0.895652 
0.887931 
  
Source 46: Own presentation. 
These two solution terms represent an enormous reduction of complexity, but they also give a 
relatively straightforward answer to the question under which conditions countries have 
adopted weak ESM participation rights. Parliaments did either not possess strong institutional 
prerogatives, had been in an unfavourable macro-economic situation or both. The low unique 
coverage for both solution terms indicates that both conditions had been absent in the majority 
of cases. This most parsimonious solution term does, however, not fully explain the outliers 
from chapter C.1.2.1. Why do some countries adopt weak ESM participation rights despite 
being in a relatively good macro-economic situation? Or why did they do so although they 
possessed quite strong formal prerogatives in EU affairs? According to the most parsimonious 
solution term, the respective other condition has not been present. This might be empirically 
true, but is not entirely satisfying with regard to the theoretical foundations the analysis is 
based on. I will therefore conduct the fsQCA manually to better reflect on the decisions taken 
to minimize the complexity of the solution terms.  
As emphasized in B.3.1, QCA builds on the assumption of equifinality. This means that 
different solution terms can be identified for the same outcome, but they must be a) logically 
equivalent, b) express the same information as contained in the truth table, c) do not 
contradict each other, and d) are acceptable summaries of the empirical information at hand 
(Schneider, Wagemann 2013: 107). Especially this fourth criterion must be checked 
manually. The minimisation process is rather mechanical; it does not necessarily respect 
important theoretical considerations. 
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C.1.2.3 Manual Interpretation of the Fuzzy Set Truth Table 
This section shall make the decisions to reduce the complexity of the most complex solution 
terms transparent. At the same time, it tries to better pay attention to the theoretical 
assumptions of this thesis by accepting minimisation procedures only if they can be justified 
theoretically. As result, the manual interpretation of the fuzzy set truth table will arrive at 
slightly different conclusions. 
The six most complex solution terms can be found in Table 27. I assume that it is theoretically 
relevant that a strong macro-economic situation (A) appears in two solution terms (covering 
four countries), while it is absent (a) in the remaining ones (covering nine countries). Since I 
am particularly interested in the question why some countries within a rather favourable 
economic situation (Luxembourg, Malta, France and Belgium) have not adopted strong ESM 
participation rights, I distinguish these two groups of solution terms. I assume that there is a 
different theoretical reasoning for weak parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs for these 
groups of countries. In order to simplify the first two solution terms, I apply Boolean algebra 
manually. The following equation is derived for the first two solution terms: 
7. A*b*c*d  + A*b*c*D   → y 
(Luxembourg, Malta)  (Belgium, France)   
 
 
 
8. A*b*c      → y 
(Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Malta) 
In these four cases, political and constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty are 
considered redundant for explaining weak parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. In 
Belgium, all parliaments had to ratify the modification of article 136 TFEU. Since three 
parliamentary chambers were involved in this ratification process, the fs-value for Belgium 
(D) had been above average. However, in-depth analysis regarding the involvement of 
Belgian parliamentary chambers reveals that their actual impact on EU policy-making is 
rather limited (see for instance Bosch 2014). Belgium is a typical case of a consensus 
democracy (see for the term Lijphart 1999). Since many different (parliamentary) actors are 
involved in the decision-making processes, it is difficult to argue that higher political and 
constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty have opened a window of opportunity for 
opposition parties to influence policy-making and demand stronger parliamentary 
participation rights in ESM affairs. In the Belgian case, a clear distinction between 
government and opposition parties is furthermore difficult to draw since most parties execute 
governmental responsibilities on at least one (federal) level. The reason for France having an 
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above average fs-value (D) is the involvement of the second chamber, the Senate, during in 
the ratification process of the ESM treaty. The Senate was dominated by the French Socialist 
party in 2012, while the UMP held a majority in the Assemblée Nationale.
91
 The Senate plays, 
however, only a subordinate role in French policy-making. It can delay decisions taken by the 
government and the first chamber, but it can normally not veto them. In this sense, it can be 
doubted that the involvement of the French Senate did pose a major political or constitutional 
obstacle for the ratification of the ESM treaty. The four countries for which the solution term 
A*b*c applies have all been in a relatively good macro-economic situation as of 2012. 
Additionally, they were characterised by the absence of strong Eurosceptical sentiments and 
the absence of strong EU parliamentary prerogatives. This conclusion is in line with the 
statements made in chapter C.1.1.2 (analysing strong parliamentary involvement in ESM 
affairs): a good macro-economic situation must be combined with strong formal prerogatives 
in EU affairs to account for strong ESM involvement (A * C → Y). Since Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg or Malta did not possess strong formal EU prerogatives, they could not adopt 
stronger ESM participation rights.  
Succinctly, the intermediate solution in C.1.2.2 assumed that the ESM involvement of 
Belgium, France, Malta and Luxembourg can be explained with the solution term (b * c → y). 
This solution is a subset of the solution term (A * b * c → y)92 and does thus not contradict 
the solution of the manual analysis. Theoretically, however, it does make more sense to still 
emphasise the inclusion A in the final solution term. The solution term (A * b* c* → y) 
allows drawing the conclusion that a strong macro-economic situation can also lead to weak 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs if it is combined with low levels of Euroscepticism 
and weak formal prerogatives in EU affairs. 
The remaining four solution terms have all been characterised by a weak macro-economic 
situation (a). They differed, however, with regard to the presence or absence of the remaining 
conditions. I will first apply Boolean algebra to the next two solution terms of Table 27: 
 
9. a*b*c*D + a*b*c*d   → y 
 (Spain)   (Ireland, Italy, Portugal) 
 
 
10. a*b*c      → y 
(Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) 
                                                 
91
 The UMP lost its parliamentary majority in the Assemblée during the legislative elections in summer 2012. 
92
 The reason for this is that the fifth (a*b*c*D → y) and sixth (a*b*c*d → y) solution terms can be simplified 
to a*b*c → y. This solution term, however, can also be simplified with the solution term A*b*c → y, by 
interpreting the absence or presence of A as redundant for the outcome. 
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With the empirical evidence at hand, political and constitutional requirements to ratify the 
ESM treaty are again interpreted as redundant to explain the weak parliamentary involvement 
in ESM affairs in these four countries.
93
 The four countries described above were indeed hit 
hard by the Eurozone crisis. Ireland and Portugal had already requested financial assistance 
from international donors when the ESM treaty was ratified; Spain requested funds from the 
ESM for its banking sector shortly after the new mechanism came into force; and Italy had 
been under the supervision of, especially, the European Commission to balance its budget and 
comply with the Maastricht criteria. These countries are the ideal types of political settings in 
which strong parliamentary involvement is most unlikely since none of the guiding 
assumptions developed in chapter B.2 applies (with the exception of Spain where the political 
and constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty were notably higher than in other 
political settings). Whether the difficult macro-economic situation would have been sufficient 
to explain weak parliamentary involvement cannot be assessed with the empirical evidence of 
the four countries alone. Equally, whether the sole absence of one of the three conditions (A, 
B or C) would have been sufficient to explain weak parliamentary involvement, or whether it 
is rather a combination of these conditions is still not clear from the data.  
The last two solution terms will be taken into account: 
11. a*B*c*d  + a*b*C*d    → y 
  (Greece, Cyprus)   (Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia)    
Both of these solutions term cannot be simplified any further with Boolean algebra. They 
have a rather weak macro-economic situation and low political and constitutional 
requirements to ratify the ESM treaty in common. They differ, however, with regard to the 
presence or absence of Eurosceptical sentiments and formal prerogatives in EU affairs. 
Looking at the theoretical expectations developed in B.2.4, it can be doubted that the absence 
of strong political or constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty (d) can explain weak 
participation rights in ESM affairs. Indeed, the causal logic for this guiding assumption was 
formulated in the reverse direction:
94
 strong political and constitutional requirements to ratify 
the ESM treaty increase the odds of strong parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs (see 
chapter B.2.4). Its absence, however, can theoretically lead to both, strong or weak 
parliamentary involvement and is not further specified in the theoretical section. Empirically, 
the cases of Finland and Estonia have shown that parliaments opted for strong parliamentary 
involvement in ESM affairs despite political and constitutional requirements being rather low. 
In this regard, it does make sense to interpret the condition (d) (including any combination 
                                                 
93
 Spain high fs-value is also a result of the role of the second chamber played in the ratification process. Similar 
to the French case, the role of the second chamber in EU policy-making is rather limited although absolute 
majorities for the ESM treaty and the modification of article 136 TFEU had been required (see Table 11). 
94
 Strong political and constitutional requirements to adapt the ESM treaty (D) were expected to lead to stronger 
parliamentary participation rights in ESM affairs (Y). 
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with it) as irrelevant for the outcome (y). This procedure is not based on Boolean algebra, but 
justified on theoretical explanations. The row 11 can thus be reformulated as follows: 
(11a)  a*B*c  +   a*b*C   → y 
(Greece, Cyprus)   (Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia)   
The five countries above are now characterized by the absence of a strong macro-economic 
situation (a) that was either combined with strong Eurosceptical sentiments and weak 
parliamentary prerogatives in EU affairs, or with weak Eurosceptical sentiments and strong 
parliamentary prerogatives in EU affairs. Combined with the former solution term in row 10 
for Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, a further minimization is possible. 
12. a*b*C +   a*b*c  + a*B*c → y 
 (Latvia, Slovenia,  (Ireland, Italy,)  (Greece, Cyprus)  
  Slovakia)   Portugal, Spain) 
 
13. a * b   + a * c   → y 
The first and third solution terms can be combined with the second solution term. The 
presence or absence of strong formal prerogatives in EU affairs (c) does not seem to impact 
on the parliamentary participation rights in ESM affairs, thus resulting in the term (a * b → 
y). The presence or absence of strong Eurosceptical sentiments does not seem to account for 
the outcome in the second and third solution term, thus (a * c → y). To increase readability, 
(a) can be factored out. 
(13a)   a* (b + c)     → y 
 
Preliminary Conclusion on Weak Parliamentary Involvement in ESM Affairs 
Based on the empirical evidence at hand, weak ESM participation (y) has two intermediate 
solution terms which are justified on methodological and theoretical grounds. First, it is a 
result of a weak macro-economic situation (a) that is either combined with weak 
Eurosceptical sentiments (b) and/or with weak formal EU prerogatives (c). A weak macro-
economic situation is neither a necessary condition for weak ESM participation rights (as the 
cases of Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Malta have shown), nor is it sufficient to explain 
the outcome (y). At least empirically, it must be combined with either (b) or (c). Second, 
weak ESM participation rights can be explained with a rather favourable economic situation 
(A) in combination with weak Eurosceptical sentiments (b) and weak formal EU prerogatives 
(c). 
a* (b + c) + A * b * c     → y. 
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These two solution terms constitute an enormous reduction of complexity compared to the six 
most complex solution terms in Table 27. They also differ from the intermediate and most 
parsimonious solution terms presented in C.1.2.2. The sole absence of a strong macro-
economic situation is a good predictor of weak ESM involvement, but it is more adequate to 
interpret the explanatory power of this condition in combination with others. Although no 
country within a weak macro-economic situation adopted strong parliamentary participation 
rights in ESM affairs, its absence was empirically accompanied with the simultaneous 
absence of (b) or (c).  
With the data at hand, it is thus impossible to ‘proof’ that a weak macro-economic situation 
must always be combined with one of the other two conditions, but theoretical considerations 
support this assumption. While a weak macro-economic situation increases the odds for weak 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs, the additional absence of (b) and (c) increases the 
coverage and consistency values. Figure 18 shows the correlation between weak ESM 
participation rights and the combination of (a * b).  
Figure 18: Weak ESM participation and a * b 
 
Source 47: Own presentation. The triangles indicate the countries under investigation, e.g. those 
parliaments with weak ESM participation rights. 
This combination explains particularly well the cases of Spain, Ireland, Slovakia, Latvia, 
Portugal, Slovenia and Italy. The consistency value is at 94%. However, outliers are those 
four countries within a rather favourable macro-economic situation as well as Greece and 
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Cyprus which had high Eurosceptical sentiments. The coverage for this solution term is 
therefore only at 54.8%. 
If a weak macro-economic situation is combined with weak formal prerogatives in EU affairs, 
the consistency (95.9%) and the coverage (61.7%) levels are higher (see Figure 19). The 
outliers are again the four countries within a favourable macro-economic situation. 
Additionally, the cases of Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia are not very well explained with this 
combination of conditions. These three countries had rather strong formal prerogatives in EU 
affairs, but were not able to transfer these powers to the European Stability Mechanism. The 
combination of the both solution terms (a * b → y and a * c → y) can explain, however, nine 
out of thirteen cases. This is why both terms are summarized in the final solution term  
a * (b + c) → y  
to indicate that one solution term for the outcome (y) requires a weak macro-economic 
situation that is combined with either weak Eurosceptical sentiments and/ or weak formal 
prerogatives in EU affairs. 
Figure 19: Weak ESM participation and a * c 
 
Source 48: Own presentation. The triangles indicate the countries under investigation, e.g. those 
parliaments with weak ESM participation rights. 
This combined final solution term leaves only those four cases unexplained that have been in 
a rather favourable macro-economic situation. As can be seen in Figure 20, the combination 
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(A * b * c → y) predicts more strongly the parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs for 
Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Malta. Despite a stronger macro-economic condition, 
these countries were not able to guarantee stronger parliamentary participation rights in ESM 
affairs since these countries neither had strong formal EU prerogatives nor very strong 
Eurosceptical sentiments. This solution term deviates from the minimization procedure 
proposed with the Quine McCluskey algorithm. The solution term for these countries was 
covered by the expression b * c. As explained above, the solution term (A * b * c → y) and (b 
* c → y) are logically equivalent and A can in principle be interpreted as redundant for the 
final solution term. However, including A in the final solution term allows explaining under 
which conditions a strong macro-economic situation of a country does not lead to strong 
involvement in ESM affairs. The consistency level for this solution term is at 92.9%, but only 
45.2% of the cases are covered with it. 
Figure 20: Weak ESM participation and A * b * c 
 
Source 49: Own presentation. The triangles indicate the countries under investigation, e.g. those 
parliaments with weak ESM participation rights. 
Succinctly, explaining weak parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs requires two separate 
solution terms. The first one (a * (b + c) → y) covers nine out of thirteen countries. A weak 
macro-economic situation is a strong predictor of weak ESM involvement, but it makes sense 
to assume that this condition must be combined with other conditions to increase its 
explanatory power. The consistency and coverage levels for a * b and a * c are both higher 
than for the conditions a on their own. Second, the four remaining countries require an own 
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solution term. A * b * c → y better explains why Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Malta 
have adopted weaker ESM participation rights despite being in a favourable macro-economic 
situation.  
 
C.1.3 Insights and Limitations of FsQCA: Intermediate Conclusion 
The primary objective of a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis is to reduce the 
complexity of empirically observed patterns for a given outcome. There are manifold reasons 
as to why parliamentarians adopted strong or weak ESM participation rights, and not all of 
these factors are generalizable across all countries under investigation. As outlined above, due 
to data limitations, the role of constitutional courts was not included as an own variable in the 
analysis. Also, the different ‘political cultures’ – especially concerning the traditional role of 
the parliament within the national political system – was not systematically investigated. It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to operationalize such a variable objectively for eighteen countries. 
The institutional prerogatives in EU affairs or the political and constitutional requirements to 
ratify the ESM treaty can, however, be interpreted as a proxy for the ‘political culture’ 
(although such a measurement has shortcomings). Both conditions can at least approximate 
the role of the parliament within the political system and thus allow drawing some modest 
conclusions concerning the ‘political culture’ of a Member State. Against this background, the 
ambition of the fsQCA is a rather modest one: based on the empirical evidence at hand, it tries 
to identify observable empirical patterns which allow for a certain degree of generalization. 
The ultimate objective of the fsQCA is thus to reduce the complexity of the empirical reality. 
This sub-chapter first critically presents some of the major insights of the fsQCA and briefly 
highlights three characteristics of this method: conjunctural causation, equifinality and 
asymmetry. These characteristics distinguish fsQCA from other statistical analyses and thus 
provide an added value in terms of the methodology used. Second, the sub-chapter critically 
discusses the limitations of the approach, resulting from the operationalization of variables as 
well as the general challenge to substantiate any claim about ‘causality’ in social sciences. At 
the end of this chapter I explain the case selection for the qualitative analysis. 
Conjunctural Causation, Equifinality and Asymmetry 
The concept of conjunctural causation assumes that a combination of conditions can exert 
higher explanatory power than the effect of each condition individually.  
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Table 30: Consistency and coverage for the absence and presence of each condition 
Condition 
Consistency Coverage 
Presence Absence Presence Absence 
Macro-Economic Situation 
62.4% 
(A → Y) 
92.0% 
(a → y) 
89.2% 
(A → Y) 
69.6% 
(a → y) 
Euroscepticism 
61.1% 
(B → Y) 
80.6% 
(b → y) 
67.7% 
(B → Y) 
75.7% 
(b → y) 
Formal EU prerogatives 
72.7% 
(C → Y) 
91.3% 
(c → y) 
86.2% 
(C → Y) 
81.7% 
(c → y) 
Const. and pol. requirements to 
ratify the ESM treaty 
60.8% 
(D → Y) 
83.2% 
(d → y) 
73.8% 
(D → Y) 
73.0% 
(d → y) 
Source 50: Own presentation. 
Table 30 lists the measured impact on the occurrence and non-occurrence of the outcome for 
the four conditions separately. The consistency values for the occurrence of the outcome are 
relatively low and range between 60.8% and 72.7% (they are fairly higher for the non-
occurrence of the outcome, ranging between 80.6% and 92.0%). These thresholds are 
certainly too low to be considered statistically significant for the outcome (although no 
objective threshold exists to determine when a consistency value can be interpreted as 
meaningful or not). There seems to be a broad agreement in the literature, however, that a 
consistency threshold must be higher than 75% to be interpreted as statistically relevant. 
Applied to the fsQCA of this thesis, even strong formal prerogatives in EU affairs (with a 
consistency value of 72.7%) do not account for strong ESM parliamentary participation rights 
to a measureable degree. 
The combined solution terms, however, do all possess higher consistency levels than the 
individual conditions. They range between 81.3% and 95.9% although the coverage level is 
lower. As elaborated above, consistency and coverage values often work against each other. 
The more precisely a solution term accounts for an outcome the more likely it is that not all 
empirical observations are covered by it. 
In this case, the concept of conjectural causation is superior to the testing of individual 
variables since all final solution terms have higher consistency levels than the individual 
conditions (see Table 31). However, this does not mean that these solution terms indicate 
causation. 
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Table 31: Consistency and coverage for the absence and presence of final solution term 
Condition Outcome 
Consistency      Coverage 
Presence Absence Presence Absence 
A * C Y 81.3 88.8 80.0 89.6 
A * b * c y 92.9 67.7 45.2 73.0 
a * (b * c) y 94.0/95.9 54.0/58.5 54.8/61.7 93.8/95.4 
Source 51: Own presentation. The third solution term includes the intermediate solution term (a*b) and 
(a*c).  
Not only is causation difficult to ‘prove’ in every social science research technique, but also 
the low number of observed cases requires caution regarding the interpretation of the results. I 
therefore formulate the insights from the analysis more carefully, i.e.: 
The simultaneous presence of a strong macro-economic situation and strong formal 
prerogatives in EU affairs is to a relatively high degree consistent with the assumption of 
strong ESM participation rights.  
In a first step, this statement is only an empirical observation which reduces the complexity of 
the four most complex solution terms (see again Table 23). However, the statement also 
confirms a theoretical reasoning developed in B.2.5: A good macro-economic situation sets 
rational incentives to secure stronger parliamentary involvement, but they can only be realised 
when parliaments already possessed strong formal tools to influence EU policy-making in the 
first place. It therefore makes sense to assume that this combination of conditions exerts 
higher explanatory power than any of the conditions individually. The theoretical expectation 
was confirmed by observable empirical patterns. 
Conjunctural causation is at first sight not very obvious for the explanation of weak 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. A weak macro-economic situation (92%) or weak 
formal prerogatives (91.3%) are already highly consistent with the assumption of weak ESM 
parliamentary participation rights. There is thus less need to suppose that a combination of 
conditions better account for weak parliamentary ESM involvement. All thirteen countries 
under investigation lacked the presence of at least one of these two conditions (this finding 
was already indicated in the most parsimonious solution term, see again C.1.2.2). Other 
theoretical aspects, such as the degree of Euroscepticism or political and constitutional 
requirements to ratify the ESM treaty, do not seem to significantly influence parliamentary 
ESM participation. Countries that neither possessed rational incentives (a strong macro-
economic situation) nor institutional capacities (or both) did not secure a stronger say in ESM 
affairs. Based on this observation, the question is whether Eurosceptical attitudes and political 
and constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty can be interpreted as redundant. 
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The empirical cases indicate that a weak macro-economic situation always occurred 
simultaneously with either weak prerogatives in EU affairs (a * c → y), weak levels of 
Euroscepticism (a * b → y), or even both (a * b * c → y). This allows no statement on 
whether the conjunction with another condition was causally relevant or not. There are no 
cases in which a country was in a weak macro-economic situation, but equally characterised 
by strong levels of Euroscepticism and strong institutional prerogatives in EU affairs (a * B * 
C → y). There is also no empirical evidence for a country in a strong macro-economic 
situation, high levels of Euroscepticism, but weak formal prerogatives in EU affairs (A * B * 
c → y). Therefore, it is at least theoretically possible that (a) or (c) would not automatically 
lead to weak ESM parliamentary involvement if both of the other two conditions were present 
simultaneously. This is why I assume that a weak macro-economic situation must occur 
simultaneously with either low levels of Euroscepticism or weak prerogatives in EU affairs. 
The final solution term (a * (b + c)) is therefore based on a conjunction of conditions, even if 
no statement on causality can be made.  
The same is true for the solution term (A * b * c → y). Belgium, France, Luxembourg and 
Malta have all been in a relatively favourable macro-economic situation. One could assume 
that the sole absence of strong formal EU prerogatives accounts for the weak ESM 
parliamentary involvement of these countries. In that case, the explanation for these four 
countries would not be any different from that of Spain, Ireland or Greece (which also possess 
only weak EU prerogatives). These four cases differ, however, because these parliaments did 
not establish strong ESM prerogatives despite having rational incentives to do so. In order to 
make sense of this pattern, I assume that the simultaneous absence of strong Eurosceptical 
sentiments and strong EU prerogatives prevented the establishment of ‘safety belts’ in form of 
stronger parliamentary participation. This is, arguably, hypothetical and does also not assume 
causation in a strict sense. However, based on the theoretical considerations (see again B.2), a 
separate explanation for these cases seems appropriate.  
These two different solution terms for weak parliamentary ESM involvement point to a 
second major characteristic of QCA. Equifinality assumes that different combinations of 
conditions can lead to the same outcome. Frequentist statistical approaches, by contrast, 
assess the impact of single variables (conditions) on a dependent variable (outcome). It is 
possible that a QCA analysis also reveals only one single solution path to the outcome (as the 
solution term explaining strong ESM parliamentary involvement indicates). However, QCA 
has its strength when it is possible to show that an outcome has different solution paths that 
are composed of different combinations of conditions. Applied to the explanation of weak 
ESM parliamentary involvement, equifinality allows arguing that a strong macro-economic 
situation (A) can be part of a solution term in some settings, but not in others. 
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Qualitative comparative analyses also highlight the notion of asymmetry of concepts and 
causal relations. Asymmetry means “that insights on the causal role of a condition are of only 
limited use for the causal role of its absence, and the explanation of the occurrence of an 
outcome does not necessarily help us much in explaining its non-occurrence” (Schneider, 
Wagemann 2013: 81). If all conditions were perfectly symmetric, their presence should 
explain the presence of the outcome to the same extent as its absence explains its non-
occurrence. Strong formal prerogatives in EU affairs, for instance, are consistent with the 
statement of strong parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs at 72.7%, but their absence is 
consistent with weak ESM involvement at 91.3%. To analyse these pattern, two separate 
definitions and operationalisations of concepts are required which are often not distinguished 
in non-set-theoretic approaches (Goertz, Mahoney 2012: 9–13)95. Overall, the presence of all 
four conditions is less consistent with the outcome Y than its absence is for the outcome y.
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The concept of asymmetry therefore reveals that the establishment of strong ESM 
parliamentary participation rights follows a more complex pattern than its mere absence. 
 
Limitations of the analysis 
As outlined above, a fsQCA essentially allows for the reduction of the complexity of 
empirically observed facts. Strictly speaking it does not allow drawing any conclusions 
concerning causality for the occurrence of an outcome. FsQCA is limited to the identification 
of general patterns which are based on a theoretically developed frame. Since the method is 
deterministic in nature, all potentially relevant conditions must be identified in the first place, 
and these conditions must be reasonably calibrated. I carefully followed this approach in this 
thesis. 
However, having in mind the general limitations of QCA, the thesis will extend the analysis 
by looking at some parliamentary settings in a qualitative way. The previous analysis 
revealed, for instance, that some parliamentary settings faced unique conditions that could not 
be covered by the fsQCA. In Germany, for instance, important judgements of the 
Constitutional Court have significantly strengthened the role of the parliament in the ESM 
(see for instance Höing 2013). Explanations for the strong parliamentary involvement in 
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 Quoted in (Schneider, Wagemann 2013: 6). 
96
 The presence of a strong macro-economic condition (A) can illustrate this finding. It correlates with strong 
parliamentary involvement at a consistency level of 62.4%. Its absence, however, correlates with weak 
parliamentary ESM involvement at a 89.2% level. The macro-economic situation of a country was indeed 
identified as a necessary condition for the outcome (see again C.1.1.1), but it was not interpreted as being 
sufficient (see C.1.1.3). Similar values are retrieved for the remaining three conditions. 
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Germany might therefore go beyond the theoretical expectations developed in B.2.
97
 With 
regard to the Austrian Nationalrat, the constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty 
might have had a stronger impact on the ESM parliamentary participation rights than the 
fsQCA has revealed (see again Konrath 2012). For this reason, Germany and Austria will be 
analysed qualitatively to test the explanatory power of the fsQCA. 
Also, as outlined in chapter A.4, the role of donor and debtor countries in the ESM is 
fundamentally different (although the ESM is designed as a permanent mechanism and former 
debtor countries can become donor countries in the future). Regarding the democratic 
legitimacy of the management of the crisis the question of parliamentary involvement in the 
negotiations of the memoranda of understanding is of major importance. Ireland and Portugal 
have been the first two countries asking for financial assistance from the newly created EFSF. 
Greece, on the other side, is a special case since it already received bilateral financial loans 
before the respective rescue mechanisms were established. For this reason, the two case 
studies dealing with the role of parliaments in debtor countries will deal with Ireland and 
Portugal.  
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 Also, as emphasized in the previous chapter, Austria was correctly assigned a fuzzy set value above the 0.5 
threshold in formal EU prerogatives, but it was nonetheless a borderline case (see B.4.2.2.2). This requires 
having an in-depth look at this two countries to assess whether the solution term (A * C → Y) adequately 
describes their parliamentary involvement. 
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C.2 Case studies 
Case studies are a useful tool to address unique features that have not been covered 
comparatively in the fsQCA. In order to increase generalizability, two cases from donor 
(Germany and Austria) and two from debtor countries (Ireland and Portugal) are selected for 
an in-depth analysis. In all four case studies, the relevant legislation related to the ratification 
of the ESM treaty will be introduced and analysed. Each section will then focus on the 
debates in the plenary, public hearings as well as – if publicly available – committee 
proceedings. Each of these chapters dedicates space to cover unique particularities of the case 
studies. A total of 29 expert interviews have been conducted which primarily serve as 
background information (see again B.3.2). This additional evidence complements the findings 
of the fsQCA.  
The mixed method design helps overcoming potential shortcomings of exclusively 
quantitative or qualitative research designs (see again B.3). I want to focus on cases in which 
strong, respectively weak, parliamentary prerogatives in ESM affairs can (additionally) be 
explained with particularities that have not been addressed in the fsQCA. In a first step, I 
explain why the four countries merit a separate analysis and then highlight their similarities 
and differences. Strong formal prerogatives in EU affairs have been identified to account for 
strong parliamentary involvement in ESM matters (in combination with a strong macro-
economic situation, see again C.1.1). The Austrian Nationalrat indeed possesses relatively 
strong formal prerogatives on paper, but it makes rarely use of them (Pollak, Slominski 2003). 
Does this characteristic nonetheless account for Austria’s strong parliamentary involvement in 
ESM affairs? In Germany, on the other side, the Bundesverfassungsgericht played an 
exceptional role in strengthening the German Bundestag in EU affairs, and especially within 
the new rescue mechanisms. How can the special role of the Court be accounted for? To what 
extent is Germany thus deviating from the fsQCA explanation for strong parliamentary 
involvement in ESM affairs? These particularities will be addressed to validate the findings of 
the fsQCA. 
Furthermore, the main research interest was so far to analyse under which conditions 
parliamentary involvement was required to issue financial guarantees. With the exception of 
Greece, all Eurozone countries have guaranteed financial assistance to another country. The 
different involvement of NPs exemplifies the increasing asymmetric parliamentary influence 
among donor countries. The parliamentary involvement of debtor countries is, however, not 
primarily concerned with decisions on sovereign aid packages or the release of financial 
tranches therein, but with the parliamentary involvement in the negotiations and 
implementation of the memoranda of understanding. In how far could parliamentary actors in 
programme countries influence these negotiations? In how far was parliamentary approval 
required to enact specific measures demanded by the MoU? This influence is difficult to 
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generalize since all of these parliaments are formally relatively weak vis-à-vis their 
governments (see again B.4.1.3). Furthermore, they all possess a couple of unique 
characteristics: 
 Greece received its first sovereign aid package in an emergency situation on the basis of 
bilateral loans in May/June 2010. The majority of these first loans did not come from either 
the EFSF or the ESM, but from a special stability mechanism designed to provide financial 
assistance to Greece. Additional bilateral loans of some non-Eurozone countries were 
equally granted outside an established institutional framework. This makes the Greek case 
in many regards exceptional (see also Vasilopoulou et al. 2014). Second, the Hellenic 
parliament has not issued financial assistance to any other Eurozone Member State, but 
only contributes to the ESM with its share of the paid-in capital.  
 Spain experienced a long period of strong economic growth after the introduction of the 
common currency. The boom in the construction sector was a result of a credit-driven 
demand, facilitated by low interest rates (Eurogroup 2012). When this bubble busted, 
Spain was the first country to receive financial assistance from the ESM. This financial 
assistance was restricted to the Spanish banking sector only (see ESM 2012). In contrast to 
the other four countries, the MoU is therefore explicitly restricted to ‘financial-sector 
policy conditionality’.  
 Cyprus received financial assistance in early 2013 and thus not within the period under 
investigation (2010-2012). Cypriot bank deposits have been partly used to provide 
immediate assistance to some the national banks, sparing only those deposits below 
€100,000 (Eurogroup 2013). Furthermore, capital controls have been enacted (which are 
partly still in place) and the IMF’s contribution to the bailout was significantly reduced 
(only around 10%, see Belke 2014).  
Due to these particularities, Greece, Spain and Cyprus will not be chosen as case studies. 
Ireland (November 2010, see EFSF 2010) and Portugal (March 2011, see EFSF 2011) have 
been the first countries requesting financial assistance from the newly established EFSF (see 
among others Gocaj, Meunier 2013). Procedures to negotiate and implement MoUs had not 
been fully established at that time. This makes both countries interesting for in-depth case 
studies. Case studies on Portugal and Ireland also have the advantage that both countries 
issued financial assistance to at least one other country (in contrast to Greece). They are thus 
not only debtor, but to a very small extent donor countries as well. Furthermore, their 
memoranda of understanding were not restricted to the banking sector, but also covered 
structural and financial reforms (in contrast to Spain). And both countries have already exited 
the programmes without entering into a precautionary credit line (in contrast to Cyprus). The 
empirical evidence for these two cases strongly focuses on interview evidence conducted in 
June and October 2013. In addition to the analysis of plenary debates and secondary literature, 
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reports concerning the role of the former troika as well as early assessments of the European 
Commission on the management of the crisis will be evaluated (European Commission 
2014b). 
Donor Countries: Austria and Germany  
The two donor countries Germany and Austria share a number of the characteristics which 
have been outlined in the theoretical section (see B.2), but they also differ in others. I am 
particularly interested in those variables that have been interpreted as redundant in the fsQCA, 
especially the degree of Euroscepticism and the political and constitutional requirements to 
ratify the ESM treaty. First, the degree of Eurosceptical sentiments differs between the two 
countries. In Austria, two relatively strong right-wing Eurosceptical parties (in the 
Nationalrat) were openly opposed to the ratification of the ESM treaty. Usherwood and 
Startin define the FPÖ (and its split-off BZÖ) as radical right wing parties for whom 
“opposition to the EU has become a central policy plank” (Usherwood, Startin 2013: 5).98 
Party Euroscepticism in Germany, on the other side, was not as strongly pronounced: The 
Left, which rejects the neo-liberal direction in which it sees European integration progressing 
(ibidem), was the only party that opposed the ratification of the ESM treaty in the German 
Bundestag. Public Euroscepticism was more strongly pronounced in Austria than it was in 
Germany (see again B.4.1.2.1). Second, Germany and Austria both have relatively strong 
formal prerogatives in EU affairs (which differ, however, in the degree to which they are 
exercised, see B.4.1.3). Austria already adopted strong formal participation rights with its 
accession to the European Union in 1995 while the German Bundestag was considered a late-
comer in EU affairs for a long time (see for instance Auel 2006; Beichelt 2012). It only 
recently reformed its parliamentary prerogatives in EU affairs (Calliess and Beichelt 2013; 
Kietz 2013). Especially the German Constitutional Court demanded stronger parliamentary 
participation in its famous Lisbon Judgement in 2009, but also in various judgements related 
to the Eurozone crisis. The decisive role of the BVerfG distinguishes Austria and Germany 
and merits a separate analysis. Third, both countries have been in a favourable macro-
economic situation as of 2012. Their parliaments had potentially more to lose should financial 
guarantees ever become due. They thus had a stronger incentive to establish comprehensive 
parliamentary participation rights. Fourth, the political and constitutional requirements to 
ratify the ESM treaty had been high in both countries. The Austrian and the German 
government relied on opposition support to adopt the ESM treaty. In Germany, opposition 
support was also needed to ratify the Fiscal Compact (in contrast to Austria); its ratification 
was politically linked to the ratification of the European Stability Mechanism (see for instance 
Austrian Nationalrat 2012e).  
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 Within these parties, resistance to EU integration is often linked to questions of immigration and globalization. 
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Debtor Countries: Ireland and Portugal 
Ireland and Portugal also share a number of characteristics. First, the macro-economic 
situation in both countries was severely troubled at the time the ESM was ratified, although 
both countries slipped into the crisis for different reasons. While low interest rates after the 
introduction of the common currency facilitated a credit-boom in the early 2000s, Ireland 
became heavily indebted after guaranteeing the Irish banking sector to not let them go 
bankrupt in 2010 (see among others Laffan 2014). Portugal’s economy, on the other side, 
faced and still faces more structural deficits (see for instance Gorjao 2012). The initial macro-
economic starting point has thus been difficult for both countries, although for different 
reasons. Second, regarding Eurosceptical sentiments, Ireland and Portugal have a tradition of 
being rather pro-European (although the Irish voters rejected a couple of treaty reforms since 
the early 2000s). Nonetheless, public outcry in the aftermath of the bailout programmes was 
more strongly articulated in Portugal. In both countries, however, no relevant political party 
(yet) demands to leave the European Union or opposes the common currency on principle 
grounds (although a new political party emerged in Portugal which might be able to enter the 
next parliament in late 2015, see C.2.4). Third, both countries are characterised by a relatively 
strong executive dominance. This is one reason why the formal parliamentary prerogatives in 
EU affairs have never been strong in these countries. Fourth, the governments did not rely on 
opposition support to ratify the ESM treaty. Both countries hold early elections after the 
former governments requested financial assistance from the predecessor of the ESM, the 
EFSF. Former opposition parties were subsequently voted into office (both in 2011) with an 
unusually high majority in parliament (see for instance Marsh, Mikhaylov 2012). 
  
C.2.1 The German Bundestag 
The degree of parliamentary involvement of the German Bundestag in the diverse rescue 
mechanisms established since 2010 was subject to huge variation. The first bilateral loans to 
Greece were decided upon under immense time pressure in May 2010, leaving little room for 
parliamentary deliberations (see Deutscher Bundestag 2010: 3995). Also, the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) (established at the end of May 2010) did originally not 
foresee a strong involvement of the German Bundestag. Some leading government 
representatives initially opposed the idea of strong co-decision powers of the German 
Bundestag (Schäuble 2010: 4427). As a reaction to a first judgement of the Constitutional 
Court (German Constitutional Court 2011), stronger parliamentary involvement was 
incorporated in the reform of the EFSF in September 2011 (more on that see C.2.1.2.3). These 
stronger powers were transferred to the ESM which was decided upon in June 2012 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2012g). A gradual strengthening of the role of the Bundestag can thus 
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be observed. The more encompassing the liability sum for German taxpayers, the more 
competences the new rescue mechanisms acquired and the more institutionalised they were 
designed, the more parliamentarians insisted on strong parliamentary co-decision powers 
(Kietz 2013: 27).  
There are multiple reasons for this change in attitudes which will be assessed in the next sub-
chapters. At the end of 2012, German Chancellor Angela Merkel emphasized that budgetary 
responsibilities will remain a key prerogative of nation states (Merkel 2012: 23814) and that 
they will not be transferred to the European level. So far, the majority of crisis instruments 
lacked a genuine European source of legitimacy (see for instance Hofmann, Wessels 2013) 
and only very few national parliaments acquired a notable role within the rescue mechanisms. 
Merkel emphasized that future cooperation in the economic and monetary union was 
nonetheless needed in order to safeguard the Eurozone. This brought the question of the 
democratic legitimacy of future cooperation to the centre of interest (see also Bellamy, Weale 
2015).  
Every decision – this is the principle – must be legitimised and controlled on the 
level where the decision has been taken. This means, whenever the European level 
is strengthened, the European Parliament must be strengthened. Whenever 
national competences are affected, it must be the parliaments of the nation states 
from which democratic legitimacy is derived
99
 (Merkel 2012: 23814). 
This general approach was not contested between the government and the parliament. The 
German political system is traditionally not characterised by a confrontation between the 
executive and the parliament, but merely by a confrontation between the governing coalition 
and the opposition (for a classicial account see King 1976). The question of parliamentary 
involvement within the ESM was, however, only seemingly concerned with this conflict line. 
A small, but vocal group of parliamentarians within the government coalition was opposed to 
financial assistance while major opposition parties in the Bundestag (especially the Social 
Democrats and the Greens) supported the government’s approach. The dividing line between 
the coalition government and the parliamentary opposition was therefore to some extent 
blurred (see Kietz, 2013: 7).
100
 Additionally, opposition to the ESM was also formed outside 
of the German Bundestag: Several non-governmental interests groups sued the federal 
government for the establishment of the ESM and the Fiscal Compact in the German 
Constitutional Court (see C.2.1.2.3), claiming that the establishment of both instruments 
would violate democratic principles of the German Basic Law.  
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 In the following, all German quotes will be roughly translated by the author. 
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 Small inquiries (‘kleine Anfragen’) are indicative for this pattern: Normally, they are utilised as a tool of 
opposition parties to question the government. They must be submitted in writing and the government is obliged 
to respond within a given time period. During the ratification process, forty small inquiries concerned the ESM. 
Thirteen of them were asked by members of the governing coalition. This unusual pattern (see Kietz 2013: 19), 
indicates the high degree of politicisation. 
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In order to ratify the ESM treaty, three additional laws had to be passed. First, the ESM 
accompanying law
101
 (Deutscher Bundestag 2012); second, a modification of the federal debt 
law
102
 (Deutscher Bundestag 2012b); and third, a law to ratify the modification of article 136 
of the TFEU (Deutscher Bundestag 2012e). The law which defines the role of the German 
parliament is the ESMFinG. To analyse the German ratification process, I will first outline the 
involvement of different parliamentary bodies involved as well as the voting on these 
measures. Afterwards, I will turn to the ratification debate from 29 June 2012 to qualitatively 
test the conditions of strong parliamentary involvement as developed in the fsQCA (see 
C.1.3). 
 
C.2.1.1 Parliamentary involvement and voting 
The next section briefly outlines the involvement of parliamentary bodies in the ratification 
process (C.2.1.1.1), as well as the actual voting on the crisis measures under investigation 
C.2.1.1.2). The subsequent analysis of the ratification debate will focus on the 29 June 2012 
plenary vote on the ESM treaty (alongside the ratification of the TSCG) (see C.2.1.2).  
C.2.1.1.1 Involvement of Parliamentary Bodies in the Scrutiny Process 
The ratification of the ESM treaty occupied a large amount of time from parliamentarians in 
2010-2012. Gattermann and Höing counted the parliamentary questions dealing with EU 
affairs and the financial crisis in the 2008-2011 period to assess the significance of this policy 
field (Gattermann, Höing 2012). Ministers or their deputies answer these questions during the 
regular plenary sessions.  
At the time when the U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008, only 1.41% 
of (EU) parliamentary questions (three questions in total) were concerned with the financial 
crisis. As of 2011, already 19% per cent of all EU parliamentary questions dealt with the 
Eurozone crisis. Although the indicator is descriptive only, it confirms assessments of 
practitioners of the German Bundestag: Sven Vollrath, the head of the EU directorate, equally 
observed an increased interest in EU, but especially financial affairs during this time period 
(see especially Vollrath 2011). The acquired data does not allow drawing the conclusion that 
the interest in EU affairs increased as a result of the Eurozone crisis. Interestingly, however, 
these questions were often asked by parliamentarians who were not members of the European 
Affairs Committee (as it is usually the case with EU-related questions). To some extent, EU 
affairs have thus become ‘mainstreamed’ in the German Bundestag during the ESM 
ratification process: different sectoral committees were involved in the scrutiny process of the 
diverse instruments to tackle the Eurozone crisis. Especially the Budget and European Affairs 
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 ESM-Finanzierungsgesetz (ESMFinG). 
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 Gesetz zur Änderung des Bundesschuldenwesengesetzes. 
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Committees scrutinised the most decisive instruments to tackle the crisis, notably the ESM, 
the EFSF and the TSCG. The EAC took the lead concerning the modification of article 136 
TFEU (changes of EU primary law are traditionally a key responsibility of the EAC). 
Instruments with budgetary implications, such as the first bailout package to Greece, the 
EFSF/ ESM and the Fiscal Compact, were scrutinised in the Budget Committee. The 
committees of law, the interior, finances as well as economy and technology were equally 
involved in the scrutiny process, although they did not take the lead (see again Kietz 2013). 
This comprehensive involvement of sectoral committees is an unusual pattern for dealing with 
EU affairs in the Bundestag and indicates the significance of the proposals under scrutiny. 
The Budget and Finance Committees organised several public hearings to assess the impact of 
the diverse rescue mechanisms. Among others, members of the ECB directorate (Jürgen 
Stark), the then-President of the Eurogroup (Jean-Claude Juncker), the Irish Foreign Minister 
(Michael Martin) or the then-Greek Minister for the Economy (Anna Diamantopoulou) were 
present. Government representatives (especially the German Finance Minister) were regularly 
invited to hearings in different sectoral committees. The EAC did not organise own public 
hearings, but participated in the organisation of the public hearings of the Budget and Finance 
Committees (see Kietz 2013: 14). Although this indicates a strong parliamentary involvement, 
the scrutiny process did not always run smoothly. The head of the European Affairs 
Committee, Günter Krichbaum, complained in the name of all parties that his committee was 
often only insufficiently informed by the federal government. Parliamentarians often received 
news from online or print media (rather than from the government directly) which he 
described as a ‘disrespect towards the German Parliament’ (ibidem). Insufficient information 
turned into a key issue for parliamentarians throughout the entire ratification process (see 
below). 
C.2.1.1.2 Voting 
The ESM treaty (including the accompanying law and the modification of article 136 TFEU) 
and the TSCG were eventually ratified on 29 June 2012 by the German Bundestag. Formally, 
the vote for both treaties took place independently from each other. However, both treaties 
were supposed to “form a unit with regard to their content” (Merkel 2012b: 22699). The ESM 
and the Fiscal Compact were “twin sisters” on the way to a “stability union” (Brüderle 2012: 
22707 and Rösler 2012: 22717). Legally, the receipt of financial ESM assistance indeed 
requires the ratification of the TSCG. The debate in the plenary
103
 had been very intense and 
passionate (Deutscher Bundestag 2012g). For some, the days preceding the official vote 
belonged to the “most extraordinary plenary weeks in the history of the Republic” (Brüderle 
2012: 22707).  
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 In the following, all statements made in the plenary debate will be roughly translated by the author to the best 
of his knowledge. 
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One reason for the hectic agitation in the forefront of the 29 June plenary vote had been a 
European Council summit. The summit took place on 28-29 June and its conclusions 
suggested that the Heads of State or Government agreed on the possibility of directly 
recapitalizing banks with funds from the ESM (see European Council 2012) – provided that 
an effective banking union was established in the meantime (on the design of the banking 
union see Howarth, Quaglia 2013). This political agreement seemed to contradict central 
provisions of the accompanying laws of the ESM treaty as well as statements of leading 
government representatives. The chancellor herself admitted that the communication in the 
aftermath of the summit had not been optimal and emphasized that every step towards a 
banking union would naturally require the explicit consent of the German Bundestag (see 
Merkel 2012a: 22701-2, but also Kauder 2012: 22712).
104
 Carsten Schneider (the then-head of 
the German Budget Committee, SPD) nonetheless observed a 180 degree U-turn of the 
government (quoted in Mahony 2012); Sigmar Gabriel, (chairman of the oppositional Social 
Democrats) equally claimed that the chancellor had given her agreement to European Council 
Conclusions which allow exactly the opposite of what current proposals are suggesting 
(Gabriel 2012: 22704). Quite unusual, the President of the German Bundestag had to clarify 
that the vote in the Bundestag was only concerned with the legislative proposals as they were 
on the agenda for the plenary session, and not with any political agreement reached at the 
European Council the day before. The opposition Left party nonetheless requested to annul 
the vote, arguing that it was meaningless in the light of the decisions taken in Brussels the day 
before.
105
  
Three other particularities also illustrate the heatedness of the plenary debate in the forefront 
of this vote. First, parliamentarians from all major political party groups dissented from their 
official party lines (all votes were casted by name). Second, the President of the German 
Bundestag allocated speaking time to some of the dissenters (although they were initially not 
nominated as speakers by their parliamentary party groups). And third, an unusual high 
amount of personal statements was submitted to the protocol in which parliamentarians from 
all party groups elaborated on why they voted in favour or against the respective rescue 
mechanism. All four proposals eventually secured large – above two thirds – majorities in the 
German Bundestag. The Social Democrats and Alliance 90/ The Greens supported the 
ratification of the treaties by majority, while the Left opposed all measures. 
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 Some German media nonetheless announced “The night in which Merkel lost”104 (Volkery 2012), stressing 
that the decisions of the European Council contradicted the initial design of the ESM treaty and its 
accompanying law 
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 The motion did not find a majority in the plenary. 
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Table 32: Voting behaviour: TSCG 
Political Party Yes No Abstain 
CDU/ CSU 233 (98.31%) 3 (1.27%) 1 (0.42%) 
SPD 113 (82.48%) 23 (16.79%) 1 (0.73%) 
FDP 87 (94.57%) 4 (4.35%) 1 (1.09%) 
The Left 0 (0.00%) 71 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Alliance 90/ The Greens 53 (81.54%) 9 (13.85%) 3 (4.62%) 
 486 110 6 
Source 52: Numbers are taken from the stenographic report of the German Bundestag from 29 June 2012, 
pages 22736-9. The numbers in brackets indicate the percentages per political party group, considering all 
casted votes. 
The Fiscal Compact (Deutscher Bundestag 2012c) was supported by 486 votes in favour and 
110 votes against (see Table 32). Only six parliamentarians abstained. The governing parties 
secured majorities of around 98% and 95% in their own ranks while this number was 
significantly lower for the Social Democrats (82%) and Alliance 90/ The Greens (81%). 
Parties from the political left were generally more supportive of financial assistance than 
liberal or conservative parties. The reverse is true for obligations to reduce public spending. 
No parliamentarian from the Left supported the Fiscal Compact. 
Regarding the ESM vote (Deutscher Bundestag 2012b), the number of dissenters in the 
government ranks was significantly higher than for the opposition (see Table 33). Around 7 
and 11% of the parliamentarians from the CDU/CSU and the FDP did not support the 
establishment of the European Stability Mechanism. These numbers would not have been 
sufficient to secure the so-called chancellor majority, i.e. at least 50 per cent of the votes in 
parliament. This is indicative for the struggle of the governing coalition to secure majorities in 
their own ranks. Among the Green party (98%) and the Social Democrats (91%), the number 
of supporters for the ESM treaty was significantly higher, with only few parliamentarians 
opposing or abstaining from the vote. 
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Table 33: Voting behaviour: ESM Treaty 
Political Party Yes No Abstain 
CDU/ CSU 218 (92.77%) 16 (6.81%) 1 (0.43%) 
SPD 128 (91.43%) 8 (5.71%) 4 (2.86%) 
FDP 82 (89.13%) 10 (10.87%) 0 (0.00%) 
The Left 0 (0.00%) 71 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Alliance 90/ The Greens 65 (98.48%) 1 (1.54%) 0 (0.00%) 
 493 106 5 
Source 53: Numbers are taken from the stenographic report of the German Bundestag from 29 June 2012, pages 
22740-2. The numbers in brackets indicate the percentages per political party group considering all casted votes. 
The accompanying law to the ESM (Deutscher Bundestag 2012d) received roughly the same 
amount of votes as the ESM treaty (see Table 34). The treaty and the accompanying law are 
complementary. It is inconsequential to support the ratification of the ESM treaty and oppose 
the accompanying law, or vice versa.  
Table 34: Voting behaviour: ESM Financing Law (ESMFinG) 
Political Party Yes No Abstain 
CDU/ CSU 217 (92.74%) 16 (6.84%) 1 (0.42%) 
SPD 130 (93.53%) 5 (3.60%) 4 (2.88%) 
FDP 83 (91.21%) 8 (8.87%) 0 (0.00%) 
The Left 0 (0.00%) 71 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Alliance 90/ The Greens 64 (98.46%) 1 (1.54%) 0 (0.00%) 
 494 101 5 
Source 54: Numbers are taken from the stenographic report of the German Bundestag from 29 June 2012, 
pages 22745-7. The numbers in brackets indicate the percentages per political party group considering all 
casted votes. 
International treaties often require accompanying laws specifying how the international 
agreement will be handled domestically. It is nonetheless telling that five parliamentarians 
who voted against the ESM treaty did not take part in the vote of the accompanying ESM law 
(the number of no-votes was reduced from 106 to 101).
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 Some parliamentarians obviously 
wanted to express their explicit opposition to the ESM treaty by voting against it, but might 
have acknowledged the relatively far-reaching parliamentary participation rights of the 
accompanying law. In order to express this ambiguity, they did not take part in the vote. This 
is, admittedly, speculative. However, in personal statements submitted to the protocol, 
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 Overall, the number of parliamentarians taking part in each of the four votes slightly varies. 
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numerous parliamentarians explained their opposition to the ESM treaty, but acknowledged 
the comparatively strong role of the Bundestag in the ESMFinG at the same time.  
The modification of article 136 TFEU received the highest parliamentary support of all four 
proposals (Deutscher Bundestag 2012e). Only the Left opposed the ratification; between 92 
and 99% of the parliamentarians in the other parliamentary party groups supported this 
measure. The two-third majorities could therefore easily be secured for all proposals.  
Table 35: Voting behaviour: Modification of article 136 TFEU 
 Yes No Abstain 
CDU/ CSU 218 (92.77%) 16 (6.81%) 1 (0.43%) 
SPD 138 (99.28%) 1 (0.72%) 0 (0.00%) 
FDP 83 (91.21%) 8 (8.87%) 0 (0.00%) 
The Left 0 (0.00%) 71 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Alliance 90/ The Greens 65 (98.48%) 1 (1.52%) 0 (0.00%) 
 504 97 1 
Source 55: Numbers are taken from the stenographic report of the German Bundestag from 29 June 2012, 
pages 22745-7. The numbers in brackets indicate the percentages per political party group considering all 
casted votes. 
Nonetheless, the plenary debate allows shedding light on especially two selected theoretical 
assumptions developed in chapter B.2. First, high political and constitutional requirements to 
ratify the ESM treaty increase the odds of stronger parliamentary ESM involvement because 
opposition parties demand stronger parliamentary participation rights if their votes are 
decisive to pass the legislation (see especially B.2.4). Second, higher Eurosceptical sentiments 
in public and within the parliament equally increase the odds for stronger parliamentary 
involvement in ESM affairs because these parties hold the government publicly accountable 
on this sensitive political question (see chapter B.2.2). In the German case, however, 
Euroscepticism is not as much pronounced as in other national settings. Whether dissent in the 
governing coalition nonetheless affected parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs will be 
analysed in the following section.
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C.2.1.2 Ratification Debate 
The analysis of the ratification debate from 29 June 2012 does not aim to explain the content 
of the diverse (legislative) proposals. Representatives from all parties disagreed – partly 
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 I will focus on these two (out of four the hypotheses) because they are political in nature and therefore more 
likely to be addressed during the ratification debate. 
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fundamentally – on whether the ESM can effectively help Eurozone states to overcome their 
refinancing problems or not. They also disagreed on whether the ESM was democratically 
legitimated since it impairs decisively on national parliamentary prerogatives. And last but not 
least, the governing coalition as well as opposition (the Social Democrats and the Greens) 
differed in how far the final comprehensive package deal – including a ‘jobs and growth pact’ 
of €120bn and the introduction of a financial transaction tax (FTT) at the European level – 
was a success of their own negotiation strategy. For many parliamentarians, the vote for the 
ESM treaty and the Fiscal Compact was a matter of conscience (Heil 2012: 22726) and many 
Social Democrats as well as Green MPs underlined that they would not have approved the 
Fiscal Compact on its own, but only in combination with the European Stability Mechanism 
(Heil 2012: 22728).
108
 Some speakers admitted that they were in a situation of “turbulence 
and exhaustion” (Brinkhaus 2012: 22733) or that they felt blackmailed by the debtor countries 
(Schäffler 2012: 22722). The vote for the ESM was therefore highly contested, despite the 
huge parliamentary majority it received. The next part of the analysis focuses on the following 
question: In how far did the parliamentary opposition use the ratification process to demand 
stronger parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs? To recall, Germany had been classified 
as an ideal case of a country with high political and constitutional requirements to ratify the 
ESM treaty (B.4.2.2.3). This was expected to increase the odds for stronger parliamentary 
involvement in ESM affairs. In the final solution term of the fsQCA, this condition was, 
however, eventually interpreted as redundant for the outcome (see C.1.1.3).  
Social Democrats and the Greens indeed negotiated with the government in the forefront of 
the vote and demanded concessions for their support for the ESM treaty and the TSCG. Since 
the ESM treaty had already been agreed upon at the EU level, opposition demands could only 
focus on the ESM accompanying law on which the German Bundestag decided 
autonomously. During the negotiations, however, the SPD and the Greens focussed on the 
‘jobs and growth pact’ and the taxation of the financial market and not on a stronger role of 
the German Bundestag within the ESM. Both parties regarded these EU level agreements as a 
success of their negotiation strategy (Gabriel 2012: 22702), especially since the German 
government had been hesitant at first to support these measures. “With the opposition in your 
neck […] we forced you to act reasonably” (Trittin 2012: 22714). Some government 
representatives complained that the consent to the ‘jobs and growth pact’ as well as the 
financial transaction tax was indeed enforced upon the government by the opposition parties 
(Willsch 2012: 22730) – to the disadvantage of the Bundestag’s budgetary sovereignty and at 
the expense of German economic interests. For government and opposition representatives 
alike, the parliamentary involvement of the German Bundestag within the ESM did 
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 A number of parliamentarians from the governing coalition supported the ratification of the TSCG, but 
opposed the ratification of the ESM. 
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nonetheless play an important role. Different speakers emphasised that Germany enters “new 
constitutional territory” with the ESM treaty, resulting in a quasi-modification of the German 
Basic Law and immense consequences for the budgetary competences of the Bundestag 
(Brüderle 2012: 22707, but also Danckert 2012: 22734 ). These “crown jewels of the 
parliament” were not sacrificed easily since the entire plenary of the Bundestag would always 
decide on all major decisions with financial implications (Brüderle 2012: 22707). Compared 
to the role of the Bundestag in other international organisations (such as the International 
Monetary Fund (Schmidt 2012: 22729) or Germany’s contribution to the EU budget (Barthle 
2012: 22733)) parliamentary participation rights in the ESM are indeed far-reaching. 
Nonetheless, it remained politically contested if Germany could be forced to contribute 
financially to the ESM without the prior approval of the Bundestag (for these exceptional 
circumstances see Gauweiler 2012: 22725). “De facto, the ESM and its accompanying law 
result in a self-imposed disempowerment of the German parliament”, as speakers of the 
opposition (the Left) complained (Groth 2012: 22766). In this argumentation, the alleged 
strong participation rights of the German Bundestag were only pretending stronger 
accountability. 
Numerous parliamentarians therefore submitted personal statements in order to express their 
feeling of unease (attached to the protocol of the plenary debate). One telling example is the 
statement of Marco Bülow from the Social Democrats: “I am not an expert for these 
questions, but have tried to deal with these questions intensively. […] The ESMFinG has a 
dimension that I cannot oversee, and the discussion has been way too short to assess its 
consequences and impact […]. This is why I am voting against the ESM” (Bülow 2012: 
22760). The complexities of the proposals made it difficult for numerous MPs to give their 
consent. In a personal statement, Birgit Reinemund (FDP) explained that she was aware of the 
fact that the decisions of the latest European Council contradicted major assumptions of the 
current proposals, but that she had confidence in the promise of the chancellor and the foreign 
minister that the Bundestag cannot be forced to guarantee more money than it explicitly 
agreed to (Reinemund 2012: 22776–7). The short amount of time to scrutinise the proposals 
intensified this feeling of uncertainty (Bülow 2012: 22760; Gohlke 2012: 22760; Rawert 
2012: 22775) although only few parliamentarians rejected the ESM on principle grounds.
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Only few speakers from the SPD or the Green Party criticised the insufficient involvement of 
the German Bundestag in EU affairs (see especially Danckert 2012 and Schwanitz 2012). The 
majority of opposition representatives seemed convinced that the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
had already secured a strong involvement of the Bundestag in ESM affairs (see especially 
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 For Wolfgang Gehrcke (the Left), the ESM treaty constitutes a clear violation of article 79(3) of the German 
Basic Law since the constitution’s character is altered without a public referendum by the German people. The 
far-reaching transfer of budgetary competences to the European Commission and national governments would 
violate the very principle of democratic sovereignty (Gehrcke 2012: 22765). 
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Sarrazin 2012: 22778, but also Trittin 2012: 22715). This is a genuine characteristic of the 
German debate: the question of stronger parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs had 
already been settled with previous decisions of the German Constitutional Court, or was 
anticipated to be eventually decided by the BVerfG. Several parliamentarians and non-
parliamentary actors announced to file actions after the vote in the Bundestag. This alliance 
represented the entire political spectrum, including the Left party, parliamentarians from the 
CDU/CSU and FDP, the former Minister of Justice Herta Däubler-Gmelin (SPD), a group of 
retired professors as well as a group of ordinary citizens (whose individual complaints had 
been selected as examples by the court) (see among others The Guardian Online 2012). 
Interestingly, the opposition to the ESM mainly came from outside the German parliament.  
C.2.1.2.1 Package Deals 
Does the analysis of the ratification debate confirm the hypothesis concerning high political 
and constitutional requirements, i.e. that opposition parties negotiated stronger parliamentary 
participation rights within the ESM? To some degree, the high authority of the German 
BVerfG indeed defused political controversy. Koczy (Greens) elaborated that the decision by 
the BVerfG allowed her to eventually approve the ESMFinG, despite initial doubts (Koczy 
2012: 22771). This is not to argue that parliamentary participation rights did not play a 
prominent role in the ratification debate. In essence, however, the dispute on parliamentary 
involvement had a legal character. Representatives from the opposition (especially from the 
SPD and the Greens) consequently focussed more strongly on political concessions, such as 
the financial transaction tax (Montag 2012: 22773 (Greens)) or the jobs and growth pact 
(Wieczorek-Zeul 2012: 22785 (SPD)), and not solely on the budgetary competences of the 
Bundestag. The particularity of the German case thus lies in the fact that the BVerfG 
eventually paved the way for stronger parliamentary involvement. Opposition parties 
demanded stronger involvement, but due to the previous judgements they could be assured 
that these would be guaranteed by the BVerfG in either case. Opposition parties could 
therefore focus on political side payments at the European level in exchange for supporting 
the ESM treaty (see especially Binding 2012: 22756). The BVerfG eventually emerged as a 
‘safety belt’ for parliamentary prerogatives – in line with previous judgements on the 
constitutionality of European Treaties with the German Basic Law. Higher political and 
constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty did therefore not decisively increase the 
odds for stronger parliamentary involvement. In line with the final solution of the fsQCA (see 
again C.1.1.2), this condition can be interpreted as redundant for stronger parliamentary 
involvement of the German Bundestag. 
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C.2.1.2.2 Euroscepticism 
I will now turn to the assessment of Eurosceptical sentiments. In chapter B.4.1.2, 
Eurosceptical sentiments were classified as weakly pronounced in Germany. First, only the 
Left in the German parliament can be classified as rather sceptical of EU integration, although 
they do not outright reject the integration process. Furthermore, they only occupied a 
relatively small share of seats. Their vote was thus not decisive to ratify the ESM treaty. 
Second, and compared to other Eurozone countries, the public attitude towards the EU was 
still rather positive in Germany (according to the data of the Eurobarometer, see chapter 
B.4.1.2.1). Nonetheless, a minority of the speakers in the German Bundestag expressed their 
deep concern with the direction in which the European Union was heading. Sara 
Wagenknecht, vice chairperson of the Left, described the ESM treaty and Fiscal Compact as a 
‘coup d’état’ against the German Basic Law (Wagenknecht 2012: 22711). Other speakers of 
the Left emphasized: “Transferring sovereignty to bureaucrats which have not been elected 
and are not accountable to the people, this does not make any sense. This is not democratic, 
but the exact opposite” (Gehrcke 2012: 22737). But not only the Left expressed its severe 
opposition to the new treaties, also representatives from the governing coalition.
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 The 
opposition to the ESM treaty cannot be equated with opposition towards the European Union 
and the European integration process. Many parliamentarians opposing the ESM treaty 
emphasized that they were ‘convinced Europeans’. It was therefore correct to classify 
Germany as being relatively pro-European in the overall attitude towards European 
integration. The assessment that no political party so far emerged that is explicitly hostile 
towards European integration is still valid (Hölscheidt 2001: 117). The formation of the 
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in 2013 might call this assumption into question in the 
long run. However, even this new party did not join an explicit Euro-hostile parliamentary 
party group after it was elected into the European Parliament in 2014 (see for instance Höing, 
Müller-Gómez 2014). The hypothesis in chapter B.2.2 assumed that the presence of 
Eurosceptical sentiments increase the odds for stronger parliamentary involvement. In the 
German case, Eurosceptical parties are in the minority. The opposition Left could therefore 
not exercise any significant influence. It was therefore correct to interpret the (low) level of 
Euroscepticism in Germany as redundant for strong parliamentary ESM involvement. 
C.2.1.2.3 Particularities of the German Case: BVerfG Judgments 
To fully understand the particularities of the German case it is necessary to look at the diverse 
judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht related to the Eurozone crisis (see Table 36). It 
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 “If you want peaceful and respectful cooperation in Europe, if you care about the future of our children and 
grandchildren, if you believe in the rule of law and in freedom and responsibility, and if you want to keep the 
Bundestag’s finest prerogatives of budgetary authority, then I ask you to oppose the ESM treaty” (Willsch 2012: 
22731). 
187 
 
was the German Constitutional Court which strengthened the participation rights of the 
German Bundestag in the management of the crisis. One the one side, these judgements are a 
continuation of previous court rulings. One the other side, they enter new legal territory.  
The famous Maastricht judgement in 1993 stressed the paramount position of Member States 
as the “master of the treaties”. They decide on the transfer – and potentially also the re-
transfer – of competences to the European level.111 Within Member States, national 
parliaments are the pivotal institutions from which democratic legitimacy is derived. 
According to the Constitutional Court, political sovereignty is thus deeply rooted in the nation 
state (Beck 2011: 475). This reasoning was confirmed in the Lisbon judgement in 2009. 
Although the Lisbon Treaty was declared constitutional, the judges emphasised anew that 
each transfer of competences to the supranational level must be explicitly decided upon by the 
German Bundestag (ruling out the possibility of a so-called Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the 
European legislator). The judges furthermore defined formal limits for the conferral of powers 
to the EU because the integration process must respect Germany’s constitutional identity 
(German Constitutional Court 2009: par. 229). With the current German Basic Law, certain 
competences may not be delegated to the European level (such as the deprivation of criminal 
law, the use of language, family life, education, freedom of opinion etc.) because “they 
particularly depend on the understanding of culture, history and language” (Piris 2010: 342). 
However, even if Germany’s constitutional identity is respected, the Court defined another 
criterion for future transfers of competences: “the level of democratic legitimation of Union 
power [must be] commensurate with the extent of the competences that have been conferred 
[to] European decision-making procedures” (German Constitutional Court 2009: par. 317). 
The BVerfG identifies severe democratic deficiencies at the European level, especially with 
regard to the composition of the European Parliament. In a ‘conventional’ democratic system, 
these deficiencies would not allow to declare the Lisbon Treaty constitutional. Only because 
the Court defines the EU system as an “association of sovereign states”, it must not 
necessarily comply with criteria of democratic legitimacy that are conventionally applied to 
national democratic systems.  
As long as, and in so far as, the principle of conferral is adhered to in an 
association of sovereign states with clear elements of executive and governmental 
cooperation, the legitimation provided by national parliaments and governments 
complemented and sustained by the directly elected European Parliament is 
sufficient in principle (German Constitutional Court 2009: par. 262). 
This leads to the question of standard models of democracy which are inherently linked to the 
question of the ‘finalité politique’ of the European Union. I will not deal with that question in 
detail, but Eriksen and Fossum have critically examined the Lisbon judgement. They argue 
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that the BVerfG judgement is inconsistent because it applies different standards of democracy 
to assess the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty (Eriksen, Fossum 2011). The Lisbon 
judgement had a much stronger impact on the future integration process than the revision of 
the accompanying laws to the Lisbon Treaty (Höpner et al. 2010: 326; Thym 2009)
112
. For 
future transfers of competences – and in the absence of a reformed European Parliament – 
democratic legitimacy must inevitably be derived from the German Bundestag.  
Table 36: Judgments related to the Eurozone crisis in 2010-2012 
Subject Matter Judgement 
EFSF, Economic 
Adjustment Programme 
Greece 
7 September 2011: 
In principle, financial guarantees can constrain the fiscal sovereignty of the 
German Bundestag, but the legislator has latitude of assessment. 
EFSF: Division of 
Competences within the 
Bundestag 
28 February 2012: 
Only under explicitly defined circumstance, the plenary may delegate 
competences to a special committee to act on its behalf. An internal 
delegation of competences is only the exception and may not be the rule. 
ESM, Euro-Plus Pact: 
Information rights of the 
German Bundestag 
30 June 2012: 
Article 23 of the German Basic Law applies for intergovernmental treaties: 
the government is obliged to inform the Bundestag comprehensively and at 
the earliest possible time. 
ESM Treaty, TSCG 
12 September 2012: 
Preliminary ruling: the ESM and the TSCG are constitutional. Financial 
guarantees can in principle violate democratic principles. The legislator 
has latitude of assessment when the amount of financial guarantees impairs 
on the financial sovereignty of the Bundestag. 
Source 56: Own presentation. 
In this respect, the diverse judgements related to the Eurozone crisis (see Table 36) are a 
continuation of the Lisbon and Maastricht rulings. However, these judgements also enter new 
legal territory since the Court assessed – for the very first time – whether democratic 
principles can also be violated in an intergovernmental setting. As a consequence, the Court 
accepted that also intergovernmental treaties can violate on democratic principles. 
The Court issued four judgements regarding the Eurozone crisis in the 2010-2012 period.
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The first one dealt with the constitutionality of the first bilateral loans to Greece and the 
establishment of the EFSF. It was issued in September 2011. The second one dealt with the 
creation of a so-called ‘Sondergremium’ – a special committee – which was supposed to take 
decisions on behalf of the Bundestag’s plenary within the EFSF mechanism (February 2012). 
The third one was concerned with the information rights of the German Bundestag during the 
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 The accompanying laws (EUZBBG and EUZBLG) were amended in a relatively short time period in the 
forefront of the 2009 federal elections. 
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 I have elaborated on three of these four rulings in a 2013 publication. The following description of the rulings 
is partly based on this previous work (Höing 2013). 
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negotiations of the ESM and the Euro-Plus Pact (June 2012). And finally, in September 2012, 
the Court issued a pre-judgement on the constitutionality of the European Stability 
Mechanism and the Fiscal Compact. All respective treaties were eventually declared 
constitutional; however, the Court regularly demanded a stronger involvement of the German 
Bundestag. 
First Judgement: EFSF and Bilateral Loans to Greece 
On 7 September 2011, the German Constitutional Court had to decide whether the ‘Act 
concerning the Giving of Guarantees in the Framework of a European Stabilisation 
Mechanism’ (EFSF) and the ‘Monetary Union Financial stabilisation Act’ (the first financial 
facility for the Hellenic Republic) were compatible with the German Basic Law. Both claims 
were accepted on the ground of possible infringements of article 38 (1) of the German 
Constitution, i.e. a violation of democratic principles. The plaintiffs argued that the elections 
to the German Bundestag would become meaningless if a significant amount of public 
expenditures was decided upon by European institutions. German citizens could no longer 
take part in the political will formation of the political system if their elected representatives 
were constrained by decisions of former governments. Both, the EFSF and the first financial 
assistance package to Greece were limited in time and scope which distinguishes them from 
the European Stability Mechanism. The EFSF was supposed to expire in 2013, and the 
financial assistance to Greece was designed as a non-recurring act. Despite these limitations 
in scope and time, the BVerfG underlined that “the decision on public revenue and 
expenditures is a fundamental part of the ability of a constitutional state to democratically 
shape itself” (German Constitutional Court 2011: par. 122). Consequently, budgetary 
authority of the German Bundestag may not be transferred to other actors by means of 
“imprecise budgetary authorisations” (ibidem). The Court decided that the legislature has a 
latitude of assessment on the probability of having to pay out financial guarantees. There is 
thus no absolute ceiling up to which the German Bundestag is allowed to give financial 
guarantees. Nonetheless, the Court decided that all provisions must be interpreted to the effect 
that the Federal Government will always be obliged to obtain prior approval of the parliament 
before financial guarantees are granted. Furthermore, the legislator must make sure that future 
parliaments remain the central institutions to decide on public revenues and expenditures and 
thus remain able to shape political life. The reason for the dismissal of the claims was that the 
plaintiffs did not present “a concrete context which indicates a supplementation of primary 
Union law by measures outside the Treaty structure that is due to the impugned measures” 
(German Constitutional Court 2011: par. 105).The relevance of the judgement derives from 
the fact that democratic principles can be violated in intergovernmental treaties, and that the 
German Bundestag must remain the ultimate decision-makers to issue financial guarantees to 
financially stricken Member States. 
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Delegation of Competences Within the EFSF Framework 
Not only had the amount of financial guarantees been disputed, but also the decision-making 
procedures within the German Bundestag. Under what conditions must the entire plenary 
agree to EFSF-related measures, and when can they be delegated to committees of the 
German Bundestag? Alongside the extension of credit facilities under the EFSF in September 
2011, the federal government envisaged the establishment of a special committee empowered 
to take decisions on behalf of the Budget Committee in cases of urgency and confidentiality. 
Although composed of only nine members, the special committee was supposed to reflect the 
majorities of the Bundestag’s plenary. The full involvement of the Budget Committee was 
feared to potentially hamper efficient decision-making, especially in the light of the fast pace 
with which financial markets operate (German Constitutional Court 2012b: par. 88). Two 
members of the then oppositional Social Democrats filed an action against the delegation of 
competences within the Bundestag (Art. 3: par. 3 and Art. 5: par. 7, EFSF Treaty); they were 
initially not supported by the majority of their parliamentary party group. The plaintiffs 
argued that their parliamentary rights as elected representatives of the German people were 
severely constrained by the delegation of competences to a Sondergremium. Furthermore, a 
committee of nine people only could not adequately reflect the majorities in the Bundestag 
plenary. The government foresaw the establishment of the Sondergremium as an exceptional 
case only. The special committee would only take decisions if the entire plenary or the budget 
committee could not convene a session in time. The overall budgetary responsibilities would 
remain with the German Bundestag in its entirety. Only decisions requiring strict 
confidentiality and urgency could be taken by the newly created committee. The German 
Constitutional Court essentially followed the arguments of the plaintiffs and declared the so-
called Sondergremium unconstitutional in its current composition: “The German Bundestag 
complies with its function as a body of representation in its entirety and through the 
participation of all its Members” (German Constitutional Court 2012b: par. 102). The German 
Basic Law does not allow for a differentiation of powers for members of the German 
Bundestag, i.e. that only a few representatives may take decisions with major financial 
implications. 
The Sondergremium still exists. However, its field of activity has been narrowed down to the 
effect that it is practically not used. In the first version, the federal government did not 
sufficiently define what they meant by urgency and confidentiality. The strict definition now 
reduces the relevance of the Sondergremium significantly.  
Information Rights of the German Bundestag 
The information rights of the German Bundestag were equally disputed during the crisis 
management. In late 2010, the European Council decided on the establishment of the so-
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called Euro-Plus Pact and “a permanent crisis mechanism to safeguard the financial stability 
of the euro area as a whole [which is based] on a limited treaty change required to that effect, 
not modifying article 125 TFEU” (European Council 2010d). These negotiations were thus 
on-going for several months. The German Basic Law (as well as the EUZBBG) stipulates in 
article 23 that the Bundestag shall “participate in matters concerning the European Union”. It 
was, however, disputed whether the Euro-Plus Pact and the ESM were ‘European matters’ 
since both treaties have been established outside the EU legal framework. The federal 
government argued that the comprehensive information rights of the parliament would not 
apply to instruments which have been established outside of the EU legal framework. There 
was thus no need to comprehensively inform the German Bundestag about on-going 
negotiations. During the negotiations, the Bundestag did only rarely receive information in 
writing and had limited possibilities to issue mandates in order to influence the government’s 
position during the negotiations. Alliance 90/ the Greens sued the federal government for not 
sufficiently informing the German Bundestag on the on-going negotiations at the European 
level. In its judgement on 19 June 2012 Karlsruhe clarified that the ESM and the Euro-Plus 
Pact showed sufficient proximity to EU law. European matters are essentially not restricted to 
EU legislative proposals, but equally apply to treaties under international law (German 
Constitutional Court 2012a: par. 100). Again, the Court extended its jurisdiction to the 
intergovernmental area and strengthened the information rights of the German Bundestag. 
Preliminary Ruling on the ESM and the TSCG 
As elaborated in C.2.1.2, individual MPs, parliamentary party groups (The Left) and non-
parliamentary actors announced to file actions against the establishment of the European 
Stability Mechanism and the Fiscal Compact. The Federal President of Germany did not sign 
the ESM and TSCG ratification laws until the German Constitutional Court issued its 
judgement on 12 September 2012. The Court eventually dismissed a provisional order to 
declare the ESM unconstitutional, but defined two major conditions. First, Germany’s 
payment obligation may not exceed the clearly defined limit of €190 billion. This had to be 
ensured with a legally binding statement from the federal government. The amount can only 
be altered if explicitly approved by the German representative in the ESM board – who must 
be mandated by the German Bundestag. This is in line with the previous EFSF judgement 
which prohibited any kind of “imprecise budgetary authorisations”(German Constitutional 
Court 2011: par. 122). Second, several obligations requiring confidentiality (Art. 32(5), Art. 
34, Art. 35 ESM Treaty) may not restrict the information rights of the German Bundestag and 
Bundesrat (German Constituional Court 2012: par. 136). Again, this judgement strengthens 
the German Bundestag formally and underlines that all legitimacy is essentially derived from 
the nation state. It therefore follows the reasoning of previous judgements on the one hand, 
but also expands parliamentary participation rights to intergovernmental treaties. 
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C.2.1.3 Conclusion German Case Study 
The analysis revealed that Germany’s strong parliamentary participation rights within the 
ESM are primarily result from the judgements of the German Constitutional Court. The 
discourse on the Bundestag’s ESM involvement had a strong legal dimension from the start. 
The Court in Karlsruhe as well as policy-makers argued that in the absence of a European 
source of democratic legitimacy, all decisions affecting budgetary prerogatives must be 
derived from the nation state. The strong formal prerogatives of the German parliament in EU 
affairs are equally a result of this logic. With its decision on the Maastricht Treaty, the 
European Arrest Warrant and the Lisbon Treaty, the BVerfG initiated debates in the German 
parliament to reconsider its position in EU affairs vis-a-vis the federal government. The 
strengthening of the German Bundestag is therefore both, a direct result of BVerfG 
judgements and an evolutionary process (Ruppert 2011). Based on the initiatives from 
parliamentarians of all party groups, the Bundestag strengthened the rights of the parliament 
in the reformed EUZBBG in 2013 – the only law that had been adopted with an all-party 
approval in the 2009-2013 legislative period. Returning to the research question (what 
determines parliamentary involvement in the ESM affairs?) the answer for the German 
Bundestag is necessarily complex: Germany’s favourable macro-economic situation has set 
strong incentives for encompassing parliamentary participation rights. A failure of the crisis 
management and a break-up of the Eurozone – with or without financial assistance – would 
have caused immense financial losses for the German economy and Germany’s taxpayers. 
The involvement of the Bundestag guarantees that the decisions on public expenditures and 
revenues remain with the German parliament, even if its sphere of action necessarily remains 
bound to the national territory (see again A.3). Eurosceptical sentiments hardly influenced the 
decision on stronger parliamentary involvement. Opposition to the ESM was particularly 
strong outside the German parliament. And the strong political and constitutional 
requirements to ratify the ESM treaty were mainly used to negotiate political side payments at 
the European level. The Bundesverfassungsgericht emerged as the central guarantor of strong 
parliamentary involvement, reducing the need for opposition parties to insist on far-reaching 
prerogatives for the German Bundestag. Since the discourse on parliamentary involvement 
was predominantly a legal one, resistance to Germany’s participation in the ESM gradually 
ebbed away after the BVerfG’s judgements. It is still correct to assume that Germany’s strong 
macro-economic situation in combination with strong formal prerogatives in EU affairs 
account for stronger ESM parliamentary involvement. However, the Bundestag’s prerogatives 
in EU affairs are partly already a result of rulings of the Court in Karlsruhe. The strong 
position of the German Bundestag in EU and ESM affairs can therefore only be understood by 
taking into account the decisive role of the German Constitutional Court.  
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C.2.2 The Austrian Nationalrat 
The Austrian Nationalrat is often described as being relatively strong on paper (Auel et al. 
2015; Bergman et al. 2003; Raunio 2005; Winzen 2012), but de-facto not very influential in 
EU affairs. Already in 2001, Blümel and Neuhold therefore noted: the Austrian parliament is 
a “rather good example of the discrepancy between legal provisions and practical 
implications” (Blümel, Neuhold 2001: 336). However, this has not always been the case. 
When Austria joined the European Union in 1995, the Nationalrat passed a relatively high 
number of binding resolutions in order to mandate the government in Council negotiations at 
the European level. Pollak and Slominski attribute this pattern to a short period of a 
“cooperative atmosphere”: the government needed opposition support for constitutional 
amendments and agreed, in return, to seek agreement on binding mandates for the government 
(Pollak, Slominski 2003: 714). In 1995, sixteen out of eighteen binding resolutions were 
supported by the governing coalition and at least one opposition party. Once the support of 
the opposition for constitutional amendments was no longer needed, cross-party cooperation 
suddenly “seemed to be a thing of the past” (Pollak, Slominski 2003: 715). Between 1997 and 
2001, the opposition did not support a single motion of the government, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, binding the government too strictly in EU negotiations was eventually regarded 
as ineffective. Succinctly, the Austrian Nationalrat played a rather influential role in EU 
affairs during a short period where grand majorities were required to amend the constitution. 
However, it made less use of its formal prerogatives once the new scrutiny system was in 
place.  
A similar pattern can be observed concerning the ratification of the ESM treaty. Again, the 
governing coalition of the SPÖ (Social Democratic Party of Austria) and ÖVP (Austrian 
People’s Party) relied on opposition support to modify article 136 TFEU. Similarly to the 
debate surrounding the accession to the European Union, political parties negotiated formal 
instruments to better control government activities at the European level. For a relatively short 
time period, it seemed that the Austrian Nationalrat would not only be formally strengthened 
in ESM affairs, but also live up to its legal capacities and make full use of its reinforced 
formal prerogatives. Opposition and government parties alike emphasized the exceptionally 
strong role of the Austrian Nationalrat in ESM affairs after agreeing on its ratification in July 
2012. The then-finance minister (ÖVP) announced: “Austria preserves encompassing 
participation - and veto rights. With the accompanying laws, the Nationalrat’s power is 
comparable to that of the German Bundestag, yet stronger than most other European 
parliaments” (Kronenzeitung Online 2012).  
The parliamentary practice of accompanying the day-to-day policy-making of the ESM 
suggests, however, that the government is not as dependent on parliamentary approval as legal 
provisions suggest, and that cross-party cooperation in ESM affairs is now rather the 
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exception than the norm. Evidence derived from interviews in March 2015 indicates that the 
salience of ESM affairs has decreased substantially in the Nationalrat, and that the 
theoretically strong parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs faces difficulties when 
translated into political reality (more below). Despite cross-party cooperation between the 
governing SPÖ, ÖVP and the Green Party, the degree of politicization of EU politics is much 
higher in the Austrian Nationalrat than, for instance, in the German Bundestag (Miklin 2015: 
389). The opposition FPÖ (Austrian’s Freedom Party) and BZÖ (Alliance for the Future of 
Austria) have an explicit Eurosceptical agenda and vigorously opposed the ratification of the 
ESM treaty (Puntscher-Riekmann, Wydra 2013: 567f). In their opposition, they were partly 
supported by Austria’s largest tabloid, the Kronenzeitung, which regularly mounts anti-EU 
campaigns (Miklin 2015: 389). Unlike Germany, Eurosceptical parties in parliament are right 
wing populist parties. Their opposition to the European Stability Mechanism focussed on 
issues such as ‘wasting taxpayer’s money’ and paving the way to a ‘transfer union’. Also, the 
question of sovereignty played a more prominent role in parliamentary debates. Contrary to 
the German Left, FPÖ and BZÖ explicitly demanded a public referendum to ratify the ESM 
treaty. This political request sharpened the tone of the already heated ratification debate in 
Austria. Cross-party cooperation was required since the share of pro-European parties in the 
Austrian parliament (SPÖ, ÖVP and the Greens) was only one seat above the two-thirds 
majority (see Interview Db). Two-thirds majorities were needed in both parliamentary 
chambers to modify article 136 TFEU. This allowed the Green Party to negotiate side 
payments for voting in favour of the ESM treaty, although the ESM treaty and the Fiscal 
Compact only required simple majorities. During these negotiations, the rather strong 
participation rights of the German Bundestag and the judgements of the German 
Constitutional Court were a recurrent theme.
114
 In the negotiations leading to the ratification 
of the European Stability Mechanism, the participation rights of the Bundestag served as a 
‘role model’ for Austrian lawmakers (see especially Konrath 2012: 2).  
Against this background, Austria is a highly interesting case to trace back the development of 
strong parliamentary prerogatives in ESM affairs. In doing so, this subchapter will first briefly 
elaborate on the parliamentary involvement of the Nationalrat in the diverse rescue 
mechanisms (the first financial facility for the Hellenic Republic, the EFSF and the ESM) and 
highlight particularities of the Austrian case.
115
 Second, it will briefly describe the role of the 
parliament in EU affairs. Third, the vote to pass the ESM treaty in the Nationalrat will be 
examined by highlighting the involvement of different parliamentary bodies in the ratification 
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Constitutional Court is impossible (Puntscher-Riekmann, Wydra 2013: 571). The Nationalrat could therefore not 
count on the Court to guarantee strong parliamentary involvement. 
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 Since the second chamber, the Bundesrat, does only play a subordinate role in day-to-day policy-making, it 
will not be analysed in much detail in this chapter. 
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process. Fourth, a detailed analysis of plenary debates and committee hearings
116
 will be 
conducted in order to retrace the motives of policy-makers for strong parliamentary 
involvement. This analysis will be complemented with interview evidence, conducted in 
March 2015 with representatives from governing and opposition parties. The conclusion of 
this chapter tries to assess in how far the favourable macro-economic situation combined with 
relatively strong formal prerogatives in EU affairs accounts for the strong involvement of the 
Austrian parliament in ESM affairs (as suggested in chapter C.1). It will especially challenge 
the assumption that Eurosceptical attitudes as well as high political and constitutional 
requirements to ratify the ESM treaty can be interpreted as redundant to explain strong ESM 
involvement in Austria.  
 
C.2.2.1 Parliamentary Involvement in the Diverse Rescue Mechanisms since 2010 
Unlike any other country, the involvement of the Austrian Nationalrat in the diverse rescue 
mechanisms has been subject to huge variation. Austria already provided financial assistance 
to Romania and Bulgaria in 2009 in the so-called Vienna initiative (see European Investment 
Bank 2011). The legal basis to provide financial assistance was thus already established with 
the Zahlungsbilanzstabilisierungsgesetz (balance of payments stabilization law). This law was 
used to regulate parliamentary involvement in the first bilateral loans to Greece as well as in 
the EFSF in 2010. Both of these measures had been decided under immense time pressure and 
little parliamentary deliberations took place. Within both mechanisms, the participation rights 
of the Nationalrat had been modest. Decisions on financial assistance were exclusively taken 
by the ministry of finance; the Austrian Nationalrat ratified the balance of payment 
stabilisation law once and was no longer involved in decisions to release sovereign aid 
packages or financial tranches therein. The Deutsche Bank consequently classified the 
parliamentary prerogatives of the Nationalrat in EFSF affairs as weak (see again Heinen, 
Theiss 2011). However, the ESM now foresees strong participation rights: in order to grant 
stability support to an ESM member (Art. 13(2) ESM Treaty) or to change the list of financial 
assistance instruments (Art. 19 ESM Treaty), the Austrian representative in the ESM Board of 
Governors as well as in the Board of Directors must have a mandate by the plenary of the 
Austrian Nationalrat (Konrath 2012). Only in cases of urgency, a competent standing sub-
committee may take this decision on behalf of the plenary. After the ratification of the ESM 
treaty, the Austrian Minister of Finance declared: “The participation rights of the Austrian 
parliament within the ESM are the strongest in Europe” (Der Standard Online 2012). 
Similarly, the SPÖ finance spokesperson, Jan Krainer, declared: „Against the falsehood of the 
FPÖ and the BZÖ, the budgetary sovereignty of the Austrian Nationalrat remains protected!” 
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 Additionally, committee hearings surrounding the ratification of the ESM treaty in June and July 2012 will be 
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(see ibidem). Comparing the EFSF with the ESM provisions, Austria is indeed the country 
which extended its parliamentary participation rights the most and belongs – at least on paper 
– to the parliaments with the strongest parliamentary involvement. In order to understand 
ESM parliamentary involvement, the role of European Affairs in the Austrian Nationalrat 
must be examined in a first step. As mentioned above, the Nationalrat is often described as 
being relatively strong in EU affairs on paper, but de-facto less influential. The encompassing 
participation rights in the ESM thus represent a reinforced position of the parliament which 
goes beyond established parliamentary routines. 
Miklin describes the parliamentary scrutiny system of EU affairs in the Nationalrat as built on 
three legal pillars: First, the Austrian Constitution (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz, B-VG) defines 
in article 23 (a-k) the general rights of the parliament vis-à-vis the government. The 
parliament must, for instance, be constantly informed about negotiations at the EU level by 
the federal government. Second, these rights are specified in the Rules of Procedures of the 
first
117
 and second chamber
118
, detailing the administrative procedure of how to handle EU 
affairs concretely. Third, since January 2012, an EU information Law
119
 is in force which 
codifies a number of existing practices (Miklin 2015: 390). At the core of these pillars is a 
solid, constitutionally guaranteed mandating system. The European Affairs Committee of the 
Nationalrat can formulate legally binding mandates that the government representative must 
respect in EU negotiations. Similar to the German case, deviations “for urgent reasons of 
foreign and integration policy” are possible in exceptional circumstances: however, only after 
the EAC has been re-consulted (Miklin 2015: 391). These far-reaching formal prerogatives 
nonetheless face conditions that hinder an effective parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs: The 
parliamentary administration of the Nationalrat is not as well equipped as, for instance, the 
German administration. Parliamentarians do often not have sufficient financial resources to 
hire own assistants for their daily administrative work (Miklin 2015: 390).
120
 Most of the 
parliamentary party groups employ one or two clerks specialising in EU affairs who do the 
preliminary work for a number of MPs. Furthermore, since the total number of 
parliamentarians is relatively small, MPs are usually sitting in various committees. 
Parliamentarians are members of, on average, four to five different standing committees. It is 
thus rare that MPs exclusively specialise in EU affairs. This could be an advantage, 
considering the cross-cutting nature of many EU legislative proposals. From a policy- or vote 
seeking perspective, however, the low salience of EU affairs makes it unlikely that MPs pay 
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 The parliamentary administration of the Nationalrat has recently been improved. The government does, by 
now, provide explanatory memoranda on legislative EU proposals and has upgraded the electronic database with 
which MPs can search for legislative proposals (Miklin 2015: 392). As a consequence, there seems to be a higher 
potential to influence EU policy-making nowadays. 
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much attention to the scrutiny of EU legislation. Finally, the electoral system is dominated by 
party lists. This makes criticizing the government a risky undertaking and points to a general 
shortcoming of scrutinising EU affairs in national parliaments (see especially Auel 2007). The 
voting cohesion of parliamentary party groups in Austria is quite high while open criticism of 
the government’s EU policy remains rare. 
C.2.2.1.1 Parliamentary Involvement During the ESM Ratification  
The ratification of the ESM treaty has not been scrutinised as a classical EU affairs 
legislation. It has occupied a huge amount of time from MPs with varying backgrounds. In 
contrast to Germany, the European Affairs Committee was not involved in the scrutiny of the 
ESM, Fiscal Compact or the modification of article 136 TFEU. The Finance Committee as 
well as the Constitutional Committee took the lead in the scrutiny process. Two separate 
hearings for the ESM and the Fiscal Compact were organised with 20 external experts. The 
fact that two committees organised hearings for the same subject matter is rather unusual for 
the Nationalrat (Tamandl 2012: 44). The hearings alone lasted for more than ten hours. The 
debate within the Constitutional Committee (15 hours) and the Finance Committee (18 hours) 
have also been an exceptionally long, as members of the governing SPÖ emphasised during 
the ratification debate in July 2012 (Wittmann 2012: 41).
121
 
C.2.2.1.2 Voting 
To ratify the ESM treaty, the Nationalrat agreed on six different proposals, while one 
opposition motion was voted down. They can be found in Table 37. Standing rules do not 
foresee that parliamentarians can abstain from a vote, but must vote either yes or no. First, the 
modification of article 136 TFEU had to be ratified with a two-thirds majority in the plenary. 
All votes were taken by name. The proposal was supported by 125 parliamentarians and 
opposed by 53. The opposition FPÖ and BZO opposed the measure, while the governing SPÖ 
and ÖVP – together with the Green Party – voted in favour. Second, the ESM treaty was 
ratified with 126 votes (opposed by 53 MPs) and thus resembled the voting pattern for the 
modification article 136 TFEU. Despite initial hesitations, the Green Party voted in favour of 
the ESM treaty (Austrian Nationalrat 2012c) for which only a simple majority was required. 
Third, the ESM accompanying law (Austrian Nationalrat 2012b) – which is legally the 
modification of the Federal Law Gazette – as well as, fourth, the modification of the Rules of 
Procedure was supported by 124 (respectively 126) parliamentarians, while 51 (respectively 
52) parliamentarians opposed it. These instruments regulate the concrete involvement of the 
Nationalrat in ESM affairs domestically. While the ESM treaty only states that the Board of 
Governors of the ESM takes decisions, the accompanying provisions specify under which 
conditions the Austrian representative can give its consent to a decision. The opposition FPÖ 
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demanded a public referendum before the vote on the accompanying law was held. This 
motion was voted down, with only 54 parliamentarians supporting it. Fifth, the parliament had 
to modify the federal financial law (Bundesfinanzgesetz) which received 126 yes and 53 no-
votes. Again, the Green Party voted with the governmental majority. Sixth, two separate 
motions to introduce a European Convent to change the Lisbon Treaties – a concession the 
Green Party negotiated (more below) – found parliamentary approval. The Fiscal Compact, 
on the other side, was only supported by the two governing parties and opposed by the 
Greens. A separate debate was held to ratify the TSCG. 
Table 37: Vote on ESM treaty and related legislation 
Proposal 
Yes Votes No Votes 
Modification Article 136 TFEU 125 53 
ESM Treaty 126 53 
Modification Federal Law Gazette 124 51 
Modification Rules of Procedure 126 52 
Holding a public referendum on the ESM treaty 54 124 
Modification Federal Financial Law 126 53 
European Convent
122
 n.a. n.a. 
Source 57: (Austrian Nationarat 2012). 
 
C.2.2.2 Ratification Debate 
The ratification debate on 6 July in the plenary of the Nationalrat had some special 
characteristics. First – and similar to the German case – the opposition tried to change the 
agenda of the plenary session before the start of the debate. While the German Left had argued 
that decisions by the previous European Council summit had made the proposals on the 
agenda redundant (see again chapter C.2.1.1.2), the FPÖ argued on principled grounds, 
namely that the introduction of the European Stability Mechanism would de-facto change the 
Austrian constitution and thus require a public referendum (Fichtenbauer 2012; Westenthaler 
2012). The leader of the opposition FPÖ, Hans-Christian Strache, argued that the ESM paved 
the way to an authoritarian system (Strache 2012: 31) and resulted in an “enabling law” 
(Ermächtigungsgesetz) with dictatorial powers for the ESM board of governors (Strache 
2012: 32). Experts in the Constitutional and Finance Committees had denied the necessity to 
hold a public referendum (Austrian Nationalrat 2012d); government representatives and the 
Green Party alike consequently voted down the motion. Some Green Party representatives 
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nonetheless expressed their sympathy for the general concerns that the ESM poses a risk for 
democratic self-determination (Glawischnig-Piesczek 2012; Kogler 2012). Removing a vote 
from the agenda, however, was only feasible if the parliament did not have sufficient time to 
scrutinise a legislative proposal. Speakers from the majority thus argued that the parliament 
intensively debated the European Stability Mechanism – including public hearings – and that 
there was consequently no need to change the agenda of the plenary session (Auer 2012: 36; 
Cap 2012: 33).  
Second, during the heated debate, the opposition tried to initiate a motion of no confidence 
against the federal government. This motion did not find support in the plenary. Several fines 
were imposed against speakers of the opposition for repeatedly breaking the house rules of the 
Nationalrat. When the Austrian chancellor, Werner Faymann (SPÖ), started his government 
declaration, members of the BZÖ uphold a poster demanding: “Public referendum now. Stop 
the ESM!”. The President of the parliament had to admonish the parliamentarians to take the 
poster down before the chancellor could proceed with his speech. Although EU affairs are 
regularly contested in Austria, the degree of politicisation in this ratification debate was 
unusually high. Third, the debates on the ESM and the Fiscal Compact were separated. They 
were treated as two independent subject matters. The Green Party, while supporting the ESM 
ratification, announced to file an action against the Fiscal Compact before the Austrian 
Constitutional Court (Austrian Nationalrat 2012a) to assess its constitutionality. 
The conditions accompanying the ratification of the ESM treaty in the Austrian Nationalrat 
were thus different from the situation in the German Bundestag. Two right-wing populist 
parties, occupying nearly one third of the seats, fiercely opposed the ratification of the ESM 
treaty. And the only opposition party supporting the ratification of the ESM treaty 
simultaneously opposed the ratification of the Fiscal Compact. During the debate, speakers 
from all political parties emphasised the favourable macro-economic situation of the Austrian 
Republic, although they differed in their assessment whether this was due to Austria’s 
membership in the common currency union or despite that fact. Government and opposition 
representatives alike appreciated that much was at stake economically. More than one million 
jobs would depend on the functioning of the monetary union (Cap 2012: 34) and Austria’s 
high employment rate could only be maintained if the monetary union survives (Faymann 
2012). The chairman of the governing SPÖ put that succinctly: “I say this to let the Austrian 
taxpayers know: we have you in mind. To be honest, the ESM and the money which we 
provide – we do this out of self-interest – because we want that the Euro […] remains stable, 
and we want to protect our own position and our own economic development” (Cap 2012: 
34). During the hearing of the Constitutional Committee, a representative of the Austrian 
Nationalbank underlined that Austria, as a small open economy, had a strong economic 
interest in a European solution. He argued that the current ESM would simply be a further 
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development of already established procedures, though more efficient and on a permanent 
basis (Mooslechner 2012). According to supporters of the ESM treaty, Austria thus had an 
economic interest in the survival of the Eurozone. However, also warnings that Austrian 
taxpayer’s money could get lost were a prominent theme. ÖVP representatives highlighted 
that no decision could be taken without at least informing the budgetary committee of the 
Nationalrat; in most cases, an explicit approval of the plenary was required. The same ÖVP 
representative made clear that this strong parliamentary involvement was a result of the 
negotiations with the Green party (Tamandl 2012). Interview evidence with government 
representatives emphasised that the finance ministry was initially opposed to the idea of a 
stronger role of the Austrian Nationalrat. The comparison with the German Bundestag, 
however, provoked a rethinking (interview Da). Understandably, the Green Party sold 
stronger parliamentary involvement as a success of their negotiation strategy: “Only because 
of the Greens, we have a parliamentary involvement that we can be proud of” (Musiol 2012: 
48). This argument was hold against the opposition FPÖ and BZÖ which did not even 
consider negotiating with the government on the accompanying law. In an interview, an MP 
of the FPÖ said that his party rejected the ESM out of principled considerations. There had 
consequently been no reason to negotiate with the government (see interview D2). But also 
government representatives did not consider negotiations with either the FPÖ or the BZÖ to 
secure a two-thirds majority in parliament (see interview D1). 
C.2.2.2.1 Euroscepticism 
This sheds some light on the question whether Eurosceptical parties increase the odds for 
stronger parliamentary involvement, as hypothesized in chapter B.2.2. The principled 
rejection of the ESM by the two opposition parties did leave no room for negotiating 
improvements of handling the ESM in the Nationalrat. Their vocal opposition might have 
increased awareness of an insufficient parliamentary involvement. However, parties in 
principled opposition to the rescue mechanisms do not have any electoral incentives to 
negotiate improvements (in terms of stronger parliamentary participation rights), even if their 
votes might be decisive for a given majority threshold. Their electorate demands principled 
opposition, rather than gradual improvements in parliamentary participation. Consequently, 
the FPÖ and BZÖ did not regard stronger parliamentary involvement as a ‘success’ of the 
Green Party. By contrast, the former minister of defence (BZÖ) attacked the Greens during 
the plenary debate: “If you seriously say that these are the best parliamentary participation 
rights in Europe, then I feel deeply sorry for all other European countries. If you are seriously 
satisfied with a subcommittee – convening sessions in secret – deciding by simple majority 
whether the money of Austrian taxpayers goes to Brussels, Madrid, Athens or Cyprus, then 
this might be satisfactory for you. For us, it is clearly not!” (Scheibner 2012: 37). In contrast 
to Germany or France, Austria cannot veto decisions in the ESM Board of Governors since its 
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in-paid capital is too small (Westenthaler 2012: 46, Strache 2012b: 64). This assessment was 
confirmed in interviews when opposition representatives described the parliamentary 
participation rights as a simple „placebo“(see interview D2). By voting for the ESM treaty, 
and against a public referendum, the Green Party has “once and for all lost its role as an 
opposition party. Do never talk about public referenda again! You have sold your soul!“ 
(Westenthaler 2012).  
C.2.2.2.2 Package Deals 
The Green Party indeed struggled within its own party ranks to ratify the ESM treaty. In their 
negotiation strategy, they therefore not only focussed on stronger parliamentary participation 
within the ESM, but also on other political side payments at the European level: in a separate 
resolution, the governing parties and the Greens committed themselves to lobby for a 
financial transaction tax (Kogler 2012). Furthermore, the Austrian government promised to 
campaign for a European Convent to renegotiate the Lisbon Treaty (Faymann 2012; 
Glawischnig-Piesczek 2012) with the aim to integrate the ESM and Fiscal Compact into 
European primary law and to give the European Parliament a stronger say in these new 
mechanisms. This has not been realised until today. However, the political situation in the 
summer of 2012, with the election of a Socialist President in France, seemed to make a 
general reorientation of economic policies possible (Wiener Zeitung Online 2012).  
 
C.2.2.3 Conclusion Austrian Case Study 
Based on the findings of the fsQCA, the question arises whether Euroscepticism and high 
political and constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty did play a role for stronger 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. Euroscepticism was indeed more strongly 
pronounced in Austria than in Germany. There was a much louder vocal opposition to the 
ratification of the ESM treaty in the parliament. However, this did not influence parliamentary 
participation rights decisively. The FPÖ and BZÖ formulated a principled opposition to the 
ESM treaty and did consequently not consider negotiating with the government to secure the 
two-thirds majority in parliament. From a vote-seeking perspective, this was a logical 
decision. Opposition to any form of bail-out funds was strongly articulated in the electorate 
leaning to the FPÖ or BZÖ. In this respect, the assessment that Euroscepticism did not 
decisively influence stronger parliamentary participation rights within the ESM is correct. 
When it comes to the constitutional and political requirements to ratify the ESM treaty, the 
conclusion of the fsQCA must be questioned to some extent. Although government 
representatives emphasized that they had been in favor of a stronger involvement of the 
Nationalrat as well, its stronger involvement can be attributed to the negotiations with the 
opposition Green Party. The Green Party was able to demand concessions for supporting the 
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amendment of article 136 TFEU, although they were not solely focusing on this issue. These 
stronger parliamentary powers of the National do nonetheless face difficulties in political 
reality, as outlined in the introduction to this sub-chapter. The Austrian legislator assumed 
that the procedure to grant financial assistance would be applied more strictly at the European 
level. The procedure foresees that the Board of Governors first takes the political decision – 
by unanimity – to grant financial assistance to an ESM Member State. In a second step, the 
ECB, the European Commission and the IMF negotiate the memorandum of understanding. In 
a last step, the final decision on financial guarantees is taken by the Board of Governors. For 
each of these three steps, the Austrian legislator had outlined detailed parliamentary 
involvement. In practice, however, these three different decisions were taken more or less on 
the same day (see interview Db), as the financial assistance to Cyprus in March 2013 had 
shown. Also, the functioning of the sub-committees for ESM affairs faces difficulties. One of 
the two sub-committees on ESM affairs was supposed to take decisions on behalf of the 
budget committee or the plenary. These provisions were basically “copied” from the German 
accompanying laws (see interview Da). In contrast to the German Bundestag, however, no 
‘Geheimschutzordnung’ (secrecy order) exists in the Austrian Nationalrat. It could thus not be 
legally guaranteed that decisions of this committee were not made public by its members. 
Consequently, the second sub-committee did not convene any session until today, and 
considerations are on-going to abolish it in the near future (see interview D2). The other ESM 
sub-committee does convene sessions on an ad-hoc basis. It is informed by the Austrian 
finance ministry. Its reports are described as “more detailed versions of the statements of the 
Eurogroup” (see interview Da). Politically, the parliamentary involvement of the Austrian 
Nationalrat does nonetheless play a role, as anecdotal evidence suggests. In fall 2011, the 
extension of the EFSF was negotiated in the budgetary committee. The head of the budgetary 
committee tried to fasten the process and proposed to include the EFSF extension on the 
committee’s agenda. The agenda of this committee session was, however, already fix and 
could only be amended with a two-third majority. Members of the committee refused to 
change the agenda and the decisions had to be postponed. An ambiguously formulated press 
release gave the impression that the Austrian parliament had refused the extension and reform 
of the EFSF, and Bloomberg Austria reported that event. Since the approval of all national 
parliaments was required, the press release shocked financial market participants. The Dow 
Jones lost 200 points within one hour – unless a new press statement was released to clarify 
the issue. This incident exemplified that the involvement of a single, small parliament can 
indeed have a decisive impact and the management of the Euro crisis.  
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C.2.3 Irish Dáil Èireann 
From all countries receiving financial assistance during the Eurozone crisis, Ireland is 
probably the one that has so far recovered the most from economic recession. In 2014, Ireland 
became the fastest growing economy in the European Union (with a 4.8% GDP growth rate, 
but also with a gross public debt still at 110.8%
123
). Although high growth figures are not 
unusual after an economic downturn, Ireland could exit the financial assistance programme in 
December 2013 without entering into a new or a precautionary assistance programme (see 
Darvas et al. 2014). To achieve this Ireland had to implement substantial budgetary and 
current-account adjustments, it still faces an above-average unemployment rate and there is no 
guarantee that the Irish public debt has yet reached a sustainable level. Furthermore, Ireland 
automatically enters into a post-programme surveillance phase
124
 until 75% of the outstanding 
loans have been repaid. It is thus still under enhanced economic surveillance of the European 
Commission. The former Irish government requested financial assistance from the 
EFSF/EFSM/IMF on 21 November 2010. It was the first country to request assistance from 
one of the newly created bailout funds. The bailout programme was negotiated between the 
Irish government and the former Troika; it initially consisted of €85 billion of which €35 
billion were foreseen for the banking sector. With the so-called Memorandum of 
Understanding, Ireland committed itself to strict conditionality in the area of fiscal policy, 
including the banking sector and the economy in general. A European Commission report 
from February 2014 concludes that Ireland’s fast economic recovery was only possible 
because the country benefited “from its large degree of economic openness and flexibility.” 
This distinguishes the Irish economy significantly from the Greek and Portuguese one where 
drastic structural reforms had been demanded by international lenders. Furthermore, “the 
numbers […] suggest […] that the macroeconomic assumptions underlying the [Irish] 
programme were sufficiently robust” (European Commission 2014b: 32). Not all budget cuts 
initiated by the Irish government, however, were a direct result of the harsh austerity 
measures demanded by the MoU. In order to preserve access to financial markets, some of 
these measures were already enacted before the Memorandum of Understanding came into 
force. This makes it challenging to single out the influence of the MoU on budget cuts, as well 
as the potential influence of the Oireachtas in the process of negotiating the MoU: first, also 
without a bailout, financial market participants would have pressured Ireland to reduce its 
public spending significantly. Second, some far-reaching measures had already been enacted 
before the MoU came into force. And third, the Irish parliament is dominated by the executive 
“through a machinery of tightly exercised party political control” (Barrett 2015: 291). In 
terms of data, an assessment of the influence of the parliament is also hampered by the fact 
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 Details of PPS are set out in Article 14 of Regulation 472/2013 on the strengthening of economic and 
budgetary surveillance. 
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that documents provided to the committees in the Irish parliament are not made publicly 
available.  
This chapter will nonetheless approximate an assessment of the parliamentary influence of the 
Irish Oireachtas in negotiating the Memorandum of Understanding. It analyses evidence from 
eight expert interviews conducted in October 2013, an assessment of a European Commission 
report on the role of the troika (European Commission 2014b) as well as a variety of 
secondary sources. The role of the Irish parliament in EU affairs will be assessed in a first 
step to put parliamentary involvement in EU affairs into perspective. 
 
C.2.3.1 Parliamentary Involvement in EU Affairs 
The Irish parliament is commonly regarded as rather weak vis-à-vis the government, both in 
domestic and European affairs. It can neither legally bind ministers in Council negotiations 
nor does it possess the right of a scrutiny reserve. The minister must not even have regard to 
any recommendation made by the plenary of either chamber or committee. The minister has 
the right to deviate from any parliamentary recommendation if he or she believes that there is 
not sufficient time to inform parliament in advance (Barrett 2015b, 292). The former minister 
for education and energy, Eamon Ryan, therefore concluded that the Oireachtas committees 
“have proved incapable of providing effective oversight” of European Union legislation. Also 
the minister of State, Alex White, admitted that it was “manifestly the case [that] we have 
serious deficiencies in our parliamentary system in regard to the scrutiny of European Union 
proposals” (quoted in Barrett 2013). Other government representatives nonetheless claim that 
the parliamentary system ensures that all EU legislation “is given full consideration” (ibidem). 
Indeed, there are some narrowly defined policy areas in which the approval of both Houses 
must be obtained before a government representative is allowed to take decisions at the 
European level: Article 29 of the Irish Constitution defines these policy areas, for instance 
defence, enhanced cooperation, the area of freedom, security and justice or the Schengen 
Protocol. As Barrett points out, however, such motions are always approved by the plenary, 
“normally without any debate” (Barrett 2015: 293). An effective EU scrutiny is furthermore 
hindered by the very low salience of EU affairs in the parliamentary work. Parliamentarians 
tend to prioritize the work in their constituency. The highly competitive voting system by 
single transferable votes makes the engagement with national or local issues far more 
rewarding for MPs than the scrutiny of European topics. As a consequence, “the Irish 
Parliament has neither enough prerogatives at its disposal nor enough parliamentarians who 
are willing to make full use of those it already holds” (Barrett 2015: 303). Nonetheless, there 
have been attempts to strengthen the Irish Parliament in EU affairs. Since 2011, the Taioseach 
(Prime Minister) gives a government declaration in the forefront of each European Council 
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meeting or Eurozone summit. This ex ante control is normally not followed by an intensive 
parliamentary debate. Recently, the foreign minister has occasionally substituted the 
Taioseach in carrying out this task. Early assessment of this new scrutiny tool highlight that 
the prospects and outcomes of European Council sessions are “unsurprisingly viewed through 
the prism of national economic interest in Dáil debates” (Barrett 2015). The Irish parliament 
consequently plays only a subordinate role in EU affairs. Another particularity of the Irish 
system is that changes of the constitution always require a public referendum. Recent treaty 
EU reforms have thus been subject to public votes, politicizing some aspects of European 
integration. The Irish political parties are largely in favour of European integration, and the 
major parties so far always supported all major treaty changes (with the exception of Sinn 
Féin and some left-wing independent MPs). Some rather Eurosceptical parties have gained 
influence in the 2011 general elections, following the official request of the Irish government 
for financial assistance. However, the current government can rely on an extraordinarily high 
majority in both chambers. Fine Gael and the Labour Party currently hold more than two 
thirds of the seats in the Dáil Èireann (the lower House of the parliament). And although Irish 
voters have recently rejected two major EU treaties (the Nice and the Lisbon Treaty)
125
, the 
majority of the Irish population is still largely in favour of European integration. 
 
C.2.3.2 The Irish Bailout Programme 
The Irish banking crisis and the subsequent bailout programme changed the rather positive 
attitude towards EU integration in the public and among political parties. It is difficult to 
assess the intrusiveness of the Irish bailout programme on parliamentary prerogatives. The 
Memorandum of Understanding was negotiated between the Irish government and the 
international lenders and involves three types of conditionality: first, fiscal measures aimed at 
reducing public deficits and debts; second, financial measures to restore the health of the 
financial sector and third, structural reforms to enhance economic competitiveness (European 
Commission 2014b: 6). The exact conditions of the programme are concluded between the 
Irish government and Troika representatives, and then approved by the ESM Board of 
Governors. An examination of the concluded MoU does therefore not reveal the alleged 
conflicts preceding the agreement. Furthermore, the Irish programme did not place much 
emphasis on structural reforms. Ireland’s financial predicament resulted primarily from its 
banking crisis. Its economy had already been very competitive before the crisis broke out.  
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Figure 21: Number of pages in adjustment programme documents  
 
Source 58: (Quoted in: European Commission 2014: 16). 
A recent study by Pisani-Ferry et al. (2013) came to the conclusion that the conditionality of 
programmes had become much more detailed in Greece, while other programmes, including 
the Irish one, contained less detailed requirements (see Pisani-Ferry et al. 2013). Figure 21 
illustrates this finding (see above). The numbers must be interpreted cautiously, since the 
authors conduct a simple page count to gauge the conditionality of the different programmes. 
The conditionality of the Greek programme is set out in more than 1800 pages, while the Irish 
programme contained only above 900 pages. Employment and business matters occupied a 
prominent place in the Irish programme while requirements for structural reforms had been 
less intrusive (the focus of the MoU was placed on reforming the banking sector which 
remained a priority for the duration of the programme). This assessment is in line with 
interview evidence from October 2013. One government MP confirmed that the agreement 
with the troika only addressed broad areas of reform, and that the government could substitute 
measures of equal value with agreement from the Troika: “Increasingly, the EU is requesting 
that Member States benchmark their progress against common objectives, share their learning 
with each other and reconfigure their practice in light of the insights gained from this process. 
This need for organisational review and reform is a vital element of Ireland’s ‘new narrative’ 
of engagement with the EU” (see interview B6126). This, however, cannot overshadow the fact 
that the Irish sovereign debt programme had been intrusive for the Irish society and economy, 
and also significantly changed the Irish political landscape. 
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C.2.3.3 Ratification Debate: Memorandum of Understanding 
On 15 December 2010 the Dáil Éireann hold a debate and a vote on the bailout package for 
Ireland which was frequently described as a “sad day” for Ireland (see among others Bruton 
2010). The question whether the Irish lower chamber should hold a debate at all and take a 
vote on the MoU was initially disputed among Irish political parties. The negotiations on the 
Irish MoU were conducted under immense time pressure; just a week earlier, the board of the 
IMF in Washington announced its willingness to postpone the decision on the MoU to “show 
the Irish parliament respect” and give it time for deliberations (Byrne 2010). The Green Party 
had just left the governing coalition with Fianna Fáil, and international lenders were unsure in 
how far the deal was incorporated by a potential new government. New elections had already 
been announced for January 2011. Especially two MPs from the governing Fianna Fáil party 
insisted on having a debate which was legally not prescribed in the Irish constitution 
(McGrath 2010). The opposition Sein Féin threatened the government to bring it to the High 
Court in order to prove the unconstitutionality of pushing through the EU-IMF programme 
without parliamentary approval (Doherty 2010). Opposition representatives criticised the 
short amount of time as a “cynical exercise” of the government, intended to force the 
opposition to say how it will run the country without the EU/IMF deal (see especially Doherty 
2010; but also Gilmore 2010). Government representatives, on the other side, thought it was 
important that the Irish Parliament endorsed the IMF deal in order to show public ownership 
for the obligations of the programme (Kennedy 2010). The involvement of the Irish 
parliament in the negotiations to the bailout deal played only a marginal role in the ratification 
debate itself. The then finance minister emphasized that an own national recovery plan – 
which committed itself to the retention of the 12.5% corporate tax rate – was embedded into 
the EU/IMF programme: “This is a key point that needs to be emphasised, as some have 
suggested that control has been taken out of the Government’s hands. This is not the case” 
(Lenihan 2010). The low corporate tax rate was one of the most controversial issues in the 
negotiations with European partners. Remaining in control of setting national tax rates was 
regarded as keeping the national prerogatives of the government (but not necessarily the Irish 
parliament). The central controversy between the governing parties and opposition leaders 
was whether the bailout deal was the best possible deal that could have been achieved. The 
then major opposition party Fine Gael announced that it would immediately renegotiate the 
bailout conditions should it be elected into office, especially the high interest rates on the 
loan. It committed itself, however, to the general objectives of the bailout programme 
(together with the opposition Labour Party). Interestingly, the leader of Fine Gael, Enda 
Kenny, had direct contacts with the IMF during the negotiations over the Irish MoU
127
: 
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“When the Fine Gael economic team and I met officials of the IMF and the EU, they made it 
perfectly plain that, in accepting the overall targets — as we do — […] they are quite open to 
discussing again and renegotiating elements of the plan for growth, job investment and a more 
effective public sector to deliver more effective services. They were very open and asked me 
to confirm that in writing to IMF headquarters in Washington, which I did” (Kenny 2010). 
The inclusion of opposition leaders in the negotiations of far-reaching bailout deals is not 
unusual, as examples in Greece or Portugal have equally exemplified. They are intended to 
ensure that measures are implemented in the event of government changes. However, even if 
an opposition leader commits him in writing to accept the general conditions of a bailout deal, 
the opposition leader is not necessarily mandated by his party or parliamentary party group to 
do so. Interview evidence from October 2013 confirmed that the large majority of the 2011-
2015 government in the Dáil facilitated agreements with international lenders since the 
government could credibly assure that crisis measures would be adhered to in parliament. 
Attempts from the Troika to find broader parliamentary support for the MoU in the Oireachtas 
certainly had a strategic dimension. The deselection of the current Irish government was 
anticipated, and the IMF searched for ways to guarantee that the negotiated conditions 
remained in place after a change in government. This strategy has probably been an important 
factor for Ireland’s efforts to regain trust from financial market participants, as nearly all 
interview partners confirmed.  
Independent MPs expressed their concern that Ireland was used as a test case: “We are being 
obliged, unjustly and unfairly, to pay for the mistakes made by the banking sectors here and in 
Europe in respect of reckless lending. We are the puppets dangling at the end of a string and 
are under the control of elite groups of bankers who are solely motivated by their own 
interests and preserving their profit margins” (O’Sullivan 2010). Especially German and 
French banks were accused of benefiting the most from the bailout, and that they were 
recapitalized with Irish taxpayer’s money. Several MPs therefore pointed to the example of 
Iceland which managed to negotiate a ceiling on repayments to a share of its economic output 
(McGrath 2010). Government representatives described the opposition’s intention to 
renegotiate a better deal as “laughable” (Lenihan 2010) since IMF interest rates are calculated 
with a standard rate that are not up for negotiations. The government therefore tried to ridicule 
Fine Gael’s argument that their membership in Angela Merkel’s EPP group could facilitate 
negotiating a better deal: “The basis for this particular argument is the proposition that Fine 
Gael is a member of the EPP and Mrs. Merkel’s party also is a member of the EPP. 
Consequently, the feeling appears to be that Fine Gael can make a telephone call to Mrs. 
Merkel and that she will put in the fix on behalf of that party with the Commission. I am 
disappointed by this line of argument, which has been made repeatedly on the other side of 
the House. The suggestion gives pot-hole politics an entirely new dimension” (Roche 2010). 
The upcoming Irish government (from early 2011 onwards) did renegotiate some elements of 
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the bailout deal during the course of the programme (European Commission 2014b: 23). 
Relaxation on some aspects of the programme had also been granted to Portugal or Greece 
(not by the IMF, but by European lenders though). The core elements of the programme 
remained, however, unchanged. The short time frame of the negotiations made it impossible 
to fully involve parliamentary bodies and committees. Even the 15 December debate on the 
bailout programme had been disputed – both legally and politically. The tight economic 
interconnectedness as well as the dependency on European and international lenders 
prevented the discussion of alternatives to the existing programme.
128
  
 
C.2.3.4 Ratification of the ESM Treaty 
The ratification of the ESM treaty in the Irish Oireachtas did not occupy a very prominent 
place in the parliamentary work. The ‘European Stability Mechanism Bill 2012’ was voted 
upon on 20 June 2012 in the plenary, followed by a relatively short parliamentary debate. 
Although Ireland had made progress regarding the implementation of the bailout programme, 
it could not be sure it would not need precautionary financial assistance from the ESM. The 
debate in the plenary thus focussed on the importance of the ESM for Ireland’s envisaged re-
entry to the financial markets. The ratification process was slightly slowed down when 
independent MP Thomas Pringle initiated legal proceedings to seek for an injunction to 
restrain the Government from enacting the permanent bailout fund. He argued that the 
enactment of the ESM was unconstitutional since it allowed overriding Europe’s no bail-out 
clause which had been ratified by the Irish people in a public referendum alongside the 
Maastricht Treaty. The inter-governmental ESM, on the other side, was ratified by the Irish 
parliament only. On 2 August 2012, the Supreme Court refused to grant Thomas Pringle an 
injunction and the ESM was eventually ratified by the government. Another major obstacle 
for ESM ratification was the public referendum on the TSCG. This referendum was 
prescribed in the Irish constitution. It limited to some extent the influence of the Oireachtas 
which could – due to the large governmental majority – always assure the timely 
implementation of measures demanded by the MoU. As elaborated above, the ratification of 
the TSCG is conditional for the receipt of funds from the ESM. Irish policy-makers from 
(most) opposition and government parties alike therefore campaigned intensively for a yes-
vote. The Fiscal Compact eventually received a large majority in a public referendum in 2012. 
Interestingly, no speakers addressed the future role of the Irish Oireachtas in the ESM 
ratification debate. The parliament will neither take a vote on future sovereign aid packages, 
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 One telling example is a statement by Labour MP Eamon Gilmore. Although the Labour Party eventually 
agreed to the bailout deal, he made clear that a solution to the crisis would require a larger contribution from 
other European partners: “Europe made its contribution to the problem and must also make a contribution to the 
solution. It must do so because until there is a solution to the Irish crisis, there will be no overall solution to the 
euro crisis. That is the reality of inter-dependence” (Gilmore 2010). 
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nor on the release of financial tranches therein. The Finance Minister is only required to 
report the aggregate value of contributions to the authorised capital stock of the ESM. The 
Irish Oireachtas will therefore not be involved in the day-to-day handling of the European 
Stability Mechanism in the future. 
 
C.2.3.5 Conclusion Irish Case Study 
The fsQCA assumed that Ireland’s weak participation rights in the ESM were influenced by 
its difficult macro-economic situation, the lack of strong Eurosceptical sentiments, the weak 
formal prerogatives in EU affairs as well as the low political and constitutional requirements 
to ratify the treaty. The analysis of the ESM ratification debate and interview evidence from 
Irish policy-makers largely confirmed this finding. Ireland depended on financial assistance of 
the EFSF/IMF at the end of 2010 and did consequently not envisage strong parliamentary 
involvement in MoU negotiations. Only the insistence of a couple of government MPs (as 
well as some opposition parties) caused the government to hold a public debate and to take a 
vote on the negotiated MoU. Some opposition leaders played a more prominent role due to 
the upcoming general elections. 
Eurosceptical parties were marginalised in these negotiations, not least because they are in the 
minority in Ireland. Furthermore, the weak role of the parliament in EU affairs, but also vis-à-
vis the government in domestic matters, is one explanation why strong ESM parliamentary 
involvement has never been seriously considered. The macro-economic situation of Ireland 
made it unlikely that it would soon be in the position to grant financial assistance to any other 
Eurozone country. When the topic of sovereignty was addressed, it mainly concentrated on 
the question of national government’s sovereignty to take decisions, for instance the retention 
of the relatively low corporate tax rate. The macro-economic situation of Ireland therefore 
largely determined its weak parliamentary participation within the ESM. Neither the influence 
of Eurosceptical parties nor political or constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty 
did play a prominent role. Since Ireland left the bailout programme in 2014, it must 
potentially contribute to future financial assistance programmes granted to other Eurozone 
members, for instance a potential third Greek bailout (which could be on the agenda in 
summer 2015). Should this decision be taken, it will only be the Irish Minister of Finance in 
the ESM Board of Governors casting a vote – without the requirement of a prior 
parliamentary approval.   
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C.2.4 Portuguese Assembleia da República 
The Portuguese parliament formally decided in April 2011 to request financial assistance 
from European lenders and the IMF. Portugal was the third country that agreed to a 
Memorandum of Understanding in exchange for financial assistance. It had initially provided 
financial support to Greece and Ireland before it agreed to a €78 billion programme itself: €26 
billion each came from the newly created EFSF, the EFSM and the International Monetary 
fund. The total amount of the programme corresponded to about 50 per cent of the Portuguese 
GDP in 2011 (European Commission 2014b: 39). The Portuguese economy had suffered 
structural problems long before it joined the Eurozone. In contrast to Spain, Ireland, or even 
Greece, it did not experience a long economic boom phase after the introduction of the 
common currency (ibidem). Portugal managed to significantly reduce its annual government 
deficit as well as the yields on ten year government bonds throughout the duration of the 
programme. The public debt level, however, remained high and the unemployment rate had 
soared significantly. The crisis had a lasting effect on the Portuguese political landscape. In 
early 2011, the Socialist minority government was voted out of office after it failed to find a 
parliamentary majority for a stability program in March 2011. The new elections in June 2011 
brought a new conservative government to power. The conservative
129
 Social Democratic 
Party (PSD, Partido Social Democrata) formed a majority government (led by Pedro Passas 
Coelho) with the conservative CDS-PP (Centro Democrático e Social – Partido Popular) and 
received an unusually high majority in the Portuguese Assembleia da República. In the 
aftermath of the election, new political movements emerged which demanded a halt to 
austerity imposed by the bailout programme, especially the newly founded party ‘Tempo de 
Avancar’ (which regards itself as a sister party of the Greek Syriza).  
In May 2014, Portugal eventually exited the financial assistance programme without entering 
into a post-programme or precautionary credit line. As a result of the Two-Pack legislation, 
however, Portugal automatically entered a post-programme surveillance phase until 75% of 
the outstanding loans are repaid (EFSF 2014). The country is thus still under the enhanced 
supervision of the European Commission. A strong involvement of the Portuguese parliament 
in this process was hampered by two main factors. First, the Portuguese parliament is 
traditionally classified as being rather weak vis-à-vis the government, both in domestic and 
EU affairs (see below). The political system is dominated by a strong executive. Second, the 
forceful and timely implementation of demands by international lenders was regarded a key 
priority of the Portuguese government to overcome the crisis. In the attempt to regain trust of 
financial market participants, the Portuguese government tried to implement structural 
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group in the European Parliament and is in general political conservative. 
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reforms without delay. Its relatively huge majority in the Assembleia da República facilitated 
this approach. As an opposition representative put it: “this government will continue blindly 
moving forward with its program. Even with all the alarm bells ringing around, I don't think 
they will stop” (see interview C 1). The decision to ratify the TSCG as quickly as possible at 
the beginning of 2012 was equally intended to send a signal to Europe (see interview C2). 204 
parliamentarians supported the treaty in parliament, while only 24 opposed it.
130
 Since 
Portugal had already been under the surveillance of the international financiers, the enhanced 
economic coordination under the TSCG was not seen as decisively more intrusive than the 
surveillance under the bailout programme. Only decisions by the Portuguese Constitutional 
Court slowed down the implementation of the bailout programme to some extent. 
In order to understand the role of Portuguese Assembleia in this process, I first elaborate on 
the general role of the Portuguese parliament in EU affairs. The parliament has recently 
improved EU scrutiny procedures, although these are still not comparable to the scrutiny 
prerogatives of parliamentary chambers such as Denmark, Finland or the Netherlands (see 
again B.4.1.3). Second, I elaborate on the details of the Portuguese bailout programme which 
placed a strong emphasis on structural reforms and set more detailed provisions than the 
bailout program for Ireland (see C.2.3.2). Third, the ratification debate of the ESM will be 
analysed. The ESM was ratified alongside the TSCG which occupied a more prominent place 
in the debate. According to the documents at hand as well as additional interview evidence, a 
strong role of the Assembleia da República in the day-to-day handling of European Stability 
Mechanism has never been seriously considered. Last, I analyse interview evidence from six 
expert interviews conducted in June 2013. This information will be complemented with 
available online sources on the implementation of the bailout programme. The objective is to 
understand the role of the Assembleia in the negotiations leading to the bailout programme as 
well as its role in the European Stability Mechanism. One major characteristic of the 
Portuguese case is the fact that the parliament did not even take a formal vote on the 
Memorandum of Understanding in early 2011. 
 
C.2.4.1 The Portuguese Parliament in EU Affairs 
Similar to Ireland, the Portuguese political system is characterized by the dominance of a 
strong executive. On various occasions, the system has been described as ‘semi-presidential’, 
‘premier-presidential’, ‘parliamentary presidential’, ‘mixed parliamentary-presidential’ or as 
‘presidentialism of the prime minister’ (on these notations see Jancic 2015). A strong division 
of power exist between the executive and the legislature in the sense that no member of the 
parliament may concomitantly be a member of the national government. Political parties in 
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 Information was retrieved from Reuters Brasil (Khalip 2012). 
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Portugal have so far been largely in favour of European integration. Portugal’s accession to 
the European Union in 1986 is often regarded as an ‘historic moment’ after decades of 
political dictatorship. The Eurozone crisis and the immense economic and social sacrifices 
resulting from the bailout programme have, however, slightly changed this general pro-
European consensus. New political movements now oppose the austerity policy imposed by 
European and international actors; at the time of writing, it appears likely that the newly 
founded party ‘Tempo de Avancar’ will enter the parliament in the next general elections in 
September 2015. However, the political Left in Portugal seems to remain more fragmented 
than in Spain or Greece (Horta 2015). 
The Portuguese Assembleia has gradually improved its scrutiny powers in EU affairs.
131
 The 
constitution obliges the government to regularly inform the parliament on EU activities (Art. 
197(1)). It furthermore allows – since 2005 – to hold a public referendum on EU treaties (Art. 
295). The major parliamentary body responsible for EU scrutiny is the European Affairs 
Committee. It can decide to involve other sectoral committees in the scrutiny process. The 
focus for the scrutiny of EU affairs by the EAC is rather new. Since the 2012 amendment, the 
Commission’s Work Programme is discussed within the EAC and no longer within the 
plenary (Art. 4(1)(e), ESA) (Jancic 2015: 370). Furthermore, meetings of the EAC to 
scrutinise the meetings of the ministers in the Council are no longer held regularly, but only 
when deemed necessary. The amount of scrutiny activities has therefore been reduced, with 
the aim to scrutinize less, but better.
132
 This explains the enhanced role of the EAC. 
According to Jancic, the Portuguese Assembleia has substantively improved its formal 
participation rights in EU affairs since 2012. ‘European debates’ are now regularly held in the 
plenary, for instance accompanying European Council meetings, the state of the Union 
address of the Commission President or the assessment of priorities of rotating EU 
presidencies. These formal improvements are in line with interview evidence from June 2013, 
although MPs from opposition and government parties alike accentuate that EU affairs are 
likely to remain a domain of the executive – despite these improvements. Especially since the 
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 The Assembleia da República is the parliamentary chamber which sends most opinions to the European 
Commission within the Political Dialogue. Quite often the Assembleia states that it has not found major 
objections to a Commission proposal. Although this EU activity is an outstanding feature of the Assembleia, I 
will not further take up this aspect. First, this would deviate from the research interest of this thesis. And second, 
the high number of opinions does not have a significant measureable impact.    
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 The rather excessive, but also uncritical scrutiny of EU affairs was exemplified in one of our interviews with 
a government MP. Regarding the Early Warning Mechanism, the MP concluded: “It's not a very interesting 
exercise. […] We have each year thousands of reports to verify subsidiarity and proportionality. In a certain way 
we feel that was a formal way to answer to the needs. Well, give them this and they will be entertained with this 
for a while and considering that we participate a lot, democracy is growing and the national parliaments are 
participating in the process. At the end, it's not true” (see interview C3). 
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outbreak of the Eurozone crisis and Portugal’s request for financial assistance, the parliament 
could not exercise any significant influence (see below).  
Throughout the implementation of the programme, Portugal experienced a number of political 
and judicial setbacks by its Constitutional Court. The Court declared some measures to tackle 
the crisis unconstitutional. The Portuguese government had authority to substitute some of 
these measures by others, but had to seek agreement with international financiers in advance. 
The Portuguese government presented three unconstitutional national budgets in a row which 
exemplifies the difficult situation for policy-makers: The government was aware that their 
presented budgets were potentially unconstitutional, but were also obliged to impose budget 
cuts in order to meet the reduction targets by international financiers. The small opposition 
parties, especially the Left Bloc, the Communists and the Greens regularly criticized the 
“government’s subservience to Franco-German and EU dictates” (Jancic 2015: 382). 
 
C.2.4.2 The Portuguese Bailout Programme 
The degree of sovereignty in the 21
st
 century equals the degree of debt that states 
assume and, above all, the ability of states to pay these debts back. Because of 
this, the best way to defend the sovereignty of Portugal, today and tomorrow, is 
not to incur too much debt […] (Portuguese Minister of State and Foreign Affairs, 
Paula Portas).
133
 
The adoption of the Portuguese bailout programme in May 2011 was preceded by a long 
political struggle. Already in 2009, the ECOFIN Council requested Portugal (in accordance 
with article 126(7) TFEU) to reduce its excessive government deficit. Portugal had therefore 
already been under the Excessive Deficit Procedure one and a half years before it formally 
signed its Memorandum of Understanding. With declining confidence in the sustainability of 
public debt levels in several peripheral Eurozone countries, yields on Portuguese sovereign 
bonds rose sharply since 2009. In this time period, the country had to revise its GDP targets a 
couple of times, although the Assembleia already passed a first far-reaching austerity budget 
in November 2010 (European Commission 2011b: 15). Similarly to the Irish case, it is 
therefore difficult to single out the influence of the Memorandum of Understanding on budget 
cuts and structural reforms. First, some austerity measures had been initiated before the 
memorandum of understanding was officially signed. Second, and in contrast to Ireland, 
Portugal had already been obliged to balance its public budget under the excessive deficit 
procedure. However, the Portuguese government was not continuously successful in 
implementing harsh austerity measures. The centre-left minority government of Prime 
Minister Socrates was defeated in a vote on a Stability Programme on 23 March 2011. This 
programme was initially designed to signal Portugal’s willingness to undertake substantial 
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 Quoted in: Jancic 2015: 382. 
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fiscal and structural reforms to overcome the re-financing crisis (ibidem). With the no-vote in 
the Assembleia, the government was forced to resign (but remained in office as a caretaker 
government). It officially requested financial assistance from the EFSF/EFSM/IMF on 7 April 
2011.  
The Troika subsequently started to negotiate the conditions of the MoU with Portuguese 
authorities. The first Commission report on the negotiations leading to the MoU described “a 
cooperative environment [during the] consultations with the main opposition parties and other 
civil society partners” (European Commission 2011: 15). The major opposition parties 
publicly supported the agreement, so that the Memorandum of Understanding was eventually 
signed on 17 May 2011 and therefore before the new parliamentary elections took place. Time 
constraints did not allow taking a formal vote on the Memorandum of Understanding. This, 
however, also exemplifies the weak position of the Portuguese parliament vis-à-vis the 
executive. The majority of measures outlined in the MoU focussed on fiscal consolidation. 
They were partly very specific and included, among others, demands to reduce corporate tax 
deductions and pensions above €1.500, the freezing of wages in the government sector or the 
increase of sale and tobacco taxes (European Commission 2014b: 80). Contrary to Ireland, the 
Portuguese programme focussed extensively on structural reforms. It was also more detailed 
than the Irish one (see again Figure 21). During the lifetime of the programme, a total of six 
official reviews have been published by the European Commission to monitor the progress of 
the bailout package. The Assembleia had to ratify and implement most of these measures 
(only rarely could the government enact measures by a governmental decree). A simple word 
count reveals that the term ‘parliament’ was mentioned around 100 times per semi-annual 
review. This should, however, not be equated with strong parliamentary influence. Most of 
the time the reviews simply mentioned the government’s intention to ‘submit’ or ‘present’ 
certain measures to the parliament. Interestingly – and in line with interview evidence – the 
reviews confirm that the Portuguese government tried to over-fulfil certain measures 
demanded by the Troika, for instance the amended Framework Law of Privatization (see 
European Commission 2011a: 52). Only rarely did the reviews mention a delay of measures 
(due to denied or belayed parliamentary approval).
134
 One telling example was the 
liberalisation of a number of regulated professions. In those cases in which the government 
did not need the approval of the parliament, the measures had been implemented immediately. 
For those regulated professions where parliamentary approval was required, the 
implementation was indeed delayed (see for instance European Commission 2011c: 37).  
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 Regarding the third Postal Directive, the review notes: “Given the need for Parliament approval the deadline 
has been postponed to Q4 2011 and the measure now includes also the re-negotiation of the concession contract 
for the provision of universal service shortening the designation period in order to further liberalise the 
sector”(European Commission 2011c: 37). 
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This gives at least the impression that the parliament exerted some minor influence regarding 
the implementation of the bailout programme (although the government tried in an act of 
anticipatory obedience to implement all measures without delay). The semi-annual reviews of 
the programme do not reveal fundamental political conflicts between the Portuguese 
government and the Assembleia. The government was able to secure broad majorities in the 
parliament and was supported – most of the time – by the major opposition party. Interview 
evidence nonetheless suggests that the implementation of the program was politically 
contested, but that the de-facto influence of the Assembleia was largely restricted (see 
C.2.4.4). 
 
C.2.4.3 Ratification of the ESM Treaty 
The ratification debate and vote on the ESM treaty took place on 13 April 2012 (Assembleia 
da República 2012b). It was voted upon alongside the ratification of the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance which had been signed only a couple of weeks earlier. Both 
treaties were approved by a large majority in parliament, including the two coalition partners 
and the major opposition party. Securing parliamentary majorities had not been particularly 
problematic for the conservative government. Especially the timely ratification of the TSCG 
was supposed to signal financial markets Portugal’s willingness to meet its financial 
obligations under the bailout program. The ratification process of the ESM involved several 
parliamentary committees, especially the Budget Committee, the Finance and Public 
Administration as well as the European Affairs Committee (which all issued opinions in the 
forefront of the ratification) (Assembleia da República 2012c). The Law on the State Budget 
for the year 2013 authorized the government to assume its capital share on the ESM until the 
due limit. Portugal’s inpaid capital share is slightly above €2 billion and calculated on the 
ECB’s capital share. Despite these relatively high sums, the ratification debate focussed more 
strongly on the TSCG than on the European Stability Mechanism. During the debate, the 
Prime Minister emphasized that Portugal had to double its efforts to prevent future crises. 
Portugal knew from experience how harmful financial and economic imbalances are for the 
people, and that the path of solidarity and integration can only be pursued if Eurozone 
Member States also deepened the path of responsibility (see Assembleia da República 2012a). 
Although it was not made very explicit during the ratification debate, Portuguese policy-
makers saw a need to implement far-reaching austerity measures at home as a precondition 
for financial assistance from other European countries. Interestingly, the involvement of the 
Assembleia da República in the day-to-day handling of the ESM did not play a prominent role 
during in the ratification debate. Similarly to the EFSF provisions, the government shall 
inform the Parliament within one month on major activities within the ESM framework; but 
no regulations exist detailing the exact involvement of the Portuguese parliament. Even when 
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the terms of conditions of aid packages are changed, the government shall only inform the 
parliament within the up-coming six months (see again Table 2). I did not find any evidence, 
neither in the ratification debate nor in secondary sources, that the non-involvement of the 
Assembleia was regarded as problematic in democratic terms by any parliamentarian or 
parliamentary party group. At least, this issue was not explicitly addressed in publicly 
available sources. One explanation could be that in 2012, the idea of Portugal being in a 
position to issue financial assistance to other Eurozone Member States was simply not a 
realistic option. 
 
C.2.4.4 Interview Evidence: the Assembleia and the Bailout Programme 
In order to secure parliamentary involvement during the execution of the bailout program, 
Portugal established a special parliamentary committee to deal with the memorandum of 
understanding in 2011. In this committee, parliamentarians were informed about the activities 
related to the bailout programme. The main scrutiny work was carried out by the 
parliamentarians themselves. There are only few administrative resources to support these 
activities (see Interview Cb) which generally hampered an efficient scrutiny process. The 
minister or the state secretary regularly informed parliamentarians about bailout-related 
activities in this committee. This usually happened after decisions at the EU level had already 
been taken, and not in the forefront (see interview C2). Occasionally, the Prime Minister 
himself answered questions in this special committee. According to opposition 
representatives, parliamentarians received largely the same information as those publicly 
available in the news, sometimes even after the national or international media had reported 
on them. Representatives of the Troika regularly informed the parliament and visited the 
Assembleia every three months during the duration of the program. These meetings had an 
informative character only and did normally not last very long. However, parliamentarians 
had the possibility to address questions directly to Troika representatives. The minister of 
finance presented the progress made under the programme on a regular basis, both in the 
budget committee as well as the newly created special committee. The possibilities to actively 
influence policy-making have been described as severely limited. A direct impact of the 
parliament could not be detected by most interviewees (see interview C3 and Ca). As an EAC 
administrator emphasized: “In what concerns the memorandum itself and its negotiations, 
[…] the parliament was not involved. The discussion was between the government, the 
executive, and the institutions, the Troika; but alongside with that, the executive had meetings 
with the political parties that are in the parliament, but not within the framework of the 
parliament. So, when the memorandum was signed, they sent a copy to the parliament, and it 
went to the EAC, even though we had many doubts if we were the competent ones, but we 
received it and we didn't really know what to do with that. Because we had a huge document 
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which was very specific in special areas, we had to ask the speaker [of the EAC, O.H.] to send 
it to the other competences committees” (see interview Cb). This statement exemplifies that 
no parliamentary procedures existed to handle the memorandum of understanding. There was 
initial confusion concerning the question which parliamentary committee should take the lead 
in scrutinising the MoU. In many regards, the receipt of information was the only (potential) 
channel of influence the Portuguese parliament possessed. Not surprisingly, opposition 
representatives in particular underlined that parliamentarians had no say in the negotiations 
leading to the Memorandum of Understanding at all: “Nothing, to be honest” (Interview C1). 
According to this interviewee, also the government majority increasingly faced problems to 
secure majorities among its own ranks. Many measures of the bailout programme run contrary 
to the electoral programmes of political parties. The smaller coalition partner in particular 
(CDS-PP) faced problems securing majorities in its own ranks for measures demanded by the 
bailout.
135
 
The consensus on the bailout programme was mainly negotiated among the three largest 
parties in Portugal, including the two government parties and the opposition Socialists. There 
was thus a general agreement on the measures which had to be implemented; however, the 
parties disagreed on the question whether Portugal would need more time and should 
renegotiate the interest rates of their loans. Especially the socialist party started to demand a 
relaxation of interest rates during the course of the programme. In April 2013, the Eurogroup 
eventually decided to extend the average maturity of outstanding loans by seven years. 
Portugal will nevertheless pay off its debt until 2040 – given that programme is executed the 
way it is currently envisaged. The large party-consensus in the Assembleia was regularly put 
to the test by frictions within the Troika. The IMF, the European Commission and the 
European Central Bank had partly diverging ideas on how exactly the programme for Portugal 
should be implemented (see interview C1, but also Belke 2014). The IMF, for instance, 
admitted relatively soon that some of the economic forecasts had been too optimistic and 
started to consider the option of a write-off on public debt. The European Central Bank, on 
the other side, insisted on the repayments of debt and focused more strongly on fiscal 
adjustments. 
The general sentiment of parliamentarians was that “we have to do what the others tell us to 
do” (see interview C3). However, the disagreement within the Troika as well as the political 
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 But also government MPs described the illusion of some of their colleagues who still believed that they were 
fully in control of the political developments in Portugal. “They don't like to think a lot about the European 
Union and they don't know a lot about the European Union and they don't like people that speak a lot about the 
European Union. They like to think they are the centre of the world. They like to think they have the same power 
and they like very much – in the majority and in the opposition – to say that all the responsibility is from the 
national government” (see interview C3). 
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struggles among the Heads of State or Government over the next steps in the management of 
the crisis fuelled disappointment among MPs. Portugal was doing its part while the EU could 
not agree on decisive steps, was a growing sentiment among MPs (concerning, for instance, 
the Banking Union, see interview C3). This dissatisfaction with EU politics was manifest, 
also among MPs who consider themselves as ‘EU-enthusiasts’.136 This sentiment was 
aggravated by the decision-making mode during the management of the crisis. The dominance 
of the European Council as well as the Eurozone summit was seen as particularly problematic 
since it gradually replaced the influence of other European institutions. Our interviewees 
pointed to the fact that the decision-making in the European Council was less transparent and 
gave the parliament fewer opportunities to influence the decision-making processes (see 
interview C3). Portugal, as a relatively small EU Member State, wished for a stronger role of 
the European Commission in the negotiations since the Commission was more likely to take 
into account the interests of smaller countries. As a result, the mood in the Portuguese 
parliament shifted throughout the programme. Although a large majority in Portugal is still in 
favour of membership in the economic and monetary Union, ‘Europe’ was increasingly 
blamed for not taking action decisively enough. Portuguese media regularly pointed to the 
fact that they had financially supported countries such as Finland after World War I; a fact 
largely neglected in Northern European countries (see interview C2). The huge majority in the 
Assembleia was challenged during the duration of the program on several occasions, but 
largely remained in place. This allowed Portugal to exit the program in 2014, despite the 
growing opposition in and outside the parliament. 
 
C.2.4.5 Conclusion Portuguese Case Study  
As outlined above, it is challenging to single out the influence of the Portuguese Assembleia 
on the negotiations of the MoU. The Memorandum of Understanding was agreed upon by 
Portuguese authorities and the ‘Troika’. Conflicts preceding this agreement can therefore not 
be detected comprehensively, but only approximated with interview evidence. There is, 
however, reason to assume that the Assembleia could not exercise significant influence during 
the execution of the programme. First, the government’s strategy was to implement the 
conditions of the MoU without delay. According to the government, the loss of sovereignty 
was primarily a result of high public debt levels. Spending cuts and fiscal adjustment were 
regarded as the only viable strategy to regain sovereignty. The government could only pursue 
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 “But even for me it's very difficult to accept and to understand why it takes so much time to solve all the 
problems. We need to have a parallel way; we can't say ‘Portugal, you have to solve your fiscal problems, your 
budgetary problems!’ Okay, we will do that, but at the same time my interest rates are three times more than in 
Germany, my unemployment rate is three or four times more than in Germany, I pay for energy four times more, 
I receive from the agriculture policy three times less than France and then they say ‘well, you have to be 
competitive, you have to go to the market. It's impossible’” (see interview C3). 
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this strategy because it could rely on a relatively broad majority in parliament, additionally 
supported by the major opposition party. This resembles the Irish case, and reveals a huge 
difference to the Greek Memorandum of Understanding (in which parliamentary majorities 
were often far from certain). Political stability was seen as a key factor to regain trust of 
market participants. Concerns by individual MPs or single political party groups were 
therefore not seriously taken into account. Secondly, the government’s approach was 
facilitated by the dominant position of the executive in the Portuguese political system. The 
government was able to implement a number of measures without explicit parliamentary 
approval. The prospect of early elections was likely to offer new political parties the chance to 
enter the parliament; a fact which welded together those parties with governmental 
responsibility. 
Third, no established parliamentary practices existed to handle the memorandum of 
understanding in the Assembleia. The confusion over the question which committee should 
take the lead in scrutinising bailout-related measures exemplifies this shortcoming. These 
factors help explaining why strong formal prerogatives in ESM affairs had not been a priority 
for Portuguese policy-makers. In the fsQCA, Portugal had been classified as an ideal case in 
which all conditions potentially accounting for strong ESM involvement had been absent (see 
again Table 22). The case study on Portugal revealed that the absence of all these factors is 
likely to have influenced the position of the Assembleia in the European Stability Mechanism 
significantly. Especially the deteriorating economic and financial situation has made any 
strong involvement of the Portuguese parliament in the execution of the bailout program 
practically impossible. 
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D. Conclusion 
The objective of this dissertation was the identification of determinants of parliamentary 
involvement in ESM affairs. To date only few academic contributions have systematically 
studied these varying parliamentary prerogatives (see A.1), or have comparatively analysed 
the budgetary constraints resulting from this newly established rescue mechanism (see A.2). 
This project intended to assist in the closure of this research gap. 
One major empirical insight is that parliamentary involvement is unevenly distributed across 
Member States. Therefore, the management of the Eurozone crisis has an asymmetric impact 
on national self-determination which strongly depends on whether a country receives or 
provides financial assistance. In addition, however, the debtor-creditor relations within the 
ESM created new financial dependencies among Eurozone countries. This restricts 
parliamentary autonomy – in donor and debtor countries alike. 
One major analytical insight is that the involvement of national parliaments politicises EMU 
decision-making. The EMU governance frame was initially designed as a rule-based system 
(preventing strong political interference from the national or European level). The 
involvement of nationally elected chambers deviates from this conception.  
Prominent political voices (for instance the former Italian Prime Minister Monti) explicitly 
suggested that governments should be less dependent on their parliaments throughout the 
management of the crisis. This discloses the inherent field of tension between democratic 
legitimacy on the one side and efficiency in EU and EMU decision-making on the other. The 
involvement of national parliaments in the ESM is a prime example of this pattern: Are they 
only vicarious agents of their national executives which can – at best – decelerate ESM 
decision-making? Or can their involvement add democratic legitimacy to decisions taken in 
the ESM framework? These questions have an empirical and a theoretical dimension which 
this dissertation addressed. 
Empirical Contribution 
In the absence of comparative empirical data, the project inductively gathered information on 
the parliamentary prerogatives in the ESM decision-making procedures of 18 Eurozone 
parliaments (see B.1). I developed a typology of parliamentary ESM involvement, 
distinguishing five types of parliaments: First, the quasi-veto powers are those parliaments 
that formally take a vote on each sovereign aid package and can also vote on the release of 
financial tranches therein:
137
 Estonia, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands possess these 
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 The plenary in these parliaments takes these decisions as a general rule. However, the accompanying 
provisions define specific circumstances under which decisions might be delegated to parliamentary committees 
(see German and Austrian case study: C.2.1 and C.2.2, but also again B.1).  
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far-reaching powers.
138
 Second, the partial veto-powers are those parliaments that formally 
approve each sovereign aid package, but which do not necessarily decide on the release of 
financial tranches therein. This applies to the Austrian Nationalrat. These two groups of 
parliaments possess the most far-reaching participation rights of all 18 Eurozone parliaments 
in the European Stability Mechanism. Their involvement is qualitatively different from the 
remaining three types. 
The third type consists of parliaments that play a consultative or political role only (France, 
Latvia, Italy and Spain). Although the government representatives are allowed to take 
decisions (in the ESM Board of Governors) without prior parliamentary approval, they must 
at least inform either the plenary or the budgetary committee in advance. Furthermore, these 
parliaments have been occasionally involved in the decision-making process although there 
was no legal requirement to do so. A fourth group of parliaments possesses information rights 
that are defined in the accompanying provisions of the ESM, but are not formally involved in 
the decision-making procedures. Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia receive 
information about ESM decision-making by their governments – although to slightly varying 
degrees. The remaining parliaments (Belgium, Cyprus, Greece and Slovakia) play no formal 
role in the European Stability Mechanism. 
Theoretical Contribution 
In order to theoretically explain the asymmetric parliamentary involvement, this project 
identified factors accounting for the establishment of firm accountability relations within the 
ESM (see B.2). I derived four guiding assumptions which are all based on a rational choice 
logic: Parliamentarians and political parties in all Eurozone parliaments have a rational 
interest in establishing firm accountability relations within the ESM in the first place. 
However, these preferences and interests are shaped and altered by internal and external 
factors. First, parliaments of countries in a favourable macro-economic situation establish 
stronger formal prerogatives since they have (economically) more to lose should the 
management of the crisis be unsuccessful. Second, Eurosceptical parties try to hold their 
governments accountable on the management of the crisis; in a response to these claims, 
national governments opt for stronger involvement of nationally elected chambers. Third, the 
institutional capacities of parliaments in EU affairs decisively determine ESM involvement. 
The ESM is an intergovernmental institution (in which parliaments have traditionally a 
weaker say). Only parliaments with firm participation rights in EU affairs possess the 
institutional capacities to transfer these powers to the intergovernmental ESM. And fourth, 
higher political and constitutional requirements to ratify the ESM treaty account for stronger 
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 Although only Germany’s share in the capital stock of the ESM results in a de-facto veto power of the 
German Bundestag, the refusal of financial assistance by one of these four chambers de-facto prevents a decision 
on a sovereign aid package since ESM-related decisions are taken by consensus. 
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parliamentary involvement. Opposition parties are able to negotiate side payments should the 
ratification process require their votes. 
None of these four guiding assumptions was expected to explain the full range of 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs, but rather a combination thereof. In particular, the 
simultaneous presence of a favourable macro-economic situation with either strong formal 
prerogatives in EU affairs or strong Eurosceptical sentiments was expected to explain strong 
parliamentary ESM involvement (see again B.2.5.). In this regard, the added value of the 
theoretical section of this thesis lies in the assumption of a configurational logic of conditions 
to explain ESM involvement.  
Methodological Contribution 
This logic has been tested in a fuzzy set comparative qualitative analysis (fsQCA, see B.3.1). 
This method has recently gained prominence in the study of the role of national parliaments in 
the EU political system, but has not been applied to the management of the crisis. FsQCA 
allowed for a systematic cross-case comparison of the 18 Eurozone parliaments under 
investigation. It was complemented by four in-depth case studies for which I have conducted 
29 expert interviews in Berlin, Dublin, Lisbon and Vienna (see B.3.2). This mixed-method 
design helped to address shortcomings of both case-oriented and variable-oriented research 
techniques. 
Empirical Findings: Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
The fsQCA revealed that a favourable macro-economic situation can be interpreted as a 
necessary condition for strong ESM parliamentary involvement. Economically strong 
countries have potentially more to lose should the management of the crisis be unsuccessful. 
The favourable macro-economic situation (relative to other Eurozone Member States) has set 
rational incentives for parliamentarians to secure strong parliamentary involvement. 
Parliamentarians may therefore claim that stronger involvement allows them to remain in 
control of decisions taken at the EU level. At the same time, strong parliamentary 
prerogatives in ESM affairs can be considered a luxury which only economically strong 
countries can afford. 
However, strong ESM prerogatives were only established when a favourable macro-economic 
situation occurred simultaneously with far-reaching formal prerogatives in EU affairs (see 
C.1.1). The major argument is that the endeavour to warrant an institutional say in EU affairs 
has heightened MPs’ awareness regarding their general role vis-à-vis the government (as 
elaborated in B.2.3, the strengthening of formal EU prerogatives has been an evolutionary 
process). MPs do not frivolously surrender powers that have been acquired in a cumbersome, 
lengthy process. These formal powers are the legacy of an historical development in which 
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(quite often a small group of) MPs and parliamentary party groups have established a stronger 
voice in EU affairs. In combination with rational incentives (established by a favourable 
macro-economic situation) it is conclusive to opt for stronger involvement in ESM affairs – 
even if this requires transferring parliamentary influence to a new intergovernmental setting. 
Weak formal involvement in ESM affairs, on the other side, was observed in all parliaments 
that were either in a difficult macro-economic situation, did not possess far-reaching 
participation rights in EU affairs, or both. The absence of these two conditions noticeably 
hampered strong ESM involvement while the absence of each condition on its own was not 
interpreted as sufficient to explain the negated outcome. In the majority of the thirteen cases 
under investigation (C.1.2), none or very few of the four conditions (developed in the 
theoretical chapter) had been present. This supports the robustness of the theoretical 
assumptions.  
The fsQCA also allowed shedding light on the question under which conditions the presence 
of a favourable macro-economic situation or firm formal EU prerogatives did not have an 
influence on a stronger role in ESM policy-making. Belgium, France, Malta and Luxembourg 
had been in a comparatively favourable macro-economic situation as of 2012, but none of 
them possessed strong formal EU prerogatives or strong Eurosceptical parties in their 
parliaments. The comparatively strong macro-economic situation might have set rational 
incentives to establish stronger participation rights; however, the simultaneous absence of 
distinct Eurosceptical sentiments or strong formal prerogatives in EU affairs has hindered the 
establishment of firm accountability relations within the ESM (see C.1.2).  
Empirical Findings: Case Study Analysis Germany and Austria 
Four case studies have been conducted to complement the findings of the fsQCA. In 
Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court has decisively influenced the far-reaching 
participation rights of the German Bundestag. Previous judgements had already contributed to 
a rising awareness among MPs concerning their role in European affairs. The unusually 
strong position of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) also released pressure 
from opposition parties to negotiate stronger ESM participation rights during the ratification 
of the ESM treaty. In recent years, the BVerfG emerged as the guarantor of parliamentary 
involvement. In contrast to many other countries, this has given the controversy regarding the 
Bundestag’s role in ESM affairs a strong legal dimension (see again C.2.1).  
In Austria the reliance on opposition support was a key factor for the Austrian Nationalrat to 
increase parliamentary prerogatives in ESM affairs. The German accompanying laws were 
cited as an example of how parliamentary involvement should be organised. The Austrian 
Green Party had therefore attempted to design parliamentary participation similar to that of 
the German Bundestag. The Austrian case study also exemplified that Eurosceptical 
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sentiments did not decisively impact on parliamentary prerogatives (see C.2.2). Parties in 
principled opposition to the ESM (and the EU) did not even consider negotiating stronger 
parliamentary prerogatives. This behaviour is rational: a large part of the electorate leaning 
towards Eurosceptical parties opposes the granting of financial assistance to Member States in 
financial predicament. 
Empirical Findings: Case Study Analysis Ireland and Portugal 
Ireland and Portugal were analysed to better understand the parliamentary processes leading 
to the drafting and implementation of the Memoranda of Understanding. The recipient states 
must implement structural reforms in exchange for financial assistance. The analysis revealed 
the difficulty in singling out the impact of the MoU on the reforms initiated in a recipient 
country. First, those Member States receiving financial assistance were characterised by a 
relatively strong executive vis-à-vis their national parliament. Second, some austerity 
measures had already been initiated and implemented before a Memorandum of 
Understanding was officially signed.  
Nonetheless, the Irish and Portuguese case studies revealed a somewhat (limited) variation 
regarding parliamentary involvement in the negotiations and implementation of the MoUs. 
The Irish Dáil Èireann took a formal vote on the Memorandum of Understanding under 
immense time pressure (the details of the programme had just been negotiated). The vote was 
neither prescribed in the Irish constitution nor originally envisaged by the Irish government, 
but resulted from political pressure (also from MPs of the governmental majority). The Irish 
MoU received the support of the governmental as well as the two major opposition parties. In 
Portugal, the Assembleia da República did not take a formal vote on the MoU.
139
 The 
eventual signing of the Memorandum of Understanding was thus an executive decision. 
In both countries, the request for financial assistance provoked the resignation of the 
incumbent governments while the in-coming governments received exceptionally high 
majorities in parliament. Both new governments attempted to implement the MoU measures 
without delay. The former opposition parties already played a decisive role in the negotiations 
leading to the MoUs. The large parliamentary majorities as well as the support of the then- 
opposition parties facilitated a timely implementation of the programmes. The programmes 
had nonetheless been politically contested; the support of opposition parties on key aspects of 
the programme facilitated, however, to secure parliamentary majorities throughout the 
duration of the programme (which is an important difference to the situation in Greece). 
The Irish and Portuguese MoUs differed in the degree to which they demanded structural and 
fiscal reforms. While the Irish government was obliged to substantially reform its banking 
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 Time pressure in the forefront of early elections made an involvement of the elected chamber impossible. 
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sector, Portugal had to implement additional structural reforms in order to increase its 
economic competitiveness. While parliamentary approval for the implementation of specific 
demands by the MoU was regularly obtained, it was only the Portuguese Constitutional Court 
that occasionally slowed down the implementation of the MoU by nullifying certain measures 
to reduce public spending. The interview evidence from both countries suggested that no 
significant parliamentary involvement was exerted in the negotiations or implementation of 
the MoUs. Although parliamentary party groups and MPs increasingly regarded the demands 
by MoUs as a severe impairment on their sovereignty and autonomy, Portugal and Ireland 
regularly secured parliamentary majorities throughout the duration of the programme. 
When the ESM was eventually ratified, a stronger role of the elected chambers in the day-to-
day policy-making of the European Stability Mechanism has not been a serious option in 
either of the two countries. In both settings, the ratification of the TSCG occupied a more 
prominent place than the ratification of the European Stability Mechanism. The ratification of 
the TSCG is conditional for the receipt of financial ESM assistance. At the same time, the 
prompt ratification of the Fiscal Compact was intended to signal financial markets that both 
countries were capable of consolidating their public budgets. Potential parliamentary 
involvement in the future granting of financial assistance had never been a serious 
consideration in either of these countries (see C.2.3 and C.2.4). Although both countries have 
already left the financial assistance programmes, ESM decision-making will remain an 
executive domain in Ireland and Portugal in the future. 
Limits of the Research Design 
As with every research design, the empirical observations contain limitations. Further insights 
could have been gained by extending the number of case studies. France and Belgium, for 
instance, are interesting cases for parliaments that have not adopted strong ESM participation 
rights – despite being in a relatively favourable macro-economic situation as of 2012. Also, a 
separate analysis of the responses of constitutional courts to the on-going crisis could add 
further insights to the question of national self-determination (which goes beyond the role of 
national parliaments). Due to time and data restrictions, the expansion of the analysis to these 
fields could not be realized. 
Furthermore, the typology of parliamentary involvement (see again B.1) was based on 
responses acquired by questionnaire. To increase the reliability of the data, all information has 
been cross-checked with publicly available sources and was partly complemented by 
additional interview evidence. Responses to the questionnaires revealed country-specific (and 
partly even parliament-specific) particularities of ESM involvement. Differences between the 
legal words of accompanying provisions and real-life practices require comprehensive 
background knowledge of each parliamentary setting. In order to reduce complexity, some of 
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these detailed accompanying provisions have been purposefully omitted. It can be noted that 
the typology of ESM involvement is too parsimonious. However, in the absence of empirical 
data in this field, this typology acts as a starting point to which additional information can be 
integrated. 
Other limitations arrive from the application of the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). 
QCA is deterministic in nature because it requires the identification of all relevant 
‘conditions’ to explain an outcome. To some extent, this is a problem that every statistical 
analysis faces (the control for alternative explanations also occurs in qualitative research 
designs). This challenge has been addressed by applying a mixed-method design which 
included qualitative case studies. The fsQCA served to identify deviating cases of 
parliamentary ESM involvement. 
A second challenge in QCA is the calibration process. Fs-values have been assigned to 
measure the presence or absence of the conditions developed in the theoretical section. No 
uniform and objective procedure exists to structure the calibration process. Although the 
different thresholds are linked to qualitative concepts – and therewith allow for quantitative 
differences within groups (see again B.3.1.1.2) – other researchers might have set slightly 
different thresholds. The calibration of the data (see B.4.2) was, however, carefully conducted 
and detailed explanations have been provided for every calibration decision. Although I 
cannot exclude that other researchers might calibrate the data in a different manner, I do not 
believe that different thresholds in the calibration process would have changed the empirical 
results of the fsQCA substantially.  
Contribution to the Existing Literature: Legitimacy in EMU Policy-Making 
With these limitations in mind, it is possible to integrate the empirical findings into a broader 
academic context. The empirical findings should be linked to the discussion on legitimacy and 
accountability in the current set up of the Economic and Monetary Union. Legitimacy is 
conventionally distinguished between an ‘input’ and an ‘output’ dimension. Input legitimacy 
is based on the idea that political choices reflect the 'will of the people' (Scharpf 1999: 7). 
Strong(er) parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs addresses this type of legitimacy 
concern. It establishes stronger accountability relations between a democratically elected 
national chamber and national government representatives. The asymmetry of parliamentary 
involvement indicates, however, that input legitimacy is unevenly distributed across Eurozone 
Member States. Parliamentary participation rights do not only differ between Eurozone and 
non-Eurozone countries, but also within the Eurozone itself. Decisions concerning financial 
assistance of the Austrian, Dutch, Estonian, Finish and German parliament consequently 
weigh more than those of other Eurozone Member States.  
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Output legitimacy, on the other side, refers to the idea that political choices effectively 
promote the common welfare (ibidem). This dimension is consequently not concerned with 
the institutional design of the rescue mechanism. Whether or not the establishment of the 
ESM promoted the common welfare is widely disputed. At least for the moment, financial 
assistance by the ESM has seemingly helped to prevent a collapse of the European banking 
system. This cannot, however, obscure the fact that the crisis had disastrous consequences in a 
number of EU Member States. The ESM might therefore only have delayed the collapse of 
the Eurozone for the time being. It has “bought time”, without necessarily addressing the 
structural causes of deficient modern capitalist systems (Streeck 2014). Output legitimacy is 
therefore also unevenly distributed across Eurozone Member States. 
The two dimensions of democratic legitimacy are of course not mutually exclusive, but 
ideally occur simultaneously. The current situation suggests, quite worryingly, that both 
dimensions are absent in several EU Member States. Every crisis weakens by its very 
definition the output legitimacy of a political system. In times of crisis, the democratic 
legitimacy therefore rests on the deduction of political decisions from the citizens’ will. The 
widely perceived lack of input-oriented elements of policy-making in EMU governance and 
the simultaneous deterioration of output-legitimacy is thus highly problematic.  
So far, input-oriented elements have been largely absent from the EMU governance 
framework. Similar to the creation of the single market, EMU governance is largely designed 
as a rule-based system. This system is characterised by the absence of politicisation of 
decision-making procedures (see in particular Alcidi et al. 2014: 15). The transfer of monetary 
competences to the European level, the (renewed) rules of the Stability and Growth Pact as 
well as the newly introduced Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance are all based 
on the idea that the same rules and targets are agreed upon at the European level and 
invariably apply to all countries. From its beginning, the Eurozone crisis has challenged these 
fundamentals of the Economic and Monetary Union
140
. The original idea is nonetheless that 
instruments (correcting, for instance, macro-economic imbalances) are applied as 
automatically as possible. The political interference from the EU or national level shall be 
eliminated, or at least reduced, by a strong rule-based system (ibidem).  
Following these arguments, the de-politicisation of decision-making has so far been largely 
advantageous for the setup of the EMU. The creation of the different rescue mechanisms – 
with (partly) strong parliamentary involvement – deviates from this conception.  
It seems no longer possible to de-politicize EMU decisions. The new rescue mechanism 
entails the allocation and redistribution of resources to an extent so far unknown (on the 
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 Examples are the breach of the no-bailout clause in the European Treaties (see again A.4.2), but also the 
violation of the SGP by Germany and France in the early 2000s as well as Greece’s fudged numbers to enter the 
Eurozone in 1999. 
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question of redistribution see Majone 1999; Moravcsik 2004). Politicisation, however, is 
likely to have spill-over effects to other basic principles of the Eurozone, such as the Stability 
and Growth Pact or general questions on whether a country may or may not enter the 
Eurozone. It is rather unlikely that politicisation can be restricted to the question of bailing out 
an individual country (de Wilde, Zürn 2012: 138). 
The involvement of national parliaments therefore makes an important difference. First, NPs’ 
involvement is desirable from an input-oriented point of view since redistributive policies 
require by definition a stronger basis of legitimacy than regulatory policies.
141
 Secondly, the 
involvement of national parliaments will inevitably slow down decision-making procedures 
and further politicise decision-making in the EMU governance framework.  
The negotiations of the extension of the Greek bailout programme in early 2015 provide 
evidence supporting this argument. The negotiations were, among other things, influenced by 
the upcoming parliamentary elections in Finland (in April 2015). As outlined in the previous 
chapters, the Finish parliament must give its consent to sovereign aid programmes and the 
release of tranches therein. The decision between a (new) third programme and an extension 
of the existing one was influenced by a simple political consideration: An extension required 
less parliamentary approval in a number of Eurozone Member States than a full new 
programme. It has also faced less parliamentary opposition in Finland.  
 
So far, national parliaments have consistently followed the propositions of their governments 
in ESM decision-making. However, a certain degree of politicisation in a single Eurozone 
Member State parliament is sufficient to block the issuing of financial guarantees in the 
future. The behaviour of the Finish government foreshadows the potential asymmetric impact 
of parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. The electoral cycle of parliaments with strong 
prerogatives in ESM affairs will decisively influence future decisions concerning sovereign 
aid programmes. Policy-makers must therefore become more responsive to the political 
demands of these parliaments. 
In my view, the current parliamentary involvement only marginally increases the overall 
input-legitimacy of the ESM. It risks aggravating parliamentary prerogatives of other elected 
chambers, especially when draft budgets are distributed to national parliaments for prior 
parliamentary attention. 
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 They are not pareto-efficient, i.e. they allocate resources from one country to another. Although the financial 
guarantees within the ESM are designed as repayable loans, they potentially pose a financial risk for donor 
countries. Financial guarantees to the ESM potentially make up one third of national annual budgets. Even if 
potential guarantees and actual expenditures cannot be compared directly, the sheer amount of financial loans 
makes an involvement of nationally elected chambers desirable. 
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Future Research 
Although the ESM was already established in late 2012, the number of sovereign aid 
packages it provided to date has been limited. Only the Spanish banking sector, Cyprus and 
Greece (in August 2015) have so far received assistance from the European Stability 
Mechanism while previous packages were decided under the EFSF/EFSM mechanisms. This 
is why this study primarily dealt with the establishment and ratification of the European 
Stability Mechanism. The empirical evidence for the parliamentary day-to-day handling of the 
ESM remains limited until today.  
Future research should therefore focus on a detailed analysis of past and current ESM 
programmes. What impact do strong parliamentary prerogatives have on negotiations at the 
EU level within the ESM framework? Can politicisation in a single Eurozone parliament 
prevent the grating of financial assistance? Will the demand for stronger ESM parliamentary 
prerogatives increase in other Eurozone parliaments during the further management of the 
crisis? And how will this asymmetric parliamentary involvement impact on the EMU 
governance framework as a whole? 
The significance of the European Stability Mechanism is likely to increase in the future. With 
the establishment of the European Banking Union in late 2014, the ESM can now directly 
recapitalize banks of Eurozone Member States. In such a system, the ESM makes decisions 
with immense redistributive consequences – and only one third of Eurozone parliaments are 
able to influence these decisions. 
Such a system – in which few parliaments of economically strong Member States occupy a 
dominant position – is unlikely to find broad political support in the long run. This 
consideration might fuel the debate of alternatives to the current setup of the European 
Stability Mechanism. 
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F. Appendix 
F.1 Questionnaire: Parliamentary participation rights within the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
Parliament: *** 
1. Does your parliament take a vote on each sovereign aid packages within the ESM framework? 
Answer Further explications/comments 
Yes  
If yes, which parliamentary body is responsible? The plenary, a committee, or 
a special committee established for that specific purpose? 
  
2. Does your parliament decide on each financial tranche of sovereign aid packages (or modifications of the sovereign aid packages)? 
Answer Further explications/comments 
Yes  
If yes, which parliamentary body is responsible? The plenary, a committee, or 
a special committee established for that specific purpose? 
No  
If the government exclusively decides, is it nonetheless obliged to inform 
specific parliamentary bodies in advance? If yes, which ones? 
 
3. Is the government obliged to report on activities within the ESM framework? 
Answer Further explications/comments 
Yes. If yes, please specify. Does it provide annual or quarterly reports? Is the 
entire plenary informed or only specific committees? 
 
No  
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Table 38: Study Deutsche Bank on EFSF parliamentary participation rights 
 
Source 59: Deutsche Bank Research 2011, http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000280052.pdf. 
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Table 39: Parliamentary participation rights in the ESM
142
  
Country Does your parliament take a vote on each sovereign aid packages 
within the ESM framework? 
2. Does your parliament decide on each financial 
tranche of sovereign aid packages (or modifications of 
the sovereign aid packages)? 
3. Is the government obliged to report on activities 
within the ESM framework? 
Austria Yes: 
The plenary of the National Council has to mandate the Austrian 
representatives in the ESM Board of Governors (resp. in the Board of 
Directors) to consent to or abstain from a vote on granting, in principle, 
stability support to an ESM Member [Art. 50b Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz 
in conjunction with § 74d (1) Geschäftsordnungsgesetz-Nationalrat] Only 
in case of urgency such a mandate may be issued by the competent 
Standing Sub-Committee [§ 74d (2) Geschäftsordnungsgesetz]. 
 
The competent Standing Sub-Committee has to mandate the Austrian 
representatives in the ESM Board of Governors (resp. in the Board of 
Directors) to consent to or abstain from a vote on a financial assistance 
facility agreement [§ 32h (1) no. 4 Geschäftsordnungsgesetz]. Such a vote 
shall be followed by a plenary debate. This debate will only have 
informative character. 
No: 
The competent Standing Sub-Committee has to mandate 
the Austrian representatives in the ESM Board of 
Governors (resp. in the Board of Directors) to consent to 
or abstain from a vote changing instruments without 
amending the amount of a given financial stability facility 
[§ 32h (1) no. 5 Geschäftsordnungsgesetz]. Such a vote 
shall also be followed by a plenary debate that has only 
informative character. 
 
However, parliament does not decide on each financial 
tranche of sovereign aid packages. 
Yes: 
The Minister of Finance provides quarterly reports which 
will be scrutinised by the competent Standing Sub-
Committee and which will be published on the 
parliamentary website. Also, the Rules of Procedure 
(Geschäftsordnungsgesetz) foresee a number of 
government duties to report according to its Annex 3. 
Belgium No143 No No formal obligation 
Cyprus No: 
The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus provides for a presidential 
political system with a strict separation of powers. Therefore the 
legislative power, i.e. the House of Representatives does not have such 
competences.  
No: 
There is no such obligation. However, if a Parliamentary 
Committee decides to discuss this issue, it can invite or 
summon any interested person or authority to provide 
information and evidence or to express and elaborate 
views and opinions on the matter under debate.  
No: 
Unless a Parliamentary Committee enters such a matter 
for debate as explained above. 
                                                 
142
 Complete answers to the questionnaires. 
143
 No Belgian representative responded to the questionnaire in writing. Information is based on a telephone interview with a representative of the Belgium permanent 
representation in June 2013. 
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Estonia Yes: 
The in the Act it is written that each new sovereign aid 
packages (memorandum of understanding/ MoU) within the 
ESM framework is voted in the plenary (and the Finance 
Committee would be the leading committee). In specific cases 
only to European Affairs Committee. 
§ 5 Memorandum of internal proceeding  
(1) a draft memorandum to vote and voting on the matter 
requires a prior decision of the Riigikogu Representative of 
the Republic of Estonia. 
(2) The Government may submit a draft memorandum, with 
the exception of Article 14, paragraph 2, Article 16, paragraph 
2 and Article 17 paragraph 2 of the draft memorandum, 
instead of the Riigikogu (Riigikogu Rules and Procedures Act 
§ 1521, paragraph 2) to European Affairs Committee to take a 
position as a memorandum draft disclosure could jeopardize 
the stability of the ESM's grant objectives. The Government 
justifies the submission of a memorandum to the European 
Affairs Committee. 
(3) shall apply to the processing of the draft Memorandum of 
§ 4, paragraph 1, second sentence, and paragraphs 3 and 4. 
Yes: 
All the decision making should be in the plenary but considering that 
some changes that are made in the MoU are minor or the MoU itself 
is confidential (before the decision is done in the ESM board) or the 
time limit is crucial then the Government may submit a draft 
memorandum to European Affairs Committee. And then the decision 
is made by the European Affairs Committee. The Government must 
justify the submission of the memorandum to the European Affairs 
Committee.  
§ 6 Memorandum of changes in domestic proceedings  
(1) amend the Memorandum to vote and voting on the matter requires 
a prior decision of the Riigikogu Representative of the Republic of 
Estonia. 
(2) The Government may, in subsection 1 shall submit a draft 
memorandum instead of the Riigikogu (Riigikogu Rules and 
Procedures Act § 1521, paragraph 2) to European Affairs Committee 
for consideration if: 
1) Memorandum, with the exception of Article 14, paragraph 2, 
Article 16, paragraph 2 and Article 17 paragraph 2 of the 
memorandum, a draft disclosure could endanger the stability of the 
ESM's target award, or 
2) a memorandum amending the amounts are insignificant and that 
the changes are not related to a stable volume expansion. 
(3) The Government justified under paragraph 2 of this section, the 
Commission submitted a draft memorandum. 
Yes: 
In the law it is written that the Government must annually 
inform Riigikogu (plenary) about the ESMs contributions. 
But the European Affairs Committee is continuously up to 
date because it is discussed in euro group (and Ecofin 
Council).  
§ 8 Informing parliament ESM's activities  
(1) The Government will provide an overview of the 
annual session of the Riigikogu ESM's contributions and 
Estonia’s participation in the ESM. 
(2) The Government or the authority of the Minister of 
Finance of the Riigikogu shall notify in writing 
immediately if: 
1) the application of stability support is made; 
2) take a decision to terminate the emergency reserve 
fund; 
3) ESM Member's contract or agreement does not comply 
with the obligation imposed by the Treaty of the Republic 
of Estonia and a significant increase in the capital 
requirement for the risk of liability for the payment of 
realization. 
Finland Yes: 
Yes; Grand Committee 
 
Yes: 
In principle decided by the Grand Committee, with the understanding 
that individual tranches would not be voted on if they are covered by 
the original aid package, with no serious questions about eligibility 
for payment. 
Yes: 
The government is obliged to seek a mandate before every 
Board of Governors meeting and to report afterwards, and 
to provide a report before and after each Board of 
Directors meeting, unless the BoD meeting’s agenda 
manifestly does not affect the powers of the Eduskunta. 
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France No: 
II : Le Parlement a été appelé à se prononcer à l’origine lors de 
l’examen de la loi n°2012-354 du 14 mars 2012 de finances 
rectificative pour 2012, qui a créé le programme 336 Dotation 
en capital du Mécanisme européen de stabilité et a ainsi 
autorisé le versement de la part de la France au capital du 
MES soit 16,3 milliards d’euros représentant 20,3% du dit 
capital. 
III : Dans les conditions et les formes prévues par le traité 
instituant le mécanisme européen de stabilité (MES), les 
différentes facilités financières sont octroyées sur décision du 
Conseil des gouverneurs, qui est composé des membres des 
gouvernements chargés des finances de chacun des États 
membres du MES. Aussi les assemblées parlementaires, et 
donc l’Assemblée nationale et le Sénat, n’interviennent pas 
dans le processus décisionnel du MES. 
No: 
II : Le Gouvernement décide par le biais du ministre de l’économie et 
des finances qui siège au conseil des gouverneurs du MES. En vertu 
de l’article 33 de la loi n°2012-354 du 14 mars 2012 de finances 
rectificatives pour 2012, le Gouvernement est tenu d’informer les 
commissions chargées des finances de l’Assemblée nationale et du 
Sénat lorsque le conseil des gouverneurs adopte les décisions 
suivantes : 
La modification du capital autorisé du MES et l’adaptation de sa 
capacité de prêt maximale ; 
L’octroi d’un soutien à la stabilité du MES y compris la 
conditionnalité de politique économique ; 
La modification de la politique et des lignes directrices concernant la 
tarification de l’assistance financière ; 
La modification de la liste des instruments d’assistance financière à la 
disposition du MES. 
III : Ainsi que l’indique la réponse précédente, le Parlement 
n’intervient pas dans le processus décisionnel du MES et n’est donc 
pas consulté sur le versement des différentes tranches de l’assistance 
financière. 
 
Yes: 
I. The Government is obliged to report on ESM activities 
each trimester (information about balance sheet and profit 
and loss) and to inform the Parliament when the ESM 
governor council takes decisions on the basis of d, f, h and 
i of 6. of article 5 of the treaty establishing the ESM 
(including decisions on aid packages). 
II. En vertu de l’article 33 de la loi n°2012-354 du 14 
mars 2012 de finances rectificatives pour 2012, le 
Gouvernement transmet aux commissions de l’Assemblée 
nationale et du Sénat chargées des finances la synthèse 
trimestrielle de la situation financière du mécanisme 
européen de stabilité ainsi que le compte de profits et 
pertes faisant ressortir les résultats de ses opérations , 
prévus à l’article 27 du traité instituant le MES. 
III : En application de l’article 33 de la loi n° 2012-354 du 
mars 2012 de finances rectificative pour 2012, le 
Gouvernement doit transmettre, chaque trimestre, aux 
commissions des finances de l’Assemblée nationale et du 
Sénat la synthèse de la situation financière du MES. En 
outre, lorsque le Conseil des gouverneurs du MES décide 
une modification du capital autorisé du Mécanisme ou 
l'adaptation de sa capacité de prêt maximale, l'octroi d'un 
soutien à la stabilité, la modification de la politique et des 
lignes directrices concernant la tarification de l'assistance 
financière, ou encore la modification de la liste des 
instruments d'assistance financière à la disposition du 
MES, le ministre chargé de l’économie doit également en 
informer les commissions des finances du Parlement 
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Germany Yes: 
§ 4 Absatz 1 ESM-Finanzierungsgesetz (ESMFinG) 
 
(2) In den Fällen, die die haushaltspolitische 
Gesamtverantwortung betreffen, darf die Bundesregierung 
einem Beschlussvorschlag in Angelegenheiten des 
Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus durch ihren Vertreter 
nur zustimmen oder sich bei einer Beschlussfassung enthalten, 
nachdem das Plenum hierzu einen zustimmenden Beschluss 
gefasst hat. Ohne einen solchen Beschluss des Plenums muss 
der deutsche Vertreter den Beschlussvorschlag ablehnen. Der 
Vertreter der Bundesregierung hat an der Beschlussfassung 
teilzunehmen. 
Yes: 
for modifications: decision by budget committee required for 
“essential” modifications, cf. § 5 Absatz 2 ESMFinG 
but no for tranches: govt has to inform budget committee: § 5 Absatz 
3 ESMFinG 
 
§5 (2) ESMFinG: Der vorherigen Zustimmung des 
Haushaltsausschusses bedürfen: 
1. Entscheidungen über die Bereitstellung zusätzlicher Instrumente 
ohne Änderung des Gesamtfinanzierungsvolumens einer 
bestehenden Finanzhilfefazilität oder wesentliche Änderungen der 
Bedingungen der Finanzhilfefazilität, 
  
2. Beschlüsse über den Abruf von Kapital nach Artikel 9 Absatz 1 
des Vertrags zur Einrichtung des Europäischen 
Stabilitätsmechanismus sowie die Annahme oder wesentliche 
Änderung der Regelungen und Bedingungen, die für Kapitalabrufe 
nach Artikel 9 Absatz 4 des Vertrags zur Einrichtung des 
Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus gelten, 
 
§5 (3) ESMFinG: In den nicht von Absatz 2 erfassten Fällen, die die 
Haushaltsverantwortung des Deutschen Bundestages berühren, hat 
die Bundesregierung den Haushaltsausschuss zu beteiligen und seine 
Stellungnahmen zu berücksichtigen. Dies gilt insbesondere bei 
Beschlüssen über die Auszahlung einzelner Tranchen der gewährten  
Stabilitätshilfe. 
Yes: 
cf. § 7 ESMFinG 
(1) Die Bundesregierung hat den Deutschen Bundestag 
und den Bundesrat in Angelegenheiten dieses Gesetzes 
umfassend, zum frühestmöglichen Zeitpunkt, fortlaufend 
und in der Regel schriftlich zu unterrichten. Sie hat dem 
Deutschen Bundestag in Angelegenheiten, die seine 
Kompetenzen betreffen, Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme zu 
geben und seine Stellungnahmen zu berücksichtigen. 
(2) Die Bundesregierung übermittelt dem Deutschen 
Bundestag alle ihr zur Verfügung stehenden Dokumente 
zur Ausübung der Beteiligungsrechte des Deutschen 
Bundestages. Sie übermittelt diese Dokumente auch dem 
Bundesrat. 
(3) Dem besonderen Schutzbedürfnis laufender 
vertraulicher Verhandlungen tragen der Deutsche 
Bundestag und der Bundesrat durch eine vertrauliche 
Behandlung Rechnung. 
(4) Im Falle des Stabilitätshilfeersuchens einer 
Vertragspartei des Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus 
nach Artikel 13 Absatz 1 des Vertrags zur Einrichtung des 
Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus übermittelt die 
Bundesregierung dem Deutschen Bundestag und dem 
Bundesrat binnen sieben Tagen nach Antragstellung 
eine erste Einschätzung zu Inhalt und Umfang der 
beantragten Hilfen. Beabsichtigt die Bundesregierung, 
der Gewährung von Stabilitätshilfe nach Artikel 13 Absatz 
2 des Vertrags zur Einrichtung des Europäischen 
Stabilitätsmechanismus zuzustimmen, übermittelt sie 
rechtzeitig eine umfassende Einschätzung zu Inhalt und 
Umfang der beantragten Hilfen sowie eine Stellungnahme 
zu der Bewertung der Europäischen Kommission nach 
Artikel 13 Absatz 1 des Vertrags zur Einrichtung des 
Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus und eine 
Abschätzung der finanziellen Folgen. 
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Greece I: Greece is recipient of an aid package and is a stepping out 
guarantor. There is no vote in Parliament. 
II: A bill is being debated and voted in the Standing 
Committee on Economic Affairs of the Hellenic Parliament. 
After that, the Plenary of the Parliament also debates on the 
bill and votes by simple majority. 
I: Whenever the Greek MOU is updated Government informs the 
Economic and European Affairs Committee. 
II: The Hellenic Parliament does not vote on the amount of the 
tranches and cannot propose any such modifications, as this is not 
provided by the Standing Orders of the Parliament. Any past 
amendments on relevant conventions concerned only legal and 
technical issues. However, the Parliament is asked to ratify such 
conventions by a YES or NO vote. 
I: No. 
II: No. 
Ireland No No Under the European Stability Mechanism Act 2012, in 
Section 8, the Minister of Finance, is required to report to 
the lower house of parliament, the aggregate value of 
contributions made by the State to the authorised capital 
stock of the ESM during a reporting period and 
cumulatively, up to the end of a reporting period. 
Italy Rather No 
Decisions taken within the ESM framework can be ruled by 
the general provision of the law n. 234/2012, whereby the 
Government is required to consult the Houses on agreements 
entailing the introduction or strengthening of financial or 
monetary rules that have significant consequences on the 
public finances and to ensure that the its position on European 
negotiations takes into account the parliamentary policy 
settings acts. In the event that the Government is unable to 
adhere to the policies as indicated by the Houses, the 
Government shall report and explain the reasons thereof. 
Rather No 
Decisions taken within the ESM framework can be ruled by the 
general provision of the law n. 234/2012, whereby the Government is 
required to consult the Houses on agreements entailing the 
introduction or strengthening of financial or monetary rules that have 
significant consequences on the public finances and to ensure that the 
its position on European negotiations takes into account the 
parliamentary policy settings acts. In the event that the Government is 
unable to adhere to the policies as indicated by the Houses, the 
Government shall report and explain the reasons thereof. 
No 
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Latvia No 
II: According to the law the Latvian representative on the 
Board of Governors (in Latvia it is a minister of Finance) have 
to obtain the consent of the Cabinet of Ministers when 
deciding to grant a stability support to the ESM Member state 
concerned in the form of a financial assistance facility. 
The parliamentary involvement is not a legal requirement. 
 
In given situation it was the political will of the minister of 
Finance to inform the European Affairs Committee of the 
Saeima about the third sovereign aid package for Greece.  
For your information, the European Affairs Committee of the 
Saeima approved the official position of the Republic of 
Latvia about the third sovereign aid package for Greece within 
the scope of the upcoming Eurogroup meeting agenda (not the 
mandate to vote in the ESM Board of Governors). 
No.  
Government is not obliged to inform the parliament about decisions 
on the financial tranche of sovereign aid packages (or modifications 
of the sovereign aid packages). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It depends on the nature of the decision at hand; the 
Latvian representatives on the Board of Governors will 
have to obtain the consent of the Saeima, the Budget and 
Finance (Taxation) Committee of the Saeima or the 
Cabinet of Ministers. Latvian representatives shall seek 
the consent of the parliamentary vote when deciding on: 
(1) changes in the authorised capital stock, (2) changes to 
the maximum lending volume, (3) changes of the list of 
financial assistance instruments. Latvian representative 
shall seek the consent of the Budget and Finance 
(Taxation) Committee of the Saeima vote when deciding 
on: (1) unpaid capital calls, (2) whether or not to take into 
account the possible contribution keys update to the 
European Central Bank’s subscribed capital, if it increases 
the Latvian subscribed authorised capital stock. 
The government each year shall be submitted to the 
Parliament a report on the European Stability Mechanism.  
Activities within ESM framework are discussed in the 
Eurogroup, ECOFIN meetings. According to the Rules of 
Procedure of the Saeima the European Affairs Committee 
of the Saeima shall examine and adopt the official 
positions of the Republic of Latvia before they are 
communicated to European Union institutions as well as 
to the Eurogroup and ECOFIN. This is complementary 
tool to the regulation on Latvia’s representation at the 
institutions of the European Stability Mechanism – the 
Board of Governors and the Board of Directors. 
II (addition September 2015): Latvian representative shall 
seek the consent of the Budget and Finance (Taxation) 
Committee of the Saeima vote when deciding on: (1) 
unpaid capital calls, (2) whether or not to take into 
account the possible contribution keys update to the 
European Central Bank’s subscribed capital, if it increases 
the Latvian subscribed authorised capital stock. The 
government (the Cabinet of Ministers) each year shall be 
submitted to the Parliament a report on the European 
Stability Mechanism.  
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Luxembourg No No Yes 
In addition to the laws approving the ESM, the Chamber 
of Deputies adopted a motion asking the government to 
report systematically to the Finance and Budget 
Committee prior to a meeting of the Council of Governors 
of the ESM in order “to set forth and discuss” the position 
of the Luxembourg Governor. The Committee is also 
informed on the outcome and the financial implications of 
the meetings of the Council of Governors 
Malta No No Yes, but optional 
Answer of the Maltese Finance Minster: “we can be 
summoned to report on the activities of the ESM before 
the Public Accounts Committee of the national 
parliament.” 
Netherlands Yes: 
The Dutch Government needs to assure that there is a (simple) 
majority in the plenary of the Dutch House of Representatives 
on: 
- on each sovereign aid package as such. 
- on the respective additional budget law 
This could be done by voting. 
Yes: 
Yes, all the financial tranches and modifications with regard to the 
sovereign aid packages are discussed and decided on in the Financial 
Affairs committee and/or the Plenary of the Dutch House of 
Representatives. Government needs to assure that there is a (simple) 
majority in the Dutch House of Representatives. This could be done 
by voting. 
Yes: 
Yes, the Dutch Government is held to inform the House 
of Representatives (plenary) on all decision of the 
EFSF/ESM in order to be discussed ex ante in a public 
debate. In practice and most of the time this is done in 
anticipation of the regular debates on the Government 
position in the Eurogroup and Ecofin Council.  
Portugal No No 
According to the Portuguese legal framework applied for EFSF 
purposes and that may be used, as well, for ESM purposes, the 
Government shall inform the Parliament, within 1 month, on the 
justification, terms and conditions of operations made regarding aid 
packages. Additionally, every 6 months the Government shall inform 
the Parliament of the execution of these operations. The document is 
sent to the Committee on Budget, Finance and Public Administration 
Yes: 
Through the Law on the State Budget for 2013, approved 
by the Parliament, the Portuguese Government was 
authorized to assume its share on the ESM, until the due 
limit. 
As regards as activities within the ESM framework, the 
Government may decide to apply the same rules as the 
EFSF, as previously referred: inform the Parliament, 
within 1 month, on the justification, terms and conditions 
of operations made regarding aid packages; and, every 6 
months, inform the Parliament of the execution of these 
operations. 
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Slovakia No 
There is no legal requirement in the Slovak Republic to 
involve the Slovak parliament or its parliamentary committees 
to adopt the potential decisions outlined in your email. 
However, we cannot rule out a theoretical possibility, in which 
a political decision could be made to bring the discussion on 
these proposal into the parliament or parliamentary bodies. 
No No 
Slovenia No No No 
But the Government presents the main elements of the 
financial programme and the total amount of the 
programme to the Committee on EU Affairs. 
Spain No No Se remite únicamente informe anual elaborado por el 
Mecanismo Europeo de Estabilidad que se remite al 
Consejo de Gobernadores 
Source 60: Own presentation, based on questionnaires send to parliamentary administrations and deputies of the respective chambers. In italics, treaty provisions mentioned in 
the responses have directly been inserted. The responses can be found in the separate appendix of the thesis (on CD-ROM): For Austria see QESMPR_Austria_2013-01-13; for 
Cyprus see QESMPR_Cyprus_2013-02-18; for Estonia see QESMPR_Estonia_2013-01-31; for Finland see: QESMPR_Finland_2013-01-16; For France see: QESMPR_France I 
2013-01-30, QESMPR_France II 2014-03-06 and QESMPR_France III 2014-04-10; for Germany see: QESMPR_Germany 2013-02-14 and ESMFinG, available from: 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/esmfing/gesamt.pdf (last accessed: 14.03.2014); for Greece see QESMPR_Greece 2014-04-04 and QESMPR_Greece II 2014-04-
10; for Ireland see QESMPR_Ireland 201-03-26, for Italy see: QESMPR_Italy 2013-04-22, for Latvia see: QESMPR_Latvia 2014-09-26, for Luxembourg see: 
QESMPR_Luxembourg 2013-03-31, for Malta see: QESMPR_Malta 2014-02-04, for the Netherlands: see QESMPR_Netherlands 2014-07-22, for Portugal see: 
QESMPR_Portugal 2013-02-12, for Slovakia see: QESMPR_Slovkia I 2014-01-28, QESMPR_Slovakia II 2014-02-03, QESMPR_Slovakia II 2014-02-04; QESMPR_Slovakia 
IV 2014-02-04; QESMPR_Slovakia V 2015-07-09, for Slovenia see: QESMPR_Slovenia 2013-04-23; for Spain see: QESMPR_Spain 2014-04-04. 
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F.2 Interview Guide 
Table 40: Interview guide (OPAL): financial/debt crisis 
Oliver Höing/ Katrin Auel, October 2012 
 
 
 
[…] We are interested in MPs’ views on how the financial crisis has and possibly will in the future affect the 
work of parliament and MPs. In particular, we would suggest asking questions on the following topics: 
 
Parliament’s involvement in the crisis management:  
• Where MPs informed fully and in time, did they get involved in the decision-making and how? Or has the 
government used the fact that many of the measures are based on intergovernmental Treaties etc. outside the 
EU legal framework to define them as foreign policy and thus to bypass EU scrutiny procedures or 
parliamentary involvement (esp. EFSF, ESM, Fiscal Compact)? If they have weak formal powers, do they 
try to get involved informally? 
• Did the crisis result in a fundamental weakening, strengthening of parliament or no real change? Which 
measures/ instruments/ institutions do MPs see as especially problematic in terms of parliamentary 
involvement/legitimacy?  
• How involved is parliament in the actual transposition (implementation) of the EU legal provisions into 
domestic law (e.g. Six-Pack, European Semester) and the day-to-day decisions made within the EFSF and 
ESM?  
• How well do different committees cooperate on ‘crisis questions’?  
• Do MPs feel that the crisis has led to a greater politicisation of the EU/EU issues in general within 
parliament/public opinion? Has this led to a Europeanisation/greater attention to EU issues in parliament in 
general/in committees apart from the EAC? 
• Have the decisions on the German Constitutional Court on the rights/involvement of the Bundestag had an 
impact on executive-legislative relations in their own parliament (BT as role model/signalling effect)? 
 
General interest 
• Impact of crisis on inter-parliamentary cooperation (greater incentives to exchange information or to 
cooperate?) 
• Impact of crisis on the role and involvement of the administration (e.g. are MPs (even) more dependent on 
expertise of administration?) 
• Do MPs feel that given the different strength of parliaments in crisis management, but also the division 
between donors and recipients of financial assistance has led to different ‘classes’ of parliaments? 
 
See next pages for info on different reforms/legal framework, parliamentary involvement in the EFSF and 
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decisions by the German FCC. We do not expect that interviewers can cover all aspects in depth. These 
questions are the ones we would find most helpful to get answers on, but they are meant as suggestions only. 
We feel that it might be easier to organise interviews on the more general questions. In reality, interviewers 
were dealing with three sub-cases (i.e. the European Semester, ESM and Fiscal Compact) while at the same 
time the number of interviews that can be done remains limited. However, if you do have interviews with MPs, 
who can provide you with detailed background information on how parliament deals/dealt with the three 
specific measures we first selected for the case study, it might be a good idea to milk them for all that it is 
worth. 
Source 61: Own presentation. 
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Table 41: Interview guide (OPAL): Portugal and Ireland 
OPAL – Interview Guide Portugal and Ireland, 
June 2013 
 
 
The Lisbon Treaty and parliament’s involvement in EU affairs 
 
 Would you say that the reform of the EU scrutiny system in 2011 had a huge impact on parliament’s 
involvement in EU affairs? If yes, in how far? Please elaborate. 
 Did the Lisbon Treaty lead to a significant change of the scrutiny of EU affairs (rising awareness of EU issues, 
more personal resources, increased politicisation)? If yes, in how far? Please elaborate. 
Parliament’s involvement in the crisis management  
 How did the parliament accompany and scrutinise instruments such as the EFSF, ESM or the Fiscal Compact?  
 In how far was the parliamentary handling of these measures different from the scrutiny of ordinary EU affairs?  
 Was the scrutiny of European Council meetings intensified? 
 Which influence does the parliament have in the day-to-day decision-making of the EFSF/ESM? 
 Could the parliament influence the negotiations of the memoranda of understanding? 
 How were the TSCG and especially the debt brake rule implemented; which role did the parliament play?  
 Can the parliament influence the drafting of the National Reform Programmes within the European Semester? 
 Did the crisis result in a fundamental weakening/strengthening of the parliament? 
 Which measures/ instruments/ institutions do you see as especially problematic in terms of parliamentary 
involvement and legitimacy? 
Source 62: Together with Claudia Hefftler, own compilation of the authors.  
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Table 42: Interview Guide: Case Study Austria 
Sehr geehrter ***** 
 
Mein Name ist Oliver Höing, ich bin Doktorand der Politikwissenschaften an der Universität zu 
Köln und promiviere zum Thema parlamentarische Beteiligungsrechte im Europäischen 
Stabilitätsmechanismus (ESM). 
Der österreichische Gesetzgeber hat starke Beteiligungsrechte des Parlamentes im ESM 
durchgesetzt, insbesondere im Vergleich zu anderen Staaten der Eurozone und den vorherigen 
Mitwirkungsmöglichkeiten in der Europäischen Finanzstabilierungsfazilität (EFSF). 
Wie werden diese Beteiligungsrechte in der Praxis umgesetzt? Wie, und in welchem Umfang 
informiert die Regierung das österreichische Parlament über laufende Hilfsprogramme innerhalb 
des Rettungsschirmes? Welche parlamentarischen Akteure sind beteiligt? Und welche 
praktischen Schwierigkeiten ergeben sich in der Umsetzung der formalen Beteiligungsrechte? 
Diesen Fragen gehe ich unter anderem in meinem Dissertationsvorhaben nach. Österreich ist 
dabei eine wichtige Fallstudie; die konkrete Mitwirkung des Parlamentes war Gegenstand 
politischer Diskussionen.  
Gerne würde ich Sie zu diesen Fragen in der Woche 16.-19. Februar für circa 30 Minuten in 
einem kurzen Experteninterview befragen. Ich sichere Ihnen dafür selbstverständlich strikte 
Anonymität zu. Die Aussagen in den Interviews dienen als spezifisches Hintergrundwissen für 
die Erstellung der Fallstudie. 
Ich freue mich über einen Terminvorschlag Ihrerseits und verbleibe mit freundlichen Grüßen 
Oliver Höing, Mag. 
 
Source 63: Own presentation. 
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F.3 Data on independent variables 
F.3.1 Credit ratings 
Table 43: Rating scale: Moody’s, Standard& Poor’s and Fitch 
Own 
operationalisation 
Moody’s S&P  Fitch Description 
16 Aaa AAA AAA Prime (Triple A) 
15 Aa1 AA+ AA+ 
High grade 14 Aa2 AA AA 
13 Aa3 AA- AA- 
12 A1 A+ A+ 
Upper Medium grade 11 A2 A A 
10 A3 A- A- 
9 Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 
Lower Medium grade 8 Baa2 BBB BBB 
7 Baa3 BBB- BBB- 
6 Ba1 BB+ BB+ Non-Investment grade 
5 Ba2 BB BB speculative 
4 Ba3 BB- BB- 
 
3 B1 B+ B+ 
Highly Speculative 2 B2 B B 
1 B3 B- B- 
0 
 
Caa1; Caa2; 
Caa3; Ca; C 
CCC+; 
CCC; CCC-
; CC; C; D 
CCC; DDD 
Substantial risks: 
Extremely speculative: 
in default with little 
prospect for recovery; 
in default. 
Source 64: The table was taken from Wikipedia (http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ratingagentur; last 
accessed 7 December, 2014) and cross-checked with information from the homepage of the rating 
agencies. 
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Table 44: Credit Rating Moody’s between 2010 and 2012 
Country April 2010 
Sep 
 2011 
Jan 
2012 
June 2012 
Oct 
2012 
Austria Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa 
Belgium Aa1 Aa1 Aa1 Aa1 Aa3 
Cyprus A2 Baa1 Baa3 Ba1 Ba3 
Estonia A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 
Finland Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa 
France Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa 
Germany Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa 
Greece B1 Ca Ca C C 
Ireland Baa3 Ba1 Ba1 Ba1 Ba1 
Italy Aa2 Aa2 A2 A3 Baa2 
Latvia  Baa3 Baa3 Baa3 Baa3 Baa3 
Luxembourg Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa 
Malta A1 A1 A2 A3 A3 
Netherlands Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa Aaa 
Portugal A1 Ba2 Ba2 Ba3 Ba3 
Slovak 
Republic 
A1 A1 A1 A2 A2 
Slovenia Aa2 Aa2 Aa3 A2 Baa2 
Spain Aa1 Aa2 A1 A3 Baa3 
Source 65: Own presentation. Information was taken from: 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AonYZs4MzlZbdDdpVmxmVXpmUTJCcm0yYT
V2UWpHOVE#gid=12, last accessed: 12 September 2014. 
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Table 45: Credit rating Fitch between 2010 and 2012 
Country 
Apr 
2010 
Sep 
2011 
Jan 
2012 
June 2012 
Oct 
2012 
Austria AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA 
Belgium AA+ AA+ AA+ AA+ AA 
Cyprus AA- A- BBB BBB BB+ 
Estonia A A+ A+ A+ A+ 
Finland AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA 
France AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA 
Germany AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA 
Greece BB+ CCC CCC CCC CCC 
Ireland BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ 
Italy AA- AA- A+ A+ A- 
Latvia BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- 
Luxembourg AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA 
Malta A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ 
Netherlands AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA 
Portugal A- BBB- BBB- BBB- BB+ 
Slovak 
Republic 
A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ 
Slovenia AA AA AA- AA- A- 
Spain AA+ AA+ AA- BBB BBB 
Source 66: Own presentation. Information was taken from: 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AonYZs4MzlZbdDdpVmxmVXpmUTJCcm0yYT
V2UWpHOVE#gid=12, last accessed: 12 September 2014. 
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Table 46: Credit rating Standard& Poor’s between 2010 and 2012 
Country April 2010 
Sep 
2011 
Jan 
2012 
June 2012 
Oct 
2012 
Austria AAA AAA AA+ AA+ AA+ 
Belgium AA+ AA+ AA AA AA 
Cyprus A A- BB+ BB+ BB 
Estonia A A AA- AA- AA- 
Finland AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA 
France AAA AAA AA+ AA+ AA+ 
Germany AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA 
Greece BB+ CC CC SD CCC 
Ireland BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ 
Italy A+ A BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ 
Latvia  BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BBB- 
Luxembourg AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA 
Malta A A A- A- A- 
Netherlands AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA 
Portugal A- BBB- BB BB BB 
Slovak 
Republic 
A+ A+ A A A 
Slovenia AA AA A+ A+ A 
Spain AA AA A A BBB- 
Source 67: Own presentation. Information was taken from: 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AonYZs4MzlZbdDdpVmxmVXpmUTJCcm0yYT
V2UWpHOVE#gid=12, last accessed: 12 September 2014. 
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Table 47: Indicators assessing the macroeconomic situation of a country as of 2012 
 Long-term Medium-term 
Medium/ Short 
Term 
Short-Term 
 GDP per 
capita in 
thousand 
Public 
Gov. 
Debt 
GDP 
Grow
th 
Unemp
loymen
t rate 
Annual 
Governm
ental 
Deficit  
Credit 
Rating 
Interest rate 
ten-year 
government 
bonds 
Austria 483 $ 81.5% 0.8% 4.9% -2.3% 15.8 2.79% 
Belgium 448 $ 103.8% 0.1% 7.6% -4.1% 14.6 3.56% 
Cyprus 288 $ 79.5% -2.4% 11.9% -5.8% 8.2 7% 
Estonia 171 $ 9.7% 4.7% 10% 0.2% 12 n/a 
Finland 474 $ 52.9% -1.4% 7.7% -1.8% 16 2.11% 
France 409 $ 89.6% 0.2% 9.8% -4.9% 15.8 2.91% 
Germany 439 $ 79.3% 0.4% 5.4% 0.1% 16 1.63% 
Greece 225 $ 156.9% -6.6% 24.5% -8.9% 1 25.07% 
Ireland 484 $ 121.7% -0.3% 14.7% -8.2% 8.07 7.12% 
Italy 349 $ 123.1% -2.8% 10.7% -3.0% 11.13 5.75% 
Latvia 140 $ 40.9% 4.8% 15% -1.3% 6.73 5.28% 
Luxembourg 1.060 $ 21.9% -0.7% 5.1% 0% 16 2.05% 
Malta 212 $ 67.4% 2.5% 6.3% -3.3% 11.13 4.25% 
Netherlands 491 $ 66.5% -1.1% 5.8% -4.1% 16 2.15% 
Portugal 206 $ 125.8% -4.0% 15.8% -6.4% 6.67 12.31% 
Slovakia 172 $ 52.1% 1.6% 14% -4.5% 11.67 4.92% 
Slovenia 225 $ 53.7% -2.7% 8.9% -4.0% 12.53 5.62% 
Spain 290 $ 84.4% -2.1% 24.8% -10.6% 11.6 5.7% 
Source 68: Own presentation, sources have been indicated in the text. Information on the 
competitiveness of a country can be retrieved from World Bank 2012. 
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F.3.2 Eurosceptical Parties in Parliament 
Table 48: Austria after parliamentary elections 2008 
Political Parties 
No. of seats in 
Parliament 
Eurosceptical 
position based on 
Chapel Hill 2010 Ø 
No. of seats * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
SPÖ 57 5.29 301.29 
ÖVP 51 6.43 327.86 
FPÖ 34 1.93 65.57 
BZÖ 21 2.43 51.00 
Gruene 20 6.07 12.43 
Total 183 22.15 867.14 
Ø 
 
4.74 
Source 69: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010. 
 
Table 49: Belgium after parliamentary elections 2010 
Political Parties 
No. of seats in 
Parliament 
Eurosceptical 
position based on 
Chapel Hill 2010 Ø 
No. of seats * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
PS (Partie Socialiste) 26 6.20 161.20 
SP.A. (Socialiste 
Partei Ander 
13 6.07 78.87 
ECOLO 6,5 6.00 39.00 
Groen 6,5 6.20 40.30 
MV (Mouvement 
Reformatuer) 
18 6.67 120.00 
VLD (Flämische 
Liberale und 
Demokraten) 
13 6.67 86.67 
CDH (Centre 
Democrate 
Humainiste) 
9 6.57 59.14 
CDV 17 6.73 114.47 
NVA 27 5.33 144.00 
VB Vlaams Belang 12 2.60 31.20 
Total 148 
 
874.84 
Ø 
 
5.91 
Source 70: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010. 
Note: The two parties ECOLO and Groen form a common parliamentary party group. 
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Table 50: Cyprus after parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2011 
Political 
Parties 
No. of 
seats in 
Parliament 
2006 
No. of 
seats in 
Parliament 
2011 
Eurosceptical 
position based 
on Chapel Hill 
2010 Ø 
No. of seats * 
Eurosceptical 
position 2006 
No. of seats * 
Eurosceptical 
position 2011 
DISY 18 20 6
144
 108.00 120.00 
AKEL 18 19 4,5 81.00 85.5 
DIKO 11 9 6 66.00 54.00 
EDEK 5 5 4,5 22.50 22.50 
EK 3 2 6 18.00 12.00 
KOP 1 1 4,5 4.50 4.50 
Total 56 56 31.50   
Ø  5.36 5.33 
Source 71: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010. 
 
Table 51: Estonia after parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2011 
Political 
Parties 
No. of 
seats in 
Parliament 
2007 
No. of 
seats in 
Parliament 
2011 
Eurosceptical 
position based 
on Chapel Hill 
2010 Ø 
No. of seats * 
Eurosceptical 
position 2007 
No. of seats * 
Eurosceptical 
position 2011 
SDE 10 19 6.57 65.71 124.86 
EER 6 0 5.85 35.08 0.00 
K 29 26 5.29 153.29 137.43 
ER 31 33 6.79 210.36 223.93 
IRL 19 23 6.50 123.50 149.50 
ERL 6 0 4.57 27.43 0.00 
Total 101 101 35.57 615.37 635.71 
Ø  6.09 6,29 
Source 72: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010. 
 
 
 
                                                 
144
 Chapel Hill data is not available for Cyprus. The numbers are estimations from an OPAL country expert. 
They were double checked with information from secondary literature. 
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Table 52: Finland after parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2011 
Political 
Parties 
No. of 
seats in 
parliament 
2007 
No. of 
seats in 
parliament 
2011 
Eurosceptical 
position based 
on Chapel Hill 
2010 Ø 
No. of seats * 
Eurosceptical 
position 2007 
No. of seats * 
Eurosceptical 
position 2011 
VAS 17 14 4.11 69.89 57.56 
SDP 45 42 5.89 265.00 247.33 
VIHR  15 10 6.11 91.67 61.11 
RKP (SFP)  10 10 6.33 63.33 63.33 
KESK  51 35 5.40 275.40 189.00 
KOK  50 44 6.38 318.75 280.50 
KD 7 6 3.78 26.44 22.67 
PS 5 39 1.67 8.33 65.00 
Total 200 200 39.67  986.50 
Ø  5.59 4.93 
Source 73: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010. 
 
Table 53: France after parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2012 
Political 
Parties 
No. of 
seats in 
parliament 
2007 
No. of 
seats in 
parliament 
2012 
Eurosceptical 
position based 
on Chapel Hill 
2010 Ø 
No. of seats * 
Eurosceptical 
position 2007 
No. of seats * 
Eurosceptical 
position 2012 
PS 186 280 6.13 1139.25 1715.00 
UMP 313 209 6.00 1878.00 1254.00 
PRG 7 12 6.17 43.19 74.04 
Les Verts 4 17 6.11 24.44 103.87 
PCF 15 10 2.78 41.70 27.80 
Divers gauche 15 22 4.44 66.67 97.78 
Nouveau 
Centriste 
22 12 6.29 138.29 75.43 
MoDem 3 2 6.67 20.01 2.44 
Mouvement 
pour la France 
1 13 1.50 1.50 19.5 
Divers droite 11 0 n/a n/a 0 
Total 565 565 46.09 3353.05 3350.36 
Ø  5.81 5.84 
Source 74: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010. 
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Table 54: Germany after parliamentary elections in 2009 
Political Parties 
No. of seats in 
Parliament 
Eurosceptical 
position based on 
Chapel Hill 2010 Ø 
No. of seats * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
CDU 194 6.00 1164.00 
SPD 146 5.88 858.82 
FDP 93 6.00 558.00 
Linke 76 3.29 250.35 
Gruene 68 6.00 408.00 
CSU 45 4.94 222.35 
Total 622 32.11 3461.53 
Ø 
 
5.57 
Source 75: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010. 
 
Table 55: Greece after parliamentary election in June 2012 
Political Parties 
No. of seats in 
Parliament 
Eurosceptical 
position based on 
Chapel Hill 2010 Ø 
No. of seats * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
PASOK 33 6.09 200.97 
ND 129 5.27 680.18 
SYRIZA 71 2.18 154.91 
KKE 12 1.00 12.00 
Laos 20 3.27 65.45 
Dimar 18 2.00 36.00 
Xa 17 1.00 17.00 
Total 300 20.82 1166.52 
Ø 
 
3,89 
Source 76: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010, except for Dimar and Xa. Their positioning are 
estimations, but were cross-checked with relevant secondary literature. 
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Table 56: Ireland after parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2011 
Political 
Parties 
No. of 
seats in 
Parliament 
2007 
No. of 
seats in 
Parliament 
2011 
Eurosceptical 
position based 
on Chapel Hill 
2010 Ø 
No. of seats 
2007 * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
No. of seats 
2011 * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
Fianna Fáil  78 20 6.38 497.25 127.50 
Fine Gael 51 76 6.50 331.50 494.00 
Labour Party 20 37 5.88 117.50 217.38 
Green Party 6 0 5.00 30.00 0.00 
Sinn Fein 4 14 2.63 10.50 36.75 
Total 159 341 26.39 986.75 875.63 
Ø 
 
6.21 5.96 
Source 77: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010. 
 
Table 57: Italy after parliamentary elections in 2008 
Political Parties 
No. of seats in 
Parliament 
Eurosceptical 
position based on 
Chapel Hill 2010 Ø 
No. of seats * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
LN Lega Nord 60 2.67 160.00 
UDC Union di Centro 36 6.33 228.00 
PDL 344 4.67 1605.33 
IDV Italio de Valori 29 6.14 178.14 
PD 217 6.56 1422.56 
MpA 8 4.67 37.33 
Total 694 31.04 3631.36 
Ø 
 
5.23 
Source 78: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010. 
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Table 58: Latvia after parliamentary elections in 2010 and 2011 
Political 
Parties 
No. of 
seats in 
Parliament 
2010 
No. of 
seats in 
Parliament 
2011 
Eurosceptical 
position based 
on Chapel Hill 
2010 Ø 
No. of seats 
2010 * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
No. of seats 
2011 * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
SC 29 31 3.11 90.22 96.44 
ZZS 22 13 4.13 90.75 53.63 
V 33 20 6.22 205.26 124.44 
PLL 8 0 n/a
145
 n/a 0.00 
NA 8 14 4.44 35.52 97.78 
Zatler’s 
Reform Party 
0 22 6.00
146
 0.00 132.00 
Total 100 100 23.90 421.75 504.29 
Ø 
 
4.59 5.96 
Source 79: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010, with the exceptions mentioned in the two footnotes. 
 
Table 59: Luxembourg after parliamentary elections in 2009 
Political Parties 
No. of seats in 
Parliament 
Eurosceptical 
position based on 
Chapel Hill 2010 Ø
147
 
No. of seats * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
Christian Social 
People's Party 
26 7 182.00 
Luxembourg Socialist 
Workers' Party 
13 7 91.00 
Democratic Party 9 6.5 58.50 
The Greens 7 6.5 45.50 
Alternative 
Democratic Reform 
Party 
4 3.5 14.00 
The Left 1 3 3.00 
Total 60 33.5 394 
Ø 
 
6.57 
Source 80: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010, with the exceptions mentioned in the two footnotes.  
                                                 
145
 Data for the PLL was not available and consequently not taken into account. It represents only 8% of 
parliamentary seats in 2010. The ommission is unfortunate, but not expected to change the results significantly, 
especially since the PLL did not gain any seats in the 2011 elections. 
146
 The data is estimated, provided by a country expert from the OPAL project. 
147
 Data is based on estimations from OPAL country experts as well as on written answers oft wo 
Luxembourgian MPs. 
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Table 60: Malta after parliamentary elections in 2009 
Political Parties 
No. of seats in 
Parliament 
Eurosceptical 
position based on 
Chapel Hill 2010 Ø
148
 
No. of seats * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
Nationalist Party 35 6.5 227.5 
Labour Party 34 7 238 
Total 69 13.5 465.60 
Ø 
 
6.74 
Source 81: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010, with the exceptions mentioned in the two footnotes. 
 
Table 61: Netherlands after parliamentary elections in 2010 and 2012 
Political 
Parties 
No. of 
seats in 
Parliament 
2010 
No. of 
seats in 
Parliament 
2012 
Eurosceptical 
position based 
on Chapel Hill 
2010 Ø 
No. of seats 
2010 * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
No. of seats 
2012 * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
CDA 21 13 5.29 111.00 68.71 
PvdA 30 38 5.29 158.57 200.86 
VVD 31 41 3.93 121.79 161.07 
D66 10 12 6.64 66.43 79.71 
GL 10 4 6.21 62.14 24.86 
SP 15 15 2.43 36.43 36.43 
CU 5 5 3.79 18.93 18.93 
PVV 24 15 1.36 32.57 20.36 
PvdD 2 4 3.63 7.25 14.50 
SGP 2 3 3.00 6.00 9.00 
Total 349 341 41.57 621.11 634.43 
Ø 
 
4.14 4.23 
Source 82: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010. 
  
                                                 
148
 Data is based on estimations from OPAL country experts. 
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Table 62: Portugal after parliamentary elections in 2009 and 2011 
Political 
Parties 
No. of 
seats in 
Parliament 
2009 
No. of 
seats in 
Parliament 
2011 
Eurosceptical 
position Ø 
based on 
Chapel Hill 
2010  
No. of seats 
2009 * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
No. of seats 
2011 * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
CDS 15 16 3.00 45.00 48.00 
PS 97 74 7.00 679.00 518.00 
PSD 81 108 6.67 540.00 720.00 
BE 16 8 3.67 58.67 29.33 
CDS/PP 21 24 5.50 115.50 132.00 
Total 230 341 25.84 1438.17 1447.33 
Ø 
 
6.25 6.29 
Source 83: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010. 
 
Table 63: Slovakia after parliamentary elections in 2010 and 2012 
Political 
Parties 
No. of 
seats in 
Parliament 
2010 
No. of 
seats in 
Parliament 
2012 
Eurosceptical 
position based 
on Chapel Hill 
2010 Ø 
No. of seats 
2010 * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
No. of seats 
2012 * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
SMER 62 83 5.87 363.73 486.93 
Most 14 13 5.87 82.13 76.27 
Sas 22 11 4.53 99.73 49.87 
SDKU 28 11 5.20 145.60 57.20 
KDH 15 16 4.53 68.00 72.53 
SNS 9 0 3.08 27.69 0 
OLanO 0 16 n/a 0 n/a 
Total 150 341 29.08 786.88 742.80 
Ø 
 
5.25 5.54
149
 
Source 84: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010, with the exception mentioned in the footnote. 
 
 
                                                 
149
 Reliable data for the newly founded Ola’nO party – which entered the Slovakian parliament for the first time 
in 2012 – was not available. It was therefore omitted for the calculation of the average score. 
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Table 64: Slovenia after parliamentary elections in 2008
150
 
Political Parties 
No. of seats in 
Parliament 
Eurosceptical 
position based on 
Chapel Hill 2010 Ø 
No. of seats * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
ZLSP 29 6.55 189.82 
SDS 28 5.82 162.91 
Zares 9 6.36 57.27 
DeSUS 7 4.9 34.30 
SNS 5 3.00 15.00 
SLS-SMS 5 4.73 23.64 
LDS 5 6.55 32.73 
Total 88 37.91 515.67 
Ø 
 
5.86 
Source 85: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010. 
Table 65: Spain after parliamentary elections in 2008 and 2011 
Political Parties 
No. of 
seats in 
Parliament 
2008 
No. of 
seats in 
Parliament 
2011 
Eurosceptical 
position based 
on Chapel 
Hill 2010 Ø 
No. of seats 
2008 * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
No. of seats 
2011 * 
Eurosceptical 
position 
PSOE 169 110 6.75 1140.75 742.50 
PP 154 186 6.00 924.00 1116.00 
IU Izquierda Unida 2 11 4.75 9.50 52.25 
Convergència i 
Unió 
10 16 5.58 55.83 89.33 
PNV/EAJ Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco 
6 6 5.73 34.36 34.36 
Esquerra 
Republicana de 
Catalunya 
3 3 5.27 15.82 15.82 
Bloque 
Nacionalista 
Gallego 
2 2 4.82 9.64 9.64 
Coalición Canaria 2 2 5.60 11.20 11.20 
Unión Progresso y 
Democracia 
1 5 5.27 5.27 26.36 
Total 349 341 49.77 2206.37 2097.46 
Ø 
 
 
 
6.32 6.15 
Source 86: Own presentation and calculation. Information on the number of parliamentary seats 
was gained from the official parliament’s website. Information on Eurosceptical positions are 
derived from the Chapel Hill Index 2010. 
  
                                                 
150
 In 2011, the newly formed party ‘Positive Slovenia’ (PS) became the strongest political party with 28 seats. 
Other political parties formed alliances in the run-up to the elections. Since no data for these new parties exists, I 
decided against re-calculating Chapel Hill score for Slovenia 2011. The newly founded PS can be considered a 
mainstream party. Therefore, the general attitude of the parliament is not expected to have changed significantly. 
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